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Pakistan, a predominantly Muslim country, was quantitative data. For the qualitative information, 
carved as a new state in August 1947 out of three provincial round-table discussions with 
British India ? with an area of 803,940 square stakeholders and 75 key informant interviews 
kilometres, of which 25,220 square kilometres are were used to gather insights and opinions. 
covered with water. According to the latest Minutes were recorded, analysed and utilised to 
figures, Pakistan's population is now 180 million write this report. Background and historical 
(of which 60 per cent is young people), making it material used in the report came from a review of 
the seventh largest country in the world in terms historical books, newspapers, reports, articles, 
of population. However, the average literacy rate journals, and experience gained through CAMP 
in Pakistan is around 60 per cent, and literacy programmes. The quantitative data was produced 
levels in rural areas are even lower (tribal women by recording the perceptions of 2,700 men and 
have the lowest literacy rate at just three per women on different aspects of justice and dispute 
cent). resolution affecting the lives of the people of 
Pakistan. 
Pakistan inherited its formal justice system from 
Britain. It was developed under British Colonial The statistics were drawn from interviews and 
rule, and continues to follow the path laid down included the perceptions of 50 per cent men and 
by the imperialist forces. The judicial structure in 50 per cent women. The objective was to sample 
Pakistan was derived from the Code of Civil enough adult males and females, urban and rural, 
Procedure (CPC) 1908 and the West Pakistan Civil to achieve a 95 per cent confidence level for their 
Courts Ordinance (Ord. II of 1962). However, the opinions on key issues related to the formal and 
formal court system evolves as its circumstances informal justice systems of Pakistan. In this report, 
change: one of the latest amendments was the the anecdotal findings from the qualitative 
addition of the Nizam-e-Adl courts as part of methods are followed by the statistical findings 
conflict resolution in Malakand in 2009. from the quantitative methods. Often the 
qualitative findings reflect widely-held beliefs 
The subject of this report is access to justice and about the traditional system of justice, but the 
the state of human rights in Pakistan under both quantitative findings show male and female 
the formal and informal justice systems. In 2010 respondents' current opinions at the present 
and 2012 similar research studies were conducted time. 
among the Pakhtuns in FATA, Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa and Pakhtun districts of 
Balochistan. In this report, comparisons between 
these provinces are presented.
This report is based on both qualitative and 
Perception of formal and informal 
institutions
This study highlights some striking differences 
between the data from Pakhtun districts and the 
data from the rest of Pakistan. For example, 
Pakhtun jirga in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 
Balochistan's Pakhtun populated districts is held 
in high esteem by the overwhelming majority ? 
and is trusted more than other forms of informal 
dispute resolution systems (panchayat, faislo and 
Baloch jirga) in other parts of Pakistan. This is not 
surprising as Pakhtun jirga is comparatively more 
organised. 
A startling revelation from the data shows that an 
overwhelming majority of respondents did not 
know about some of the formal institutions. With 
regards to the formal institutions that they were 
familiar with, the majority hold negative 
perceptions of these. People's lack of knowledge 
and negative perceptions of formal justice 
systems is perturbing and needs to be taken 
seriously and addressed by the policy makers. Access to justice and conflict dynamics 
Lack of access to the formal justice system in most in Pakistan
parts of the country undermines the rule of law, 
and leads to a breakdown of law and order. It is evident that ordinary people have a good 
During the round-table discussions, the understanding of access to justice, and the media 
overwhelming majority of participants blamed seems to have played a pivotal role in educating 
the formal judicial system for poor people's denial the masses on this subject. However, the concept 
of access to justice, compelling them to take the of justice and its inaccessibility is clear when 
law in their own hands. Due to gaps in the analysing the data. 
administrative and executive system, people are 
forced to find another relief system. Respondents show little trust on informal justice 
systems (panchayat, faislo, Baloch Jirga) as 
Formal institutions are largely by-passed, compared to formal justice systems. However, 
regarded as inaccessible, expensive, corrupt, and common perceptions favour the use of extended 
believed to be influenced by political peddling. family, neighbourhood and clan – which are also 
informal institutions and which have shared a 
fairly large burden of cases with formal and 
informal justice systems. If we are to consider 
extended family, neighbourhood and clan as 
forums of informal justice systems where a higher 
percentage of people take their cases, then it can 02
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
An overwhelming majority of respondents 
(92 per cent) is aware of the existence of the 
police department; this is followed by those 
who are aware of the informal dispute 
resolution system (78 per cent).
Despite the negative views about the police, 
respondents believed the police is the most 
prominent institution for settling disputes, 
followed by the informal systems of 
khandan (extended family) and biradari 
(clan).
Less than a quarter of respondents (21.9 per 
cent) believed that the Superior Judiciary is 
'affordable' and 'speedy'.
Pakhtun respondents show more confidence 
in the Pakhtun jirga, in comparison to 
respondents from other provinces who were 
asked about their respective informal justice 
systems (panchayat, faislo, Baloch Jirga 
etc.).
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amicably resolved, often linger on for decades 
and develop more complexities. Poor people have 
little or no access to justice, whereas the wealthy 
elite not only dominate the system but are also 
part of the law-making. Nevertheless, the data 
still shows that people generally prefer to 
approach the formal courts for criminal and 
complex cases, and that they use other options as 
a last resort. 
Parallel informal justice systems that lack 
technical knowledge and flexibility often violate 
human rights, especially in relation to women and 
minority groups. 
Efficiency and effectiveness of formal 
and informal justice systems
Traditional methods of dispute resolution are a 
strong component of social control in the rural 
areas of Pakistan. Pakistan's legal system needs to 
be effective and efficient if it is to be sustained for 
a long time. 
Once it is established that Pakistan's judicial 
system is efficient and effective then the 
importance of the informal justice system will be 
considerably reduced. General perceptions seem 
to support the assumption that the informal 
justice system is effective and efficient and these 
two characteristics have kept the informal justice 
system in operation for a very long time. 
Furthermore, the majority believes that the be safely argued that the majority in Pakistan 
informal justice system is effective and efficient prefers the informal mechanism – despite a lower 
when dealing with criminal and civil disputes. preference shown for panchayat, faislo and 
However, more respondents thought that the Baloch jirga.
informal justice system is more effective when 
dealing with civil matters than criminal cases. With regards to disputes of a petty nature and the 
Respondents very responsibly identified state's institutions' inability to dispense justice on 
challenges faced by the informal justice system, in time and with affordability, this sometimes leads 
particular with regards to issues that stem out of to widespread anger, frustration, and violence, 
such verdicts that violate the Constitution of Pakistan is a case in point – formal judicial 
Pakistan and international human rights systems are failing to provide access to justice for 
standards.   all. Cases which could easily be concluded and 
Operation of informal justice systems
It is interesting to discover that most of our 
respondents are aware of the existence of various 
informal institutions and that they have an 
understanding of the way such institutions 
operate in their respective communities. 
Various assumptions were tested through several 
questions with options. The results favoured the 
informal justice system, surprisingly. However, 
there were certain assumptions, issues and 
challenges identified relating to the informal 
justice system – for example, the majority 
believes that the informal justice system reaches 
verdicts under political influence. 
Interestingly, the majority agreed that the 
informal justice system reconciles disputing 
parties and restores harmony within rural 
societies – which formal justice can not ensure, 
according to the respondents. 
With regards to the notion that the informal 
justice system can help reduce militancy in the 
country, the majority of respondents agreed. This 
should not be oversimplified as the current 
context of militancy is too complex, and we have 
unfortunately reached a stage where the informal 
justice system seems helpless.  
The majority of respondents in Pakistan (65 
per cent) believed that there has been 
access to justice 'to a moderate extent', 
compared to only 13.6 per cent who 
believed there has been access to justice 'to 
a large extent'.
Long timeframes and high costs are the 
most significant reasons limiting people to 
access the formal justice system in Pakistan.
Pakhtun respondents believed they would 
contact the Jirga in case of a conflict or 
dispute, whereas respondents from the rest 
of Pakistan are most likely to contact the 
police.
Respondents who accessed various dispute 
resolution systems believed that they were 
most satisfied with extended family (94 per 
cent), followed by informal justice systems 
(47.6 per cent) in comparison to the formal 
systems such as the Superior Courts (15.8 
per cent) or the police department (14 per 
cent).
The majority of respondents would prefer to 
take criminal cases to the police (53.3 per 
cent); only 15.3 per cent said they would 
take cases of a civil nature to the police. For 
resolving civil cases, the top choice for  
respondents was extended family (24.5 per 
cent).
Out of 22 institutions, respondents believed 
that the five most effective institutions in 
dispensing justice and other services were 
informal institutions (clan, neighbourhood, 
family, informal justice systems and large 
local land owners).
The 'fairest' institutions dispensing justice 
services were also identified as informal 
institutions, including extended family, clan 
and others, followed by the lower courts 
and police.
More Pakhtun respondents (85.7 per cent) 
agreed that the 'informal justice system is a 
speedy and affordable justice system' 
compared to respondents from the rest of 
Pakistan (75.8 per cent).
Members of the informal justice system are 
most likely to be local respected citizens 
(who are not politicians), according to the 
majority of the respondents. Religious 
leaders seem to be more involved in the 
informal justice systems in KP and 
Balochistan, compared to other areas of 
Pakistan.
Women's representation/role in the 
informal justice system is mostly limited to 
the extended family, neighbourhood and 
clan. Only 7 per cent of the respondents 
believed that women attended the 
proceedings of the informal justice systems.
Almost half of the respondents (48 per cent) 
believed that the decisions taken by 
informal dispute resolution systems are 
made after consensus among all the 
members, while 20 per cent believed these 
decisions are made unanimously.
More than half of the respondents (51.6 per 
cent) confirmed that customary or tribal law 
is taken into consideration when deciding a 
case; 35.7 per cent believed that cases are 
decided combining both customary law as 
well Islamic law.
More than three-quarters of the 
respondents (76.9 per cent) showed their 
satisfaction over evidence collection under 
the informal justice system process. Only 16 
per cent said that they were not satisfied 
with the evidence collection standards in 
the informal justice system.
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Respondents who were familiar with the 
rights, protections and remedies available in 
the Constitution of Pakistan and general 
laws (61.1 per cent) is only slightly higher 
than those who are familiar with the 
international standards of human rights 
(52.9 per cent); while a higher percentage 
were familiar with Islamic legal principles 
and legal injunctions pertaining to human 
rights (77.4 per cent).
The majority of the respondents believed 
that the informal justice systems complied 
more with international human rights 
standards and the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution of Pakistan, 
in comparison to the formal systems such as 
the police department and the formal 
courts.
64.6 per cent of respondents agreed that 
informal dispute resolution systems are at 
times biased again women in matrimonial 
disputes, while over a quarter of the 
respondents (28 per cent) disagreed with 
this notion.
More than half of the respondents (52.6 per 
cent) supported informal justice systems 
making decisions in favour of honour 
killings; 41 per cent opposed it.
Almost half of the survey respondents (46.9 
per cent) agreed that indirect 
representation of women in the informal 
dispute resolution systems is effective, 
whereas 31.8 per cent did not agree.
Participation by women in the proceedings – as institution to associate itself with the informal 
decision makers, witnesses or parties – presents a justice system. However, in reality officials from 
major challenge. The majority of respondents the formal system are involved informally to sort 
confirmed that women are not allowed to attend out cases, according to the study. 
proceedings of panchayat, faislo or Baloch jirga. 
However, it is encouraging that the data suggests The state of human rights under 
that women are participating in other informal informal justice systemsmechanisms – such as khandan (extended family), 
mohalla (neighbourhood), and biradari (clan) etc. 
There are many surprising and interesting facets Interestingly, Sindh is credited for the highest 
of formal and informal institutions ? which either levels of women's participation in the proceedings 
offer justice services directly to the masses or of informal institutions.   
help provide easy access to justice. On several 
occasions respondents showed a good A sizeable percentage of respondents said that 
understanding. However, many were also the informal justice system offers opportunities 
oblivious of certain facts. for the involvement of minority groups and 
women in its proceedings.  However, our 
Overall, the survey shows that respondents have knowledge and experience contradicts this. 
faith in informal institutions – more precisely, Nonetheless, there may be certain situations 
those institutions that are closer to them and where vulnerable groups are provided with the 
more accessible – such as khandan, mohalla, opportunity to participate in the proceedings. 
biradari and the informal justice system. Although 
these institutions have no formal recognition, this The participation of ethnic groups in the process – 
does not mean that they are free of any in the context of all informal institutions – is also 
obligations. Cases have been reported where seen as particularly challenging in Punjab, Khyber 
human rights were violated, and the state Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. However, data 
machinery had to react and declared the informal from Sindh conveyed a pluralistic openness 
justice system illegal. However, as the majority towards ethnic and religious minorities. 
shows their support for these institutions, these 
informal institutions continue to survive and The majority believed that the decisions of the 
operate informally and without state patronage. informal justice system are reached through 
Respondents reveal that they have lost their faith consensus, and are accepted voluntarily by both 
in the state's institutions ? which, in turn, makes it parties, leaving little need for appeal or for 
easy for people to approach informal institutions accessing the formal judicial system. 
for dispute resolution and other matters. People 
are also often unaware of the formal judicial Another interesting finding is that the majority of 
system and its network. It is for these reasons respondents were satisfied about the levels of 
that informal institutions are surviving and evidence collection under the informal justice 
thriving. system. In reality, there is very little evidence 
collected, as the local residents and mediators 
Various state and non-state institutions were often presume to know the facts in advance. 
tested under various human rights standards – 
international standards, the Pakistan Constitution Links between the informal justice system and 
and Islamic principles. The overwhelming majority formal institutions have no formal recognition. 
of respondents sadly did not know whether the This is due to the fact that it is illegal for a formal 
verdicts with regards to the informal institutions 
and their compliance with these human rights 
standards. 
With regards to women and the informal justice 
system, survey findings reveal that the issue of 
how the informal justice system treats women is 
controversial, and viewpoints vary considerably. 
After cross-tabulation of several datasets, 
generally, men were more inclined than women 
to state that the informal justice system 
supported women; educated women were more 
inclined to be critical of the informal justice 
system (although not always) than uneducated 
women; and women from the rural sector 
claimed that they were treated more unfairly than 
urban women. There were also many who 
complained about the way the informal justice 
system treated women. 
There is a need for an extensive awareness 
campaign at the grassroots level with regards to 
the protection of human rights – human rights 
that are enshrined in international human rights 
law, Pakistan's Constitution and Islamic principles. 
The way forward
The way forward is clear. The findings of this 
research on the formal and informal systems of 
justice are encouraging, but questions have been 
raised too. One thing is absolutely certain: both 
the informal justice system and the formal judicial 
system need to be reformed. The following are 
some suggested steps that the government of 
Pakistan can follow for judicial reform: 
lunderstand the functions and operations of 
the formal and informal justice systems and 
various institutions complied with the decide the overall aim of the justice system; 
international human rights standards, and the linvestigate the positive and problematic 
human rights enshrined in the Constitution of features in the relationship between the 
Pakistan and Islamic principles and legal formal and informal justice systems; 
injunctions. Nonetheless, the few respondents lorganise a national dialogue and share the 
that were aware generally gave favourable 
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understanding. However, many were also the informal justice system offers opportunities 
oblivious of certain facts. for the involvement of minority groups and 
women in its proceedings.  However, our 
Overall, the survey shows that respondents have knowledge and experience contradicts this. 
faith in informal institutions – more precisely, Nonetheless, there may be certain situations 
those institutions that are closer to them and where vulnerable groups are provided with the 
more accessible – such as khandan, mohalla, opportunity to participate in the proceedings. 
biradari and the informal justice system. Although 
these institutions have no formal recognition, this The participation of ethnic groups in the process – 
does not mean that they are free of any in the context of all informal institutions – is also 
obligations. Cases have been reported where seen as particularly challenging in Punjab, Khyber 
human rights were violated, and the state Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. However, data 
machinery had to react and declared the informal from Sindh conveyed a pluralistic openness 
justice system illegal. However, as the majority towards ethnic and religious minorities. 
shows their support for these institutions, these 
informal institutions continue to survive and The majority believed that the decisions of the 
operate informally and without state patronage. informal justice system are reached through 
Respondents reveal that they have lost their faith consensus, and are accepted voluntarily by both 
in the state's institutions ? which, in turn, makes it parties, leaving little need for appeal or for 
easy for people to approach informal institutions accessing the formal judicial system. 
for dispute resolution and other matters. People 
are also often unaware of the formal judicial Another interesting finding is that the majority of 
system and its network. It is for these reasons respondents were satisfied about the levels of 
that informal institutions are surviving and evidence collection under the informal justice 
thriving. system. In reality, there is very little evidence 
collected, as the local residents and mediators 
Various state and non-state institutions were often presume to know the facts in advance. 
tested under various human rights standards – 
international standards, the Pakistan Constitution Links between the informal justice system and 
and Islamic principles. The overwhelming majority formal institutions have no formal recognition. 
of respondents sadly did not know whether the This is due to the fact that it is illegal for a formal 
verdicts with regards to the informal institutions 
and their compliance with these human rights 
standards. 
With regards to women and the informal justice 
system, survey findings reveal that the issue of 
how the informal justice system treats women is 
controversial, and viewpoints vary considerably. 
After cross-tabulation of several datasets, 
generally, men were more inclined than women 
to state that the informal justice system 
supported women; educated women were more 
inclined to be critical of the informal justice 
system (although not always) than uneducated 
women; and women from the rural sector 
claimed that they were treated more unfairly than 
urban women. There were also many who 
complained about the way the informal justice 
system treated women. 
There is a need for an extensive awareness 
campaign at the grassroots level with regards to 
the protection of human rights – human rights 
that are enshrined in international human rights 
law, Pakistan's Constitution and Islamic principles. 
The way forward
The way forward is clear. The findings of this 
research on the formal and informal systems of 
justice are encouraging, but questions have been 
raised too. One thing is absolutely certain: both 
the informal justice system and the formal judicial 
system need to be reformed. The following are 
some suggested steps that the government of 
Pakistan can follow for judicial reform: 
lunderstand the functions and operations of 
the formal and informal justice systems and 
various institutions complied with the decide the overall aim of the justice system; 
international human rights standards, and the linvestigate the positive and problematic 
human rights enshrined in the Constitution of features in the relationship between the 
Pakistan and Islamic principles and legal formal and informal justice systems; 
injunctions. Nonetheless, the few respondents lorganise a national dialogue and share the 
that were aware generally gave favourable 
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A large group of respondents (44.5 per cent) 
confirmed their support for the informal 
justice system if recognised by the 
government, whereas 24.9 per cent did not 
favour this integration.
40 per cent of survey respondents believed 
that if informal justice systems are 
integrated into the formal system, they 
would be plagued with the same 
weaknesses inherent in the formal system; 
35.9 per cent had the opposite view.
Almost three quarters of the respondents 
(74.9 per cent) agreed that women-led 
informal dispute resolution systems should 
be set up.
will improve markedly as a result; hopefully in the 
not too distant future, we will see all Pakistani 
citizens benefiting from easy access to the fair, 
efficient and effective justice system that they 
deserve.
model of a new system for adaptation and 
recognition; 
ldevelop methods and infrastructure for 
implementation and a system for evaluating 
the changes; 
lcontinue to evaluate and revise the model.  
The suggested steps for reform can be used as a 
first point for discussion, and can be debated with 
experts and policy-makers alike. The reform 
agenda that develops must be dynamic, changing 
over time following rigorous evaluation and critical 
analysis. 
Ultimately, for a particular legal system to be 
considered just, the present normative values, 
sensibilities and expectations of a society must be 
reflected in the legal system. The present study 
lays bare a general finding that Pakistanis are able 
to access both formal and informal, community-
based dispute resolution processes in order to seek 
relief.
It is hoped that if adopted, evaluated periodically, 
and reformed accordingly, the overall justice sector 
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The domination of formal dispute resolution to uphold traditional customs, and to adhere to 
systems in post-colonial developing countries has varying, communal and often inequitable norms, 
been such that any mention of informal dispute and to perpetuate processes and mechanisms 
resolution systems invariably generates a reaction that lack the fundamentals of modern concepts of 
and critique that categorises any reliance on and due process and natural justice; 
continuation of a role for the informal – especially 
traditional mechanisms for dispute resolution – as (iii) The formal dispute resolution system is an 
regressive and inequitable. A blind adherence to embodiment of the state and its commitment to 
an exclusivity of the formal dispute resolution provide efficient and just dispute resolution based 
system is the outcome of several commonly held on 'universally' accepted norms of justice as well 
notions and frequently voiced arguments which as carefully calibrated policy choices, and thereby 
are briefly stated below. structured, funded and institutionally supported 
to deliver efficient and fair outcomes. In contrast, 
informal dispute resolution systems are perceived The domination of the formal – main 
as aberrations and/or divergences of inconsistent arguments  
pedigree and quality from state dispensed justice. 
As a consequence, they are seen to invariably (i) The formal dispute resolution system denotes 
undermine the writ of state law and thus progress and sophistication over ostensibly 
ultimately the state itself; archaic and outdated informal dispute resolution 
systems – it is the triumph of 'contract' based 
(iv) The formal dispute resolution system is not rights over purely 'status' based dispensations; 
only meant to resolve disputes but to also, while the ascendancy of objective justice over 
doing so, uphold constitutional rights in modern subjective justice;
constitution democracies where the 
constitutional document is the ultimate testimony (ii) The formal dispute resolution system is meant 
to and safeguard for the expression of the popular to uphold a common law – which is the same for 
will, to be bound by certain definite and invocable all and which provides additional mechanisms for 
collective norms. Furthermore, the formal legal protecting minorities and historically vulnerable 
system is also expected to constantly remain groups – and that emerges out of deliberative 
cognizant of international consensus on universal democratic processes. In contrast, informal 
human rights and to uphold the state's dispute resolution systems are largely perceived 
international treaty obligations while resolving resolution mechanisms; and, 
disputes and dispensing justice, especially where 
such international norms have been incorporated (viii) A modern formal adversarial dispute 
into state law through appropriate legislation. On resolution system is served and facilitated by a 
the other hand, informal dispute resolution professional class of lawyers and other legally-
systems are perceived as rigid, parochial, trained people who are meant to assist courts in 
provincial, insular and frequently in violation of reaching just and efficient decisions and to 
constitutional as well as international treaty facilitate them in meaningfully improving and 
obligations; developing the law. The informal dispute 
resolution mechanisms lack this additional 
(v) The formal dispute resolution system is dimension and disputants are perceived to be 
operated by an educated and specialised cadre of invariably left to fend for themselves without any 
judges and their support staff that is specially able legal assistance, so that more often than not 
trained and incentivised to deliver a uniform, the powerful dominate the weak, and caprice, 
consistent, predictable, reliable, even-handed and clout and intimidation determine the actual 
efficient brand of justice. Informal dispute outcomes of disputes decided by such dispute 
resolution systems, however, are seen to alter resolution mechanisms. 
tremendously from individual to individual and 
from area to area, thereby violating some of the Overarching assumptions and ground 
primary aspirations of modern law – i.e., realities
uniformity, consistency, equity, and predictability; 
If a centralised formal dispute resolution system 
(vi) Good laws and legal systems are meant to were essentially to function efficiently, equitably 
progressively evolve with modern political and and staunchly adhering to the ethos of a 
economic developments and evolving social and constitutional democracy, all the above 
cultural perceptions of individual and group rights arguments about its advantages have a lot of 
and obligations. Therefore, formal dispute resonance. This, however, is not to say that all the 
resolution systems are expected and calibrated to afore-stated assumptions and perceptions about 
embrace and adjust to such societal progressions informal dispute resolution systems are 
and evolutions and to also come up with answers unassailable, as shall be shortly discussed. 
to increasingly complex social, economic and Furthermore, in actual practice there are several 
political disputes and contestations. Informal caveats and departures from theory when it 
dispute resolution systems, on the other hand, comes to the everyday performance of formal 
are perceived to lack such capacity, ability and legal systems in post-colonial developing 
sophistication and are thought, at best, to make countries. For a start, in post-colonial developing 
sense in very simple social and economic nations in particular, the formal systems often 
transactions; have a prominent alien and alienating, elitist, and 
1inaccessible dimension to them.  As these nations 
(vii) Predictability and consistency of outcomes is confront the myriad issues of low economic 
also a function of establishing, recording and growth, inequitable wealth distribution, weak 
following precedents which is something that a social and economic indicators, unstable politics 
formal dispute resolution system is meant to as well as frequent bouts of undemocratic rule, 
establish and staunchly follow. The same is not fragile institutions, and multiple levels of 
quite seen to be the case with informal dispute 
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NOT RELICS OF THE PAST BUT AVENUES OF OPPORTUNITY:
THE FUTURE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL INFORMAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION MECHANISMS IN THE PAKISTANI JUSTICE SECTOR
Dr. Osama Siddique
1. See Osama Siddique, Pakistan's Experience with Formal Law: An Alien Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), at 174 (hereafter 'Pakistan's Experience 
with Formal Law').
The domination of formal dispute resolution to uphold traditional customs, and to adhere to 
systems in post-colonial developing countries has varying, communal and often inequitable norms, 
been such that any mention of informal dispute and to perpetuate processes and mechanisms 
resolution systems invariably generates a reaction that lack the fundamentals of modern concepts of 
and critique that categorises any reliance on and due process and natural justice; 
continuation of a role for the informal – especially 
traditional mechanisms for dispute resolution – as (iii) The formal dispute resolution system is an 
regressive and inequitable. A blind adherence to embodiment of the state and its commitment to 
an exclusivity of the formal dispute resolution provide efficient and just dispute resolution based 
system is the outcome of several commonly held on 'universally' accepted norms of justice as well 
notions and frequently voiced arguments which as carefully calibrated policy choices, and thereby 
are briefly stated below. structured, funded and institutionally supported 
to deliver efficient and fair outcomes. In contrast, 
informal dispute resolution systems are perceived The domination of the formal – main 
as aberrations and/or divergences of inconsistent arguments  
pedigree and quality from state dispensed justice. 
As a consequence, they are seen to invariably (i) The formal dispute resolution system denotes 
undermine the writ of state law and thus progress and sophistication over ostensibly 
ultimately the state itself; archaic and outdated informal dispute resolution 
systems – it is the triumph of 'contract' based 
(iv) The formal dispute resolution system is not rights over purely 'status' based dispensations; 
only meant to resolve disputes but to also, while the ascendancy of objective justice over 
doing so, uphold constitutional rights in modern subjective justice;
constitution democracies where the 
constitutional document is the ultimate testimony (ii) The formal dispute resolution system is meant 
to and safeguard for the expression of the popular to uphold a common law – which is the same for 
will, to be bound by certain definite and invocable all and which provides additional mechanisms for 
collective norms. Furthermore, the formal legal protecting minorities and historically vulnerable 
system is also expected to constantly remain groups – and that emerges out of deliberative 
cognizant of international consensus on universal democratic processes. In contrast, informal 
human rights and to uphold the state's dispute resolution systems are largely perceived 
international treaty obligations while resolving resolution mechanisms; and, 
disputes and dispensing justice, especially where 
such international norms have been incorporated (viii) A modern formal adversarial dispute 
into state law through appropriate legislation. On resolution system is served and facilitated by a 
the other hand, informal dispute resolution professional class of lawyers and other legally-
systems are perceived as rigid, parochial, trained people who are meant to assist courts in 
provincial, insular and frequently in violation of reaching just and efficient decisions and to 
constitutional as well as international treaty facilitate them in meaningfully improving and 
obligations; developing the law. The informal dispute 
resolution mechanisms lack this additional 
(v) The formal dispute resolution system is dimension and disputants are perceived to be 
operated by an educated and specialised cadre of invariably left to fend for themselves without any 
judges and their support staff that is specially able legal assistance, so that more often than not 
trained and incentivised to deliver a uniform, the powerful dominate the weak, and caprice, 
consistent, predictable, reliable, even-handed and clout and intimidation determine the actual 
efficient brand of justice. Informal dispute outcomes of disputes decided by such dispute 
resolution systems, however, are seen to alter resolution mechanisms. 
tremendously from individual to individual and 
from area to area, thereby violating some of the Overarching assumptions and ground 
primary aspirations of modern law – i.e., realities
uniformity, consistency, equity, and predictability; 
If a centralised formal dispute resolution system 
(vi) Good laws and legal systems are meant to were essentially to function efficiently, equitably 
progressively evolve with modern political and and staunchly adhering to the ethos of a 
economic developments and evolving social and constitutional democracy, all the above 
cultural perceptions of individual and group rights arguments about its advantages have a lot of 
and obligations. Therefore, formal dispute resonance. This, however, is not to say that all the 
resolution systems are expected and calibrated to afore-stated assumptions and perceptions about 
embrace and adjust to such societal progressions informal dispute resolution systems are 
and evolutions and to also come up with answers unassailable, as shall be shortly discussed. 
to increasingly complex social, economic and Furthermore, in actual practice there are several 
political disputes and contestations. Informal caveats and departures from theory when it 
dispute resolution systems, on the other hand, comes to the everyday performance of formal 
are perceived to lack such capacity, ability and legal systems in post-colonial developing 
sophistication and are thought, at best, to make countries. For a start, in post-colonial developing 
sense in very simple social and economic nations in particular, the formal systems often 
transactions; have a prominent alien and alienating, elitist, and 
1inaccessible dimension to them.  As these nations 
(vii) Predictability and consistency of outcomes is confront the myriad issues of low economic 
also a function of establishing, recording and growth, inequitable wealth distribution, weak 
following precedents which is something that a social and economic indicators, unstable politics 
formal dispute resolution system is meant to as well as frequent bouts of undemocratic rule, 
establish and staunchly follow. The same is not fragile institutions, and multiple levels of 
quite seen to be the case with informal dispute 
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entrenched societal exploitation based, among system rather than contemplating any informal 
other things, on race, caste, sect, gender, ethnicity, solutions. However, this argument is more 
class, age and sexual orientation, their formal legal aspirational than realistic as several decades after 
systems frequently face political interference and independence from colonial rule, neither the 
domination, elite capture, and special interest flawed legal systems nor societal inequities and 
group control. Independent judiciaries are few and modes of exploitation have shown many signs of 
3far between and even where they try and assert abatement and acceptable levels of reform.  
themselves, they find themselves simply Meanwhile, the vast multitude of the populations 
overwhelmed by resource shortage, low public of post-colonial developing countries is finding the 
policy prioritisation and massive workloads – gaps between their everyday problems and the 
caused both by slow processes and consequently dispensations of the formal legal system getting 
delayed outcomes (low disposal rates) as well as larger and larger. Simultaneously, as populations 
ever-escalating rates of disputes and contestations rapidly grow bigger, and governance and official 
in society (high rates of new litigation). service delivery fail to catch up, disputes in society 
grow in number and complexity and the formal 
The overarching laws are often archaic and legal systems get increasingly embroiled and 
institutional support from other – equally weak burdened. In addition, a fair number of court 
and/or overwhelmed – political and justice sector contestations are often not standalone and are 
institutions is not always forthcoming. As a result, instead connected to past conflicts and grievances 
the lived experience of millions of disputants and as well as additional on-going legal battles – the 
litigants on the ground – an already highly courts regularly become arenas for settling 
disparate group in terms of wealth, education and multiple scores. Elongated embroilment of an 
social contacts, privilege and leverage – is highly opponent in a resource and energy sapping court 
unsatisfactory. The formal processes for the battle – which is often frivolous or malicious – is 
resolution of disputes and the eventually itself a tactic or even the ultimate goal. Given this 
dispensed justice are more often than not state of affairs, it makes sense at least to honestly 
unintelligible, slow, expensive, open to obstruction understand and realistically assess how many 
and/or corruption, inaccessible, and frequently citizens continue to resolve disputes outside courts 
flouted by those who can do so with impunity. At and who does so, and whether these mechanisms 
various levels, instead of becoming a shield for the are all bad or whether they have any merit and 
already defenceless, the formal justice system is potential. If the latter is true, then does it make 
co-opted by – or plays into the hands of – the sense to closely examine these mechanisms and 
aggressor and the mischievous as a coercive explore possible opportunities for embracing, 
weapon. At other levels, the poor, the accepting, selectively anointing, monitoring and 
disempowered and the uneducated simply cannot developing linkages with those aspects of the same 
decipher and/or meaningfully seek recourse to it that can bring some relief to both the crowded 
due to its alien and complex language, courts and the harassed litigants?
unscrupulous lawyers, insufficiently trained judges, 
convoluted and outdated laws and processes, weak Coming back to the possible misconceptions and 
administration and governance, and rampant apprehensions about informal dispute resolution 
2corruption.   systems, a fair and objective assessment of the 
possible merit and potential of the same is 
It can be argued that the only solution lies in impeded by several factors that are described 
strengthening and improving the formal legal below. 
forward a colonial legacy in several post-colonial Prejudices against the informal – the main 
laws and procedures that were formulated in the strains
first place under imperatives, among other things, 
of privileging certain sections of society and (i) Being so used to the exclusive operation and 
subjugating others. In addition, many sections of overarching culture of the domestic formal legal 
society in such states continue to live in very systems, many people are ill-informed about and 
diverse situations that are characterised by often partisan in favour of the same. At the same 
different social norms, cultural practices, economic time they remain ignorant of the fact (due to lack 
conditions and socio-political frameworks as well of exposure and informed journalistic and 
as very divergent levels of understanding of and/or academic dialogues) that alternative dispute 
acceptance of the dominant culture and norms resolution (ADR) – whether court assisted or non-
enshrined in the formal legal system. This court assisted – continues to play a major role in 
necessitates a careful scrutiny of the various gaps justice systems all over the world in order to 
between official norms and local customs and provide simpler and cheaper solutions in suitable 
practices and suitable adjustments in both in order cases, and also to lessen the burden on courts so 
to promote commonly shared ideals of society. that their valuable time can be dedicated to cases 
Furthermore, a regular scrutiny of how political, that are more fit for formal adjudication; 
economic and social patterns of domination and 
power skew the processes and outcomes of a (ii) Sections of the legal fraternity – judges, 
formal legal system in their own favour is also lawyers, bureaucrats and others trained in formal 
essentially missing – thus creating a false law – are either deeply contemptuous of informal 
impression of objective fairness simply because the solutions or are unwilling to relinquish institutional 
dispute resolution process has a formal feel, form turf or potential clients, or both. The primary 
and structure.  However, an approach to evidence for this is that despite legislation to bring 
envisioning and analysing law as a possible source about court assisted ADR in Pakistan, the 
of private coercion, as well as a valuable tool in mechanism is barely used and no necessary 
service of society (particularly for those in greatest concomitant steps have been taken to date in 
need of assistance) is absent in milieus where the order to institutionalise and regularise the same; 
law was, and at several levels continues to be 
employed as an instrument of rule and (iii) Even otherwise, in Pakistan as well as in other 
domination. This has a direct correlation with post-colonial developing countries, the given and 
fragile federal structures, weak political and often received formal law is imagined in a narrowly 
democratic norms and practices, and nascent doctrinal manner and not sufficiently attuned to 
institutions, especially those vital for generating the important sociological dimensions that 
and sustaining robust politics as well as knowledge characterise the complex interplays between law 
production, i.e. political parties and collectives as and society. In other words, there is hardly any 
well as the intelligentsia. Evidence-based scholarly recognition of current and cutting-edge research 
inquiry is both rare and inhibited, not least elsewhere that emphasises the fact that formal 
because of the weaknesses of the legal academy in legal systems everywhere can continue to impact 
4the region;different citizens in an asymmetric manner, simply 
because the background rules that they uphold can 
(iv) Given that the court systems in post-colonial be very asymmetric in nature. This could not be 
developing countries are still largely governed and truer in post-colonial states that continue to carry 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. See Osama Siddique, Legal Education in Pakistan: The Domination of Practitioners and the 'Critically Endangered' Academic, Journal of Legal Education, Volume 63, 
Number 3 (February 2014); and, also
Martial Laws and Lawyers: The Crisis of Legal Education in Pakistan and Key Areas of Reform, 5 Regent J. Int'l L. 95 (2007). 
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entrenched societal exploitation based, among system rather than contemplating any informal 
other things, on race, caste, sect, gender, ethnicity, solutions. However, this argument is more 
class, age and sexual orientation, their formal legal aspirational than realistic as several decades after 
systems frequently face political interference and independence from colonial rule, neither the 
domination, elite capture, and special interest flawed legal systems nor societal inequities and 
group control. Independent judiciaries are few and modes of exploitation have shown many signs of 
3far between and even where they try and assert abatement and acceptable levels of reform.  
themselves, they find themselves simply Meanwhile, the vast multitude of the populations 
overwhelmed by resource shortage, low public of post-colonial developing countries is finding the 
policy prioritisation and massive workloads – gaps between their everyday problems and the 
caused both by slow processes and consequently dispensations of the formal legal system getting 
delayed outcomes (low disposal rates) as well as larger and larger. Simultaneously, as populations 
ever-escalating rates of disputes and contestations rapidly grow bigger, and governance and official 
in society (high rates of new litigation). service delivery fail to catch up, disputes in society 
grow in number and complexity and the formal 
The overarching laws are often archaic and legal systems get increasingly embroiled and 
institutional support from other – equally weak burdened. In addition, a fair number of court 
and/or overwhelmed – political and justice sector contestations are often not standalone and are 
institutions is not always forthcoming. As a result, instead connected to past conflicts and grievances 
the lived experience of millions of disputants and as well as additional on-going legal battles – the 
litigants on the ground – an already highly courts regularly become arenas for settling 
disparate group in terms of wealth, education and multiple scores. Elongated embroilment of an 
social contacts, privilege and leverage – is highly opponent in a resource and energy sapping court 
unsatisfactory. The formal processes for the battle – which is often frivolous or malicious – is 
resolution of disputes and the eventually itself a tactic or even the ultimate goal. Given this 
dispensed justice are more often than not state of affairs, it makes sense at least to honestly 
unintelligible, slow, expensive, open to obstruction understand and realistically assess how many 
and/or corruption, inaccessible, and frequently citizens continue to resolve disputes outside courts 
flouted by those who can do so with impunity. At and who does so, and whether these mechanisms 
various levels, instead of becoming a shield for the are all bad or whether they have any merit and 
already defenceless, the formal justice system is potential. If the latter is true, then does it make 
co-opted by – or plays into the hands of – the sense to closely examine these mechanisms and 
aggressor and the mischievous as a coercive explore possible opportunities for embracing, 
weapon. At other levels, the poor, the accepting, selectively anointing, monitoring and 
disempowered and the uneducated simply cannot developing linkages with those aspects of the same 
decipher and/or meaningfully seek recourse to it that can bring some relief to both the crowded 
due to its alien and complex language, courts and the harassed litigants?
unscrupulous lawyers, insufficiently trained judges, 
convoluted and outdated laws and processes, weak Coming back to the possible misconceptions and 
administration and governance, and rampant apprehensions about informal dispute resolution 
2corruption.   systems, a fair and objective assessment of the 
possible merit and potential of the same is 
It can be argued that the only solution lies in impeded by several factors that are described 
strengthening and improving the formal legal below. 
forward a colonial legacy in several post-colonial Prejudices against the informal – the main 
laws and procedures that were formulated in the strains
first place under imperatives, among other things, 
of privileging certain sections of society and (i) Being so used to the exclusive operation and 
subjugating others. In addition, many sections of overarching culture of the domestic formal legal 
society in such states continue to live in very systems, many people are ill-informed about and 
diverse situations that are characterised by often partisan in favour of the same. At the same 
different social norms, cultural practices, economic time they remain ignorant of the fact (due to lack 
conditions and socio-political frameworks as well of exposure and informed journalistic and 
as very divergent levels of understanding of and/or academic dialogues) that alternative dispute 
acceptance of the dominant culture and norms resolution (ADR) – whether court assisted or non-
enshrined in the formal legal system. This court assisted – continues to play a major role in 
necessitates a careful scrutiny of the various gaps justice systems all over the world in order to 
between official norms and local customs and provide simpler and cheaper solutions in suitable 
practices and suitable adjustments in both in order cases, and also to lessen the burden on courts so 
to promote commonly shared ideals of society. that their valuable time can be dedicated to cases 
Furthermore, a regular scrutiny of how political, that are more fit for formal adjudication; 
economic and social patterns of domination and 
power skew the processes and outcomes of a (ii) Sections of the legal fraternity – judges, 
formal legal system in their own favour is also lawyers, bureaucrats and others trained in formal 
essentially missing – thus creating a false law – are either deeply contemptuous of informal 
impression of objective fairness simply because the solutions or are unwilling to relinquish institutional 
dispute resolution process has a formal feel, form turf or potential clients, or both. The primary 
and structure.  However, an approach to evidence for this is that despite legislation to bring 
envisioning and analysing law as a possible source about court assisted ADR in Pakistan, the 
of private coercion, as well as a valuable tool in mechanism is barely used and no necessary 
service of society (particularly for those in greatest concomitant steps have been taken to date in 
need of assistance) is absent in milieus where the order to institutionalise and regularise the same; 
law was, and at several levels continues to be 
employed as an instrument of rule and (iii) Even otherwise, in Pakistan as well as in other 
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inquiry is both rare and inhibited, not least elsewhere that emphasises the fact that formal 
because of the weaknesses of the legal academy in legal systems everywhere can continue to impact 
4the region;different citizens in an asymmetric manner, simply 
because the background rules that they uphold can 
(iv) Given that the court systems in post-colonial be very asymmetric in nature. This could not be 
developing countries are still largely governed and truer in post-colonial states that continue to carry 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. See Osama Siddique, Legal Education in Pakistan: The Domination of Practitioners and the 'Critically Endangered' Academic, Journal of Legal Education, Volume 63, 
Number 3 (February 2014); and, also
Martial Laws and Lawyers: The Crisis of Legal Education in Pakistan and Key Areas of Reform, 5 Regent J. Int'l L. 95 (2007). 
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administered as if they exist in some past century appreciating that the term 'informal dispute 
and also the near-absence of any mechanisms for resolution systems' is used to denote essentially 
reliable collection and incisive analysis of essential simpler, more flexible, quicker, and less expensive 
disaggregated data on the number, features and mechanisms that provide solutions to ordinary 
nature of legal cases, there is insufficient empirical and everyday disputes – and, therefore, these can 
information to fully gauge where the bottlenecks be both traditional community-based mechanisms 
in the formal system are and where suitable as well as various permutations of state and 
disputes can be systematically filtered or taken community partnership as well as court assisted 
out of the formal system through court directions. and supervised regimes of arbitration and 
Not only do the governments, courts and other mediation – the term is simplistically and 
related institutions in post-colonial developing erroneously conflated with purely traditional 
countries generate very little reliable modes of justice, (and there too, despite some of 
disaggregated data on court litigation, they are their advantages and positives, is associated 
also largely wary of sharing it with researchers merely with the most crude, retrogressive and 
and critical commentators. In other words, the scandalous output generated by some of them). 
basic raw material required for diagnosing Sometimes, such reductionism is even more 
systemic problems, formulating informed policies, erroneous and informal justice is wrongly equated 
institutional administrative adjustments, and with an extreme phenomenon, such as instances 
effective reform prescriptions, in order to of the more brutal Taliban style of justice; and, 
selectively employ informal systems in a 
complimentary manner for assisting both the (vii) The dominant legal culture is defined and 
courts and the disputants, is simply missing. The upheld by the English speaking class and the 
wholesale condemnation of the informal is as informal systems are both conceptually 
empirically ungrounded as the unquestioned unintelligible to as well as deemed culturally 
celebration of the formal courts as more efficient, inferior by the same – equated as they are in the 
more reliable, and as equal opportunity forums; post-colonial mindset with misdirected plebeian 
notions of popular justice and unsophisticated 
(v) The exclusivity of fiscal, monetary, and aspirations and mechanisms for dispute 
administrative control over the formal legal resolution. 
system by those who are also the direct operators 
and beneficiaries of the same also results, Growing popular discontent with the 
especially in weak democratic milieus, in an performance of the formal legal system in 
exclusivity of control over the extant discourses on Pakistan
the condition and reform of the formal legal 
system. In other words, any ideas to constructively Given the above, it would be useful at this stage 
explore and develop linkages between the formal to evaluate briefly the actual performance of the 
and the informal are either not discussed with any Pakistani formal legal system in view of the 
great rigour, and even if they are, they do not find perception of its end-users. A recent survey of 
their way into the exalted decision-making litigants in the Lahore District Courts, for instance, 
avenues. As a result, the dominant official reform presented a rather remarkable result. Of the 440 
discourses are largely not introspective, largely randomly surveyed litigants, as many as 42 per 
uncritical, and frequently self-perpetuating; cent dissatisfied litigants said that they would not 
like to bring their disputes to the courts in future; 
(vi) Informal dispute resolution systems are often instead, they would rather explore ADR 
confused with traditional community-based possibilities. Another 39.5 per cent expressed 
dispute resolution systems. Instead of 
frustration with the courts and stated that only informal, both to lighten the burden on courts and 
the lack of any viable alternatives would cause also to provide additional cheaper, simpler and 
7them to approach the courts again. Thus, as many accessible options to the citizens.  
as 81.5 per cent of the interviewees voiced their 
lack of faith in the formal legal system and Informal dispute resolution systems – the 
5expressed a yearning for informal alternatives.  international experience
This is a resounding indictment of the country's 
formal legal system. The results are highly While the idea of informal mechanisms to 
noteworthy not just due to the magnitude of augment and support the formal legal system 
discontent but also because they don't come from continues to largely face neglect in justice sector 
a far-flung area or a remote location but indeed reform thinking in Pakistan, elsewhere in the 
from the main district courts of a major world it is now well understood that not all types 
metropolis, situated in one of the most socio- of disputes are suitable for a formal court-based 
8economically developed districts of the largest solution.  Further, that the vast majority of 
and most affluent Pakistani province. The disputes actually never make it to court at all. 
numbers speak volumes about ordinary people's Certain studies estimate that 80-90 per cent of all 
disenchantment with the formal legal system at disputes are resolved through informal 
9several levels, as well as the continuing relevance mechanisms.  The reasons for this include, as 
of informal alternatives. This is just a mentioned earlier, the fact that many forms of 
representative recent empirical insight. A variety disputes are more amenable to resolution at 
of governmental and non-governmental public other levels; there may be issues of access to and 
perception surveys and reports over the years affordability of the formal system; formal systems 
only confirm and supplement its findings about may command limited public confidence; and 
popular dissatisfaction with various facets of the court time is a precious asset often reserved for 
6formal legal system. more complex and significant matters. There is 
also growing recognition of the relative neglect of 
Despite ever-escalating litigation, mounting informal justice systems by donor-funded 
caseloads for courts, and consequent delays in programmes, especially in light of the fact that 
legal proceedings, historically very little attention they are seen to furnish quick, cheap and 
has been paid to the state of informal dispute culturally relevant remedies for the majority of 
resolution mechanisms in Pakistan. Very little populations, especially the poor and the 
10thought has gone into possible linkages and disadvantaged.  For instance, according to an 
arrangements between the formal and the evaluation report from the Danish Ministry of 
5. See Pakistan's Experience with Formal Law. 
6. See for instance, Caroline Wadhams, Brian Katulis, Lawrence Korb, and Colin Cookman, Partnership For Progress: Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability 
in Pakistan and the Region, (Center for American Progress November 2008); Crisis Group Asia Report N°160, Reforming the Judiciary in Pakistan, 16 October 2008; Crisis 
Group Asia Report N° 86, Building Judicial Independence in Pakistan, 10 November 2004; Crisis Group Asia Report N° 137, Elections, Democracy and Stability in Pakistan, 
31 July 2007; Crisis Group Asia Briefing N° 70, Winding Back Martial Law in Pakistan, 12 November 2007. See also, Government of Pakistan's National Reconstruction 
Bureau: Social Audit of Governance and Delivery of Public Services: Baseline Survey 2004-5; Government of Pakistan's National Reconstruction Bureau: Social Audit of 
Governance and Delivery of Public Services: Baseline Survey 2002 – National Report; Corruption in Judicial Systems: Transparency International's Global Corruption 
Report 2007; Transparency International Pakistan: National Corruption Perception Survey, 2006; Transparency International: National Integrity Systems – Country Study 
Report Pakistan, 2003; Transparency International Pakistan: Survey on Nature and Extent of Corruption in the Public Sector, March 2002; and, periodic Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan's Reports. See also Richard Blue, Richard Hoffman & Louis-Alexandre Berg, Pakistan Rule of Law Assessment – Final Report (USAID: November 
2008).
7. See Osama Siddique, From the Case and the Court to the Dispute and the Disputant: Revitalizing Informal Justice in Pakistan, in Indian Legal System Reform: Empirical 
Baselines and Normative Frameworks (Sudhir Krishnaswami ed., New Delhi: Oxford University Press) (forthcoming in Fall, 2015). [hereafter 'From the Case and the Court 
to the Dispute and the Disputant'].
8. Id. 
9. See Ewa Wojkowska, Doing Justice: How informal justice systems can contribute, United Nations Development Programme, Oslo Governance Centre, The Democratic 
Governance Fellowship Programme, December 2006.
10. Id.
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disaggregated data on the number, features and mechanisms that provide solutions to ordinary 
nature of legal cases, there is insufficient empirical and everyday disputes – and, therefore, these can 
information to fully gauge where the bottlenecks be both traditional community-based mechanisms 
in the formal system are and where suitable as well as various permutations of state and 
disputes can be systematically filtered or taken community partnership as well as court assisted 
out of the formal system through court directions. and supervised regimes of arbitration and 
Not only do the governments, courts and other mediation – the term is simplistically and 
related institutions in post-colonial developing erroneously conflated with purely traditional 
countries generate very little reliable modes of justice, (and there too, despite some of 
disaggregated data on court litigation, they are their advantages and positives, is associated 
also largely wary of sharing it with researchers merely with the most crude, retrogressive and 
and critical commentators. In other words, the scandalous output generated by some of them). 
basic raw material required for diagnosing Sometimes, such reductionism is even more 
systemic problems, formulating informed policies, erroneous and informal justice is wrongly equated 
institutional administrative adjustments, and with an extreme phenomenon, such as instances 
effective reform prescriptions, in order to of the more brutal Taliban style of justice; and, 
selectively employ informal systems in a 
complimentary manner for assisting both the (vii) The dominant legal culture is defined and 
courts and the disputants, is simply missing. The upheld by the English speaking class and the 
wholesale condemnation of the informal is as informal systems are both conceptually 
empirically ungrounded as the unquestioned unintelligible to as well as deemed culturally 
celebration of the formal courts as more efficient, inferior by the same – equated as they are in the 
more reliable, and as equal opportunity forums; post-colonial mindset with misdirected plebeian 
notions of popular justice and unsophisticated 
(v) The exclusivity of fiscal, monetary, and aspirations and mechanisms for dispute 
administrative control over the formal legal resolution. 
system by those who are also the direct operators 
and beneficiaries of the same also results, Growing popular discontent with the 
especially in weak democratic milieus, in an performance of the formal legal system in 
exclusivity of control over the extant discourses on Pakistan
the condition and reform of the formal legal 
system. In other words, any ideas to constructively Given the above, it would be useful at this stage 
explore and develop linkages between the formal to evaluate briefly the actual performance of the 
and the informal are either not discussed with any Pakistani formal legal system in view of the 
great rigour, and even if they are, they do not find perception of its end-users. A recent survey of 
their way into the exalted decision-making litigants in the Lahore District Courts, for instance, 
avenues. As a result, the dominant official reform presented a rather remarkable result. Of the 440 
discourses are largely not introspective, largely randomly surveyed litigants, as many as 42 per 
uncritical, and frequently self-perpetuating; cent dissatisfied litigants said that they would not 
like to bring their disputes to the courts in future; 
(vi) Informal dispute resolution systems are often instead, they would rather explore ADR 
confused with traditional community-based possibilities. Another 39.5 per cent expressed 
dispute resolution systems. Instead of 
frustration with the courts and stated that only informal, both to lighten the burden on courts and 
the lack of any viable alternatives would cause also to provide additional cheaper, simpler and 
7them to approach the courts again. Thus, as many accessible options to the citizens.  
as 81.5 per cent of the interviewees voiced their 
lack of faith in the formal legal system and Informal dispute resolution systems – the 
5expressed a yearning for informal alternatives.  international experience
This is a resounding indictment of the country's 
formal legal system. The results are highly While the idea of informal mechanisms to 
noteworthy not just due to the magnitude of augment and support the formal legal system 
discontent but also because they don't come from continues to largely face neglect in justice sector 
a far-flung area or a remote location but indeed reform thinking in Pakistan, elsewhere in the 
from the main district courts of a major world it is now well understood that not all types 
metropolis, situated in one of the most socio- of disputes are suitable for a formal court-based 
8economically developed districts of the largest solution.  Further, that the vast majority of 
and most affluent Pakistani province. The disputes actually never make it to court at all. 
numbers speak volumes about ordinary people's Certain studies estimate that 80-90 per cent of all 
disenchantment with the formal legal system at disputes are resolved through informal 
9several levels, as well as the continuing relevance mechanisms.  The reasons for this include, as 
of informal alternatives. This is just a mentioned earlier, the fact that many forms of 
representative recent empirical insight. A variety disputes are more amenable to resolution at 
of governmental and non-governmental public other levels; there may be issues of access to and 
perception surveys and reports over the years affordability of the formal system; formal systems 
only confirm and supplement its findings about may command limited public confidence; and 
popular dissatisfaction with various facets of the court time is a precious asset often reserved for 
6formal legal system. more complex and significant matters. There is 
also growing recognition of the relative neglect of 
Despite ever-escalating litigation, mounting informal justice systems by donor-funded 
caseloads for courts, and consequent delays in programmes, especially in light of the fact that 
legal proceedings, historically very little attention they are seen to furnish quick, cheap and 
has been paid to the state of informal dispute culturally relevant remedies for the majority of 
resolution mechanisms in Pakistan. Very little populations, especially the poor and the 
10thought has gone into possible linkages and disadvantaged.  For instance, according to an 
arrangements between the formal and the evaluation report from the Danish Ministry of 
5. See Pakistan's Experience with Formal Law. 
6. See for instance, Caroline Wadhams, Brian Katulis, Lawrence Korb, and Colin Cookman, Partnership For Progress: Advancing a New Strategy for Prosperity and Stability 
in Pakistan and the Region, (Center for American Progress November 2008); Crisis Group Asia Report N°160, Reforming the Judiciary in Pakistan, 16 October 2008; Crisis 
Group Asia Report N° 86, Building Judicial Independence in Pakistan, 10 November 2004; Crisis Group Asia Report N° 137, Elections, Democracy and Stability in Pakistan, 
31 July 2007; Crisis Group Asia Briefing N° 70, Winding Back Martial Law in Pakistan, 12 November 2007. See also, Government of Pakistan's National Reconstruction 
Bureau: Social Audit of Governance and Delivery of Public Services: Baseline Survey 2004-5; Government of Pakistan's National Reconstruction Bureau: Social Audit of 
Governance and Delivery of Public Services: Baseline Survey 2002 – National Report; Corruption in Judicial Systems: Transparency International's Global Corruption 
Report 2007; Transparency International Pakistan: National Corruption Perception Survey, 2006; Transparency International: National Integrity Systems – Country Study 
Report Pakistan, 2003; Transparency International Pakistan: Survey on Nature and Extent of Corruption in the Public Sector, March 2002; and, periodic Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan's Reports. See also Richard Blue, Richard Hoffman & Louis-Alexandre Berg, Pakistan Rule of Law Assessment – Final Report (USAID: November 
2008).
7. See Osama Siddique, From the Case and the Court to the Dispute and the Disputant: Revitalizing Informal Justice in Pakistan, in Indian Legal System Reform: Empirical 
Baselines and Normative Frameworks (Sudhir Krishnaswami ed., New Delhi: Oxford University Press) (forthcoming in Fall, 2015). [hereafter 'From the Case and the Court 
to the Dispute and the Disputant'].
8. Id. 
9. See Ewa Wojkowska, Doing Justice: How informal justice systems can contribute, United Nations Development Programme, Oslo Governance Centre, The Democratic 
Governance Fellowship Programme, December 2006.
10. Id.
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Foreign Affairs: “The majority of the population is notion of patriarchal land and property ownership 
often not in a position to access the formal legal regimes (which suited foreign rule) over others 
system for various cultural, linguistic, financial and that were more progressive, for example towards 
14logistical reasons. Their access to justice largely the inheritance rights of women.
depends on the functioning of informal systems, 
which have been neglected in terms of external Colonial schemes of codification of the dynamic, 
11support.”  A vast literature now recommends that oral and multifarious concept of Islamic Shariah 
more effective social regulation and greater through the creation of Muslim Personal Law has 
allocation of social disputes to ADR can furnish also been criticised for having rigidified it, and for 
many desirable substitutes to court-based introducing a particular bias towards normative 
12 15adjudications. positions suited to the imperatives of the Raj.  
Thus, there is compelling historical evidence that 
customary norms and dispute resolution The informal in the colonial era
mechanisms were frequently formalised in the 
colonial era for the primary purpose of extending At this juncture, it is also instructive to take note 
certain state policies (including those of winning of how customary practices in post-colonial 
the loyalty of local political strongmen) rather societies such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
than purely extending a cheap and acceptable have historically been subject to periods of 
mode of dispute resolution to ordinary people. In heightened governmental interest in the potential 
contrast to more organic and evolving norms and of informal dispute resolution mechanisms and 
mechanisms they therefore often failed to gain also instances of selective co-option by the 
wider public confidence and support. These colonial state. This had divergent consequences – 
lessons from the colonial past ought to act as a while formal acceptance or tolerance enhanced 
stern reminder for any reform efforts in the post-customary mechanisms in certain instances, such 
colonial state. co-option also led to inadvertent or deliberate 
transformation in many cases. The colonial 
Pakistani justice sector approaches toward legislative forays to establish a structured and 
controlled operation of the village panchayats in informal dispute resolution mechanisms
Punjab in the years immediately preceding Indian 
independence, the extensive process of The justice sector reform agenda in Pakistan over 
codification of the rewaj (or local practice) in the past decade and a half has been essentially 
Punjab, and also the general codification of the funded and driven by international donor led 
dharmashastras (Hindu wisdom literature) are reform programmes. A recurring weakness of 
13prime examples.  This formalisation of informal these 'court and case'-focused and efficiency-
law led, it has been forcefully argued, however, to fixated reform approaches has been their 
the empowerment of property-owning elites in consistent obliviousness to complex and diverse 
the former; and in the latter to the elevation of underlying societal disputes and contestations and 
one distinct set of traditions favouring a certain their disregard of the multiple fissures between 
prevalent social norms and practices and the achieve more expeditious resolution of disputes, 
official normative framework. Largely technically- reduction of pendency in courts, and, enhanced 
oriented, these programmes have not taken access to justice for the marginalised and the 
19 account of the need for dialogue and poor. This Study also emphasises the need to 
collaboration to resolve the tensions implicit in make constitutional and legal obligations more 
the differences between these social norms and comprehensible and widely understood by 
16official codes.  The on-going neglect – barring translating them into common language, so that 
some fairly recent exceptions – of the potential of they can be employed by traditional mediators 
20informal systems to support and supplement the and arbitrators while resolving disputes.  The 
state in providing cheap, intelligible and accessible Study makes some important recommendations 
justice to the weakest and most vulnerable regarding both traditional ADR mechanisms (jirga, 
reflects what has been described in international panchayat, faislo, sulh etc.,) as well as ADR based 
literature as the 'cultural hegemony' of formal law. in specially created public bodies (particularly, 
Such 'hegemony' may well be doctrinal as well as Musalihat Anjuman and Small Claims and Minor 
institutional, as indeed it may also manifest in Offences courts (SMOC courts). These 
terms of its special language, procedures, recommendations call for better allocation of 
17categorisations and general modus operandi.  To appropriate kinds of disputes, institutionalised 
borrow a concept from Foucault and apply it in and regularised case directions/redirections by 
this context, legal 'normalisation' ought to be the courts to both kinds of ADR mechanisms, as 
under special scrutiny, especially when it seems well as referral of complex cases by the informal 
increasingly violative of diversity, pluralism and mechanisms to the courts. Furthermore, since the 
popular modes of access to justice, or when it decisions of the informal mechanisms are not 
ignores (or seeks to erase or transform) what the enforceable by the law, the Study advocates 
common person finds more intelligible, accessible further close examination of the interaction of the 
18and fulfilling. formal and the informal systems in order to 
21identify additional interfaces and linkages.  
In this context it is important to direct attention to 
a recent official Pakistani Study on the state of Over the past half a decade or so, some of the 
informal justice in the country, conducted by a most prominent developments towards 
team of appellate court judges, which highlights promoting court-assisted and informal dispute 
the acute need to develop meaningful linkages resolution mechanisms in Pakistan have included, 
between a variety of non-state informal dispute among other things: (i) amendments to the Code 
resolution mechanisms operating in the country of Civil Procedure for promoting court-assisted 
and the state's formal legal system. It advocates, ADR; (ii) special ADR committees for tax matters; 
among other things, more effective legislation for special initiatives for expeditious resolution of 
viable arrangements for referring disputes from commercial disputes; and, establishment of 
the formal to the informal sphere, and suitable bodies such as the Karachi Centre for Dispute 
frameworks for linking the operation and Resolution; (iii) promulgation of the Small Claims 
outcomes of informal mediations, arbitrations and and Minor Offences Ordinance and the 
reconciliations with the formal system in order to subsequent setting up of the SMOC courts for 11. See Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida Evaluation: Danish Support to Promotion of Human Rights and Democratization, Volume 2: Justice, Constitution and Legislation (Copenhagen: Evaluation Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). Cited in Stephen Golub, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment 
Alternative, Rule of Law Series, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Democracy and the Rule of Law Project, No. 41, October 2003.
12. See Syed Ali Murtaza & Osama Siddique, The Retrospective Report: Mapping and Assessment of Justice Sector Interventions – Donors and Government, 1998-2010 
(The Asia Foundation: 2010) [hereinafter the 'Retrospective Report'].
13. See From the Case and the Court to the Dispute and the Disputant.
14. See Neeladri Bhattacharya, Remaking Custom: The Discourse and Practice of Colonial Codification, in Tradition, Dissent and Ideology: Essays in Honour of Romila 
Thapar (R. Champaklaksmi and S. Gopal eds., 2001), [hereafter 'Remaking Custom']; and also, Nandini Bhattacharyya-Panda, Appropriation and Invention of Tradition: 
The East India Company and Hindu Law in Early Colonial Bengal (Oxford University Press, 2008).
15. See Scott Alan Kugle, Framed, Blamed and Renamed: The Recasting of Islamic Jurisprudence in Colonial South Asia, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2. (May, 2001); 
and also, Jörg Fisch, Cheap Lives and Dear Limbs: The British Transformation of the Bengal Criminal Law 1769-1817 (Franz Steiner Verlag. Wiesbaden 1983).
16. See Pakistan's Experience with Formal Law. 
17. See for instance Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach 55 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1978); see also, Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and 
Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-Class Americans 1, 14-15 (The University of Chicago Press, 1990).
18 See Michael Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Vintage Books, 1975); See also Remaking Custom.
19. See Study on Informal Justice System in Pakistan, Sindh Judicial Academy (2008) (hereafter 'Sindh Judicial Academy Study').
20. Id.
21. Id.
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often not in a position to access the formal legal regimes (which suited foreign rule) over others 
system for various cultural, linguistic, financial and that were more progressive, for example towards 
14logistical reasons. Their access to justice largely the inheritance rights of women.
depends on the functioning of informal systems, 
which have been neglected in terms of external Colonial schemes of codification of the dynamic, 
11support.”  A vast literature now recommends that oral and multifarious concept of Islamic Shariah 
more effective social regulation and greater through the creation of Muslim Personal Law has 
allocation of social disputes to ADR can furnish also been criticised for having rigidified it, and for 
many desirable substitutes to court-based introducing a particular bias towards normative 
12 15adjudications. positions suited to the imperatives of the Raj.  
Thus, there is compelling historical evidence that 
customary norms and dispute resolution The informal in the colonial era
mechanisms were frequently formalised in the 
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the loyalty of local political strongmen) rather societies such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
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lessons from the colonial past ought to act as a while formal acceptance or tolerance enhanced 
stern reminder for any reform efforts in the post-customary mechanisms in certain instances, such 
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transformation in many cases. The colonial 
Pakistani justice sector approaches toward legislative forays to establish a structured and 
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Punjab, and also the general codification of the funded and driven by international donor led 
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13prime examples.  This formalisation of informal these 'court and case'-focused and efficiency-
law led, it has been forcefully argued, however, to fixated reform approaches has been their 
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the former; and in the latter to the elevation of underlying societal disputes and contestations and 
one distinct set of traditions favouring a certain their disregard of the multiple fissures between 
prevalent social norms and practices and the achieve more expeditious resolution of disputes, 
official normative framework. Largely technically- reduction of pendency in courts, and, enhanced 
oriented, these programmes have not taken access to justice for the marginalised and the 
19 account of the need for dialogue and poor. This Study also emphasises the need to 
collaboration to resolve the tensions implicit in make constitutional and legal obligations more 
the differences between these social norms and comprehensible and widely understood by 
16official codes.  The on-going neglect – barring translating them into common language, so that 
some fairly recent exceptions – of the potential of they can be employed by traditional mediators 
20informal systems to support and supplement the and arbitrators while resolving disputes.  The 
state in providing cheap, intelligible and accessible Study makes some important recommendations 
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reflects what has been described in international panchayat, faislo, sulh etc.,) as well as ADR based 
literature as the 'cultural hegemony' of formal law. in specially created public bodies (particularly, 
Such 'hegemony' may well be doctrinal as well as Musalihat Anjuman and Small Claims and Minor 
institutional, as indeed it may also manifest in Offences courts (SMOC courts). These 
terms of its special language, procedures, recommendations call for better allocation of 
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resolution mechanisms operating in the country of Civil Procedure for promoting court-assisted 
and the state's formal legal system. It advocates, ADR; (ii) special ADR committees for tax matters; 
among other things, more effective legislation for special initiatives for expeditious resolution of 
viable arrangements for referring disputes from commercial disputes; and, establishment of 
the formal to the informal sphere, and suitable bodies such as the Karachi Centre for Dispute 
frameworks for linking the operation and Resolution; (iii) promulgation of the Small Claims 
outcomes of informal mediations, arbitrations and and Minor Offences Ordinance and the 
reconciliations with the formal system in order to subsequent setting up of the SMOC courts for 11. See Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida Evaluation: Danish Support to Promotion of Human Rights and Democratization, Volume 2: Justice, Constitution and Legislation (Copenhagen: Evaluation Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). Cited in Stephen Golub, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment 
Alternative, Rule of Law Series, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Democracy and the Rule of Law Project, No. 41, October 2003.
12. See Syed Ali Murtaza & Osama Siddique, The Retrospective Report: Mapping and Assessment of Justice Sector Interventions – Donors and Government, 1998-2010 
(The Asia Foundation: 2010) [hereinafter the 'Retrospective Report'].
13. See From the Case and the Court to the Dispute and the Disputant.
14. See Neeladri Bhattacharya, Remaking Custom: The Discourse and Practice of Colonial Codification, in Tradition, Dissent and Ideology: Essays in Honour of Romila 
Thapar (R. Champaklaksmi and S. Gopal eds., 2001), [hereafter 'Remaking Custom']; and also, Nandini Bhattacharyya-Panda, Appropriation and Invention of Tradition: 
The East India Company and Hindu Law in Early Colonial Bengal (Oxford University Press, 2008).
15. See Scott Alan Kugle, Framed, Blamed and Renamed: The Recasting of Islamic Jurisprudence in Colonial South Asia, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2. (May, 2001); 
and also, Jörg Fisch, Cheap Lives and Dear Limbs: The British Transformation of the Bengal Criminal Law 1769-1817 (Franz Steiner Verlag. Wiesbaden 1983).
16. See Pakistan's Experience with Formal Law. 
17. See for instance Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach 55 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1978); see also, Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and 
Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-Class Americans 1, 14-15 (The University of Chicago Press, 1990).
18 See Michael Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Vintage Books, 1975); See also Remaking Custom.
19. See Study on Informal Justice System in Pakistan, Sindh Judicial Academy (2008) (hereafter 'Sindh Judicial Academy Study').
20. Id.
21. Id.
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expediting and facilitating the resolution of minor operationalising MAs in union councils in selected 
disputes; (iv) introduction of local mediation districts; capacity building of MAs; establishing 
bodies called Musalihat Anjuman ('MAs') under partnerships between judiciary, police and MAs 
the Local Government Ordinance 2001 ('LGO for fair and equitable dispensation of justice; and, 
2001'); and, (v)  introduction of a new Arbitration promoting community advocacy for legal rights of 
22Act.  While (i) and (ii) have been comparatively women and active participation of men to end 
25somewhat successful, either in creating the gender-based violence.  Official reports indicate 
necessary enabling environment for further heartening progress in terms of successful 
reforms or in introducing ease of access and operationalisation, capacity-building and 
26efficiencies for certain types of dispute resolution, training.  As is usually the case, however, there is 
the performance and prognosis is far from a considerable gap between official reporting on 
satisfactory as far as the remaining – and more progress and the situation on the ground. So far 
significant structural and systemic – reforms are this initiative's actual level of success is heavily 
concerned. contested and far from clear. The LGO 2001, the 
essential framework of the MA reforms, envisions 
Looking first at the SMOC courts, the enabling law creation of Insaaf Committees (ICs) elected by the 
did not mandate the establishment of exclusive Union Councils, which in turn are meant to 
courts for this purpose – existing courts/judicial appoint panels of respected persons of integrity 
officers were declared to also perform the and good judgement from the communities to 
function of SMOC courts. Consequently, no constitute the MAs. The LGO 2001 also envisions 
discernable improvement has resulted in terms of cases being referred by any court to the MAs, 
reduction in delays and in case disposals. Further, where the proceedings are pending. However, lack 
reportedly the governing ordinance has actually of clarity on the status and provisions of the LGO 
been superseded by a new law, which does not 2001, lack of sustained governmental 
require separate SMOC courts. Thus no distinct commitment to the reform, the absence of 
SMOC courts have been established and very few detailed rules for actual functioning, lack of funds, 
23SMOC cases appear to have been filed.  and the limited role and participation of female 
councillors have been blamed by the reform 
27In a context where reform of the formal has donors themselves for lacklustre outcomes.  
historically been the predominant focus, the MA According to one independent survey, only eight 
reforms were a key intervention that sought to per cent of the respondents reported the 
28forge linkages between the formal and the presence of MAs in their communities and areas.  
informal. Funded by the UNDP, the MAs were 
designed to form an ADR mechanism for Other critics have also pointed out that the LGO 
arbitration, mediation and reconciliation of 2001 actually needs various amendments in order 
disputes, and were supposed to be to, among other things, address existing 
operationalised in various districts in the country ambiguities and contradictions in the law and the 
24under the LGO 2001.  This initiative, among other roles of its envisioned operators; rationalise 
things, focused on: constituting and conflicts with other overlapping and as yet 
unrepealed laws; provide a framework for linkages recognition would empower ADR providers and 
between different MAs; and, embrace and allow them to work with greater confidence and 
address important areas of operation where the consistency, thereby increasing their efficacy in 
MAs are likely to play a role, or may have no ending on-going disputes and building their 
choice but to play a role (about which the stature as decision-makers whose decisions have 
governing law is currently silent). Subordinate legal sanction and thus cannot be flouted. It 
legislation on its own, it is argued, is not likely to would also raise public esteem for and faith in the 
29succeed in alleviating these various problems.  formal justice system under the auspices and 
This is quite apart from the continuing imperative through the support of which these informal 
of framing detailed rules for the meaningful mechanisms would be operating. By giving 
operation of MAs in a context where they are informal verdicts the force of formal law in 
meant to have linkages and interfaces with appropriate spheres and situations, the justice 
various existing justice sector and local extended by the informal sector could be 
30 projected as an extension of the overall government institutions.   
commitment of the formal justice system to 
providing easily accessible and locally acceptable Regarding the new Arbitration Act, several factors 
solutions to disputants and contestants and to continue to impede this reform from having any 
protecting the rights of the weak and the creditable impact on easing the caseload pressure 
vulnerable.on courts and making less time-consuming 
dispute resolution options available to the 
31public.  Key factors include opposition from both Context matters – case study: the Pakhtun 
the bench and the bar, absence of mechanisms for areas of Pakistan 
mandatory referrals, the dearth of specialised 
ADR resource persons, and lack of a requisite The Pakhtun areas of Pakistan – comprising of the 
enabling framework as well as necessary provinces of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP), certain 
32training.  areas in the province of Balochistan, the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the 
The above points to the acute need to salvage and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) may 
resuscitate the various existing initiatives in the be unique in terms of the variety of historical and 
area and to fill current gaps by boosting the contemporary legal and governance systems, 
impetus and enabling environment for the formal disparate constitutional arrangements, attempts 
court system to rely on ADR mechanisms; for at political and social engineering, short-term 
developing better systems, guidelines and institutional hybrids, and multiple administrative 
frameworks for enhancing court referral of cases frameworks that they have encountered and 
to ADR mechanisms, and, for overall awareness continue to do so. At the same time, barring a few 
generation to increase the demand for these ADR exceptions and variations at the popular 
services. At the same time, once informal normative level, pakhtunwali is the unwritten 
mechanisms and mediators reach just decisions, code of life that governs Pakhtun society in this 
there is as yet no mechanism to extend formal vast territory, and indeed in neighbouring 
33recognition to such decisions. Such official Afghanistan.  Pakhtunwali is a combination of 
22. Id.
23. See Retrospective Report.
24. See UNDP website page on the Musalihat Anjuman project.
25 Id.
26 Id. See also Gender Justice through Musalihat Anjuman: A Proposal for Completion of Planned Activities during Existing Pilot Project Phase and Upscaling/Extension 
from 2007 to 2011, UNDP (2011) [hereafter 'Musalihat Anjuman: Proposal for Completion of Planned Activities']; see also Gender Justice through Musalihat Anjuman: 
Project Facts, UNDP (2011). 
27. See Musalihat Anjuman: Proposal for Completion of Planned Activities. 
28. See Naveed Ahmed Shinwari and Neha Gauhar, Understanding Justice Systems of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and Balochistan: The Pakhtun Perspective, Community 
Appraisal and Motivation Programme (CAMP), April, 2013 [hereafter 'Understanding Justice Systems'].
29. See Zafar Iqbal Kalanauri, The Implementation Strategy for Successful Functioning of Musalihat Anjuman, (Undated). 
30. Id
31. See Retrospective Report. See also Program Completion Report: Access to Justice Program (Pakistan) (Loans 1897-PAK, 1898-PAK, and 1899-PAK), Asian Development 
Bank, 29 December, 2009. Several of these shortcomings appear as classic factors that lead to failure of ADR. See Government of New Zealand,  Ministry of Justice website, 
at http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/a/alternative-dispute-resolution-general-civil-cases/7-opportunities-for-improved-adr-take-up
32. See Retrospective Report.
33. See Osama Siddique, The Other Pakistan: Special Laws, Diminished Citizenship and the Gathering Storm (December 5, 2012). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2185535 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2185535; see also The Jirga: Justice and Conflict Transformation, Community Appraisal and 
Motivation Programme (CAMP) and Saferworld, March 2012 [hereafter Jirga: Justice and Conflict Transformation].
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expediting and facilitating the resolution of minor operationalising MAs in union councils in selected 
disputes; (iv) introduction of local mediation districts; capacity building of MAs; establishing 
bodies called Musalihat Anjuman ('MAs') under partnerships between judiciary, police and MAs 
the Local Government Ordinance 2001 ('LGO for fair and equitable dispensation of justice; and, 
2001'); and, (v)  introduction of a new Arbitration promoting community advocacy for legal rights of 
22Act.  While (i) and (ii) have been comparatively women and active participation of men to end 
25somewhat successful, either in creating the gender-based violence.  Official reports indicate 
necessary enabling environment for further heartening progress in terms of successful 
reforms or in introducing ease of access and operationalisation, capacity-building and 
26efficiencies for certain types of dispute resolution, training.  As is usually the case, however, there is 
the performance and prognosis is far from a considerable gap between official reporting on 
satisfactory as far as the remaining – and more progress and the situation on the ground. So far 
significant structural and systemic – reforms are this initiative's actual level of success is heavily 
concerned. contested and far from clear. The LGO 2001, the 
essential framework of the MA reforms, envisions 
Looking first at the SMOC courts, the enabling law creation of Insaaf Committees (ICs) elected by the 
did not mandate the establishment of exclusive Union Councils, which in turn are meant to 
courts for this purpose – existing courts/judicial appoint panels of respected persons of integrity 
officers were declared to also perform the and good judgement from the communities to 
function of SMOC courts. Consequently, no constitute the MAs. The LGO 2001 also envisions 
discernable improvement has resulted in terms of cases being referred by any court to the MAs, 
reduction in delays and in case disposals. Further, where the proceedings are pending. However, lack 
reportedly the governing ordinance has actually of clarity on the status and provisions of the LGO 
been superseded by a new law, which does not 2001, lack of sustained governmental 
require separate SMOC courts. Thus no distinct commitment to the reform, the absence of 
SMOC courts have been established and very few detailed rules for actual functioning, lack of funds, 
23SMOC cases appear to have been filed.  and the limited role and participation of female 
councillors have been blamed by the reform 
27In a context where reform of the formal has donors themselves for lacklustre outcomes.  
historically been the predominant focus, the MA According to one independent survey, only eight 
reforms were a key intervention that sought to per cent of the respondents reported the 
28forge linkages between the formal and the presence of MAs in their communities and areas.  
informal. Funded by the UNDP, the MAs were 
designed to form an ADR mechanism for Other critics have also pointed out that the LGO 
arbitration, mediation and reconciliation of 2001 actually needs various amendments in order 
disputes, and were supposed to be to, among other things, address existing 
operationalised in various districts in the country ambiguities and contradictions in the law and the 
24under the LGO 2001.  This initiative, among other roles of its envisioned operators; rationalise 
things, focused on: constituting and conflicts with other overlapping and as yet 
unrepealed laws; provide a framework for linkages recognition would empower ADR providers and 
between different MAs; and, embrace and allow them to work with greater confidence and 
address important areas of operation where the consistency, thereby increasing their efficacy in 
MAs are likely to play a role, or may have no ending on-going disputes and building their 
choice but to play a role (about which the stature as decision-makers whose decisions have 
governing law is currently silent). Subordinate legal sanction and thus cannot be flouted. It 
legislation on its own, it is argued, is not likely to would also raise public esteem for and faith in the 
29succeed in alleviating these various problems.  formal justice system under the auspices and 
This is quite apart from the continuing imperative through the support of which these informal 
of framing detailed rules for the meaningful mechanisms would be operating. By giving 
operation of MAs in a context where they are informal verdicts the force of formal law in 
meant to have linkages and interfaces with appropriate spheres and situations, the justice 
various existing justice sector and local extended by the informal sector could be 
30 projected as an extension of the overall government institutions.   
commitment of the formal justice system to 
providing easily accessible and locally acceptable Regarding the new Arbitration Act, several factors 
solutions to disputants and contestants and to continue to impede this reform from having any 
protecting the rights of the weak and the creditable impact on easing the caseload pressure 
vulnerable.on courts and making less time-consuming 
dispute resolution options available to the 
31public.  Key factors include opposition from both Context matters – case study: the Pakhtun 
the bench and the bar, absence of mechanisms for areas of Pakistan 
mandatory referrals, the dearth of specialised 
ADR resource persons, and lack of a requisite The Pakhtun areas of Pakistan – comprising of the 
enabling framework as well as necessary provinces of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP), certain 
32training.  areas in the province of Balochistan, the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the 
The above points to the acute need to salvage and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) may 
resuscitate the various existing initiatives in the be unique in terms of the variety of historical and 
area and to fill current gaps by boosting the contemporary legal and governance systems, 
impetus and enabling environment for the formal disparate constitutional arrangements, attempts 
court system to rely on ADR mechanisms; for at political and social engineering, short-term 
developing better systems, guidelines and institutional hybrids, and multiple administrative 
frameworks for enhancing court referral of cases frameworks that they have encountered and 
to ADR mechanisms, and, for overall awareness continue to do so. At the same time, barring a few 
generation to increase the demand for these ADR exceptions and variations at the popular 
services. At the same time, once informal normative level, pakhtunwali is the unwritten 
mechanisms and mediators reach just decisions, code of life that governs Pakhtun society in this 
there is as yet no mechanism to extend formal vast territory, and indeed in neighbouring 
33recognition to such decisions. Such official Afghanistan.  Pakhtunwali is a combination of 
22. Id.
23. See Retrospective Report.
24. See UNDP website page on the Musalihat Anjuman project.
25 Id.
26 Id. See also Gender Justice through Musalihat Anjuman: A Proposal for Completion of Planned Activities during Existing Pilot Project Phase and Upscaling/Extension 
from 2007 to 2011, UNDP (2011) [hereafter 'Musalihat Anjuman: Proposal for Completion of Planned Activities']; see also Gender Justice through Musalihat Anjuman: 
Project Facts, UNDP (2011). 
27. See Musalihat Anjuman: Proposal for Completion of Planned Activities. 
28. See Naveed Ahmed Shinwari and Neha Gauhar, Understanding Justice Systems of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and Balochistan: The Pakhtun Perspective, Community 
Appraisal and Motivation Programme (CAMP), April, 2013 [hereafter 'Understanding Justice Systems'].
29. See Zafar Iqbal Kalanauri, The Implementation Strategy for Successful Functioning of Musalihat Anjuman, (Undated). 
30. Id
31. See Retrospective Report. See also Program Completion Report: Access to Justice Program (Pakistan) (Loans 1897-PAK, 1898-PAK, and 1899-PAK), Asian Development 
Bank, 29 December, 2009. Several of these shortcomings appear as classic factors that lead to failure of ADR. See Government of New Zealand,  Ministry of Justice website, 
at http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/a/alternative-dispute-resolution-general-civil-cases/7-opportunities-for-improved-adr-take-up
32. See Retrospective Report.
33. See Osama Siddique, The Other Pakistan: Special Laws, Diminished Citizenship and the Gathering Storm (December 5, 2012). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2185535 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2185535; see also The Jirga: Justice and Conflict Transformation, Community Appraisal and 
Motivation Programme (CAMP) and Saferworld, March 2012 [hereafter Jirga: Justice and Conflict Transformation].
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belief systems, social institutions and values and reform endeavours pursuing greater linkages 
normative benchmarks. Viewed simplistically, it between formal and informal dispute resolution 
36can appear to be a paradoxical code of life that systems in the area.
places an equally high premium on the seemingly 
contradictory values of revenge and hospitality. Pakhtunwali provides the overarching normative 
Like any framework of human social existence, framework or informal 'legislative code' within 
however, pakhtunwali endeavours to strike a which the jirgas operate. The term jirga refers to 
balance between the competing perspectives and both a practice and an institution. It is essentially 
imperatives of different sections of society, while a congregation of elders (often including maliks or 
embracing its own particular notion of a social heads of dominant tribes), convened by an 
contract.  It also responds to contextual and intermediary to resolve disputes through 
geographical imperatives (such as the inhospitable meetings, consultations and evidence gathering, 
terrain, the local political economy, modes of that delivers verdicts which comprise a variety of 
37industry and production, and the contests which punishments and social sanctions.  It is thus a 
arise over competing demands for limited mode of customary dispute resolution that 
34resources).  Though arguably somewhat operates at several levels. There are some 
exaggerated and oversimplified, the following variations across the vast Pakhtun region due to 
quotation captures well the multi-tiered local differences of rewaj (custom). Akin in many 
phenomenon of pakhtunwali. “It is law inasmuch ways to a jury, it is used to settling more 
as it is enforced by maliks and jirgas and was circumscribed local disputes within the family, 
accepted as such by the British Frontier Crime clan, tribe, and sub-tribe as well as larger inter-
38Regulations. It is custom insofar as every Pakhtun tribal conflicts.  Significant in this context are a 
knows what to do or not to do under it in the set of principles for dispute resolution, 
circumstances of daily life. It is manners because a mechanisms for peace-keeping, tools for tribal 
'true khan-like' Pakhtun never departs from it. It is cooperation and promotion of co-existence, 
35mind-set because all Pathans accept it.” approaches toward women, and social 
39ostracisation and penal sanction frameworks.
Like all normative frameworks enjoying longevity, 
pakhtunwali also pursues a certain notion of The pakhtunwali and the jirgas operate in the 
rights, justness and equity. These notions may, context of, and alongside: the formal legal system 
and indeed do at times, violate other notions of in place in those parts of this region that are part 
justice – both within Pakistan as enshrined in its of the mainstream Pakistani governance 
constitutional framework, and internationally as framework, the special colonial era mechanisms – 
reflected in human rights charters and treaties. somewhat amended in recent years – in place in 
Reconciling the aspiration to comply with the FATA, the shariah-inspired court-based legal 
national constitution and international human system in PATA, and shariah itself (as well as its 
rights norms without forcibly uprooting or local interpretations by elders). This creates 
transplanting a culture which has been largely contestations at several levels, in settled districts 
acceptable for centuries and still commands the of KP, for instance, the three systems – formal law, 
support of many is a major challenge for any the shariah itself, and the jirga – create a complex 
three-way contestation, as well as important areas custody including whether strict age limits 
of overlap and mutual support. denoting when children should go to which parent 
can prevail over the 'child welfare' calculus 
Three-way contestations routinely employed by the courts, the status of 
interest on capital and its acceptability in banking 
The shariah has always been dynamic and open to etc). Understanding the levels of compatibility, 
diverse interpretations according to context. The interface and interaction between these systems 
static notion of codified Muslim Personal Law, is highly important to guide efforts to enhance the 
current state-sanctioned notions of shariah ways in which citizens can access the most 
(where too there have been divergences between appropriate means of recourse, including through 
the Supreme Court and the parallel structure of case referral between the formal and informal 
the Federal Shariat Court introduced by the systems. 
military dictator Zia-ul-Haq on issues such as 
interest and land reforms) and various other living The continuing popularity of jirgas in Pakhtun 
interpretations of shariah as put forward by the areas
madaris (religious seminaries), Islamic scholars 
and schools of thought, and tribal elders, Any outright cooption, continued neglect, or a 
therefore, have constant tensions. There are also blunderbuss mainstreaming of the customary 
areas where the contestation arises from conflict dispute resolution mechanisms in the Pakhtun 
between the pakhtunwali and jirga decisions and areas in order to fully align them with formal law 
both shariah (state sanctioned as well as the would be unrealistic, unpopular, unfair and 
larger phenomenon) and formal law (especially counter-productive. Recent empirical inquiries in 
the Fundamental Rights and Principles of Policy representative Pakhtun areas found that when 
under the Constitution) – for example in the asked about various kinds of informal dispute 
customary practice of swara (the marrying of a resolution systems prevalent in their communities 
girl in the family to an enemy in order to end a and areas, 81.2 per cent of the respondents from 
40 41feud).  KP and PATA reported the existence of the jirga.  
On the other hand, while 88.8 per cent reported 
In other situations, what the formal law says or the presence of district administration and police, 
does in practice is quite different (denoting the only 42.6 per cent actually reported the presence 
42internal understanding of judges etc.) from what it of mainstream formal courts.  In terms of who to 
may nominally embrace as shariah through contact in case of a conflict or dispute, the jirga 
codification or what may be widely embraced as was at the top with 61.7 per cent of the 
shariah in society and/or in mainstream Islamic respondents mentioning it, followed by district 
scholarly interpretations (and is not even administration and police (28.9 per cent). Formal 
nominally embraced by formal law) – for example courts were only mentioned by 0.6 per cent of the 
43in the hudood punishments (for theft, adultery respondents.  
and other crimes, the allowance of polygamy, the 
special tax to be paid by minorities, certain Exploring forum shopping behaviour, a survey of 
aspects of inheritance law such as what do representative respondents in KP and Balochistan 
grandchildren inherit from grandparents if the also tells an interesting story. When asked about 
parents have expired, various aspects of child where they would refer their critical criminal 34. For more on pakhtunwali see Palwasha Kakar, Tribal Law of Pakhtunwali and Women's Legislative Authority, Harvard Islamic Legal Studies Program, 2005.35. See Spain W James, Pathans of the Latter Day, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), at 39.
36.  A rigorous anthropological study of Pakhtun culture and society is the classic work, Fredrik Barth, Political Leadership among Swat Pathans, University of London, 
Athlone Press, 1959.
37. Definitions vary from source to source as the practice also differs from place in terms of its ambit and process, but not in any major substantive way. This definition 
encompasses the main features and characteristics of the jirga and has been gleaned from the various sources cited in this chapter.
38. See Understanding Justice Systems.
39. See Dr. Sherzaman Taizi, Jirga System in Tribal Life, Area Study Center (Russia, China and Central Asia) April, 2007. 
40. See Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard country, Penguin Books, 2012, at 118-121.
41. See Understanding Justice Systems.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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belief systems, social institutions and values and reform endeavours pursuing greater linkages 
normative benchmarks. Viewed simplistically, it between formal and informal dispute resolution 
36can appear to be a paradoxical code of life that systems in the area.
places an equally high premium on the seemingly 
contradictory values of revenge and hospitality. Pakhtunwali provides the overarching normative 
Like any framework of human social existence, framework or informal 'legislative code' within 
however, pakhtunwali endeavours to strike a which the jirgas operate. The term jirga refers to 
balance between the competing perspectives and both a practice and an institution. It is essentially 
imperatives of different sections of society, while a congregation of elders (often including maliks or 
embracing its own particular notion of a social heads of dominant tribes), convened by an 
contract.  It also responds to contextual and intermediary to resolve disputes through 
geographical imperatives (such as the inhospitable meetings, consultations and evidence gathering, 
terrain, the local political economy, modes of that delivers verdicts which comprise a variety of 
37industry and production, and the contests which punishments and social sanctions.  It is thus a 
arise over competing demands for limited mode of customary dispute resolution that 
34resources).  Though arguably somewhat operates at several levels. There are some 
exaggerated and oversimplified, the following variations across the vast Pakhtun region due to 
quotation captures well the multi-tiered local differences of rewaj (custom). Akin in many 
phenomenon of pakhtunwali. “It is law inasmuch ways to a jury, it is used to settling more 
as it is enforced by maliks and jirgas and was circumscribed local disputes within the family, 
accepted as such by the British Frontier Crime clan, tribe, and sub-tribe as well as larger inter-
38Regulations. It is custom insofar as every Pakhtun tribal conflicts.  Significant in this context are a 
knows what to do or not to do under it in the set of principles for dispute resolution, 
circumstances of daily life. It is manners because a mechanisms for peace-keeping, tools for tribal 
'true khan-like' Pakhtun never departs from it. It is cooperation and promotion of co-existence, 
35mind-set because all Pathans accept it.” approaches toward women, and social 
39ostracisation and penal sanction frameworks.
Like all normative frameworks enjoying longevity, 
pakhtunwali also pursues a certain notion of The pakhtunwali and the jirgas operate in the 
rights, justness and equity. These notions may, context of, and alongside: the formal legal system 
and indeed do at times, violate other notions of in place in those parts of this region that are part 
justice – both within Pakistan as enshrined in its of the mainstream Pakistani governance 
constitutional framework, and internationally as framework, the special colonial era mechanisms – 
reflected in human rights charters and treaties. somewhat amended in recent years – in place in 
Reconciling the aspiration to comply with the FATA, the shariah-inspired court-based legal 
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madaris (religious seminaries), Islamic scholars 
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40 41feud).  KP and PATA reported the existence of the jirga.  
On the other hand, while 88.8 per cent reported 
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42internal understanding of judges etc.) from what it of mainstream formal courts.  In terms of who to 
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nominally embraced by formal law) – for example courts were only mentioned by 0.6 per cent of the 
43in the hudood punishments (for theft, adultery respondents.  
and other crimes, the allowance of polygamy, the 
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aspects of inheritance law such as what do representative respondents in KP and Balochistan 
grandchildren inherit from grandparents if the also tells an interesting story. When asked about 
parents have expired, various aspects of child where they would refer their critical criminal 34. For more on pakhtunwali see Palwasha Kakar, Tribal Law of Pakhtunwali and Women's Legislative Authority, Harvard Islamic Legal Studies Program, 2005.35. See Spain W James, Pathans of the Latter Day, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), at 39.
36.  A rigorous anthropological study of Pakhtun culture and society is the classic work, Fredrik Barth, Political Leadership among Swat Pathans, University of London, 
Athlone Press, 1959.
37. Definitions vary from source to source as the practice also differs from place in terms of its ambit and process, but not in any major substantive way. This definition 
encompasses the main features and characteristics of the jirga and has been gleaned from the various sources cited in this chapter.
38. See Understanding Justice Systems.
39. See Dr. Sherzaman Taizi, Jirga System in Tribal Life, Area Study Center (Russia, China and Central Asia) April, 2007. 
40. See Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard country, Penguin Books, 2012, at 118-121.
41. See Understanding Justice Systems.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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disputes (murder, theft, robbery etc.,) the tribal elders as custodians of traditional wisdom, 
following were the responses: jirga (47.6 per and the obvious advantages of accessibility, 
cent), district administration and police (37.7 per intelligibility and affordability that jirgas often 
cent) and formal courts (8 per cent). Asked about offer. At the same time, the state can't ignore the 
their forum preference for civil disputes the importance of formal courts to tackle more 
responses were: jirga (59.1 per cent), district intractable and complex issues. Neither can it 
administration and police (16.9 per cent) and forget that courts may provide easier recourse 
formal courts (14 per cent). When asked about and better protection to those segments of 
forum preferences according to the nature of society that apprehend and face greater 
dispute, the most prominent response (44.5 per vulnerability and disempowerment under 
cent) showed a preference for the courts for traditional informal dispute resolution 
deciding complex cases while 12.6 per cent of mechanisms. There is sufficient evidence that the 
respondents confirmed that they would refer latter can at times engage in serious process and 
cases concerning land and property to the courts.  substantive rights violations – rights that are 
Only 5.8 per cent identified jirga as a preferred meant to be safeguarded by the constitution and 
option for resolving complex disputes. At the the national formal legal system for the country's 
46same time, only 9.5 per cent of respondents said entire citizenry.  
that they would take all cases to formal courts. On 
the other hand, 38 per cent of respondents said The above analysis and findings are very pertinent 
they would refer all cases to the informal systems when it comes to other areas of Pakistan that 
and 14.5 per cent also said they would not refer retain traditional normative and dispute 
44any cases to the formal courts.   Various resolution frameworks operating alongside the 
important findings and insights are embedded in formal law regime. Traditional dispute resolution 
this. It can be safely gauged that Pakhtun mechanisms such as the panchayat in Punjab, the 
communities across the region continue to repose faislo in Sindh, and the jirga in parts of Sindh and 
greater confidence in the jirga system as Baluchistan are institutions of great provenance 
compared to the formal and other informal and have embodied the practical dispute 
systems. However, the data from the same study resolution dimensions of customary norms, 
also shows that Pakhtuns have fast eroding understandings and practices. However, these 
confidence in the implementation capacity of the traditional institutions and mechanisms and their 
jirga system; very importantly, for quite a few current operations, if any, are barely documented 
there are also additional substantive issues with and we have no clear contemporary empirical 
the same, including patriarchal attitudes, violation understanding of the roles that they continue to 
of due process and equal protection principles, play alongside, in conjunction with, or in 
elite capture, inadequate representation and contradiction to the formal legal system. For all 
prejudicial approach towards the rights of women, the aforementioned reasons that necessitate a 
especially vis-à-vis inheritance, rights of widows better mapping and understanding of the jirga in 
45and divorcees to remarry etc.   Pakhtun areas and the development of possible 
linkages between the informal and the informal, 
It would be self-defeating to ignore the high these customary frameworks also need to be 
degree of support which the jirgas continue to much better understood. In many ways, this 
court in Pakhtun areas, the continuing respect for report makes a very significant endeavour 
towards doing so. areas of further engagement and collaboration; 
(iv) perceptions and perspectives of different Neglected research
segments of society regarding different forums for 
dispute resolution, in particular the preferences of To reemphasise the above point, while the 
women and other vulnerable groups and the aforementioned empirical work provides valuable 
reasons for those perceptions; initial insights, any informed administrative and 
legislative interventions in this complex area 
(v) detailed assessment of the state of health and require much more credible information. The 
continuing operation of the traditional dispute paucity of empirical research on the actual 
resolution mechanisms in conflict areas e.g. in performance of the formal legal system and the 
PATA, where they were targeted by the Taliban;state of informal dispute resolution mechanisms 
greatly inhibit the contemplation of meaningful 
 (vi) closer understanding of the historical and reform thinking and approaches. A detailed and 
current operation of the formal-informal hybrids, dis aggregated understanding of citizen 
for instance, the formal jirgas in FATA, their expectations as well as how various components 
evolution, amendments made over the years, and of the justice sector address the needs of different 
relevant lessons for forging greater linkages segments of society, especially those of the poor 
between the formal and the informal – there is and the most vulnerable, remains pending. As a 
some empirical and also considerable anecdotal result, the following remain fairly unexplored 
evidence to suggest that such formal-informal questions: 
hybrids also exist in Punjab and Sindh, as also 
does the utilisation of the informal by the formal (i) How disputes emerge in society (the nature of 
based on subjective official choices i.e., local disputes, the frequency of certain dominant kinds 
police involving and utilising the panchayat during of disputes etc); 
47criminal investigations;  
(ii) how disputes get resolved or are perpetuated; 
(vii) detailed mapping and exploration of current and subsequently, whether, how, and how many 
policies, rules, processes and practices in the of these disputes become legal contestations; 
formal justice system vis-à-vis referral/direction of 
cases to the court-assisted as well as informal ADR (iii) detailed mapping and documentation of the 
mechanisms; and, actual operation of various traditional as well as 
contemporary informal dispute resolution 
(viii) further exploration of the complex  mechanisms (the latter include modern versions 
interaction between local normative codes such and variants of traditional mechanisms as well as 
as pakhtunwali and other local and regional inherently modern mechanisms such as market 
normative understandings and customary committees, traders' unions etc), focusing on their 
practices, shariah and formal law in order to existing structure(s), management and 
identify areas of overlap as well as conflict and administration, roles and responsibilities, capacity, 
thus to better understand forum shopping membership, working practices, different stages 
behaviour. This should include further from complaint to execution, processes, checks 
examination of where human rights and civil and balances, record-keeping, 
liberty principles in the Constitution resonate, incentives/payment/reward structures and 
complement, support, and overlap with implementation mechanisms, in order to identify 
44. Id.
45. Id. See also Jirga: Justice and Conflict Transformation; see also Women's Rights in Pakistan – Status and Challenges, Stakeholders Joint Submission for Pakistan's 
thReview in The Human Rights Council (14  Session, October 2012); see also Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, Understanding Jirga, Community Appraisal and Motivation Program 
(CAMP), 2011.
46. See From the Case and the Court to the Dispute and the Disputant. 47. See Osama Siddique & Saif Anjum, The Punjab Crime Perception Survey Report (Asian Development Bank: 2009).
Ch
ap
te
r 
1 
:  
N
ot
 re
lic
s o
f t
he
 p
as
t b
ut
 a
ve
nu
es
 o
f o
pp
or
tu
ni
ty
Ch
ap
te
r 
1 
:  
N
ot
 re
lic
s o
f t
he
 p
as
t b
ut
 a
ve
nu
es
 o
f o
pp
or
tu
ni
ty
22 23
disputes (murder, theft, robbery etc.,) the tribal elders as custodians of traditional wisdom, 
following were the responses: jirga (47.6 per and the obvious advantages of accessibility, 
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their forum preference for civil disputes the importance of formal courts to tackle more 
responses were: jirga (59.1 per cent), district intractable and complex issues. Neither can it 
administration and police (16.9 per cent) and forget that courts may provide easier recourse 
formal courts (14 per cent). When asked about and better protection to those segments of 
forum preferences according to the nature of society that apprehend and face greater 
dispute, the most prominent response (44.5 per vulnerability and disempowerment under 
cent) showed a preference for the courts for traditional informal dispute resolution 
deciding complex cases while 12.6 per cent of mechanisms. There is sufficient evidence that the 
respondents confirmed that they would refer latter can at times engage in serious process and 
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option for resolving complex disputes. At the the national formal legal system for the country's 
46same time, only 9.5 per cent of respondents said entire citizenry.  
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the other hand, 38 per cent of respondents said The above analysis and findings are very pertinent 
they would refer all cases to the informal systems when it comes to other areas of Pakistan that 
and 14.5 per cent also said they would not refer retain traditional normative and dispute 
44any cases to the formal courts.   Various resolution frameworks operating alongside the 
important findings and insights are embedded in formal law regime. Traditional dispute resolution 
this. It can be safely gauged that Pakhtun mechanisms such as the panchayat in Punjab, the 
communities across the region continue to repose faislo in Sindh, and the jirga in parts of Sindh and 
greater confidence in the jirga system as Baluchistan are institutions of great provenance 
compared to the formal and other informal and have embodied the practical dispute 
systems. However, the data from the same study resolution dimensions of customary norms, 
also shows that Pakhtuns have fast eroding understandings and practices. However, these 
confidence in the implementation capacity of the traditional institutions and mechanisms and their 
jirga system; very importantly, for quite a few current operations, if any, are barely documented 
there are also additional substantive issues with and we have no clear contemporary empirical 
the same, including patriarchal attitudes, violation understanding of the roles that they continue to 
of due process and equal protection principles, play alongside, in conjunction with, or in 
elite capture, inadequate representation and contradiction to the formal legal system. For all 
prejudicial approach towards the rights of women, the aforementioned reasons that necessitate a 
especially vis-à-vis inheritance, rights of widows better mapping and understanding of the jirga in 
45and divorcees to remarry etc.   Pakhtun areas and the development of possible 
linkages between the informal and the informal, 
It would be self-defeating to ignore the high these customary frameworks also need to be 
degree of support which the jirgas continue to much better understood. In many ways, this 
court in Pakhtun areas, the continuing respect for report makes a very significant endeavour 
towards doing so. areas of further engagement and collaboration; 
(iv) perceptions and perspectives of different Neglected research
segments of society regarding different forums for 
dispute resolution, in particular the preferences of To reemphasise the above point, while the 
women and other vulnerable groups and the aforementioned empirical work provides valuable 
reasons for those perceptions; initial insights, any informed administrative and 
legislative interventions in this complex area 
(v) detailed assessment of the state of health and require much more credible information. The 
continuing operation of the traditional dispute paucity of empirical research on the actual 
resolution mechanisms in conflict areas e.g. in performance of the formal legal system and the 
PATA, where they were targeted by the Taliban;state of informal dispute resolution mechanisms 
greatly inhibit the contemplation of meaningful 
 (vi) closer understanding of the historical and reform thinking and approaches. A detailed and 
current operation of the formal-informal hybrids, dis aggregated understanding of citizen 
for instance, the formal jirgas in FATA, their expectations as well as how various components 
evolution, amendments made over the years, and of the justice sector address the needs of different 
relevant lessons for forging greater linkages segments of society, especially those of the poor 
between the formal and the informal – there is and the most vulnerable, remains pending. As a 
some empirical and also considerable anecdotal result, the following remain fairly unexplored 
evidence to suggest that such formal-informal questions: 
hybrids also exist in Punjab and Sindh, as also 
does the utilisation of the informal by the formal (i) How disputes emerge in society (the nature of 
based on subjective official choices i.e., local disputes, the frequency of certain dominant kinds 
police involving and utilising the panchayat during of disputes etc); 
47criminal investigations;  
(ii) how disputes get resolved or are perpetuated; 
(vii) detailed mapping and exploration of current and subsequently, whether, how, and how many 
policies, rules, processes and practices in the of these disputes become legal contestations; 
formal justice system vis-à-vis referral/direction of 
cases to the court-assisted as well as informal ADR (iii) detailed mapping and documentation of the 
mechanisms; and, actual operation of various traditional as well as 
contemporary informal dispute resolution 
(viii) further exploration of the complex  mechanisms (the latter include modern versions 
interaction between local normative codes such and variants of traditional mechanisms as well as 
as pakhtunwali and other local and regional inherently modern mechanisms such as market 
normative understandings and customary committees, traders' unions etc), focusing on their 
practices, shariah and formal law in order to existing structure(s), management and 
identify areas of overlap as well as conflict and administration, roles and responsibilities, capacity, 
thus to better understand forum shopping membership, working practices, different stages 
behaviour. This should include further from complaint to execution, processes, checks 
examination of where human rights and civil and balances, record-keeping, 
liberty principles in the Constitution resonate, incentives/payment/reward structures and 
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44. Id.
45. Id. See also Jirga: Justice and Conflict Transformation; see also Women's Rights in Pakistan – Status and Challenges, Stakeholders Joint Submission for Pakistan's 
thReview in The Human Rights Council (14  Session, October 2012); see also Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, Understanding Jirga, Community Appraisal and Motivation Program 
(CAMP), 2011.
46. See From the Case and the Court to the Dispute and the Disputant. 47. See Osama Siddique & Saif Anjum, The Punjab Crime Perception Survey Report (Asian Development Bank: 2009).
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customary practices and/or the shariah in order to government gets the deserved credit, for these 
identify areas of complementarity and conflict, enhancements. Simultaneously, the state needs to 
and the devising of suitable strategies to build an avoid – in reality as well as in perception – the 
overall Constitution-compliant normative notion that it is adopting a co-option strategy 
framework and practices for dispute and conflict which is seen primarily to serve the purpose of 
48resolution.  strengthening state control, or of prioritising state 
or political interests in the informal justice 
50process.  CONCLUSION
It is worth re-emphasising that any state reforms International literature, previous reform 
to recognise, enhance and supervise the informal experience in Pakistan, and available 
ought to ensure that they avoid taking away the contemporary research suggest that the main 
vitality of the informal – the Indian experience, for challenges in supporting the informal sector and 
instance, illustrates the danger of taking the strengthening the formal-informal interface – in 51desirable 'informal' out of informal justice.  This Pakistan as well as elsewhere in South Asia – are 
can have the unintended and undesirable to both approach the reform of the informal 
consequence that the informal starts becoming as sector  in tandem with reforms to the formal 
bureaucratic, procedurally rigid, slow, and sector (and not as truncated and isolated activity) 
cumbersome as the formal legal system, and/or as and to strike a balance between retaining the 
52susceptible to elite capture.  There is also the risk informal character, intelligibility, local accessibility 
of the informal mechanisms getting relegated in and legitimacy of the customary justice systems, 
the popular consciousness as something inferior while making sufficient improvements to their 
49 that are meant only for the poor, while the formal functioning and effectiveness.  In other words, 
justice system with its relatively smart courts and whilst the state needs to guide, augment and 
53fancy lawyers remain reserved for the rich.  support provision of informal justice in a regular, 
Commentators have argued that one aspect is predictable, equitable, and enforceable manner – 
that the Indian state promoted local mediation and also needs to be seen to do so (thus boosting 
alternatives like Nyaya Panchayat and Lok Adalat public confidence in the state) – this should not 
have created an apartheid-like impression among compromise the fundamental benefits of informal 
54certain sections of the underprivileged.  systems. The risk of 'too little' state involvement in 
customary justice must be balanced against the 
At the same time, it is very important to risk of 'too much' state involvement. 
meaningfully address the multiple fissures 
between social norms/customs and the official The risk of insufficient visible state involvement in 
framework through fostering an open and public improving informal justice is that enhancements 
policy dialogue. Ignoring the differences does not of the non-state alternatives in such manner may 
mean they are not there, and sustained policy make the state appear even less capable, by 
dialogues are required to help the informal comparison, of providing adequate (formal) 
systems evolve in a way which preserves cultural justice services. It is important, therefore, that the 
relevance and intelligibility whilst taking account 
of vital rights enshrined in the national normative only after the development of a much more 
and constitutional frameworks. This is likely to nuanced understanding of the current state of 
generate some difficult discussions and decisions, play when it comes to the current state of 
since it is very possible that, at one level, informal existence and continuing operation of informal 
justice mechanisms are deemed more legitimate dispute resolutions systems in the country. The 
because they accord with principles which run seminal research that underlies the analysis 
55counter to official norms.  conducted in this report towards this end 
promises to not only excavate, collate, analyse 
Not only from a distributive consequences and present invaluable new information but to 
standpoint but also from a narrower efficiency also hopefully revive and invigorate the much-
perspective, no formal justice system in the world needed national debate on the future role of 
can and does have the capacity and capability to informal dispute resolution mechanisms in the 
resolve all disputes in society. Reforms towards Pakistani justice system.
assisting and persuading formal sector operators 
in the use of court-assisted ADR as well as 
community-based mediation, whilst building 
efficient court directions and case referral 
procedures, can strengthen the ability of the 
formal sector to benefit from the informal sector 
as a key resource and partner in justice 
56provision.  At the same time, direct support for 
informal ADR capacity, alignment of the informal 
function with constitutional principles and norms 
(particularly those that enshrine the rights of 
disempowered and vulnerable groups) through 
effective oversight, and, suitable recognition of 
appropriate outcomes emanating from the 
informal in order to ensure their effectiveness and 
implementation, will both complement and 
57reinforce the formal sector.  This integrated and 
multi-pronged approach to the full justice 
spectrum stands the best possible chance of 
achieving the concrete outcomes of reduced case 
backlog, accelerated litigation, better qualitative 
results, greater choice of accessible forums for the 
public, and, quicker dispute adjudication and 
conflict resolution in society, and, as a 
consequence enhanced government legitimacy as 
58well as public trust in the state.
Ultimately, however, all these policy deliberations 
and any suitable reform interventions are possible 48. See From the Case and the Court to the Dispute and the Disputant.49. See Janine Ubink, Customary Justice Sector Reform, Research and Policy Note, University of Leiden Faculty of Law and International Development Law Organization, 
2011.
50. See From the Case and the Court to the Dispute and the Disputant.
51. See Marc Galanter and Jayanth K. Krishnan, “Bread for the Poor:” Access to Justice and the Rights of the Needy in India, 55 Hastings L.J. 789 (2004).
52. Id
53. Id
54. See Marc Galanter and Jayanth K. Krishnan, Debased Informalism: Lok Adalats and Legal Rights in Modern India (2003).
55. See From the Case and the Court to the Dispute and the Disputant.
56. Id.
57. Id. 
58. See Pakistan's Experience with Formal Law.
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53fancy lawyers remain reserved for the rich.  support provision of informal justice in a regular, 
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alternatives like Nyaya Panchayat and Lok Adalat public confidence in the state) – this should not 
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justice mechanisms are deemed more legitimate dispute resolutions systems in the country. The 
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as a key resource and partner in justice 
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50. See From the Case and the Court to the Dispute and the Disputant.
51. See Marc Galanter and Jayanth K. Krishnan, “Bread for the Poor:” Access to Justice and the Rights of the Needy in India, 55 Hastings L.J. 789 (2004).
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assemblies. During General Parvaiz Musharraf's INTRODUCTION
era, women were given 33 per cent 
representation in parliament through a special Pakistan, a predominantly Muslim country, was 
quota system.   carved as a new state in August 1947 out of 
British India. With an area of 803,940 square 
In terms of its location, history, and culture, kilometres, of which 25,220 square kilometres are 
Pakistan is a meeting ground for various pluralistic covered with water, Pakistan is nearly twice the 
21 traditions.  The country boasts of multitude of size of California.  According to the latest figures, 
native languages, of which there are currently Pakistan's population is now 180 million (of which 
more than 80 ? major languages among them are 60 per cent are young people), making it the 
Urdu, Punjabi, Siriaki, Sindhi, Pushtu, Balochi etc. seventh largest country in the world in terms of 
To solve the problem of communication, Mr. population. However, the average literacy rate in 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, Pakistan is around 60 per cent, and literacy levels 
made Urdu the national language. However in rural areas are even lower (tribal women have 
English remains the main official language.the lowest literacy rate at just 3 per cent). 
The formal structure of the courts in PakistanPakistan is a federation of four provinces carved 
from linguistic and historic roots, with a strong 
Since the main theme of this study is access to central government. Pakistan administers some 
justice, a brief account of the formal structure of special areas through its federal government, 
the courts in Pakistan is provided here in order to namely FATA (Federally Administered Tribal 
explain the workings of the formal judicial system Areas), Northern Areas (NA) and Pakistan's 
of Pakistan.Administered Kashmir. Pakistan has a 
parliamentarian government headed by an 
Pakistan inherited its formal justice system from elected prime minister and a cabinet which runs 
Britain. It was developed under British Colonial the government, whereas the President heads the 
rule, and continues to follow the path laid down country. The national parliament is divided into an 
by the imperialist forces. The judicial structure in elected National Assembly elected through adult 
Pakistan was derived from the Code of Civil franchise suffrage whereas its Senate ? the Upper 
3Procedure (CPC) 1908  and the West Pakistan Civil House ? is elected by the provincial and national 
Courts Ordinance (Ord. II of 1962). However, the elected members of the provincial and national 
formal court system evolves as its circumstances the court. 
change: one of the latest amendments was the 
addition of the Nizam-e-Adl courts as part of The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in 
conflict resolution in Malakand in 2009. disputes involving the federal or provincial 
governments under Article 184; it will exercise 
Under the 1962 Ordinance, the power for original jurisdiction while enforcing fundamental 
determining the class and jurisdiction of the civil rights, but only when a question of 'public 
4 8judges lies with the relevant High Court. importance' is involved.  Appellate jurisdiction in 
The courts' structure of Pakistan, in descending civil and criminal matters is exercised by the SCP 
order, is as follows: under Article 185, while Article 186 provides 
scope for advisory jurisdiction while extending 
A. Supreme Court of Pakistan (premier court advice to the government in legal matters.
seated in the federal capital, Islamabad)
B. Federal Sharia Court B. Federal Sharia Court (FSC) of Pakistan
C. High Courts of Pakistan (provincial and 
federal level) The Federal Sharia Court (FSC) of Pakistan was 
9D. District and Sessions Courts (district level) established under a Presidential Order in 1980.  
E. Civil Judge/Judicial Magistrates' Courts ? The rationale for its establishment is to scrutinise 
these deal with purely civil matters except as all laws within the country in order to ascertain 
empowered under Section 30 of the Code of whether they are in line with Islamic values as 
10Criminal Procedure (CrPC) 1898 to hear expressed in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.  The 
criminal matters. FSC is comprised of eight Muslim judges, including 
11F. Special Courts the Chief Justice of Pakistan.  Among the judges 
at least three must be Islamic Scholars/Ulema 
12A. Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) who are well versed in Islamic law.  The decisions 
of the FSC are binding on all the High Courts and 
13The Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) is the other subordinate courts.  The Supreme Court 
premier court of the country ? it has the final also has a Sharia Appellate Bench which has the 
5 14authority in all legal and constitutional matters.  It power to review decisions of the FSC.
is comprised of a Chief Justice and 16 permanent 
6judges.  It has a permanent seat in Islamabad, C. High Courts of Pakistan
with Branch Registries in the capital of each 
province at Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta and There is one High Court in each province as well 
7 15Karachi. as one in the federal capital of Islamabad.  They 
are as follows: 
Justices of the Supreme Court are supervised by 
the Supreme Judicial Council, and derive their 1. Lahore High Court, Lahore, Punjab
authority from Articles 176 to Article 191 of the 2. Sindh High Court, Karachi, Sindh
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 3. Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, Khyber 
1973, which explain the functions and powers of Pakhtunkhwa
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16. Ibid
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18. Ibid
19. Ibid
20. Ibid
21. Ibid
22. Ibid
23. Section 30, Pakistan's Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
24. Ibid
25. Ibid
26. Ibid
27. Ibid
28. Faqir Hussainr (Registrar, Supreme Court of Pakistan) The Judicial System of Pakistan, Revised (15 February 2011)
29. The English meaning of this expression is “not according to Sharia.” 
30 It is derived, from the Qur'an, the authentic narrations of the Prophet (Hadith), Consensus (ijma), and analogical reasoning (qiyas), qiyas only being applied if direct material cannot be found 
in the Qur'an or Hadith.  It is this last reasoning that makes the Pakistani application considering the beliefs or traditions of the disputants relevant, but also a point of friction with the TNSM.
4. Balochistan High Court, Quetta, Balochistan Judge. These courts all have equal authority within 
5. Islamabad (Federal) High Court, Islamabad their respective jurisdiction. When hearing criminal 
cases, it is known as the Sessions Court; while 
The High Courts are the appellate forums for all adjudicating upon civil cases, it becomes the 
20civil and criminal cases within the territorial limits District Court.
16of each respective province.  Articles 192 to 203 of 
the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan The High Court exercises appellate jurisdiction over 
211973 provide for the functions and powers of the the lower courts in each province,  and, in turn, 
High Courts in Pakistan. the Supreme Court of Pakistan has authority and 
appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of High 
22Under the Constitution, any particular High Court Court.
will exercise both its original and appellate 
jurisdiction under Article 199 for the enforcement E. Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrates' Courts 
of Fundamental Rights and review of (with power of Section 30 of Cr.PC 1898 only in 
judgements/orders of the subordinate courts in criminal trials)
civil and criminal disputes.
There are multiple Civil and Judicial Magistrates' 
23D. District and Session Courts of Pakistan Courts in every tehsil and district.  A Magistrate 
under the powers of Section 30, Code of Criminal 
The District and Session Courts are functional in Procedure (CrPC) 1898, has the authority to hear 
every district of each province, with civil criminal cases, excluding those cases that would 
jurisdiction under the West Pakistan Civil Court involve the death penalty as punishment, for 
Ordinance 1962 and criminal jurisdiction under the example, attempted murder, banditry, robbery, 
17 24Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) 1898.  extortion, etc.
In each district headquarters, there are numerous In relation to awarding penalties, the Magistrates' 
Additional District and Session Judges who usually Courts can only award a punishment of up to seven 
25head the courts. A District and Sessions Judge has years' imprisonment.  Where imprisonment is 
both executive and judicial power all over the deemed to be more than seven years, that 
18district within his jurisdiction. particular case must then be referred to a higher 
26court.  Each Judicial Magistrate's Court is also 
The Sessions Court is also a trial court for severe given a jurisdiction, normally covering one or more 
27criminal offences such as murder, rape, armed police stations of any particular locality.
robbery and others where specific amounts of gold 
and/or cash is involved. It also serves as an F. Special Courts' of Pakistan 
19appellate court for civil suits of lesser value.
In addition to the above mentioned courts there 
All towns and cities of Pakistan now have a are some Special Courts or Tribunals and Boards 
separate Additional District Court and a  Sessions 
that deal with 'specialized' cases that require 2. Zila (district); 
28certain expertise for resolution. 3. Darul Qaza (the highest level), to which appeals 
from the lower courts can be made. 
These include the banking/consumer courts; anti-
corruption, anti-terrorism, and anti-narcotics To date, only the highest level (Darul Qaza) has 
courts; family courts and special magistrate courts been established.  The judges (Qazi) at each level 
(seated at the District/Sessions Courts); labour are appointed by the government. This 
relations courts; juvenile courts; numerous government appointment apparently was not 
tribunals which include the services tribunal, and anticipated by the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-
income tax tribunals; and, the Federal Board of Mohammadi/ Movement for the Enforcement of 
Revenue (FBR). Islamic Law (TNSM) because in 2009 Sufi 
Mohammad said 'Delegating Qazis' powers to 
29G. Nizam-e-Adl in Malakand judges is Ghair Sharai.  We want Qazis in 
accordance with Sharia.' He said the TNSM wanted 
One of the most recent additions to the formal to transform the judicial system into an Islamic 
courts system in Pakistan has been the Nizam-e- Sharia system. The point is that from early Islamic 
Adl. In the case of the Nizam-e-Adl we have a times the Qazi had been appointed by the Islamic 
special mechanism for justice that came about as rulers from among confident men who were 
part of the negotiations to establish a settlement known to have studied Islamic jurisprudence, and 
to the civil war in the Swat Valley that ended in Sufi Mohammad may have believed that he would 
2009.  Malakand has been part of PATA since 2007. have been consulted about appointees. Hence, 
It had previously been a Tribal Area known as the perhaps, the appointees would have been stricter. 
Malakand Protected Area, part of the Malakand There is another aspect that comes from the 
Agency of PATA.  From 1970 to 2000 the district scholarly debate about the term Ijma or the 
was part of Malakand Division, and as part of PATA, consensus of the community.  For some, the term 
it had the other systems of justice described refers to the opinion of the community of Sharia 
above. As a means to end the civil war of the mid- scholars; for others, the term 'community' refers to 
2000s, the government of Pakistan negotiated a the whole Muslim community. Therefore, an 
ceasefire by agreeing, in part, to establish Sharia- interesting aspect of the system as practised in the 
based Courts. In 2009 these courts were Malakand context is that these courts defer to local 
established after legislative approval of the traditional and religious interpretations of Sharia 
Presidential proposal. law by the disputants rather than an absolute 
30Sharia code. It is more in the broader Hanafi  
Hence in an area that had been under the school of legal thought. This reminds us of the 
regulations and justice systems previously variation in jirga conclusions from area to area 
described, a new system came into being. In other simply because the local interpretation of 
chapters we examine how Nizam-e-Adl functions Pakhtunwali varies (in the same way as the 
and the opinion of Malakand's citizens toward variations of interpretation of what applies from 
Nizam-e-Adl in comparison with the pre-existing Sharia). In other words, there is a varying 
systems of justice. jurisprudence, but, in this case, because the 
Nizam-e-Adl began in the context of Malakand in 
The Nizam-e-Adl consists of the following three 2009, we can assume that previous jirga and also 
levels: formal systems of PATA from 1970 onward would 
1.  Ilaqa (local); have tempered or influenced this system too.  
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Some reports indicate that what leaders like Sufi does not necessarily mean that they do 
Muhammad and Muslim Khan of the TNSM had in satisfactorily address the legal needs of the 
mind was the application of Sharia as practised respondents. 
and advocated by the Taliban.
H. Jirga under FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulation)
Proceedings of the Nizam-e-Adl are initiated by an 
aggrieved party. The complaint can be filed The FCR defines jirga as a 'council of elders' which 
directly by any citizen. It is not necessary to is 'a council of three or more persons convened 
employ a lawyer, the filing fee is minor, and when according to the Pathan.....usage as the Deputy 
31the parties are brought before the judge (Qazi), Commissioner may direct'.  However the 1973's 
the judge uses both Sharia law and a negotiated Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 
settlement between the parties to arrive at a article 247(6) has formally used the words 'tribal 
conclusion.  This aspect, the negotiated jirga' in the context of changing the status of 
32settlement rather than a punishment brought FATA.  The use of the word jirga in the 
against a “guilty party” and a fine paid to the Constitution refers to the importance and 
state, echoes traditional Pakhtun justice recognition of the jirga system in tribal affairs. 
procedures and brings closure to a dispute. It is a According to Hart, the literal meaning of the word 
system of mitigation and conflict resolution. is an assembly which addresses questions 
33between parties.
Another important aspect of the system is the 
formal study of Sharia law among the lawyers in Jirga in every day practice refers to a tribal 
Pakistan.  Because many of these urban scholars institution of decision-making and dispute 
study both Sharia and Pakistani jurisprudence, as settlement that incorporates the prevalent local 
well as international law and civil rights, their customary law, institutional rituals, and a body of 
outlook is more forward-thinking with dispute village elders whose collective decision about the 
settlements bringing more modern practices into resolution of dispute (or local problem) is binding 
34the realm from national and international on the parties involved.   
debates. As a result, we are seeing a drop in the 
use of traditional punishments, such as hand FATA is divided into two administrative categories 
chopping for robbery, stoning for adultery etc. i.e. 'protected areas' and 'non-protected areas'. 
Protective areas are areas under the direct control 
With regards to this survey, the initial enquiry of the government, while non-protective areas are 
about various formal and informal institutions administered indirectly by the political 
aimed to gauge the level of respondents' administration through local tribes. 
awareness and to document the opinions they 
have of each institution. This will eventually help In protected areas of FATA, civil and criminal cases 
us to chalk-out a strategy, so that we can move are decided by the political administration vested 
forward with well-informed policies and with both judicial and executive powers. 
programmes. 
A modified form of jirga (Sarkari) was adopted for 
35Please note that although the institutions listed use by the PAs (Political Agents)  as a formal 
aim to complement the rule of law and satisfy the mechanism for dispensing justice and resolving 
legal and social needs of the local populace, this conflicts in the FATA under the Frontier Crimes 
Regulation (FCR).  The state in this case plays a Disputants are allowed to select their mediators, 
very distinct role. The aggrieved person goes to although the political administration does play a 
the PA, or, if the PA suspects a crime, the PA role in this selection. Mediators first intervene to 
charges a person. In protected areas of FATA, achieve a truce (tiga) between parties in a 
political officers, vested with judicial powers, deal criminal case, or to obtain security (muchalga) in 
with civil and criminal cases. One of the ways of cash or kind for civil disputes. Thereafter, parties 
seeking redressal of the grievances against a must arrive at a consensus concerning the mode 
person or group of persons is to approach the of settlement ? arbitration, riwaj (customary law) 
administrative courts in the concerned tribal or Sharia (Islamic law). Once the mode of 
36agency.  An application in the court of the settlement is agreed upon, mediators arrange for 
political or assistant political agent may be the selection of a jirga with the consent of the 
submitted to initiate a case. After completing the parties to the dispute. Implementation of jirga 
necessary inquiries and investigations, cognizance decisions in non-protected areas is the 
42of the case is taken and a jirga is constituted both responsibility of the tribe.  The jirga may mete 
for civil (section 8 of the FCR, 1901) and criminal out punishment to an offender, and impose a 
matter (section 11), from the maliks enlisted with heavy fine. Occasionally, more serious measures 
the political administration and who get lungi may be taken such as expelling an individual or a 
(economic benefit) from the political family from the area, or confiscating, destroying 
37administration.  The disputant parties under the or setting fire to homes and property. In such 
FCR have the right to raise objection on the cases, the entire tribe joins together as a lakhkar 
nominated jirga members but practically the (army) to enforce the decision. If the political 
political administration rarely considers any such authorities are party to the truce, any violations of 
38 the truce may result in the administration objection.  The case is then referred to the FCR 
suspending or repealing any economic benefits jirga for rai (opinion) and award. Mostly the jirga 
enjoyed by the offending party.opinion and award is made through the decision 
of the political officer. It is alleged that in most 
Pakhtun tribes in FATA generally support the jirga cases the jirga members sign a blank piece of 
as an efficient institution dispensing justice. At the paper; subsequently an opinion pertaining to be 
same time they are of the opinion that the the jirga decision is actually written by the 
involvement of the political administration has put political administration according to their own 
39 its status and future at stake because the political wishes.  
43administration handpicks the jirga members.  
Decisions under FCR jirga often favour those with The party who bribes and/or influences the political 
40 political or economic clout at the expense of poor administration will easily get a favourable decision.  
or vulnerable parties, and because of this, FCR Under the FCR, PA or APA can refer and constitute 
44jirga has lost public credibility.   On the other the jirga but in practice these powers are 
hand, the survey results and opinions of key predominantly exercised by the Political Tehsildar 
41 informants show that Olasi jirga is viewed as the (PT) and Naib Tehsildar (NT). Implementation of 
most credible and trusted institution, providing the decisions of FCR jirga is the responsibility of the 
cheap and speedy justice to local people in FATA. political administration.
However, the fact that money and power also 
31 32
31. Section 2 (a) of The Frontier Crimes regulations, 1901
32. Article 247(6) of The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 
33. David M Hart, Guardian of the Khyber Pass, Vanguard Books, 1985, Page 71  
34. Ali Wardak, University of Glamorgan, UK, (2002 b). Note: The Pashtun/Pukhtun jirga system is almost the same on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border.
35. Political Agent is a representative of federal bureaucracy. Unlike his counterpart in the settled districts of Pakistan, he was appropriately given this titled. The incumbents of this office were 
drawn from the Indian civil or sometime military service who would have acquired a certain degree of proficiency not only in Pashto but also in administrative affairs of the area. Only the most 
outstanding men of very high caliber were posted as political agents. On one hand he was the representative of the Crown, charged with ensuring that the area he administered posed no 
serious security threats for the government and on the other hand he was an advocate of the tribes vis-à-vis the government.
36. Interviews with Mr. Iqbal Mohmand, Deputy Attorney General KP, Peshawar High Court Building, Peshawar, 10/2/2011
37. Interview with Muhammad Rafiq Khan Momand, Deputy Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar High Court building, Peshawar - 20/1/2011
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39 Interviews with lawyers from FATA (January 2011 Peshawar) and 19 focus-group discussions with respondents with men, women, youth and litigants of FATA (February-March 2011) 
40 Ibid
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43. Interviews with lawyers in Peshawar, January 2011 and focus-group discussions and consultations with various groups – February-March 2011
44. This can be supported by the results of survey and respondents' views during the focus-group discussions and consultations 
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outlook is more forward-thinking with dispute village elders whose collective decision about the 
settlements bringing more modern practices into resolution of dispute (or local problem) is binding 
34the realm from national and international on the parties involved.   
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with civil and criminal cases. One of the ways of cash or kind for civil disputes. Thereafter, parties 
seeking redressal of the grievances against a must arrive at a consensus concerning the mode 
person or group of persons is to approach the of settlement ? arbitration, riwaj (customary law) 
administrative courts in the concerned tribal or Sharia (Islamic law). Once the mode of 
36agency.  An application in the court of the settlement is agreed upon, mediators arrange for 
political or assistant political agent may be the selection of a jirga with the consent of the 
submitted to initiate a case. After completing the parties to the dispute. Implementation of jirga 
necessary inquiries and investigations, cognizance decisions in non-protected areas is the 
42of the case is taken and a jirga is constituted both responsibility of the tribe.  The jirga may mete 
for civil (section 8 of the FCR, 1901) and criminal out punishment to an offender, and impose a 
matter (section 11), from the maliks enlisted with heavy fine. Occasionally, more serious measures 
the political administration and who get lungi may be taken such as expelling an individual or a 
(economic benefit) from the political family from the area, or confiscating, destroying 
37administration.  The disputant parties under the or setting fire to homes and property. In such 
FCR have the right to raise objection on the cases, the entire tribe joins together as a lakhkar 
nominated jirga members but practically the (army) to enforce the decision. If the political 
political administration rarely considers any such authorities are party to the truce, any violations of 
38 the truce may result in the administration objection.  The case is then referred to the FCR 
suspending or repealing any economic benefits jirga for rai (opinion) and award. Mostly the jirga 
enjoyed by the offending party.opinion and award is made through the decision 
of the political officer. It is alleged that in most 
Pakhtun tribes in FATA generally support the jirga cases the jirga members sign a blank piece of 
as an efficient institution dispensing justice. At the paper; subsequently an opinion pertaining to be 
same time they are of the opinion that the the jirga decision is actually written by the 
involvement of the political administration has put political administration according to their own 
39 its status and future at stake because the political wishes.  
43administration handpicks the jirga members.  
Decisions under FCR jirga often favour those with The party who bribes and/or influences the political 
40 political or economic clout at the expense of poor administration will easily get a favourable decision.  
or vulnerable parties, and because of this, FCR Under the FCR, PA or APA can refer and constitute 
44jirga has lost public credibility.   On the other the jirga but in practice these powers are 
hand, the survey results and opinions of key predominantly exercised by the Political Tehsildar 
41 informants show that Olasi jirga is viewed as the (PT) and Naib Tehsildar (NT). Implementation of 
most credible and trusted institution, providing the decisions of FCR jirga is the responsibility of the 
cheap and speedy justice to local people in FATA. political administration.
However, the fact that money and power also 
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have influence over Olasi jirga was admitted by Awareness of institutions and actors
the members of the focus-group discussions, 
other key informants and survey respondents. It is Generally, for dispute resolution, people in 
clear that tribal societies, which have undergone Pakistan have access to a number of formal and 
tremendous change over the last few decades, are informal institutions to satisfy their legal service 
not immune to the influence of money – money needs. The majority of Pakistan's population lives 
has become a symbol of status and even the tribal in rural areas that have limited access to formal 
elders can not save their communities from this. justice system for a variety of reasons. In addition, 
Nevertheless tribal people in FATA support the people have developed negative opinions about 
jirga system over the formal judicial system ? as the formal justice system ? this is explained in the 
the formal system has failed to deliver justice and introductory chapter and is elaborated upon 
the costs involved in the litigation process make it further in this report on several occasions. The 
economically unviable for these poor tribal main reasons why people choose the informal 
communities. dispute resolution system are: people's lack of 
awareness of the formal institutions and actors; 
distance to the courts from their dwellings; the Survey findings and analysis
high fees of courts and lawyers which poor people 
can not afford to pay; people's lack of trust in This section provides analysis on respondents' 
formal institutions and actors; the lengthy, time-perceptions of various institutions – formal as well 
consuming and painful process involved to get as informal. 
justice; and a belief that formal institutions and Institutions and actors concerning formal and 
actors are corrupt and favour the rich and informal justice or dispute resolution systems, or 
45influential.  Whilst urban populations tend to related area of work, are introduced in the 
approach the state's legal system, it was also subsequent pages through various questions. 
observed by the majority of participants of the However, first there is a need to understand the 
round-table discussions that informal remedies level of awareness of the respondents on the 
are also available in urban areas to address existence of various institutions and actors in their 
46 areas. disputes and reconcile litigants.  
The graph is self-explanatory and shows the level There is a need to analyse and compare data from 
of awareness of respondents. The most significant both rural and urban areas, along with 
finding is that the police department topped the ascertaining the overall level of respondents' 
list, as the overwhelming majority of respondents awareness of institutions and actors.
(92.6 per cent) was aware of the existence of the  
police department in their area. Interestingly, next In the first graph, our concern is not the level of 
came the informal dispute resolution system interest, but the difference between the rural and 
(panchayat, faislo, and Baloch jirga), which was urban responses. With the exception of the 
identified by more than three quarters of Musalihati Council and Ombudsman, the 
respondents (78.4 per cent). The Lower and percentage difference between rural and urban 
Superior Courts were identified by 73.4 per cent respondents is minor, and the level of awareness 
and 71.8 per cent, respectively.about the institutions is very similar in both rural 
and urban areas (as was the case with our 
The above data shows that the majority of the previous study on the justice system in Khyber 
47 Pakistani population is aware of both formal and Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and Balochistan).
informal institutions and actors dispensing justice 
33 3445. Round-table discussion in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta – August – December 2013
46. Ibid
47. See Naveed Shinwari and Neha Gauhar, 2013. Understanding Justice Systems of KP, FATA and Balochistan: The Pakhtun Perspective. CAMP
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Institutions and actors Awareness Urban % Rural % Total %
Yes 75.2 68.4 71.8
No 24.8 31.6 28.2
Yes 77.8 69 73.4
No 22.2 31 26.6
Yes 38.1 28.9 33.5
No 61.9 71.1 66.5
Yes 29.9 22.5 26.2
No 71.1 77.5 73.8
Yes 40.9 25.6 33.3
No 59.1 74.4 66.7
Yes 26.5 18.9 22.7
No 73.5 81.1 73.3
Yes 37.3 21.6 29.5
No 62.7 78.4 70.5
Yes 74.9 81.9 78.4
No 25.1 18.1 21.6
Yes 91.2 93.9 92.6
No 8.8 6.1 7.4
Yes 22.1 12.1 17.1
No 77.9 87.9 82.9
Are you aware of the following institutions and actors? Cross-tab with Urban/Rural areas.
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 
Jirga  system, panchayat, faislo  or other informal dispute resolution mechanisms 
Police department 
Musalihati Council 
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and High Courts)
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District and Sessions Courts)
Specialised Anti-Terrorism or Narcotics Courts 
Federal Shariat Court 
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris and other registered Madaris)
Ombudsman
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have influence over Olasi jirga was admitted by Awareness of institutions and actors
the members of the focus-group discussions, 
other key informants and survey respondents. It is Generally, for dispute resolution, people in 
clear that tribal societies, which have undergone Pakistan have access to a number of formal and 
tremendous change over the last few decades, are informal institutions to satisfy their legal service 
not immune to the influence of money – money needs. The majority of Pakistan's population lives 
has become a symbol of status and even the tribal in rural areas that have limited access to formal 
elders can not save their communities from this. justice system for a variety of reasons. In addition, 
Nevertheless tribal people in FATA support the people have developed negative opinions about 
jirga system over the formal judicial system ? as the formal justice system ? this is explained in the 
the formal system has failed to deliver justice and introductory chapter and is elaborated upon 
the costs involved in the litigation process make it further in this report on several occasions. The 
economically unviable for these poor tribal main reasons why people choose the informal 
communities. dispute resolution system are: people's lack of 
awareness of the formal institutions and actors; 
distance to the courts from their dwellings; the Survey findings and analysis
high fees of courts and lawyers which poor people 
can not afford to pay; people's lack of trust in This section provides analysis on respondents' 
formal institutions and actors; the lengthy, time-perceptions of various institutions – formal as well 
consuming and painful process involved to get as informal. 
justice; and a belief that formal institutions and Institutions and actors concerning formal and 
actors are corrupt and favour the rich and informal justice or dispute resolution systems, or 
45influential.  Whilst urban populations tend to related area of work, are introduced in the 
approach the state's legal system, it was also subsequent pages through various questions. 
observed by the majority of participants of the However, first there is a need to understand the 
round-table discussions that informal remedies level of awareness of the respondents on the 
are also available in urban areas to address existence of various institutions and actors in their 
46 areas. disputes and reconcile litigants.  
The graph is self-explanatory and shows the level There is a need to analyse and compare data from 
of awareness of respondents. The most significant both rural and urban areas, along with 
finding is that the police department topped the ascertaining the overall level of respondents' 
list, as the overwhelming majority of respondents awareness of institutions and actors.
(92.6 per cent) was aware of the existence of the  
police department in their area. Interestingly, next In the first graph, our concern is not the level of 
came the informal dispute resolution system interest, but the difference between the rural and 
(panchayat, faislo, and Baloch jirga), which was urban responses. With the exception of the 
identified by more than three quarters of Musalihati Council and Ombudsman, the 
respondents (78.4 per cent). The Lower and percentage difference between rural and urban 
Superior Courts were identified by 73.4 per cent respondents is minor, and the level of awareness 
and 71.8 per cent, respectively.about the institutions is very similar in both rural 
and urban areas (as was the case with our 
The above data shows that the majority of the previous study on the justice system in Khyber 
47 Pakistani population is aware of both formal and Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and Balochistan).
informal institutions and actors dispensing justice 
33 3445. Round-table discussion in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta – August – December 2013
46. Ibid
47. See Naveed Shinwari and Neha Gauhar, 2013. Understanding Justice Systems of KP, FATA and Balochistan: The Pakhtun Perspective. CAMP
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Institutions and actors Awareness Urban % Rural % Total %
Yes 75.2 68.4 71.8
No 24.8 31.6 28.2
Yes 77.8 69 73.4
No 22.2 31 26.6
Yes 38.1 28.9 33.5
No 61.9 71.1 66.5
Yes 29.9 22.5 26.2
No 71.1 77.5 73.8
Yes 40.9 25.6 33.3
No 59.1 74.4 66.7
Yes 26.5 18.9 22.7
No 73.5 81.1 73.3
Yes 37.3 21.6 29.5
No 62.7 78.4 70.5
Yes 74.9 81.9 78.4
No 25.1 18.1 21.6
Yes 91.2 93.9 92.6
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Yes 22.1 12.1 17.1
No 77.9 87.9 82.9
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Are you aware of the following institutions and actors?
and resolving disputes. However, a significant authorities and their representatives. The police 
number of respondents were not aware of certain derived its powers of arrest, investigation, and 
formal institutions – such as Ombudsman, Federal search from the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. 
Shariat Court etc. Furthermore, the Pakistani authorities under the 
Government of India Act 1935 adopted pre-
Opinions about institutions and actors independence laws. Crimes are reported to the 
police, who then register a First Information 
This question aims to document the opinion of Report [FIR]. Police authorities are responsible for 
the respondents about various formal and maintaining public order, investigating crimes, and 
informal institutions concerning justice arresting offenders. 
dispensation or dispute resolution. 
The majority view of the police department in 
The study treats each institution separately, Pakistan is negative. People have  developed ill 
beginning with a brief introduction for each feelings towards the police for numerous reasons, 
institution and actor. Respondents were provided the most common of which is that the police are 
with different attributes ? both negative and seen to be corrupt and to yield to political 
48positive ? and they were asked to say if these pressure.   In particular, negative views were 
attributes were reflected in each institution. expressed during round-table discussions 
organised in Karachi, Lahore and Quetta where 
Provincial police authorities and their local participants blamed the police department and its 
representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP, etc.) officials for their corrupt practices which led to 
people's loss of faith in the formal institutions and 
The first institution tested under various options thereby impacted overall law and order and the 
49through this question was provincial police violation of human rights.  The feudal system is 
also responsible for influencing the police community is slightly more optimistic about the 
department, and for swaying verdicts in civil and police department, compared to other provinces. 
50criminal cases.  It also suggests that the police departments in KP 
and Balochistan are performing well.
Overall, the survey shows that respondents have 
negative views of the police in general. More than Superior Courts in Pakistan i.e. Supreme Court 
two-thirds of respondents (69.1 per cent), believe and High Courts
that police authorities take 'bribes', and 39.1 per 
cent said that police authorities are involved in In recent years the Superior Judiciary, under the 
'influence peddling'. In addition, 24.9 per cent of former Chief Justice of Pakistan Justice (retired) 
respondents said that the police 'ignore human Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, who stood up 
rights' (in all likelihood due to numerous media against the military dictator in 2007 and refused 
reports which have criticised the police for to obey the unconstitutional orders of former 
mishandling people and ignoring their rights); President General (retired) Pervaiz Musharraf, had 
22.3 per cent said the police are 'unresponsive to gained considerable respect nationally and 
criticism'; 19.4 per cent said the police had a 'class globally. The Chief Justice's suo moto actions on 
bias'. Only 9.5 per cent of respondents thought several issues of national interest also made 
that dealing with police authorities is 'affordable' headline news in the media, making him and the 
(due to the heavy cost of bribes for favourable superior judiciary very popular. However, the 
police support, along with other expenses, which former Chief Justice's son and his alleged misuse 
51 of power received widespread criticism within the poor people cannot afford to pay).
media and in political circles. 
Comparing the above data from all provinces with 
Views expressed during round-table discussions the data from the Pakhtun populated areas of KP 
also favoured the Superior Judiciary's recent suo and Balochistan, it appears that the Pakhtun 
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and resolving disputes. However, a significant authorities and their representatives. The police 
number of respondents were not aware of certain derived its powers of arrest, investigation, and 
formal institutions – such as Ombudsman, Federal search from the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. 
Shariat Court etc. Furthermore, the Pakistani authorities under the 
Government of India Act 1935 adopted pre-
Opinions about institutions and actors independence laws. Crimes are reported to the 
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The study treats each institution separately, Pakistan is negative. People have  developed ill 
beginning with a brief introduction for each feelings towards the police for numerous reasons, 
institution and actor. Respondents were provided the most common of which is that the police are 
with different attributes ? both negative and seen to be corrupt and to yield to political 
48positive ? and they were asked to say if these pressure.   In particular, negative views were 
attributes were reflected in each institution. expressed during round-table discussions 
organised in Karachi, Lahore and Quetta where 
Provincial police authorities and their local participants blamed the police department and its 
representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP, etc.) officials for their corrupt practices which led to 
people's loss of faith in the formal institutions and 
The first institution tested under various options thereby impacted overall law and order and the 
49through this question was provincial police violation of human rights.  The feudal system is 
also responsible for influencing the police community is slightly more optimistic about the 
department, and for swaying verdicts in civil and police department, compared to other provinces. 
50criminal cases.  It also suggests that the police departments in KP 
and Balochistan are performing well.
Overall, the survey shows that respondents have 
negative views of the police in general. More than Superior Courts in Pakistan i.e. Supreme Court 
two-thirds of respondents (69.1 per cent), believe and High Courts
that police authorities take 'bribes', and 39.1 per 
cent said that police authorities are involved in In recent years the Superior Judiciary, under the 
'influence peddling'. In addition, 24.9 per cent of former Chief Justice of Pakistan Justice (retired) 
respondents said that the police 'ignore human Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, who stood up 
rights' (in all likelihood due to numerous media against the military dictator in 2007 and refused 
reports which have criticised the police for to obey the unconstitutional orders of former 
mishandling people and ignoring their rights); President General (retired) Pervaiz Musharraf, had 
22.3 per cent said the police are 'unresponsive to gained considerable respect nationally and 
criticism'; 19.4 per cent said the police had a 'class globally. The Chief Justice's suo moto actions on 
bias'. Only 9.5 per cent of respondents thought several issues of national interest also made 
that dealing with police authorities is 'affordable' headline news in the media, making him and the 
(due to the heavy cost of bribes for favourable superior judiciary very popular. However, the 
police support, along with other expenses, which former Chief Justice's son and his alleged misuse 
51 of power received widespread criticism within the poor people cannot afford to pay).
media and in political circles. 
Comparing the above data from all provinces with 
Views expressed during round-table discussions the data from the Pakhtun populated areas of KP 
also favoured the Superior Judiciary's recent suo and Balochistan, it appears that the Pakhtun 
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moto actions on issues which were seen against results from the Pakhtun districts of KP and 
the Constitution of Pakistan and/or where the Balochistan, there is not a significant variation, 
rights of the people were violated. However, they except that respondents are slightly more 
also shared some concerns on the Supreme pessimistic in relation to the attributes of 
Court's selective suo moto actions and suggested 'influence peddling' and 'speedy'.  
that there are numerous instances where the 
Superior Judiciary has disappointed people in Lower Courts in Pakistan i.e. Judicial Magistrate, 
52Pakistan by not reacting to certain incidents.   District and Sessions Courts
In our survey of 2700 respondents in Pakistan, Generally, the lower courts in Pakistan have little 
data here shows that less than a quarter of credibility for numerous reasons – they are seen 
53respondents (21.9 per cent) believed that the as unaffordable, slow, corrupt, inaccessible, etc.  
Superior Judiciary is 'affordable' and 'speedy'; Delays when using the service cause anxiety and 
18.6 per cent believed that the Superior Judiciary frustration and people tend to choose other 
54is prone to 'influence peddling'; 14 per cent said options  ? options which are cheap and easy, and 
that 'bribes' affect the performance of the which solve their problems without spending too 
55Superior Judiciary; and more than one quarter much time.  Keeping in view these general 
(27.5 per cent) said they did not know. Other trends, the survey asked respondents to share 
aspects can be seen in the table. their opinion about the lower courts of Pakistan. 
Overall the results show respondents' optimism, The data reveals that one-third of the 
despite recent criticism against the retired Chief respondents (34 per cent) believed that the lower 
Justice (Iftikhar Chaudhry) who made his mark in courts are prone to 'influence peddling'; 
the legal history of Pakistan. With regards to surprisingly, 23.2 per cent said that the lower 
courts are affordable; close to one-fifth (19.6 per comprising various sects who are supposed to 
cent) pointed to 'bribes' as another negative have an understanding of the Federal Sharia Court 
aspect of the lower courts; 14.3 per cent said that (FSC), located in Islamabad. However, the majority 
the lower courts are 'unresponsive to criticism'; of respondents in our survey (68.5 per cent) said 
and 12.4 per cent believed that the lower courts they did not know very much at all about the 
provide 'speedy' justice to the population. Federal Sharia Court. 
Just 7 per cent of respondents thought that the 
lower courts are 'class biased'. However, The data showed that 11.8 per cent of 
according to the round-table participants it was respondents believed that the FSC is 'affordable'. 
generally believed that the court system prefers There was also some negative opinion about the 
and supports the richer classes while ignoring courts, as you can see from the data in the table. 
those who can not afford to pay the high fee of 
56lawyers. There is little difference in the data from Pakhtun 
districts, with the exception of the  fact that more 
Comparing the data from the rest of Pakistan with respondents from Pakhtun districts did not know 
the data from the Pakhtun districts of Pakistan, it what to think. 
is evident that more respondents in Pukhtun 
districts did not know what to think, and fewer Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris 
Pakhtun respondents believed that the lower or other registered Madaris)
courts are affordable. Other data results are very 
similar.  Wafaq ul Madaris Al-Arabia of Pakistan was 
founded in 1957 in West Pakistan. It is the largest 
57Federal Shariat Court federation of Islamic Seminaries in the world.  
Religious clerics who sit on these boards often 
Pakistani society is roughly 97 per cent Muslim – provide opinions on family law issues based on 
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moto actions on issues which were seen against results from the Pakhtun districts of KP and 
the Constitution of Pakistan and/or where the Balochistan, there is not a significant variation, 
rights of the people were violated. However, they except that respondents are slightly more 
also shared some concerns on the Supreme pessimistic in relation to the attributes of 
Court's selective suo moto actions and suggested 'influence peddling' and 'speedy'.  
that there are numerous instances where the 
Superior Judiciary has disappointed people in Lower Courts in Pakistan i.e. Judicial Magistrate, 
52Pakistan by not reacting to certain incidents.   District and Sessions Courts
In our survey of 2700 respondents in Pakistan, Generally, the lower courts in Pakistan have little 
data here shows that less than a quarter of credibility for numerous reasons – they are seen 
53respondents (21.9 per cent) believed that the as unaffordable, slow, corrupt, inaccessible, etc.  
Superior Judiciary is 'affordable' and 'speedy'; Delays when using the service cause anxiety and 
18.6 per cent believed that the Superior Judiciary frustration and people tend to choose other 
54is prone to 'influence peddling'; 14 per cent said options  ? options which are cheap and easy, and 
that 'bribes' affect the performance of the which solve their problems without spending too 
55Superior Judiciary; and more than one quarter much time.  Keeping in view these general 
(27.5 per cent) said they did not know. Other trends, the survey asked respondents to share 
aspects can be seen in the table. their opinion about the lower courts of Pakistan. 
Overall the results show respondents' optimism, The data reveals that one-third of the 
despite recent criticism against the retired Chief respondents (34 per cent) believed that the lower 
Justice (Iftikhar Chaudhry) who made his mark in courts are prone to 'influence peddling'; 
the legal history of Pakistan. With regards to surprisingly, 23.2 per cent said that the lower 
courts are affordable; close to one-fifth (19.6 per comprising various sects who are supposed to 
cent) pointed to 'bribes' as another negative have an understanding of the Federal Sharia Court 
aspect of the lower courts; 14.3 per cent said that (FSC), located in Islamabad. However, the majority 
the lower courts are 'unresponsive to criticism'; of respondents in our survey (68.5 per cent) said 
and 12.4 per cent believed that the lower courts they did not know very much at all about the 
provide 'speedy' justice to the population. Federal Sharia Court. 
Just 7 per cent of respondents thought that the 
lower courts are 'class biased'. However, The data showed that 11.8 per cent of 
according to the round-table participants it was respondents believed that the FSC is 'affordable'. 
generally believed that the court system prefers There was also some negative opinion about the 
and supports the richer classes while ignoring courts, as you can see from the data in the table. 
those who can not afford to pay the high fee of 
56lawyers. There is little difference in the data from Pakhtun 
districts, with the exception of the  fact that more 
Comparing the data from the rest of Pakistan with respondents from Pakhtun districts did not know 
the data from the Pakhtun districts of Pakistan, it what to think. 
is evident that more respondents in Pukhtun 
districts did not know what to think, and fewer Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris 
Pakhtun respondents believed that the lower or other registered Madaris)
courts are affordable. Other data results are very 
similar.  Wafaq ul Madaris Al-Arabia of Pakistan was 
founded in 1957 in West Pakistan. It is the largest 
57Federal Shariat Court federation of Islamic Seminaries in the world.  
Religious clerics who sit on these boards often 
Pakistani society is roughly 97 per cent Muslim – provide opinions on family law issues based on 
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Islamic law precepts. The 'madaris certificates' 'bribery'. The rest of the table is self-explanatory.
they issue can be brought to a general court to  
support one's claim. Some other recognised Comparing this data with the data from Pakhtun 
religious seminaries are Wafaq/Tanzeem ul districts, we see some significant differences. For 
Madaris/Rabit ul Madaris, Tanzeem-ul-Madaris example, 45.6 per cent of respondents in Pakhtun 
Ahle Sunnat, Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia, Wafaq- districts, (as opposed to only 16.8 per cent of 
ul-Madaris Al-Salafia, and Rabita-ul-Madaris Al respondents from rest of Pakistan), believed that 
Islamia. There are thousands of religious religious seminaries provide 'affordable' services 
madrassas operating in Pakistan; most of them to the people, while 31.1 per cent of respondents 
under the management of the above-mentioned from Pakhtun districts (compared to only 12.8 per 
organisations. cent from the rest of Pakistan) are more optimistic 
and believed that religious seminaries are 'speedy' 
Male and female respondents from all three in providing services. Twice as many respondents 
provinces were asked to share their opinions of in the rest of Pakistan do not know about this 
the above-mentioned religious seminary boards. institution's characteristics (58.8 per cent) as 
More than half of the respondents (58.8 per cent) compared to 26.5 per cent of respondents in 
said they did not know about this institution's Pakhtun districts. Other results are very similar. 
characteristics; only 16.8 per cent believed that 
these institutions are 'affordable'; followed by Ombudsman (Mohtasib)
12.8 per cent who believed that religious  
seminaries are 'speedy' in providing services to On 8 August 1983, the office of the Federal 
the population; 6.3 per cent of respondents Ombudsman was established under the Wafaqi 
believed that religious seminaries are Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 (President's 
58'unresponsive to criticism'; and just 2.7 per cent Order No. 1 of 1983).  In Pakistan, the 
believed that such institutions are involved in establishment of an Ombudsman institution had 
been advocated for some time before Article 276 Analysing the positive aspects of the Office of 
of the Interim Constitution of 1972 provided for Ombudsman, a total of 8.7 per cent of 
the appointment of a Federal Ombudsman respondents said that this institution provides a 
(Wafaqi Mohtasib in Urdu) and Provincial 'speedy' service; 7.6 per cent said that the Office 
59Ombudsmen.  The Ombudsman is an of Ombudsmen is 'affordable'; and only 6.7 per 
independent institution, established under law, to cent believed that the Ombudsman can be 
provide speedy relief to the general public in case 'influenced' by the powerful in order that a 
somebody has suffered 'maladministration' at the weaker party does not receive due justice. 
hands of a Federal Government Agency. Other 
Ombudsman agencies in Pakistan include When comparing this data from the rest of 
Provincial Ombudsman (Mohtasib-e-Aala) offices Pakistan to the data from the Pakhtun districts of 
in Punjab, Balochistan and Sindh; a banking KP and Balochistan data, there are no significant 
Ombudsman, the Banking Mohtasib Pakistan; a variations, except that an even higher number of 
Federal Insurance Ombudsman and a Federal Tax respondents in Pakhtun districts did not know 
60 about the Office of the Ombudsman.Ombudsman.  The disputed region of Azad 
Jammu and Kashmir also has an Ombudsman 
61 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)office.  
In 1987, the Human Rights Commission of The following survey results confirm that the 
Pakistan (HRCP) was founded by some very majority in Pakistan do not have a very clear idea 
prominent human rights activists. The HRCP is an about the Office of Ombudsman and its mandate. 
independent, non-profit organisation which is not The table below shows that 72.3 per cent did not 
associated or affiliated with the government or know about the characteristics of the 
any political party. It is mandated to: spread Ombudsman. 
awareness of human rights among the people; to 
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they issue can be brought to a general court to  
support one's claim. Some other recognised Comparing this data with the data from Pakhtun 
religious seminaries are Wafaq/Tanzeem ul districts, we see some significant differences. For 
Madaris/Rabit ul Madaris, Tanzeem-ul-Madaris example, 45.6 per cent of respondents in Pakhtun 
Ahle Sunnat, Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia, Wafaq- districts, (as opposed to only 16.8 per cent of 
ul-Madaris Al-Salafia, and Rabita-ul-Madaris Al respondents from rest of Pakistan), believed that 
Islamia. There are thousands of religious religious seminaries provide 'affordable' services 
madrassas operating in Pakistan; most of them to the people, while 31.1 per cent of respondents 
under the management of the above-mentioned from Pakhtun districts (compared to only 12.8 per 
organisations. cent from the rest of Pakistan) are more optimistic 
and believed that religious seminaries are 'speedy' 
Male and female respondents from all three in providing services. Twice as many respondents 
provinces were asked to share their opinions of in the rest of Pakistan do not know about this 
the above-mentioned religious seminary boards. institution's characteristics (58.8 per cent) as 
More than half of the respondents (58.8 per cent) compared to 26.5 per cent of respondents in 
said they did not know about this institution's Pakhtun districts. Other results are very similar. 
characteristics; only 16.8 per cent believed that 
these institutions are 'affordable'; followed by Ombudsman (Mohtasib)
12.8 per cent who believed that religious  
seminaries are 'speedy' in providing services to On 8 August 1983, the office of the Federal 
the population; 6.3 per cent of respondents Ombudsman was established under the Wafaqi 
believed that religious seminaries are Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 (President's 
58'unresponsive to criticism'; and just 2.7 per cent Order No. 1 of 1983).  In Pakistan, the 
believed that such institutions are involved in establishment of an Ombudsman institution had 
been advocated for some time before Article 276 Analysing the positive aspects of the Office of 
of the Interim Constitution of 1972 provided for Ombudsman, a total of 8.7 per cent of 
the appointment of a Federal Ombudsman respondents said that this institution provides a 
(Wafaqi Mohtasib in Urdu) and Provincial 'speedy' service; 7.6 per cent said that the Office 
59Ombudsmen.  The Ombudsman is an of Ombudsmen is 'affordable'; and only 6.7 per 
independent institution, established under law, to cent believed that the Ombudsman can be 
provide speedy relief to the general public in case 'influenced' by the powerful in order that a 
somebody has suffered 'maladministration' at the weaker party does not receive due justice. 
hands of a Federal Government Agency. Other 
Ombudsman agencies in Pakistan include When comparing this data from the rest of 
Provincial Ombudsman (Mohtasib-e-Aala) offices Pakistan to the data from the Pakhtun districts of 
in Punjab, Balochistan and Sindh; a banking KP and Balochistan data, there are no significant 
Ombudsman, the Banking Mohtasib Pakistan; a variations, except that an even higher number of 
Federal Insurance Ombudsman and a Federal Tax respondents in Pakhtun districts did not know 
60 about the Office of the Ombudsman.Ombudsman.  The disputed region of Azad 
Jammu and Kashmir also has an Ombudsman 
61 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)office.  
In 1987, the Human Rights Commission of The following survey results confirm that the 
Pakistan (HRCP) was founded by some very majority in Pakistan do not have a very clear idea 
prominent human rights activists. The HRCP is an about the Office of Ombudsman and its mandate. 
independent, non-profit organisation which is not The table below shows that 72.3 per cent did not 
associated or affiliated with the government or know about the characteristics of the 
any political party. It is mandated to: spread Ombudsman. 
awareness of human rights among the people; to 
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mobilise public opinion; to collect information; to Khandan (extended family)
disseminate knowledge about human rights 
abuses; and to monitor and defend human rights Khandan, or extended family, is patriarchal in 
in Pakistan. HRCP also operates a “Complaint Cell” character and headed by a male. It is bigger and 
where individuals can call to lodge a complaint. beyond the size of an immediate family unit, and 
HRCP has branches all over the country, including consists of grandparents, aunts, uncles, and 
in some of FATA's Agencies and Frontier Regions). cousins. The entire family may live in the same 
compound or household or in a closely located 
The data shows that 61.6 per cent of respondents neighbourhood. In South Asian societies, the 
did not know about the characteristics of the kinship bond is much stronger in rural 
HRCP and therefore they could not share their communities than in urban ones. Extended family 
opinion; 13.3 per cent of respondents thought systems have survived in rural set-ups due to 
that the HCRP provides 'affordable' services; and social, economic, security and political reasons. 
10.9 per cent of respondents said that the HRCP Looking at the tribal governance systems in 
provides 'speedy' services. There was little Pakistani tribal societies, it is obvious that they 
pessimism shown. rely on kinship for protecting honour ? they often 
take the law into their own hands for political 
In comparing this data from the rest of Pakistan ends, and they share the economic burdens and 
62data with the results from the Pakhtun districts of profits.    
KP and Balochistan, an overwhelming majority 
(80.4 per cent) in KP and Balochistan did not know Not surprisingly, respondents show a great deal of 
about the characteristics of the HRCP and could support for khandan. The majority of respondents 
not share their opinion. There is little pessimism (54 per cent) said that khandan is 'affordable' with 
shown from KP and Balochistan. regards to the services or assistance it provides in 
times of need; and 41.4 per cent believed that 
khandan provides 'speedy' services/solves issues 
quickly. The results reflect Pakistani society's trust important role to play in extending solidarity and 
in the khandan system. moral support to those who are faced with 
63disputes or other problems.  The respondents 
Mohalla (neighbourhood) were asked to share their opinion about mohalla 
and surprisingly, the data shows a great deal of 
In Pakistan, mohalla (or neighbourhood) has an trust in the mohalla system. For example, 44.8 per 
41 4262. Interview with Abdul Razaaq Gumrani, Manager Sindh province, HANDS (NGO), 25 August 2014, Karachi 63. Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
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mobilise public opinion; to collect information; to Khandan (extended family)
disseminate knowledge about human rights 
abuses; and to monitor and defend human rights Khandan, or extended family, is patriarchal in 
in Pakistan. HRCP also operates a “Complaint Cell” character and headed by a male. It is bigger and 
where individuals can call to lodge a complaint. beyond the size of an immediate family unit, and 
HRCP has branches all over the country, including consists of grandparents, aunts, uncles, and 
in some of FATA's Agencies and Frontier Regions). cousins. The entire family may live in the same 
compound or household or in a closely located 
The data shows that 61.6 per cent of respondents neighbourhood. In South Asian societies, the 
did not know about the characteristics of the kinship bond is much stronger in rural 
HRCP and therefore they could not share their communities than in urban ones. Extended family 
opinion; 13.3 per cent of respondents thought systems have survived in rural set-ups due to 
that the HCRP provides 'affordable' services; and social, economic, security and political reasons. 
10.9 per cent of respondents said that the HRCP Looking at the tribal governance systems in 
provides 'speedy' services. There was little Pakistani tribal societies, it is obvious that they 
pessimism shown. rely on kinship for protecting honour ? they often 
take the law into their own hands for political 
In comparing this data from the rest of Pakistan ends, and they share the economic burdens and 
62data with the results from the Pakhtun districts of profits.    
KP and Balochistan, an overwhelming majority 
(80.4 per cent) in KP and Balochistan did not know Not surprisingly, respondents show a great deal of 
about the characteristics of the HRCP and could support for khandan. The majority of respondents 
not share their opinion. There is little pessimism (54 per cent) said that khandan is 'affordable' with 
shown from KP and Balochistan. regards to the services or assistance it provides in 
times of need; and 41.4 per cent believed that 
khandan provides 'speedy' services/solves issues 
quickly. The results reflect Pakistani society's trust important role to play in extending solidarity and 
in the khandan system. moral support to those who are faced with 
63disputes or other problems.  The respondents 
Mohalla (neighbourhood) were asked to share their opinion about mohalla 
and surprisingly, the data shows a great deal of 
In Pakistan, mohalla (or neighbourhood) has an trust in the mohalla system. For example, 44.8 per 
41 4262. Interview with Abdul Razaaq Gumrani, Manager Sindh province, HANDS (NGO), 25 August 2014, Karachi 63. Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
Ch
ap
te
r 
2 
:  
Pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
of
 f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
 
Ch
ap
te
r 
2 
:  
Pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
of
 f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
 
13
.3
10
.9
2.
5 8
.4
4.
4
4.
4 4.
8
2.
9
61
.6
8.
9
3.
4
1 2
.8
1.
8
1.
2 2.
3
0.
9
80
.4
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
Affordable Speedy Bribes Influence 
peddling
Unresponsive to 
criticism
Ignores human 
rights
Gender equality Class bias Don’t know
Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun Districts %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
54
41
.4
1.
6 5.
3
5.
9
3.
8 4.
5
4.
8
10
.3
Khandan (extended family)
Affordable Speedy Bribes Influence 
peddling
Unresponsive to 
criticism
Ignores human 
rights
Gender equality Class bias Don’t know
Rest of Pakistan %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
44
.8
36
.6
2.
5
12
.3
6.
5
6.
7
2.
9 8.
1
11
.2
Mohalla (neighbourhood)
Affordable Speedy Bribes Influence 
peddling
Unresponsive to 
criticism
Ignores human 
rights
Gender equality Class bias Don’t know
Rest of Pakistan %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
cent believed that mohalla provides 'affordable' helps to shape a political agenda, and invests in 
services, while 36.6 per cent thought mohalla is a support mechanisms for times of insecurity or 
65'speedy' mechanism. It is interesting that 12.3 per calamity.  biradari also plays a significant role in 
cent of respondents described mohalla as addressing legal and civil disputes within its clan 
66'influence peddling'. Politics in neighbourhoods and or against another clan.  Keeping in view its 
can often be contentious, with wealthy and/or role and functions, it was important to gauge the 
politically strong groups and individuals trying to views of respondents on biradari. 
control and influence the local affairs. 
The data shows that more than 50 per cent of 
This question about mohalla was not included in respondents thought that the biradari system is 
the 2012 survey in Pakhtun districts, so we cannot 'affordable' and 41.6 per cent thought that the 
make comparisons between the regions. biradari system provides 'speedy' services to its 
members. Respondents were not without 
Biradari (clan) concerns: some 11.8 per cent said the biradari 
system was prone to 'influence peddling'. This 
Biradari (or clan) is an informal institution which is reflects similar sentiments as shown above for 
very strong in Pakistan, especially in rural areas, mohalla ? where the rich and politically strong try 
and more specifically in Pakhtun and Baloch to exert influence over the other, weaker 
67communities that are more tribal in terms of members of the group.  
64governance and outlook.  The clan provides a 
protection and security mechanism against This question about biradari was not included in 
external factors and threats. To improve this the 2012 survey in Pakhtun districts, so we cannot 
mechanism, each family within clan or biradari make comparisons between the regions. 
Large local landowners (Village survey also included this category in the list. 
Chaudhry/Malik/Sardar/Wadera)
After studying the survey data, the findings reflect 
In Pakistani society and politics, large landowners the true sentiments of the general public. For 
play a vital role – both negative and positive. instance one-third (33.7 per cent) showed their 
However, they are generally perceived negatively. dissatisfaction over the role of 'local large 
The issue is that large swathes of land are owned landowners' and believed that this group is 
by just a few families ? this has created an involved in 'influence peddling'. Some 19 per cent 
extreme imbalance of power between them and believed that local landowners' services are 
68their labourers (kisan).  Political parties with 'affordable', and 18 per cent thought large 
socialist or liberal philosophies have always landowners provide 'speedy' services. According 
targeted these large landowners as they have to participants at the round-table discussions, 
always influenced the political scene in Pakistan. generally, large landowners do not charge fees 
These landowners have remained not only from local communities and they usually incur the 
beneficiaries of this system but the major cost of any activities ? so that in return they get 
69 respect from the community and can exert their stumbling block in changing the status quo.  
influence on local people for their own political Participants of the round-table discussions viewed 
71  the involvement of feudal lords in the informal gain during times of need. The data shows that 
justice system's operation as negative, and 16 per cent of respondents believed that large 
believed that their involvement always favours landowners are 'class biased'; 13.9 per cent said 
70 that large landowners are 'unresponsive to their fellow landowners only.  Since these large 
criticism'; 13.5 per cent said they 'ignore human landowners play a role in dispute resolution – 
rights'; and surprisingly, only 7.5 per cent of most of the time as part of the dispute – this 
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64 Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013 
65 Ibid
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cent believed that mohalla provides 'affordable' helps to shape a political agenda, and invests in 
services, while 36.6 per cent thought mohalla is a support mechanisms for times of insecurity or 
65'speedy' mechanism. It is interesting that 12.3 per calamity.  biradari also plays a significant role in 
cent of respondents described mohalla as addressing legal and civil disputes within its clan 
66'influence peddling'. Politics in neighbourhoods and or against another clan.  Keeping in view its 
can often be contentious, with wealthy and/or role and functions, it was important to gauge the 
politically strong groups and individuals trying to views of respondents on biradari. 
control and influence the local affairs. 
The data shows that more than 50 per cent of 
This question about mohalla was not included in respondents thought that the biradari system is 
the 2012 survey in Pakhtun districts, so we cannot 'affordable' and 41.6 per cent thought that the 
make comparisons between the regions. biradari system provides 'speedy' services to its 
members. Respondents were not without 
Biradari (clan) concerns: some 11.8 per cent said the biradari 
system was prone to 'influence peddling'. This 
Biradari (or clan) is an informal institution which is reflects similar sentiments as shown above for 
very strong in Pakistan, especially in rural areas, mohalla ? where the rich and politically strong try 
and more specifically in Pakhtun and Baloch to exert influence over the other, weaker 
67communities that are more tribal in terms of members of the group.  
64governance and outlook.  The clan provides a 
protection and security mechanism against This question about biradari was not included in 
external factors and threats. To improve this the 2012 survey in Pakhtun districts, so we cannot 
mechanism, each family within clan or biradari make comparisons between the regions. 
Large local landowners (Village survey also included this category in the list. 
Chaudhry/Malik/Sardar/Wadera)
After studying the survey data, the findings reflect 
In Pakistani society and politics, large landowners the true sentiments of the general public. For 
play a vital role – both negative and positive. instance one-third (33.7 per cent) showed their 
However, they are generally perceived negatively. dissatisfaction over the role of 'local large 
The issue is that large swathes of land are owned landowners' and believed that this group is 
by just a few families ? this has created an involved in 'influence peddling'. Some 19 per cent 
extreme imbalance of power between them and believed that local landowners' services are 
68their labourers (kisan).  Political parties with 'affordable', and 18 per cent thought large 
socialist or liberal philosophies have always landowners provide 'speedy' services. According 
targeted these large landowners as they have to participants at the round-table discussions, 
always influenced the political scene in Pakistan. generally, large landowners do not charge fees 
These landowners have remained not only from local communities and they usually incur the 
beneficiaries of this system but the major cost of any activities ? so that in return they get 
69 respect from the community and can exert their stumbling block in changing the status quo.  
influence on local people for their own political Participants of the round-table discussions viewed 
71  the involvement of feudal lords in the informal gain during times of need. The data shows that 
justice system's operation as negative, and 16 per cent of respondents believed that large 
believed that their involvement always favours landowners are 'class biased'; 13.9 per cent said 
70 that large landowners are 'unresponsive to their fellow landowners only.  Since these large 
criticism'; 13.5 per cent said they 'ignore human landowners play a role in dispute resolution – 
rights'; and surprisingly, only 7.5 per cent of most of the time as part of the dispute – this 
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respondents said that local large landowners are of Pakistan. Respondents in  Pakhtun districts 
72committed to 'gender equality'.  identified aspects of their jirga system of informal 
justice.
Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh 
panchayat, pareon) or faislo or Baloch jirga Secondly, if we compare the informal justice 
systems of other provinces and ethnic groups with 
Like many other informal dispute resolution Pakhtun jirga, we see a very clear difference of 
systems in the world, village panchayat, faislo, opinion. Pakhtun respondents, both men and 
Pakhtun jirga and Baloch jirga existed and women, showed more confidence in jirga as 
flourished in rural society, long before the advent compared to the rest of Pakistan data – for 
of the British incursion in the Sub-continent. example, 55.1 per cent thought that Pakhtun jirga 
Please refer to Chapter 3 of this study for a was 'affordable' and 46.1 per cent felt it was 
detailed account of the informal justice system. 'speedy' in providing justice to the people. 
The data is divided into two sets which show two To further explain reasons for less support in the 
striking revelations. Firstly, the data for the rest of rest of Pakistan as compared to Pakhtun districts 
Pakistan shows respondents' confidence in the of Pakistan, please refer to the following 
informal dispute resolution system: 27.2 per cent provincial data. 
believed that the informal dispute resolution 
system is 'affordable' and 29.1 per cent identified The overall trend shows that the informal justice 
it as 'speedy'. However, some 21 per cent said system takes fourth place in terms of the 
that there is an element of 'influence peddling' in satisfaction of people in Sindh, Punjab and Baloch 
the informal dispute resolution system. As shown districts, as one can argue that khandan, mohalla 
in the table, other attributes of informal justice and biradari are much stronger than informal 
systems were identified by respondents in the rest justice systems in these regions. Khandan, 
mohalla and biradari play a significant and similar Influentials (local, provincial, national)
role in resolving cases at their levels, and 
removing the need to access the informal justice It is generally perceived by Pakistani society that 
systems at all. influentials play a role in manipulating or 
influencing local power and politics, both 
negatively and positively, depending on their 
45 46
72. Ibid
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respondents said that local large landowners are of Pakistan. Respondents in  Pakhtun districts 
72committed to 'gender equality'.  identified aspects of their jirga system of informal 
justice.
Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh 
panchayat, pareon) or faislo or Baloch jirga Secondly, if we compare the informal justice 
systems of other provinces and ethnic groups with 
Like many other informal dispute resolution Pakhtun jirga, we see a very clear difference of 
systems in the world, village panchayat, faislo, opinion. Pakhtun respondents, both men and 
Pakhtun jirga and Baloch jirga existed and women, showed more confidence in jirga as 
flourished in rural society, long before the advent compared to the rest of Pakistan data – for 
of the British incursion in the Sub-continent. example, 55.1 per cent thought that Pakhtun jirga 
Please refer to Chapter 3 of this study for a was 'affordable' and 46.1 per cent felt it was 
detailed account of the informal justice system. 'speedy' in providing justice to the people. 
The data is divided into two sets which show two To further explain reasons for less support in the 
striking revelations. Firstly, the data for the rest of rest of Pakistan as compared to Pakhtun districts 
Pakistan shows respondents' confidence in the of Pakistan, please refer to the following 
informal dispute resolution system: 27.2 per cent provincial data. 
believed that the informal dispute resolution 
system is 'affordable' and 29.1 per cent identified The overall trend shows that the informal justice 
it as 'speedy'. However, some 21 per cent said system takes fourth place in terms of the 
that there is an element of 'influence peddling' in satisfaction of people in Sindh, Punjab and Baloch 
the informal dispute resolution system. As shown districts, as one can argue that khandan, mohalla 
in the table, other attributes of informal justice and biradari are much stronger than informal 
systems were identified by respondents in the rest justice systems in these regions. Khandan, 
mohalla and biradari play a significant and similar Influentials (local, provincial, national)
role in resolving cases at their levels, and 
removing the need to access the informal justice It is generally perceived by Pakistani society that 
systems at all. influentials play a role in manipulating or 
influencing local power and politics, both 
negatively and positively, depending on their 
45 46
72. Ibid
Ch
ap
te
r 
2 
:  
Pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
of
 f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
 
Ch
ap
te
r 
2 
:  
Pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
of
 f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
 
27
.2
29
.1
11
.3
21
.6
10
.1
10
.3
3.
3
11
.7
16
.9
55
.1
46
.1
1.
6
3.
4
1.
7
1.
6 2.
8
1.
9
18
.3
Village panchayat or faislo or Baloch jirga
Affordable Speedy Bribes Influence 
peddling
Unresponsive to 
criticism
Ignores human 
rights
Gender equality Class bias Don’t know
Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun Districts %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
8.
2
7.
9
12
.8
37
.4
11
.4
10
.7
3.
2
21
.2
31
.8
Influentials (local, provincial, national)
Affordable Speedy Bribes Influence 
peddling
Unresponsive to 
criticism
Ignores human 
rights
Gender equality Class bias Don’t know
Rest of Pakistan %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
21
.5
21
.5
6.
1
18
.1
6.
9 7.
4
2.
6 4.
3
11
.7
9.
2
21
.1
14
.2
11
.6
2.
8
9.
8
0.
8
11
.8 1
8.
824
.6
19
.2
5.
2
10
.9
5.
2 3.
2 9
.9
6.
8
Affordable Speedy Bribes Influence 
peddling
Unresponsive 
to criticism
Ignores human 
rights
Gender equality Class bias Don’t know
Village panchayat or faislo or Baloch jirga - Provincial cross-tabulation
Punjab % Sindh % Balochistan %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
15
.1
73interest.   This study intends to document how a cut or bribe when resolving civil matters, and 
the male and female respondents viewed poor people always feel victimised in dealing with 
74influentials in their respective areas.  them.  
According to the data, a high percentage of The positive attributes of local bureaucracy were 
respondents identified the negative, rather than only identified by a negligible number of 
positive, attributes of influentials. As indicated by respondents in our survey: 5.6 per cent said they 
the use of term 'influential', 37.4 per cent offered an 'affordable' service; 4.7 per cent said 
believed that influentials are involved in 'influence they were 'speedy'; and 3.3 per cent associated 
peddling' when resolving an issue or engaging them with 'gender equality'.
with local matters; 21.2 per cent believed that  
influentials are 'class bias', which was echoed by Negative attributes were identified by a much 
the participants of the round-table discussions; higher number of respondents, as you can see 
and 12.8 per cent believed that influentials from the table. However, more than one-third said 
receive 'bribes' when addressing any issue that is they did not know about the attributes of local 
brought to their attention.     bureaucracy.
Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district 
keepers); nambardars (village headmen); magistrates etc.)
tehsildars (Tehsil administration/revenue 
collection heads) or others District civil bureaucracy is predominantly 
mandated to maintain law and order, dispense 
The following data shows respondents lack of justice (both criminal and civil), and provide other 
trust of the local bureaucracy. There is a general services related to law and order and access to 
perception that local bureaucracy officials receive justice. Unfortunately, respondents' opinion about 
civil bureaucracy is also not very positive. attributes of district civil bureaucracy. 
In general, negative attributes (rather than Political groupings/vote banks (dharras)
positive attributes) were identified by a higher 
group of respondents. Surprisingly, close to half of Major political parties in Pakistan have set-up 
the respondents said they did not know about the their own small, local  political groups/vote banks 
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receive 'bribes' when addressing any issue that is they did not know about the attributes of local 
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keepers); nambardars (village headmen); magistrates etc.)
tehsildars (Tehsil administration/revenue 
collection heads) or others District civil bureaucracy is predominantly 
mandated to maintain law and order, dispense 
The following data shows respondents lack of justice (both criminal and civil), and provide other 
trust of the local bureaucracy. There is a general services related to law and order and access to 
perception that local bureaucracy officials receive justice. Unfortunately, respondents' opinion about 
civil bureaucracy is also not very positive. attributes of district civil bureaucracy. 
In general, negative attributes (rather than Political groupings/vote banks (dharras)
positive attributes) were identified by a higher 
group of respondents. Surprisingly, close to half of Major political parties in Pakistan have set-up 
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(dharras). These political groups also play a role in organised. This began to change when NGOs (non-
the local power politics and try to influence local governmental organisations) were introduced into 
75situations and issues.  According to the data, a the remote areas which the government could not 
high group of respondents (22.2 per cent) reach due to its limited resources. Pakistani 
believed that political groups are involved in society saw a mushrooming of NGOs in Pakistan, 
'influence peddling'; 18 per cent thought that especially during the Afghan jihad of the 1980s 
such groups are 'class biased'; and 10.4 per cent when United Nations organisations, the US and 
believed that such political groupings are western NGOs and humanitarian aid agencies set 
'unresponsive to criticism'.  up their offices and operations in Pakistan, 
helping Afghan refugees who crossed the Durand 
The rest of the data is self-explanatory and shows Line in search of shelter and humanitarian 
that respondents were not very positive about the assistance. 
role of political groupings. Surprisingly, 45.3 per 
cent said they did not know about the attributes Generally, development NGOs mobilise and work 
of political groupings. This could be because in through communities, especially in the rural areas 
general people in Pakistan do not like to associate of Pakistan. The data shows that the presence of 
themselves with any political party ? vote-casting community organisations in rural areas is small 
history shows that the majority do not vote in and there is still a very large portion of Pakistan's 
general elections.   landscape and community which remains 
untouched by such groups. However, where they 
Self-provision village organisations; community do exist, they carry out work in developing their 
organisations respective communities. 
Self-provision village organisations or community The question aimed to find out whether such 
organisations have existed for a long time. organisations have a presence, and if so what role 
However, until recently, they were not very well are they playing in terms of influencing local 
politics and addressing local disputes and needs Pakistan's rural areas and this is reflected in the 
etc. survey findings. The majority of respondents (63.3 
per cent) said they did not know about NGOs, 
Not surprisingly, more than two-thirds of surprisingly. However, a significant proportion of 
respondents (68.3 per cent) could not share their respondents (15.1 per cent) believed that NGOs 
opinion, as they seem to have no knowledge of provide 'affordable' services, and 9.2 per cent 
the presence of community organisations. From thought that NGOs provide 'speedy' services. 
the respondents who did know about these Negative aspects were identified by a negligible 
organisations, it is encouraging to see that more proportion of respondents ? this indicates that 
respondents identified positive attributes of people generally have a positive experience with 
community organisations than negative aspects. NGOs. 
For example, 11.1 per cent and 10.3 per cent of 
respondents believed that community Private dispute resolution mechanisms that 
organisations are 'affordable' and 'speedy', charge a fee
respectively. Only a negligible 3.2 per cent said 
that community organisations take bribes. The question on private dispute resolutions 
mechanisms that charge fee was added to this 
Local NGOs survey, as during the course of qualitative data 
gathering some key informants identified this 
According to some reports, there are more than institution. However, the existence of these 
77100,000 NGOs registered in Pakistan. However, mechanisms is not known by many.  The 
there may be only a few thousand that are active structure of such institutions varies from place to 
and working in the development, humanitarian place: some mechanisms are run by criminal 
76and policy advocacy sectors in Pakistan.  gangs and others under the patronage of the 
78political elite.
As described above, NGOs particularly target 
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the local power politics and try to influence local governmental organisations) were introduced into 
75situations and issues.  According to the data, a the remote areas which the government could not 
high group of respondents (22.2 per cent) reach due to its limited resources. Pakistani 
believed that political groups are involved in society saw a mushrooming of NGOs in Pakistan, 
'influence peddling'; 18 per cent thought that especially during the Afghan jihad of the 1980s 
such groups are 'class biased'; and 10.4 per cent when United Nations organisations, the US and 
believed that such political groupings are western NGOs and humanitarian aid agencies set 
'unresponsive to criticism'.  up their offices and operations in Pakistan, 
helping Afghan refugees who crossed the Durand 
The rest of the data is self-explanatory and shows Line in search of shelter and humanitarian 
that respondents were not very positive about the assistance. 
role of political groupings. Surprisingly, 45.3 per 
cent said they did not know about the attributes Generally, development NGOs mobilise and work 
of political groupings. This could be because in through communities, especially in the rural areas 
general people in Pakistan do not like to associate of Pakistan. The data shows that the presence of 
themselves with any political party ? vote-casting community organisations in rural areas is small 
history shows that the majority do not vote in and there is still a very large portion of Pakistan's 
general elections.   landscape and community which remains 
untouched by such groups. However, where they 
Self-provision village organisations; community do exist, they carry out work in developing their 
organisations respective communities. 
Self-provision village organisations or community The question aimed to find out whether such 
organisations have existed for a long time. organisations have a presence, and if so what role 
However, until recently, they were not very well are they playing in terms of influencing local 
politics and addressing local disputes and needs Pakistan's rural areas and this is reflected in the 
etc. survey findings. The majority of respondents (63.3 
per cent) said they did not know about NGOs, 
Not surprisingly, more than two-thirds of surprisingly. However, a significant proportion of 
respondents (68.3 per cent) could not share their respondents (15.1 per cent) believed that NGOs 
opinion, as they seem to have no knowledge of provide 'affordable' services, and 9.2 per cent 
the presence of community organisations. From thought that NGOs provide 'speedy' services. 
the respondents who did know about these Negative aspects were identified by a negligible 
organisations, it is encouraging to see that more proportion of respondents ? this indicates that 
respondents identified positive attributes of people generally have a positive experience with 
community organisations than negative aspects. NGOs. 
For example, 11.1 per cent and 10.3 per cent of 
respondents believed that community Private dispute resolution mechanisms that 
organisations are 'affordable' and 'speedy', charge a fee
respectively. Only a negligible 3.2 per cent said 
that community organisations take bribes. The question on private dispute resolutions 
mechanisms that charge fee was added to this 
Local NGOs survey, as during the course of qualitative data 
gathering some key informants identified this 
According to some reports, there are more than institution. However, the existence of these 
77100,000 NGOs registered in Pakistan. However, mechanisms is not known by many.  The 
there may be only a few thousand that are active structure of such institutions varies from place to 
and working in the development, humanitarian place: some mechanisms are run by criminal 
76and policy advocacy sectors in Pakistan.  gangs and others under the patronage of the 
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According to the survey data, 82.9 per cent of identify elements which challenge the existence of 
respondents had not heard of these private the judiciary and the breakdown of security in 
dispute resolution mechanisms that charge fee.  Pakistan. 
Nevertheless, in certain situations such When asked this question, more than three 
institutions do exist and play a role. In most cases quarters of respondents (76.5 per cent) said they 
their role is perceived as negative and did not know about crime lords – either they did 
79manipulative.  The data shows that those who not know or they did not want to speak openly. Of 
know of such institutions predominantly hold the respondents who did share an opinion, 10.6 
negative views of them. However, some per cent said that crime lords are 'class biased'. 
respondents said that such institutions offer an Apart from the negative attributes which are 
'affordable' and 'speedy' service – it may be those obvious in this case, some respondents identified 
who could afford to access these institutions and positive attributes too, surprisingly. It is possible 
had good experiences.   that the rich and powerful may have a positive 
view of such institutions, as they may have a 
Local crime lords favourable relationship with crime lords.  
'Crime lords' are most prevalent in slums, but they Religious leaders in the community
sometimes operate in other rural areas and urban 
centres too. Their presence is feared by local Religious leaders are well respected within 
communities and is not appreciated by the communities across Pakistan, especially in rural 
majority. This survey aimed to gather areas. The role and prestige of religious clergy and 
respondents' views about crime lords, so as to leaders has increased tremendously during recent 
give a comparison to other institutions, and to years, especially during the Afghan Jihad against 
the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, when garner support at the grassroots level for Jihad in 
Pakistan helped the Afghan Mujahideen during Afghanistan, especially in FATA, KP, Balochistan 
80 81their struggle.  Religious leaders were utilised to and the southern part of Punjab.
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According to the survey data, 82.9 per cent of identify elements which challenge the existence of 
respondents had not heard of these private the judiciary and the breakdown of security in 
dispute resolution mechanisms that charge fee.  Pakistan. 
Nevertheless, in certain situations such When asked this question, more than three 
institutions do exist and play a role. In most cases quarters of respondents (76.5 per cent) said they 
their role is perceived as negative and did not know about crime lords – either they did 
79manipulative.  The data shows that those who not know or they did not want to speak openly. Of 
know of such institutions predominantly hold the respondents who did share an opinion, 10.6 
negative views of them. However, some per cent said that crime lords are 'class biased'. 
respondents said that such institutions offer an Apart from the negative attributes which are 
'affordable' and 'speedy' service – it may be those obvious in this case, some respondents identified 
who could afford to access these institutions and positive attributes too, surprisingly. It is possible 
had good experiences.   that the rich and powerful may have a positive 
view of such institutions, as they may have a 
Local crime lords favourable relationship with crime lords.  
'Crime lords' are most prevalent in slums, but they Religious leaders in the community
sometimes operate in other rural areas and urban 
centres too. Their presence is feared by local Religious leaders are well respected within 
communities and is not appreciated by the communities across Pakistan, especially in rural 
majority. This survey aimed to gather areas. The role and prestige of religious clergy and 
respondents' views about crime lords, so as to leaders has increased tremendously during recent 
give a comparison to other institutions, and to years, especially during the Afghan Jihad against 
the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, when garner support at the grassroots level for Jihad in 
Pakistan helped the Afghan Mujahideen during Afghanistan, especially in FATA, KP, Balochistan 
80 81their struggle.  Religious leaders were utilised to and the southern part of Punjab.
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However, recently religious leaders have received did not know about religious leaders, while in 
criticism for their role in dispute resolution, Pakhtun districts only one quarter (26.5 per cent) 
particularly in cases where their harsh decisions said they did not know. A higher number of 
82have violated the rights of the people involved.  Pakhtun respondents (45.6 per cent) believed that 
Generally, disputants consult religious leaders the services of religious leaders were 'affordable', 
over petty issues and family matters. Respondents compared to only 18.5 per cent of respondents 
of round-table discussions confirmed that from the rest of Pakistan. Another striking 
religious leaders are also available to resolve comparison is with regards to views on the speed 
complex matters, such as cases of robbery/theft, of service. In Pakhtun districts, 31.1 per cent said 
83 that religious leaders provide 'speedy' services, murders, honour killing, etc.  In recent times, the 
compared to 21.5 per cent from the rest of media has highlighted the role of religious leaders 
Pakistan. in certain cases – especially cases of a criminal 
nature where religious leaders made harsh 
84 In analysing respondents' views of the negative decisions.  It has been observed that verdicts 
attributes of religious leaders in both regions, issued by religious leaders have violated human 
85 there is little variation. rights.
On the whole, the above data shows that religious The graph shows data for rest of Pakistan as well 
leaders are more highly respected in Pakhtun as data for Pakhtun districts of KP and Balochistan. 
districts than in the rest of Pakistan. The results show a clear distinction between 
 opinions from respondents in Pakhtun districts 
Musalihati Council (MC)and from respondents in the rest of Pakistan. For 
example, more than half (56.3 per cent) of the 
Established under the Local Government  respondents from the rest of Pakistan said they 
Ordinance 2001, Musalihati Councils or Anjuman by 80.7 per cent of respondents. In Pakhtun 
are Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) districts too, 88.8 per cent, an overwhelming 
mechanisms for the settlement of disputes and majority, identified police authorities. This 
mediation. These councils were set-up in 22 response was predictable, as the network of 
districts of Pakistan with the objectives of: police stations and their presence is highly visible 
building cooperation amongst the judiciary, police and people have a good knowledge of the police. 
and Musalihati Anjuman; promoting the The second highest-ranked institution was 
accountable and equitable dispensation of justice; khandan (extended family), which was identified 
promoting the legal rights of women, and the role by 77.2 per cent of respondents; 72.7 per cent of 
of men in ending violence; and maintaining law respondents identified biradari (clan); and 71.1 
and order. per cent of respondents identified mohalla 
(neighbourhood). Respondents have very carefully 
The surveys for respondents in the rest of Pakistan and responsibly identified the above-mentioned 
and Pakhtun districts were undertaken at different institutions according to their importance and 
times. 3 districts out of 12 - where Musalihati existence. The data here shows that these 
Anjuman were set up alongside the local institutions have close links with people.
government system - were part of the survey 
sample. The survey results below indicate that the In terms of other institutions that respondents 
overwhelming majority of respondents in both identified as per their order of importance, the 
regions – 85.6 per cent in the rest of Pakistan and next institution was the local landowner which 
87.1 per cent in Pakhtun districts – did not know was identified by 54.2 per cent of respondents. 
about the attributes of the MCs because they are 
not active in their districts. The rest of the data is Next is 'lower courts' – which was identified by 43 
self-explanatory. per cent of respondents. It should be noted that 
lower courts exist in urban centres and therefore 
The data shows a small variation between both they are more accessible to urban populations as 
regions on both negative and positive attributes of opposed to rural communities. 
Musalihati Councils.
Finally, panchayat/faislo/Baloch jirga takes 
Existence/presence of various formal and seventh place in the list in terms of the results 
informal institutions within communities from respondents in the rest of Pakistan, though 
in Pakhtun districts it takes second place on the 
Respondents were asked about the presence of list (with 81.2 per cent of respondents identifying 
various formal and informal institutions which jirga during the 2012 survey conducted in Pakhtun 
respondents can access for getting services districts of KP and Balochistan). It is generally 
regarding justice and/ or to settle their disputes. perceived that local informal dispute resolution 
Respondents were provided with a long list (with mechanisms do exist in the rural areas of Pakistan. 
multiple choices) of relevant institutions which  Although this may be true in the case of Pakhtun 
are directly or indirectly involved in resolving districts, the results for the rest of Pakistan do not 
people's disputes and issues. completely endorse this. Further data analysis 
later in this report may help us to draw some 
Respondents identified the various institutions conclusions.  
which they considered most important. Police 
authorities or their representatives stood out as The data in the rest of the table is self-
the most prominent institution and was identified explanatory. 
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84. Interview with Rizwan Tariq, Editor Daily Jang newspaper, 25 August 2013, Karachi
85. Ibid 
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about the attributes of the MCs because they are 
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self-explanatory. per cent of respondents. It should be noted that 
lower courts exist in urban centres and therefore 
The data shows a small variation between both they are more accessible to urban populations as 
regions on both negative and positive attributes of opposed to rural communities. 
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Finally, panchayat/faislo/Baloch jirga takes 
Existence/presence of various formal and seventh place in the list in terms of the results 
informal institutions within communities from respondents in the rest of Pakistan, though 
in Pakhtun districts it takes second place on the 
Respondents were asked about the presence of list (with 81.2 per cent of respondents identifying 
various formal and informal institutions which jirga during the 2012 survey conducted in Pakhtun 
respondents can access for getting services districts of KP and Balochistan). It is generally 
regarding justice and/ or to settle their disputes. perceived that local informal dispute resolution 
Respondents were provided with a long list (with mechanisms do exist in the rural areas of Pakistan. 
multiple choices) of relevant institutions which  Although this may be true in the case of Pakhtun 
are directly or indirectly involved in resolving districts, the results for the rest of Pakistan do not 
people's disputes and issues. completely endorse this. Further data analysis 
later in this report may help us to draw some 
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82. Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
83. Ibid 
84. Interview with Rizwan Tariq, Editor Daily Jang newspaper, 25 August 2013, Karachi
85. Ibid 
which might have affected the overall result for CONCLUSION 
panchayat, faislo and Baloch jirga. The Pakhtun 
survey generally discussed Pakhtun jirga as the This study compares recent survey results for the 
only informal justice system, whereas the recent three Pakistani provinces of Punjab, Sindh and 
survey had enhanced the list of choice for Baloch districts, with 2012 data gathered in 
respondents with more informal institutions to Pakhtun districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 
choose from including khandan, mohalla, and Balochistan. 
biradari. This might have divided respondents' 
choice and affected the overall result.  This chapter highlights a few striking 
dissimilarities between the two data sets. For 
The data shows that the overwhelming majority example, Pakhtun jirga in KP and Balochistan's 
of respondents did not know about some of the Pakhtun populated districts is held in high esteem 
formal institutions. With regards to the formal by the overwhelming majority and is trusted more 
institutions that they were familiar with, the than other forms of informal dispute resolution 
majority hold negative perceptions of these. systems (panchayat, faislo and Baloch jirga) in 
People's lack of knowledge and negative other parts of Pakistan. This is not surprising as 
perceptions of formal justice systems is perturbing Pakhtun jirga is comparatively more organised. 
and needs to be taken seriously and addressed by However, it is important to share another reason 
the policy makers. Lack of access to the formal 
justice system in most parts of the country 
undermines the rule of law, and leads to a 
86 breakdown of law and order. During the round-
table discussions, the overwhelming majority of 
participants blamed the formal judicial system for 
poor people's denial of access to justice, 
compelling them to take the law in their own 
87hands.  Due to gaps in the administrative and 
executive system people are forced to find 
88another relief system.
Despite their institutional weaknesses, lack of 
inclusivity and poor infrastructure, informal 
dispute resolution institutions are being 
approached by the majority in Pakistan. Formal 
institutions are largely by-passed, regarded as 
inaccessible, expensive, corrupt, and influenced 
by political peddling.
This survey and previous surveys provide 
sufficient evidence for policy makers to begin a 
debate for a judicial system which could 
accommodate informal institutions at some level. 
A few options and questions are raised in the last 
chapter of this study for policy makers to mull 
over.
55 56
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Institutions Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun districts %
Provincial police authorities and their local representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP, etc.) 80.7 88.8
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and High Courts) 13.3 42.6
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District and Sessions Courts) 43 Did not ask
Federal Shariat Court 4.6 Did not ask
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 17.4 Did not ask
Ombudsman 8.5 Did not ask
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 9.1 Did not ask
Khandan (extended family) 77.2 Did not ask
Mohalla  (neighbourhood) 71.1 Did not ask
Biradari  (clan) 72.7 Did not ask
Large local landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 54.2 Did not ask
Village panchayat  (akhat pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon), faislo, Baloch jirga 42.9 81.2
Local influentials (local, provincial, national) 35.2 Did not ask
Local bureaucracy – patwaris  (land record keepers); nambardars  (village headmen); 
tehsildars 37.5 Did not ask
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates etc.) 20.4 Did not ask
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras ) 21.5 Did not ask
Self-provision village organisations; community organisations 7 Did not ask
Local NGOs 19.5 Did not ask
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that charge a fee 1.4 Did not ask
Local crime lords 3.5 Did not ask
Religious leader in the community 14.7 Did not ask
Musalihati Council 4
Other 0.3 0.4
Don’t know 1.3 1
Do you have the following institutions in your community/area?
Did not ask
which might have affected the overall result for CONCLUSION 
panchayat, faislo and Baloch jirga. The Pakhtun 
survey generally discussed Pakhtun jirga as the This study compares recent survey results for the 
only informal justice system, whereas the recent three Pakistani provinces of Punjab, Sindh and 
survey had enhanced the list of choice for Baloch districts, with 2012 data gathered in 
respondents with more informal institutions to Pakhtun districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 
choose from including khandan, mohalla, and Balochistan. 
biradari. This might have divided respondents' 
choice and affected the overall result.  This chapter highlights a few striking 
dissimilarities between the two data sets. For 
The data shows that the overwhelming majority example, Pakhtun jirga in KP and Balochistan's 
of respondents did not know about some of the Pakhtun populated districts is held in high esteem 
formal institutions. With regards to the formal by the overwhelming majority and is trusted more 
institutions that they were familiar with, the than other forms of informal dispute resolution 
majority hold negative perceptions of these. systems (panchayat, faislo and Baloch jirga) in 
People's lack of knowledge and negative other parts of Pakistan. This is not surprising as 
perceptions of formal justice systems is perturbing Pakhtun jirga is comparatively more organised. 
and needs to be taken seriously and addressed by However, it is important to share another reason 
the policy makers. Lack of access to the formal 
justice system in most parts of the country 
undermines the rule of law, and leads to a 
86 breakdown of law and order. During the round-
table discussions, the overwhelming majority of 
participants blamed the formal judicial system for 
poor people's denial of access to justice, 
compelling them to take the law in their own 
87hands.  Due to gaps in the administrative and 
executive system people are forced to find 
88another relief system.
Despite their institutional weaknesses, lack of 
inclusivity and poor infrastructure, informal 
dispute resolution institutions are being 
approached by the majority in Pakistan. Formal 
institutions are largely by-passed, regarded as 
inaccessible, expensive, corrupt, and influenced 
by political peddling.
This survey and previous surveys provide 
sufficient evidence for policy makers to begin a 
debate for a judicial system which could 
accommodate informal institutions at some level. 
A few options and questions are raised in the last 
chapter of this study for policy makers to mull 
over.
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Provincial police authorities and their local representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP, etc.) 80.7 88.8
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and High Courts) 13.3 42.6
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District and Sessions Courts) 43 Did not ask
Federal Shariat Court 4.6 Did not ask
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 17.4 Did not ask
Ombudsman 8.5 Did not ask
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 9.1 Did not ask
Khandan (extended family) 77.2 Did not ask
Mohalla  (neighbourhood) 71.1 Did not ask
Biradari  (clan) 72.7 Did not ask
Large local landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 54.2 Did not ask
Village panchayat  (akhat pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon), faislo, Baloch jirga 42.9 81.2
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Local bureaucracy – patwaris  (land record keepers); nambardars  (village headmen); 
tehsildars 37.5 Did not ask
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates etc.) 20.4 Did not ask
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras ) 21.5 Did not ask
Self-provision village organisations; community organisations 7 Did not ask
Local NGOs 19.5 Did not ask
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that charge a fee 1.4 Did not ask
Local crime lords 3.5 Did not ask
Religious leader in the community 14.7 Did not ask
Musalihati Council 4
Other 0.3 0.4
Don’t know 1.3 1
Do you have the following institutions in your community/area?
Did not ask

lFormal courts of law – both lower and INTRODUCTION
superior courts as well as Federal Shariat 
Court Access to justice is defined by UNDP as 'the ability 
lState administrative authorities and of people to seek and obtain a remedy through 
institutions (police department, district formal or informal institutions of justice, in 
1 administration, paralegal services, conformity with human rights standards'.  UNDP's 
Ombudsmen)report further elaborates, 'This definition 
lNizam-e-Adal – in case of Malakand division describes people's ability to solve disputes and 
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwareach adequate remedies for grievances, using 
lMusalihati Councils (MCs) or state's formal or non-formal justice systems. It further 
sponsored alternative dispute resolution clarifies that the justice process has qualitative 
mechanism, which was trialled in 22 districts dimensions, and should be carried out in 
of Pakistan but could not continue providing accordance with human rights principles and 
2 their services the moment Local Bodies (LBs) standards.’   As is reflected in the definition and 
were dissolved in 2007. MCs were informal elaborated further in the same report, 'access to 
but were having state's patronage. Local justice goes beyond access to formal structures of 
elections are expected to take place in the courts and the legal system. It incorporates a 
near future and it is anticipated that LBs will process that comprises more normative 
be revived again. understanding of fairness and accountability, 
lInformal dispute resolution mechanisms – which result in strategic approaches that ensure 
panchayat, faislo, Baloch jirga, Pakhtun jirga.equal and equitable access to rights and 
3services.’  
In addition, other informal institutions, such as 
extended family, clans and neighbourhood, In this study we have identified the following 
political dharras, etc. provide other options formal and informal institutions dealing with 
accessible to people for such remedies. This study justice services. However, the number may not be 
uses theoretical analysis from available material restricted to the following institutions and might 
developed for other situations, and primary data go beyond this list. 
from Pakistan respondents help reinforce the 
argument for having a legal pluralism, which could path laid down by the imperialist forces. 
be accessed by the rich and poor in Pakistan.  Unfortunately, however, despite all of its 
In the introductory chapter of this study, Dr. sophistications, the majority in Pakistan 
Osama Siddique provides extensive information (representing the poorest sectors) do not 
and strong arguments for why the informal justice understand the formal court procedures and 
system does not currently do more in supporting language, and view it as an alien system. 
the formal judicial system of Pakistan. Dr. Osama 
6also explains why informal dispute resolution According to George C. Pavlich (1996):
systems have been criticized, and how the formal 
justice system is assumed (especially by judges, 'Buying ecclesial indulgences for absolution is no 
lawyers, bureaucrats and others trained in formal longer common practice, but purchasing justice is. 
law) as an embodiment of the state and its In secular worlds under postmodern conditions, 
commitment to uphold a common law which is the aim of such purchase is not to find salvation in 
the same for all and which provides additional the hereafter, but to rectify circumstances in the 
mechanisms for protecting minorities and here and now. Many critical scholars engaged in 
historically vulnerable groups – and that emerges legal thought, in juris disciplina, have suspended 
out of deliberative democratic processes. Dr. metanarratives pertaining to an eternal, singular 
Osama argues convincingly for informal justice justice, or a lex eterna, which promises equal 
systems to be integrated into the state's justice treatment to all those who come before it 
system. This chapter will build on Dr. Osama's (Lyotard and Thebaud 1985, Derrida 1992, White 
argument and will provide some academic 1987/8). For, in the everyday, temporal processes 
evidence to support the case for the integration of law, the lex temporalis, a steady stream of 
of informal justice systems into Pakistan's formal bewildered litigants must endure the costly, time-
justice system, making it a country with pluralist consuming and inhospitable processes of the 
legal systems working together or simultaneously. courthouse. The liberal promise of equality before 
the law today rings as little more than a formal, 
Like many other countries with colonial history, hollow abstraction, largely favouring those with 
Pakistan's formal judicial system was developed the means to play the legal game.'
for the first time under British Colonial rule, 
whereas informal justice systems existed and The formal system of Pakistan is assumed to be 
persisted before the advent of British Raj. Despite more sophisticated, effective, and efficient than 
gaining independence from Britain, Pakistan the informal dispute resolution system. However, 
continues to practice the British formal system this is highly misleading. The widely-
4without bringing any reform to it.  Pakistan took a acknowledged shortcomings of, and hostility to, 
while after independence to develop its first the Pakistani formal justice system by the 
Constitution in 1956, which was obviously in majority of its citizens, illustrate the system's 
7accordance with Western ideologies and law. limits and limitations.
Since the advent of independence, the external 
imposition of legal systems has in some ways Pavlich (1996) adds that typically, 'the 
increased, as 'the new nations frequently stress mechanisms of litigation usurp conflict from a 
5legal uniformity as a key to nation-building'.  The given situation and transform it, often 
legal system of Pakistan continues to follow the unrecognizably to those involved, into a 
CHAPTER 3
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were dissolved in 2007. MCs were informal elaborated further in the same report, 'access to 
but were having state's patronage. Local justice goes beyond access to formal structures of 
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near future and it is anticipated that LBs will process that comprises more normative 
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accessible to people for such remedies. This study justice services. However, the number may not be 
uses theoretical analysis from available material restricted to the following institutions and might 
developed for other situations, and primary data go beyond this list. 
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be accessed by the rich and poor in Pakistan.  Unfortunately, however, despite all of its 
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7) Interview with Nadeem Qureshi, Judge Customs Appellate Court, 26 August 2013, Karachi
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8professonalised legal dispute'…   and that 'having systems demonstrate that informal justice systems 
such a situation in front, a common man will opt and practices hold the promise of a justice that is 
for options which he sees as less expensive, quick more accessible, empowering and participatory, 
9 less costly and less adversarial. Before we analyse and in accordance with his needs'. 
the survey data, it will be helpful to analyse briefly 
some academic literature developed on the The majority in Pakistan rely on restorative 
informal justice systems.  (healing) principles – which are derived 
fundamentally from indigenous or rural societies 
Andrew Woolford and R.S. Ratner state that the and their practices in Pakistan's major cultures. 
'informal' characteristics that unite these justice There is sufficient evidence to prove that this 
13restorative informal justice system is effective and practices are:
has legitimacy within the masses despite its illegal 
presence in Pakistan society. The fact that o They are intended to facilitate the 
advocacy has grown stronger shows that traditions, participation and empowerment of the parties 
customs, and native laws (customary law) remain involved in the conflict without necessary 
effective and efficient in rural as well as industrial recourse to legal professionals;
cultures; it also shows that traditions, customs, and o They are adaptable to the specific conditions 
native laws are potent mechanisms for social of the conflict at hand, rather than rigidly 
10 bound by rules;control in a modern society. 
o Their legitimacy does not derive from 
authorities, but rather from the representative The existence of normative legal systems operating 
and deliberative involvement of concerned independently or semi-independently from the 
parties, as well as participant satisfaction. state is an empirical reality in almost every 
11decolonised country in the world.  The 'informal 
To support this argument, Albert Fiadjoe shares the justice' systems refer to those forms of justice that 
following model from Zehr (1990) providing are said to take place outside of the formal 
assumptions for retributive and restorative justice courtroom, in settings that are less rule-bound and 
1412 systems:adversarial.  Such informal justice systems are 
operating under different customs and traditions in 
Pakistan's heterogeneous society. This study 
focuses on four major cultures and languages, 
namely panchayat (Punjab), Pakhtun jirga (KP, 
Balochistan's Pashtun speaking districts and FATA), 
faislo (Sindh) and Baloch jirga (Balochistan's Baloch 
districts). Despite their prevalence, legitimacy 
within the masses and the growing academic 
recognition of their existence, Pakistan's 'positivist' 
state institutions and civil society have remained 
very critical of their existence. 
On the other hand, critiques of formal justice 
17Woolford and Ratner add that 'in contrast, the Albert Fiadjoe (2004) argues,
formal justice system fails on these three grounds. 
The court-based system of formal justice “There is no question but that conflict resolution, 
disempowers the parties to a dispute by making through the process of negotiation, mediation and 
legal professionals the key participants in the arbitration, has become an acceptable and, indeed, 
dispute resolution process. Formal law serves the inevitable part of creative lawyering in the 21st 
primary function of reinforcing state legitimacy century. That explains why all self-respecting law 
rather than restoring positive community schools now provide for skills training in the field of 
15relations.'  This is precisely so because crime has Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as part of 
hitherto been regarded as an offence against the their core offering.”
state (society) … not many recognise such a system 
16as being capable of achieving 'justice' for all.    Furthermore, roots of informal dispute resolution 
61 62
8) George C. Pavlich, Justice Fragmented: Mediating community disputes under postmodern conditions, Routledge. p. 1.(1996)
9) Interview with Saif Anjum, Special Secretary Home, Punjab, 22 August 2013, Lahore
10) Nonso Okafo, Reconstructing Law and Justice in a Postcolony, Ashgate Publishing Company, p.8.(2009)
11) Franz von Benda-Beckmann (1985) quoted in Miranda Forsyth, 2009, A bird that flies with two wings: Kastom and state justice systems in Vanuatu, University Printing Services, ANU
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13) Ibid. p. 2–3.
14) [Source: Adapted from Zehr, 1990] Zehr, H, 'Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice', Mennonite Central Committee. Quoted in Albert Fiadjoe (2004). p.125.
15) Ibid. p. 3.
16) Albert Fiadjoe, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Developing World Perspective, Cavendish Publishing. p.109.(2004)
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Retributive  Restorative justice 
Crime is an act against the state, a violation of a 
law, an abstract idea.  
Crime is an act against another person or 
the community. 
The criminal justice system controls crime. Crime control lies primarily in the 
community. 
Offender accountability defined as taking 
punishment. 
Accountability defined as assuming 
responsibility and taking action to repair 
harm. 
Punishment is effective; threat of punishment 
deters crime; punishment changes behaviour.  
Punishment alone is not effective in 
changing behaviour and is disruptive to 
community harmony and good 
relationships. 
Victims are peripheral to the process. Victims are central to the process of 
resolving a crime. 
The offender is defined by deficits. The offender is defined by capacity to 
make reparation. 
Focus on establishing blame, on guilt, on 
past (did he/she do it?). 
Focus on problem solving, on liabilities or 
obligations, on future (what should be 
done). 
Emphasis on adversarial relationship. Emphasis on dialogue and negotiation. 
Imposition of pain to punish/deter.  Restitution as a means of restoring both 
parties’ goal of reconciliation/restoration. 
Community on sideline, represented abstractly 
by the state. 
Community as facilitator in restorative 
process. 
Response focused on offender’s past 
behaviour.  
 
Response focused on harmful 
consequences of offender’s behaviour, 
emphasis on the future. 
Dependence upon proxy professionals. 
 
Direct involvement by participants. 
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Crime is an act against another person or 
the community. 
The criminal justice system controls crime. Crime control lies primarily in the 
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Offender accountability defined as taking 
punishment. 
Accountability defined as assuming 
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Punishment is effective; threat of punishment 
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changing behaviour and is disruptive to 
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past (did he/she do it?). 
Focus on problem solving, on liabilities or 
obligations, on future (what should be 
done). 
Emphasis on adversarial relationship. Emphasis on dialogue and negotiation. 
Imposition of pain to punish/deter.  Restitution as a means of restoring both 
parties’ goal of reconciliation/restoration. 
Community on sideline, represented abstractly 
by the state. 
Community as facilitator in restorative 
process. 
Response focused on offender’s past 
behaviour.  
 
Response focused on harmful 
consequences of offender’s behaviour, 
emphasis on the future. 
Dependence upon proxy professionals. 
 
Direct involvement by participants. 
19systems or restorative justice systems can be wani  and have contributed significantly to the 
traced in Islam from its early stages of advent. rise of cases of violence against women in 
According to Jerome T. Barrett with Joseph P. Pakistan. For instance, in cases of murder, 
18Barrett, (2004): informal justice systems may recommend direct 
vengeance or the exchange of women as 
'From the earliest days of Islam, Muhammad swara/wani.  According to a 2012 UNICEF report, 
(PBUH-570 to 632 AD) encouraged and practised approximately 1000 women are killed in Pakistan 
tahkim, or arbitration, to resolve a variety of per year in the name of honour. In other words, 
disputes. Muhammad's role as arbitrator is 25 per cent of the total honour killings in the 
20sanctioned by revelation. Once Islam became world occur in Pakistan.  Human rights challenges 
dominant in a community, local law was amended posed by informal justice systems are discussed 
to include arbitration. The Islamic tradition and further in chapter six of this study.
culture focuses more on the group or community 
than on the individual. Originating in ancient Survey findings and analysis 
Middle Eastern tribes and villages were the 
dispute resolution practices of sulh (settlement) The survey aimed to gather respondents' 
and Musalaha (reconciliation). The two together, understanding of access to justice. This section 
often referred to simply as Sulh, have been used will also make use of the previous survey (2012) 
to control conflict and maintain harmony within data documented from Pakhtun districts of 
and between tightly knit social groups. The ritual Pakistan, which will help draw comparisons 
practices involve conversations, information among various institutions, regions, cultures and 
sharing, and exchanging promises about the circumstances. This section analyses the survey 
future.' findings pertaining to respondents' knowledge 
and experience of access to justice, correlating 
Although informal justice systems may be with dynamics of conflict and disputes. 
preferred for reasons cited above, they have the 
tendency to violate human rights, especially Understanding access to justice
women's and minority rights. Informal justice 
systems are seen to have abetted inhuman The respondents were provided with multiple 
cultural practices against women such as swara or options and were allowed to select more than one 
option. The concept of access to justice is rest of Pakistan. It is to be noted that two options 
assumed to be technical and for a layperson it is given in the rest of Pakistan survey were not 
hard to correctly define. Nonetheless, it can be offered in the Pakhtun districts survey. 
argued that common perceptions often convey 
correct sentiment. Perception of access to justice 
The data shows some interesting trends. More Once respondents had been asked to define 
than half of the respondents (53.8 per cent) access to justice, they were further asked to share 
believed that access to justice meant the 'right to their perception of how access was ensured to all. 
a fair and just trial' whereas 40 per cent thought As shown in the table below, the majority (61.8 
that access to justice meant a 'proper hearing, per cent) believed that 'to a moderate extent' 
trial and remedies against grievances'. For 28.5 there has been access to justice in their districts 
per cent of respondents, access to justice meant or area. In Pakhtun districts too, a two-third 
'justice for all, especially vulnerable groups majority (68.3 per cent – slightly higher than the 
(women and minorities)'; 21 per cent believed rest of Pakistan) had the same opinion about 
access to justice meant 'better distribution of equal access to justice. Respondents from the rest 
society's resources'. of Pakistan survey seemed to be more pessimistic 
– 20 per cent of respondents thought that there 
Comparing both sets of data, we see striking has been no access to justice at all, compared to 
similarities except in one area. According to the only 9.2 per cent from Pakhtun districts who 
data, Pakhtun districts seem more realistic of responded to this question.   
access to justice and more respondents believed 
in access to justice for all, especially for vulnerable More respondents in Pakhtun districts (17.1 per 
groups as compared to the respondents in the cent) as compared to those in the rest of Pakistan 
63 6418) Jerome T. Barrett with Joseph P. Barrett, A History of Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Story of a Political, Cultural, and Social Movement. Published in affiliation with the Association for Conflict Resolution. Jossey-Bass: A Wiley Imprint. P.13–14.(2004)
19) Swara (in Pushtu language) or Wani (in Punjabi language) means marriage of a girl from the offender's family/tribe to the victim's close relative without her consent
20) Situation Analysis of Women and Children in Pakistan, National Report, UNICEF, p.118.(2012)
Response Rest of Pakistan 
(%)
Pakhtun districts 
(%)
Right to a fair and just trial 53.8 50
Access to justice for all, especially for vulnerable groups (women and
minorities etc)
28.5 40.46
Proper hearing, trial and remedies against grievances 40.1 40.1
Better access to opportunities for employment and income generation 13.6 Did not ask
Better distribution of society’s resources 21 Did not ask
Other 1.3 2.33
Don’t know 11.6 7.33
 What is your understanding of access to justice? 
Ch
ap
te
r 
3 
: A
cc
es
s 
to
 ju
st
ic
e 
an
d 
co
nf
lic
t 
dy
na
m
ic
s 
in
 P
ak
is
ta
n
Ch
ap
te
r 
3 
: A
cc
es
s 
to
 ju
st
ic
e 
an
d 
co
nf
lic
t 
dy
na
m
ic
s 
in
 P
ak
is
ta
n
Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun Districts %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
20
61
.8
10
.2
8.
1
9.
2
68
.3
17
.1
5.
4
Not at all To a moderate extent To a large extent Don’t know
To what extend do you think there has been access to justice in your district/area?
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Response Rest of Pakistan 
(%)
Pakhtun districts 
(%)
Right to a fair and just trial 53.8 50
Access to justice for all, especially for vulnerable groups (women and
minorities etc)
28.5 40.46
Proper hearing, trial and remedies against grievances 40.1 40.1
Better access to opportunities for employment and income generation 13.6 Did not ask
Better distribution of society’s resources 21 Did not ask
Other 1.3 2.33
Don’t know 11.6 7.33
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To what extend do you think there has been access to justice in your district/area?
(10.2 per cent) thought that there has been access the categories of individuals/groups who do not 
to justice to a large extent. The overall data for have access to justice under the formal justice 
this inquiry shows that people in the rest of system. 
Pakistan are more pessimistic than those in 
Pakhtun districts. The graph shows significant variations in the data 
for both regions. For instance, in Pakhtun districts, 
Participants of the round-table discussions in 29.8 per cent believed that women do not have 
Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan were also quite access to the formal justice system, whereas in 
distrustful about access to justice under the the rest of Pakistan survey 42.8 per cent of 
formal justice system. The majority of the respondents believed that women do not have 
participants of the round-table discussions access to justice. We have seen and observed that 
criticised the role of the informal justice system, vulnerable women scarcely have access to justice 
which often violates the rights of vulnerable due to numerous cultural, financial and physical 
people. However, they equally criticised the barriers. However, respondents in Pakhtun 
formal judicial system, which is not accessible to districts, as compared to the respondents in the 
21vulnerable groups. rest of Pakistan, seem to have little realization of 
the fact that women have not been given ample 
Perception of equal access to justice – under the opportunities and space to have access to formal 
22formal system justice.  In addition, 98.2 per cent of respondents 
from the rest of Pakistan survey thought that poor 
This question addresses the issue of access to and low caste groups do not have access to 
justice for different groups of society. justice, as compared to Pakhtun districts where 
Respondents were asked to share their opinion on 65.6 per cent believed this. This is a significant 
variation between both sets of data. The reason vulnerable people approach the formal court 
could be that there isn't really a culture of castes system, they end up facing resourceful opponents 
24in Pakhtun areas as compared to other provinces, and losing their cases.
and that Pakhtun society is more egalitarian than 
other cultures as argued by many western Perception of equal access to justice – under 
anthropologists, writers and historians – although various informal justice systems
women have low status in Pukhtun society. 
A similar question with similar options is repeated 
25.1 per cent of respondents believed that here, but this time the question is in reference to 
'landless peasants and agricultural laborers' have the informal justice system, specifically village 
access to formal justice. Please note this was a panchayat, faislo, and Baloch jirga. This data is 
new category added in the latest survey further compared with data sets gathered from 
conducted in the rest of Pakistan.  Pakhtun districts and Pakhtun jirga. The data 
provides a striking contrast with the previous 
Participants of the round-table discussions were opinions and with the Pakhtun region about the 
also very cynical about vulnerable groups' access formal and informal systems of justice. 
to justice under the formal justice system. 
Vulnerable groups are always neglected under any More than half of respondents (54.1 per cent) 
system – be it formal or informal – as they do not believed that women do not have access to justice 
have ample opportunities and resources to satisfy under informal justice systems. This shows 
23their needs pertaining to justice.  Informal justice respondents' clarity on women's lack of access to 
systems favour rich and influential groups; if informal justice systems – panchayat, faislo and 
65 66
21) Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
22) Interview with Maryam Bibi, Chief Executive Khwendo Kor (Sisters' Home – NGO), 13 August 2013, Peshawar
23) Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
24) Ibid
23) Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
24) Ibid
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What categories of individuals/groups do not have access to justice in your district/area under the
formal justice system such as the Supreme Court, High Courts and Lower Courts?
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What categories of individuals/groups do not have access to justice in your district/area under
informal justice system such as jirga/panchayat/faislo? 
(10.2 per cent) thought that there has been access the categories of individuals/groups who do not 
to justice to a large extent. The overall data for have access to justice under the formal justice 
this inquiry shows that people in the rest of system. 
Pakistan are more pessimistic than those in 
Pakhtun districts. The graph shows significant variations in the data 
for both regions. For instance, in Pakhtun districts, 
Participants of the round-table discussions in 29.8 per cent believed that women do not have 
Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan were also quite access to the formal justice system, whereas in 
distrustful about access to justice under the the rest of Pakistan survey 42.8 per cent of 
formal justice system. The majority of the respondents believed that women do not have 
participants of the round-table discussions access to justice. We have seen and observed that 
criticised the role of the informal justice system, vulnerable women scarcely have access to justice 
which often violates the rights of vulnerable due to numerous cultural, financial and physical 
people. However, they equally criticised the barriers. However, respondents in Pakhtun 
formal judicial system, which is not accessible to districts, as compared to the respondents in the 
21vulnerable groups. rest of Pakistan, seem to have little realization of 
the fact that women have not been given ample 
Perception of equal access to justice – under the opportunities and space to have access to formal 
22formal system justice.  In addition, 98.2 per cent of respondents 
from the rest of Pakistan survey thought that poor 
This question addresses the issue of access to and low caste groups do not have access to 
justice for different groups of society. justice, as compared to Pakhtun districts where 
Respondents were asked to share their opinion on 65.6 per cent believed this. This is a significant 
variation between both sets of data. The reason vulnerable people approach the formal court 
could be that there isn't really a culture of castes system, they end up facing resourceful opponents 
24in Pakhtun areas as compared to other provinces, and losing their cases.
and that Pakhtun society is more egalitarian than 
other cultures as argued by many western Perception of equal access to justice – under 
anthropologists, writers and historians – although various informal justice systems
women have low status in Pukhtun society. 
A similar question with similar options is repeated 
25.1 per cent of respondents believed that here, but this time the question is in reference to 
'landless peasants and agricultural laborers' have the informal justice system, specifically village 
access to formal justice. Please note this was a panchayat, faislo, and Baloch jirga. This data is 
new category added in the latest survey further compared with data sets gathered from 
conducted in the rest of Pakistan.  Pakhtun districts and Pakhtun jirga. The data 
provides a striking contrast with the previous 
Participants of the round-table discussions were opinions and with the Pakhtun region about the 
also very cynical about vulnerable groups' access formal and informal systems of justice. 
to justice under the formal justice system. 
Vulnerable groups are always neglected under any More than half of respondents (54.1 per cent) 
system – be it formal or informal – as they do not believed that women do not have access to justice 
have ample opportunities and resources to satisfy under informal justice systems. This shows 
23their needs pertaining to justice.  Informal justice respondents' clarity on women's lack of access to 
systems favour rich and influential groups; if informal justice systems – panchayat, faislo and 
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21) Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
22) Interview with Maryam Bibi, Chief Executive Khwendo Kor (Sisters' Home – NGO), 13 August 2013, Peshawar
23) Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
24) Ibid
23) Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
24) Ibid
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formal justice system such as the Supreme Court, High Courts and Lower Courts?
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Balochi jirga. Comparing this data with Pakhtun men and women. In many cases, women are killed 
districts and Pakhtun jirga, only 28 per cent and men escape the punishment by paying money 
27believed that women have no access to Pakhtun or a girl in marriage (as vani).  Participants of 
jirga. Since women have indirect access to Balochistan round-table discussions were more in 
Pakhtun jirga through their male family members, favour of Baloch jirga which they believed was 
it might be perceived by respondents in Pakhtun more accessible to all. However, they could not 
districts that women have access to jirga. provide sufficient justification that there was 
28However, if women do not have direct access then accessibility for women.
this access to justice under the informal justice 
system itself becomes questionable. This is also true to some extent with other 
informal justice systems within various cultures 
On the question of minorities, only 11.1 per cent and major ethnic groups in Pakistan. However, in 
thought that minorities do not have access to areas such as Punjab and Sindh there is the 
informal justice systems in Punjab, Sindh, and possibility or flexibility for women to attend the 
Baloch areas of Balochistan, while in Pakhtun proceedings of informal justice systems as a party 
29districts, only 5.5 per cent thought so. or as a witness.  We rarely hear of or see any 
instances where a woman takes part in such 
Another striking comparison is on poor and low proceedings as a mediator or decision-maker. 
caste groups. Two-thirds (66.4 per cent) of 
respondents from the rest of Pakistan believed Perceived reasons for limited access to justice 
that poor and low caste groups do not have access under the formal justice system
to informal justice systems in Punjab, Sindh and 
Baloch districts of Balochistan, in comparison to The survey used another angle to explore 
only 21.7 per cent from Pakhtun districts. This is perceptions of access to justice i.e. to document 
three times lower. As stated above, in Pakhtun reasons, perceived by the respondents, for limited 
districts, low caste systems and biases might not access under the formal justice system. Multiple-
be an issue. response questions were asked of respondents in 
a qualified manner. Data is also compared with 
Overall, the above data clearly conveys that the the Pakhtun districts of KP and Balochistan at the 
rest of Pakistan and Pakhtun districts have a end of this question. The list of options provided 
different perception on how vulnerable groups was limited in the previous survey. However, more 
suffer when it comes to accessing informal justice options were added to the survey under analysis 
systems for justice services. to understand new dimensions and how 
respondents have perceived them when 
Women, who receive punishment under the responding to this question. Since the list of 
informal justice system, are seen as the most options is fairly long, few are worth analysis and 
25vulnerable segment of the Pakistani society.  many have less significance.
Participants of round-table discussions in Punjab 
and Sindh were also wary of the role of informal Close to three-quarters (73.1 per cent) of 
justice systems when dealing with vulnerable respondents from the rest of Pakistan believed 
groups. They shared their concerns over the that access to justice under the formal court 
punishment sang chatti, vani – all against system is limited due to time involved – which 
26women.  Informal justice systems also give rise to does not allow cases to be expedited and resolved 
cases of karo kari (honour killings) against both within time. Although considerably lower, this was 
also believed by the majority (57.8 per cent) of fee. This is reflected, and rightly so, in the survey 
respondents in Pakhtun districts. This is data for both regions – it is the second highest 
compelling evidence that ordinary men and option on the list in both regions of Pakistan and 
women in Pakistan have lost their trust in the perceived similarly by all ethnic groups of 
30formal justice system of Pakistan. Pakistan. Close to half, 49.4 per cent, in the rest of 
Pakistan and 56.5 per cent in Pakhtun districts of 
Another important argument is the high cost of Pakistan believed that limited access to justice 
lawyers' fees, which most of the time, is beyond under the formal court system is due to high legal 
the reach of ordinary people in Pakistan. For those fees/charges of lawyers, which they cannot afford 
who do take their case to court, they often end up to pay.  
losing due to their inability to afford the lawyer's 
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Options Rest of Pakistan 
(%)
Pakhtun districts
(%)
Time consuming and cases not expedited 73.1 57.8
Legal aid department understaffed 12.6 10.6
Unavailability of legal aid 10.3 8.7
Accused overstay without trial due to lack of understanding of their
legal rights
15.4 18.5
High legal fees of lawyers 49.4 56.5
Not all cases reported 17.6
Long distances to courts 15.9 36.5
High level of corruption in the courts 21.8 16
Justice structures concentrated in towns 6.4 9.2
Not aware of how to access justice by those in remote areas 12.4 15
Widespread confusion about the legal system 5.8 11.5
Dissatisfied with the fairness of the court process 13.3 Did not ask
Interviewee ill-equipped to fight a legal battle due to lack of 
experience or legal know-how
6.3 Did not ask
Interviewee under social/community pressure to settle out of court 
with opponent
8.7 Did not ask
Interviewee facing threats/coercion from opponent to settle out of 
court
6.5 Did not ask
Interviewee concerned with the quality and/or commitment of the 
lawyer
6.3 Did not ask
Legal opponent is able to unfairly influence the court process 6.7 Did not ask
An out of court solution seems simpler and quicker in comparison 9.2 Did not ask
Laws and formal procedures are complex and unintelligible 7.1 Did not ask
Laws are complex as they are in English 7 Did not ask
Other 3 1.2
Don’t know 12.3 17.3
What are the reasons for limited access to formal justice as well as reluctance to access formal courts?
25. Interview with Maryam Bibi, Chief Executive Khwendo Kor (Sisters' Home – NGO), 13 August 2013, Peshawar
26. Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
27. Interview with I.A. Rehman, Director, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), 22 August 2013, Lahore
28. Round-table discussion in Quetta, 11 December 2013
29. Round-table discussions in Lahore and Karachi, August 2013
Balochi jirga. Comparing this data with Pakhtun men and women. In many cases, women are killed 
districts and Pakhtun jirga, only 28 per cent and men escape the punishment by paying money 
27believed that women have no access to Pakhtun or a girl in marriage (as vani).  Participants of 
jirga. Since women have indirect access to Balochistan round-table discussions were more in 
Pakhtun jirga through their male family members, favour of Baloch jirga which they believed was 
it might be perceived by respondents in Pakhtun more accessible to all. However, they could not 
districts that women have access to jirga. provide sufficient justification that there was 
28However, if women do not have direct access then accessibility for women.
this access to justice under the informal justice 
system itself becomes questionable. This is also true to some extent with other 
informal justice systems within various cultures 
On the question of minorities, only 11.1 per cent and major ethnic groups in Pakistan. However, in 
thought that minorities do not have access to areas such as Punjab and Sindh there is the 
informal justice systems in Punjab, Sindh, and possibility or flexibility for women to attend the 
Baloch areas of Balochistan, while in Pakhtun proceedings of informal justice systems as a party 
29districts, only 5.5 per cent thought so. or as a witness.  We rarely hear of or see any 
instances where a woman takes part in such 
Another striking comparison is on poor and low proceedings as a mediator or decision-maker. 
caste groups. Two-thirds (66.4 per cent) of 
respondents from the rest of Pakistan believed Perceived reasons for limited access to justice 
that poor and low caste groups do not have access under the formal justice system
to informal justice systems in Punjab, Sindh and 
Baloch districts of Balochistan, in comparison to The survey used another angle to explore 
only 21.7 per cent from Pakhtun districts. This is perceptions of access to justice i.e. to document 
three times lower. As stated above, in Pakhtun reasons, perceived by the respondents, for limited 
districts, low caste systems and biases might not access under the formal justice system. Multiple-
be an issue. response questions were asked of respondents in 
a qualified manner. Data is also compared with 
Overall, the above data clearly conveys that the the Pakhtun districts of KP and Balochistan at the 
rest of Pakistan and Pakhtun districts have a end of this question. The list of options provided 
different perception on how vulnerable groups was limited in the previous survey. However, more 
suffer when it comes to accessing informal justice options were added to the survey under analysis 
systems for justice services. to understand new dimensions and how 
respondents have perceived them when 
Women, who receive punishment under the responding to this question. Since the list of 
informal justice system, are seen as the most options is fairly long, few are worth analysis and 
25vulnerable segment of the Pakistani society.  many have less significance.
Participants of round-table discussions in Punjab 
and Sindh were also wary of the role of informal Close to three-quarters (73.1 per cent) of 
justice systems when dealing with vulnerable respondents from the rest of Pakistan believed 
groups. They shared their concerns over the that access to justice under the formal court 
punishment sang chatti, vani – all against system is limited due to time involved – which 
26women.  Informal justice systems also give rise to does not allow cases to be expedited and resolved 
cases of karo kari (honour killings) against both within time. Although considerably lower, this was 
also believed by the majority (57.8 per cent) of fee. This is reflected, and rightly so, in the survey 
respondents in Pakhtun districts. This is data for both regions – it is the second highest 
compelling evidence that ordinary men and option on the list in both regions of Pakistan and 
women in Pakistan have lost their trust in the perceived similarly by all ethnic groups of 
30formal justice system of Pakistan. Pakistan. Close to half, 49.4 per cent, in the rest of 
Pakistan and 56.5 per cent in Pakhtun districts of 
Another important argument is the high cost of Pakistan believed that limited access to justice 
lawyers' fees, which most of the time, is beyond under the formal court system is due to high legal 
the reach of ordinary people in Pakistan. For those fees/charges of lawyers, which they cannot afford 
who do take their case to court, they often end up to pay.  
losing due to their inability to afford the lawyer's 
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Options Rest of Pakistan 
(%)
Pakhtun districts
(%)
Time consuming and cases not expedited 73.1 57.8
Legal aid department understaffed 12.6 10.6
Unavailability of legal aid 10.3 8.7
Accused overstay without trial due to lack of understanding of their
legal rights
15.4 18.5
High legal fees of lawyers 49.4 56.5
Not all cases reported 17.6
Long distances to courts 15.9 36.5
High level of corruption in the courts 21.8 16
Justice structures concentrated in towns 6.4 9.2
Not aware of how to access justice by those in remote areas 12.4 15
Widespread confusion about the legal system 5.8 11.5
Dissatisfied with the fairness of the court process 13.3 Did not ask
Interviewee ill-equipped to fight a legal battle due to lack of 
experience or legal know-how
6.3 Did not ask
Interviewee under social/community pressure to settle out of court 
with opponent
8.7 Did not ask
Interviewee facing threats/coercion from opponent to settle out of 
court
6.5 Did not ask
Interviewee concerned with the quality and/or commitment of the 
lawyer
6.3 Did not ask
Legal opponent is able to unfairly influence the court process 6.7 Did not ask
An out of court solution seems simpler and quicker in comparison 9.2 Did not ask
Laws and formal procedures are complex and unintelligible 7.1 Did not ask
Laws are complex as they are in English 7 Did not ask
Other 3 1.2
Don’t know 12.3 17.3
What are the reasons for limited access to formal justice as well as reluctance to access formal courts?
25. Interview with Maryam Bibi, Chief Executive Khwendo Kor (Sisters' Home – NGO), 13 August 2013, Peshawar
26. Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
27. Interview with I.A. Rehman, Director, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), 22 August 2013, Lahore
28. Round-table discussion in Quetta, 11 December 2013
29. Round-table discussions in Lahore and Karachi, August 2013
The last option worth mentioning is 'long Perceived reasons for limited access to justice 
distances to courts'. Of the respondents in the under the informal justice system
rest of Pakistan, 15.9 per cent said that formal 
courts are a long distance from their dwelling – Just as in reference to the formal system, the 
which hinders their access to justice under formal respondents were asked to share the reasons for 
justice systems – whereas 36.5 per cent, a larger limited access to justice under the informal justice 
group in Pakhtun districts, believed this. This system, such as village panchayat, faislo, and 
could be due to harsh terrain and remote regions Baloch jirga. This comparison draws 
in Pakhtun areas of Pakistan. understanding of the general feelings of ordinary 
Pakistani citizens when they access justice systems 
– under both modalities. 
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Options
Rest of 
Pakistan (%)
Pakhtun districts 
(%)
Informal systems lack authority to implement their decisions. 25.5 10.1
Members of informal systems are not qualified to resolve complex 
disputes.
15.5 14.2
Informal systems are inaccessible for women. 26.7 18.8
Informal systems are inaccessible for minorities. 11.9 5.5
Members of informal systems sometimes take bribes. 13.8 8.4
Members of informal systems are biased at times. 28.1 13.5
Sometime their solutions are unsustainable/unworkable. 11.2 14.8
No precedents of previous decisions. 7.8 8.4
People don’t have faith in the capacity and efficiency of such mechanisms. 8 Did not ask
These mechanisms are vulnerable to private pressure and influence. 20.4 Did not ask
Such mechanisms are outdated and unfamiliar with modern ideas of 
fairness and justice.
5.8 Did not ask
No such viable mechanisms exist anymore in my area/locality. 6.2 Did not ask
People have greater faith in the fairness of the court system. 11.3 Did not ask
The court system is more easily accessible. 6.4 Did not ask
Influential people feel more confident of manipulating the informal 
systems.
8.5 Did not ask
Weaker parties feel more empowered by the formal legal/court system. 4.4 Did not ask
The law mandates going to the formal legal system for certain kinds of 
disputes.
4.7 Did not ask
Lack of satisfaction with past outcomes of non-court dispute resolution 
mechanisms.
5.1 Did not ask
Often one of the parties is a trouble-maker and needs to be taught a lesson 
in court.
6.1 Did not ask
Often one of the parties is a trouble maker and wants to embroil his/her 
opponents in court contestations.
4.5 Did not ask
Other 5.5 12.5
Don’t know 17.6 38.3
What are the reasons for limited access to informal justice mechanisms as well as reluctance to 
access informal mechanisms? 
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The survey findings are further compared with the and their tribal elders. 
Pakhtun jirga findings of the previous survey. 
Various options under this question were Another high group of respondents was the 26.7 
provided to the respondents. per cent of respondents from the rest of Pakistan 
areas, who believed that informal justice systems 
Looking at both data sets gathered from both are inaccessible for women. In Pakhtun districts, 
regions in different times, it is clear that there is a this figure was lower – 18.8 per cent of 
striking perception difference between the rest of respondents believed that women have no access 
Pakistan and Pakhtun districts. There is a need to to the informal justice system. 
cross-tabulate the data by region as well, which is 
elaborated, in the following lines. For instance, Another interesting dimension to access to justice 
28.1 per cent (the highest figure on the list) of under the informal justice system is its perceived 
respondents from the rest of Pakistan believed lack of authority to implement decisions. The data 
that members of informal justice systems are from both regions clearly shows that respondents 
biased at times when resolving or deciding a case, lacked confidence on this aspect of the informal 
while 13.5 per cent of Pakhtun respondents (less justice system. One quarter of respondents from 
than half of rest of Pakistan), believed so. The the rest of Pakistan believed that the informal 
following cross tabulation by province shows justice system lacks authority to implement its 
more favourable perceptions, with similar views in decisions, while only 10.1 per cent respondents of 
Sindh and Punjab as compared to Baloch districts Pakhtun districts believed so. In the case of tribal 
of Balochistan. The reason could be Baloch jirga in FATA, the authority of tribal masharan 
people's tendency to favour tribal ways of living (elders) is strong and has the support from the 
31and their trust in the traditional justice system community to implement jirga decisions.  In rural 
Options Punjab % Sindh % Balochistan %
Informal systems lack authority to implement their decisions. 11.1 13.4 7.1
Members of informal systems are not qualified to resolve complex disputes. 8 5.4 5.1
Informal systems are inaccessible for women. 8.4 12.5 10.8
Informal systems are inaccessible for minorities. 3.6 7.1 4
Members of informal systems sometimes take bribes. 4 4.2 7.3
Members of informal systems are biased at times. 14.3 14.4 6.4
Sometime their solutions are unsustainable/unworkable. 3.4 3.2 5.9
No precedents of previous decisions. 2.2 1.2 4.9
People don’t have faith in the capacity and efficiency of such mechanisms. 3.7 1.3 3.8
These mechanisms are vulnerable to private pressure and influence. 9.7 5.6 8.2
Such mechanisms are outdated and unfamiliar with modern ideas of fairness and 
justice.
2.6 2 2.2
No such viable mechanisms exist anymore in my area/locality. 2.4 3.9 1.5
People have greater faith in the fairness of the court system. 4.3 3.9 4.8
The court system is more easily accessible. 2.5 0.6 3.6
Influential people feel more confident of manipulating the informal systems. 2.4 3 4.2
Weaker parties feel more empowered by the formal legal/court system. 1.6 0.3 2.7
The law mandates going to the formal legal system for certain kinds of disputes. 1.7 0.2 3
Lack of satisfaction with past outcomes of non-court dispute resolution mechanisms. 1.9 1.5 2.4
Often one of the parties is a trouble-maker and needs to be taught a lesson in court. 3.9 0.1 2.7
Often one of the parties is a trouble maker and wants to embroil his/her opponents in 
court contestations.
1.8 1 2.2
Other 1.1 4.4 1.6
Don’t know 5.4 10.6 5.7
What are the reasons for limited access to informal justice mechanisms as well as reluctance to access informal mechanisms? 
Cross-tab with Provinces
31) See Naveed Shinwari, Understanding Jirga: Legality and Legitimacy in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. CAMP (2011)
The last option worth mentioning is 'long Perceived reasons for limited access to justice 
distances to courts'. Of the respondents in the under the informal justice system
rest of Pakistan, 15.9 per cent said that formal 
courts are a long distance from their dwelling – Just as in reference to the formal system, the 
which hinders their access to justice under formal respondents were asked to share the reasons for 
justice systems – whereas 36.5 per cent, a larger limited access to justice under the informal justice 
group in Pakhtun districts, believed this. This system, such as village panchayat, faislo, and 
could be due to harsh terrain and remote regions Baloch jirga. This comparison draws 
in Pakhtun areas of Pakistan. understanding of the general feelings of ordinary 
Pakistani citizens when they access justice systems 
– under both modalities. 
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Options
Rest of 
Pakistan (%)
Pakhtun districts 
(%)
Informal systems lack authority to implement their decisions. 25.5 10.1
Members of informal systems are not qualified to resolve complex 
disputes.
15.5 14.2
Informal systems are inaccessible for women. 26.7 18.8
Informal systems are inaccessible for minorities. 11.9 5.5
Members of informal systems sometimes take bribes. 13.8 8.4
Members of informal systems are biased at times. 28.1 13.5
Sometime their solutions are unsustainable/unworkable. 11.2 14.8
No precedents of previous decisions. 7.8 8.4
People don’t have faith in the capacity and efficiency of such mechanisms. 8 Did not ask
These mechanisms are vulnerable to private pressure and influence. 20.4 Did not ask
Such mechanisms are outdated and unfamiliar with modern ideas of 
fairness and justice.
5.8 Did not ask
No such viable mechanisms exist anymore in my area/locality. 6.2 Did not ask
People have greater faith in the fairness of the court system. 11.3 Did not ask
The court system is more easily accessible. 6.4 Did not ask
Influential people feel more confident of manipulating the informal 
systems.
8.5 Did not ask
Weaker parties feel more empowered by the formal legal/court system. 4.4 Did not ask
The law mandates going to the formal legal system for certain kinds of 
disputes.
4.7 Did not ask
Lack of satisfaction with past outcomes of non-court dispute resolution 
mechanisms.
5.1 Did not ask
Often one of the parties is a trouble-maker and needs to be taught a lesson 
in court.
6.1 Did not ask
Often one of the parties is a trouble maker and wants to embroil his/her 
opponents in court contestations.
4.5 Did not ask
Other 5.5 12.5
Don’t know 17.6 38.3
What are the reasons for limited access to informal justice mechanisms as well as reluctance to 
access informal mechanisms? 
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The survey findings are further compared with the and their tribal elders. 
Pakhtun jirga findings of the previous survey. 
Various options under this question were Another high group of respondents was the 26.7 
provided to the respondents. per cent of respondents from the rest of Pakistan 
areas, who believed that informal justice systems 
Looking at both data sets gathered from both are inaccessible for women. In Pakhtun districts, 
regions in different times, it is clear that there is a this figure was lower – 18.8 per cent of 
striking perception difference between the rest of respondents believed that women have no access 
Pakistan and Pakhtun districts. There is a need to to the informal justice system. 
cross-tabulate the data by region as well, which is 
elaborated, in the following lines. For instance, Another interesting dimension to access to justice 
28.1 per cent (the highest figure on the list) of under the informal justice system is its perceived 
respondents from the rest of Pakistan believed lack of authority to implement decisions. The data 
that members of informal justice systems are from both regions clearly shows that respondents 
biased at times when resolving or deciding a case, lacked confidence on this aspect of the informal 
while 13.5 per cent of Pakhtun respondents (less justice system. One quarter of respondents from 
than half of rest of Pakistan), believed so. The the rest of Pakistan believed that the informal 
following cross tabulation by province shows justice system lacks authority to implement its 
more favourable perceptions, with similar views in decisions, while only 10.1 per cent respondents of 
Sindh and Punjab as compared to Baloch districts Pakhtun districts believed so. In the case of tribal 
of Balochistan. The reason could be Baloch jirga in FATA, the authority of tribal masharan 
people's tendency to favour tribal ways of living (elders) is strong and has the support from the 
31and their trust in the traditional justice system community to implement jirga decisions.  In rural 
Options Punjab % Sindh % Balochistan %
Informal systems lack authority to implement their decisions. 11.1 13.4 7.1
Members of informal systems are not qualified to resolve complex disputes. 8 5.4 5.1
Informal systems are inaccessible for women. 8.4 12.5 10.8
Informal systems are inaccessible for minorities. 3.6 7.1 4
Members of informal systems sometimes take bribes. 4 4.2 7.3
Members of informal systems are biased at times. 14.3 14.4 6.4
Sometime their solutions are unsustainable/unworkable. 3.4 3.2 5.9
No precedents of previous decisions. 2.2 1.2 4.9
People don’t have faith in the capacity and efficiency of such mechanisms. 3.7 1.3 3.8
These mechanisms are vulnerable to private pressure and influence. 9.7 5.6 8.2
Such mechanisms are outdated and unfamiliar with modern ideas of fairness and 
justice.
2.6 2 2.2
No such viable mechanisms exist anymore in my area/locality. 2.4 3.9 1.5
People have greater faith in the fairness of the court system. 4.3 3.9 4.8
The court system is more easily accessible. 2.5 0.6 3.6
Influential people feel more confident of manipulating the informal systems. 2.4 3 4.2
Weaker parties feel more empowered by the formal legal/court system. 1.6 0.3 2.7
The law mandates going to the formal legal system for certain kinds of disputes. 1.7 0.2 3
Lack of satisfaction with past outcomes of non-court dispute resolution mechanisms. 1.9 1.5 2.4
Often one of the parties is a trouble-maker and needs to be taught a lesson in court. 3.9 0.1 2.7
Often one of the parties is a trouble maker and wants to embroil his/her opponents in 
court contestations.
1.8 1 2.2
Other 1.1 4.4 1.6
Don’t know 5.4 10.6 5.7
What are the reasons for limited access to informal justice mechanisms as well as reluctance to access informal mechanisms? 
Cross-tab with Provinces
31) See Naveed Shinwari, Understanding Jirga: Legality and Legitimacy in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. CAMP (2011)
Pakistan and 53 per cent in Pakhtun districts), was a shared wall / property etc) were identified by 
conflict over young people and children 21.8 per cent of respondents in the rest of 
quarrelling and fighting. Pakistan, compared to 43.1 per cent for Pakhtun 
districts of KP and Balochistan. In Pakhtun culture, 
Another high group of respondents (43.3 per cent) especially in rural areas, neighbourhood disputes 
believed that issues around agricultural land such as over a shared wall or property are 
instigate conflict, and 34.7 per cent thought that considered a question of honour; these always 
land grabbing was an issue that leads to conflict. lead to a conflict at some point. It is for this 
Family honour, identified by 34 per cent of reason that more respondents in Pakhtun districts 
respondents, was also identified as a critical issue identified this as an issue, compared to the 
that was believed to lead to conflict. There were a respondents in the rest of Pakistan. 
number of other options provided to the 
respondents and each one was identified Another issue identified was 'grazing animals'. 
according to their importance in different Rearing livestock is one of the major occupations 
circumstances. in the rural communities of Pakistan, especially in 
Punjab and Sindh due to huge amount of lands 
Comparing the data of both surveys conducted at available for grazing as compared to KP and 
different times, in different regions and in Balochistan – where most of the land is either 
different cultural settings, we see similarities of barren, or mountainous and infertile. Therefore, 
understanding of issues by the respondents. for respondents from the areas in the rest of 
However, there were a few exceptions. For Pakistan, this could be a major issue leading to 
example, issues of neighbourhood (possession of conflicts.
parts of Pakhtun districts of KP and Balochistan, it Participants of the round-table discussions were 
31is believed that jirga decisions  are respected and also aware of how the rule of law and access to 
owned by disputant parties voluntarily and there justice are seen as key agendas in today's politics, 
32 and how NGOs run programmes on these topics is a social pressure to implement decisions.
to raise local communities' level of awareness on 
33Cross tabulation by province is self-explanatory access to justice.  Participants added that 
and provides sufficient evidence to support the 'religious leaders too are either helping the local 
argument that the informal justice system is population or tending to exploit situations in their 
interestingly more organised in Pakhtun and favour, in areas where people have either limited 
Baloch districts as compared to Punjab and Sindh. access to justice or they completely lack access to 
34justice'.
Other entities providing justice services to the 
communities Main issues that instigate conflict
There are other actors and institutions that The study aimed to determine the major issues 
provide justice services to the local communities leading to violent conflicts or disputes. The 
on petty civil issues, such as NGOs, religious question, 'what are the main issues that instigate 
leaders/groups etc. conflict?', was posed in the last survey conducted 
in Pakhtun districts and with some additional 
Results astonishingly showed that 32.7 per cent of options, it was included in the recent survey 
respondents in the rest of Pakistan believed that conducted in the rest of Pakistan. The data draws 
other institutions (NGOs, religious groups) provide some very interesting comparisons.  
justice services to the local communities. This is a 
fairly significant proportion of the sample. Interestingly, the major issue identified by the 
majority in both surveys (64 per cent in rest of 
71 72
32) See Naveed Shinwari and Neha Gauhar, Understanding Justice Systems of KP, FATA and Balochistan: The Pakhtun Perspective. CAMP (2013)
33) Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
34 Ibid
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Apart from formal justice system are other informal justice systems like NGOs, religious groups etc. 
showing their interest about people’s access to justice?
Options Rest of Pakistan (%)
Pakhtun districts 
(%)
Agricultural land 43.3 37.5
Urban property – (private) 15.9 Did not ask
Urban property – (commercial) 13.7 Did not ask
Land grabbing 34.7 Did not ask
Distribution of water sources (warabandi) 30.2 25.8
Neighbourhood (position of shared wall, property, etc) 21.8 43.1
Political violence 14.8 6.8
Grazing animals 20.7 8.3
Sectarian 10.2 7.6
Family issues (forced marriages, divorce, child custody, shared property, 
wedding expenses)
29.5 27.4
Youth/children quarrelling and fighting 64.4 53.3
Familyhonour issues 34 25.2
Tribal clashes 9.4 9.9
Tribal customs such as swara/vani/karo kari, bride price and jhag 6.9 3.9
Militancy 2.5 1.8
Terrorism 8.5 3.4
Unequal distribution of aid 5.4 9.4
Theft/robbery 21.6 20.8
Murder/homicide/rising crime 8.5 12.2
Other 3.7 7.9
What are the main issues that instigate conflict in your community?
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instigate conflict, and 34.7 per cent thought that considered a question of honour; these always 
land grabbing was an issue that leads to conflict. lead to a conflict at some point. It is for this 
Family honour, identified by 34 per cent of reason that more respondents in Pakhtun districts 
respondents, was also identified as a critical issue identified this as an issue, compared to the 
that was believed to lead to conflict. There were a respondents in the rest of Pakistan. 
number of other options provided to the 
respondents and each one was identified Another issue identified was 'grazing animals'. 
according to their importance in different Rearing livestock is one of the major occupations 
circumstances. in the rural communities of Pakistan, especially in 
Punjab and Sindh due to huge amount of lands 
Comparing the data of both surveys conducted at available for grazing as compared to KP and 
different times, in different regions and in Balochistan – where most of the land is either 
different cultural settings, we see similarities of barren, or mountainous and infertile. Therefore, 
understanding of issues by the respondents. for respondents from the areas in the rest of 
However, there were a few exceptions. For Pakistan, this could be a major issue leading to 
example, issues of neighbourhood (possession of conflicts.
parts of Pakhtun districts of KP and Balochistan, it Participants of the round-table discussions were 
31is believed that jirga decisions  are respected and also aware of how the rule of law and access to 
owned by disputant parties voluntarily and there justice are seen as key agendas in today's politics, 
32 and how NGOs run programmes on these topics is a social pressure to implement decisions.
to raise local communities' level of awareness on 
33Cross tabulation by province is self-explanatory access to justice.  Participants added that 
and provides sufficient evidence to support the 'religious leaders too are either helping the local 
argument that the informal justice system is population or tending to exploit situations in their 
interestingly more organised in Pakhtun and favour, in areas where people have either limited 
Baloch districts as compared to Punjab and Sindh. access to justice or they completely lack access to 
34justice'.
Other entities providing justice services to the 
communities Main issues that instigate conflict
There are other actors and institutions that The study aimed to determine the major issues 
provide justice services to the local communities leading to violent conflicts or disputes. The 
on petty civil issues, such as NGOs, religious question, 'what are the main issues that instigate 
leaders/groups etc. conflict?', was posed in the last survey conducted 
in Pakhtun districts and with some additional 
Results astonishingly showed that 32.7 per cent of options, it was included in the recent survey 
respondents in the rest of Pakistan believed that conducted in the rest of Pakistan. The data draws 
other institutions (NGOs, religious groups) provide some very interesting comparisons.  
justice services to the local communities. This is a 
fairly significant proportion of the sample. Interestingly, the major issue identified by the 
majority in both surveys (64 per cent in rest of 
71 72
32) See Naveed Shinwari and Neha Gauhar, Understanding Justice Systems of KP, FATA and Balochistan: The Pakhtun Perspective. CAMP (2013)
33) Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
34 Ibid
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Apart from formal justice system are other informal justice systems like NGOs, religious groups etc. 
showing their interest about people’s access to justice?
Options Rest of Pakistan (%)
Pakhtun districts 
(%)
Agricultural land 43.3 37.5
Urban property – (private) 15.9 Did not ask
Urban property – (commercial) 13.7 Did not ask
Land grabbing 34.7 Did not ask
Distribution of water sources (warabandi) 30.2 25.8
Neighbourhood (position of shared wall, property, etc) 21.8 43.1
Political violence 14.8 6.8
Grazing animals 20.7 8.3
Sectarian 10.2 7.6
Family issues (forced marriages, divorce, child custody, shared property, 
wedding expenses)
29.5 27.4
Youth/children quarrelling and fighting 64.4 53.3
Familyhonour issues 34 25.2
Tribal clashes 9.4 9.9
Tribal customs such as swara/vani/karo kari, bride price and jhag 6.9 3.9
Militancy 2.5 1.8
Terrorism 8.5 3.4
Unequal distribution of aid 5.4 9.4
Theft/robbery 21.6 20.8
Murder/homicide/rising crime 8.5 12.2
Other 3.7 7.9
What are the main issues that instigate conflict in your community?
Political violence was also identified by more part of various layers of the informal justice 
respondents in the rest of Pakistan as compared system that is also serving their members with 
36to Pakhtun districts of Pakistan. In the major justice services.
provinces of Punjab and Sindh, large landowners 
hold political power and make up major political Experience of litigation
parties such as PML (N), PML (Q), PPP and MQM. 
Due to tough competition for political power, Questions were asked to understand whether 
violent incidents become inevitable in these respondents or their family members had 
regions, rather than in Pakhtun districts of KP and experienced any litigation and if so, how was their 
Balochistan. experience of accessing formal or informal justice 
systems.  
Participants of the round-table discussions in 
Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan also blamed In order to ascertain the level and types of 
political leadership and Sardars for promoting and disputes or conflicts, respondents were asked if 
sustaining political violence, especially during the they had various types of litigation experience. 
35times of elections. They were asked to respond with 'yes', 'no', 'don't 
know' or simply 'no response'.
Who to contact in situations of conflict or 
dispute Crimes should be assumed as a rare thing in any 
society and because the majority may not have 
In response to the question, 'who would you experienced it, we will look at the 'yes' attribute 
contact in situations of conflict or dispute?', the of the question rather than counting those who 
reply from respondents from the rest of Pakistan said 'no'. This will help us to understand the level 
is astonishing and fairly different to the reply from of violence and the nature of litigations within 
respondents from the Pakhtun districts of KP and Pakistani society in different regions and different 
Balochistan. On the whole, the data is self- circumstances. The table shows the responses to 
explanatory. However, a few options from the list the question.
are worth mentioning. For instance, a large group 
of respondents (32.5 per cent) confirmed that The most common response (24.9 per cent) 
they would contact the police authorities in the confirmed that they or their family members 
case of any conflict or dispute. In the Pakhtun experienced fraud or had been victims of theft. 
districts of Pakistan the majority surprisingly This alarming figure shows the prevalence of fraud 
identified Pakhtun jirga as a favourite choice. or theft in Pakistan. The reasons for this include a 
With regards to respondents from the rest of lack of capacity of our civilian security agencies, 
Pakistan, 25.4 per cent confirmed extended family loopholes in the legal system urbanisation and 
37as a key choice, 18.6 per cent chose clan and 8.7 high levels of poverty.  With the average across 
per cent of respondents identified large, local the various Pakistani regions at 24.9 per cent, it is 
landowners. Only 5.4 per cent of respondents surprising that 36.1 per cent of respondents in 
chose informal justice systems – panchayat, faislo Sindh confirmed that they had been victims of 
and Baloch jirga – which is very surprising. This fraud or theft, while in Punjab, the biggest 
might be due to the fact that several more options province in terms of population, only 19.3 per 
were added for this survey – such as extended cent of respondents confirmed this. Balochistan 
family, neighbourhood and clan. These informal shares the same percentage (19.1 per cent), 
family and clan-based institutions are perceived as however, as this is the smallest province in 
73 74
35) Ibid
36) Interview with Saif Anjum, Special Secretary Home, Punjab, 22 August 2013, Lahore
37) Interview with Advocate Tahir Iqbal, Legal Reform Forum (NGO), 25 August 2013, Karachi
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Pakistan in terms of population, it seems that the readers' observations. 
ratio of cases of fraud and theft is also higher in 
Balochistan. Data for the Pakhtun districts is the Access to justice systems in the case of litigation
lowest with only 11.5 per cent of respondents 
confirming an experience with theft and fraud. A multiple response question was put to the small 
Another finding is that 16.2 per cent of proportion of the survey who had confirmed that 
respondents (and/or their family members) had they or their family members had experienced any 
sustained injuries in road accidents. This is also sort of litigation.
the second highest response (12.9 per cent) for 
those surveyed in the Pakhtun district. The As shown in the table from the small proportion 
remainder of the list is self-explanatory, it does of respondents in the rest of Pakistan with 
not need detailed analysis but is instead left for experience of litigation, the majority (62.7 per 
Options
Rest of Pakistan 
(%)
Provincial police authorities and their local representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP, etc.) 32.5
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and High Courts) 0.8
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District and Sessions Courts) 1
Federal Shariat Court 0.2
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 0.1
Ombudsman 0.1
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 0.1
Khandan (extended family) 25.4
Mohalla (neighbourhood) 1.1
Biradari (clan) 18.6
Large local landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 8.7
Village council (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon/faislo/Baloch jirga ) 5.4
Local influentials (local, provincial, national) 0.3
Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record keepers), nambardars (village
headmen), tehsildars
1
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district magistrates etc.) 0.5
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras) 0.1
Self-provision village organisations; community organisations 0.1
Local crime lords 0
Religious leader in the community 0.3
Musalihati council 1.9
Other 0.2
Don’t know 0.7
Not answered 0.8
Total 100
Who do you first contact in case of any conflict or dispute? 
Political violence was also identified by more part of various layers of the informal justice 
respondents in the rest of Pakistan as compared system that is also serving their members with 
36to Pakhtun districts of Pakistan. In the major justice services.
provinces of Punjab and Sindh, large landowners 
hold political power and make up major political Experience of litigation
parties such as PML (N), PML (Q), PPP and MQM. 
Due to tough competition for political power, Questions were asked to understand whether 
violent incidents become inevitable in these respondents or their family members had 
regions, rather than in Pakhtun districts of KP and experienced any litigation and if so, how was their 
Balochistan. experience of accessing formal or informal justice 
systems.  
Participants of the round-table discussions in 
Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan also blamed In order to ascertain the level and types of 
political leadership and Sardars for promoting and disputes or conflicts, respondents were asked if 
sustaining political violence, especially during the they had various types of litigation experience. 
35times of elections. They were asked to respond with 'yes', 'no', 'don't 
know' or simply 'no response'.
Who to contact in situations of conflict or 
dispute Crimes should be assumed as a rare thing in any 
society and because the majority may not have 
In response to the question, 'who would you experienced it, we will look at the 'yes' attribute 
contact in situations of conflict or dispute?', the of the question rather than counting those who 
reply from respondents from the rest of Pakistan said 'no'. This will help us to understand the level 
is astonishing and fairly different to the reply from of violence and the nature of litigations within 
respondents from the Pakhtun districts of KP and Pakistani society in different regions and different 
Balochistan. On the whole, the data is self- circumstances. The table shows the responses to 
explanatory. However, a few options from the list the question.
are worth mentioning. For instance, a large group 
of respondents (32.5 per cent) confirmed that The most common response (24.9 per cent) 
they would contact the police authorities in the confirmed that they or their family members 
case of any conflict or dispute. In the Pakhtun experienced fraud or had been victims of theft. 
districts of Pakistan the majority surprisingly This alarming figure shows the prevalence of fraud 
identified Pakhtun jirga as a favourite choice. or theft in Pakistan. The reasons for this include a 
With regards to respondents from the rest of lack of capacity of our civilian security agencies, 
Pakistan, 25.4 per cent confirmed extended family loopholes in the legal system urbanisation and 
37as a key choice, 18.6 per cent chose clan and 8.7 high levels of poverty.  With the average across 
per cent of respondents identified large, local the various Pakistani regions at 24.9 per cent, it is 
landowners. Only 5.4 per cent of respondents surprising that 36.1 per cent of respondents in 
chose informal justice systems – panchayat, faislo Sindh confirmed that they had been victims of 
and Baloch jirga – which is very surprising. This fraud or theft, while in Punjab, the biggest 
might be due to the fact that several more options province in terms of population, only 19.3 per 
were added for this survey – such as extended cent of respondents confirmed this. Balochistan 
family, neighbourhood and clan. These informal shares the same percentage (19.1 per cent), 
family and clan-based institutions are perceived as however, as this is the smallest province in 
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35) Ibid
36) Interview with Saif Anjum, Special Secretary Home, Punjab, 22 August 2013, Lahore
37) Interview with Advocate Tahir Iqbal, Legal Reform Forum (NGO), 25 August 2013, Karachi
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Pakistan in terms of population, it seems that the readers' observations. 
ratio of cases of fraud and theft is also higher in 
Balochistan. Data for the Pakhtun districts is the Access to justice systems in the case of litigation
lowest with only 11.5 per cent of respondents 
confirming an experience with theft and fraud. A multiple response question was put to the small 
Another finding is that 16.2 per cent of proportion of the survey who had confirmed that 
respondents (and/or their family members) had they or their family members had experienced any 
sustained injuries in road accidents. This is also sort of litigation.
the second highest response (12.9 per cent) for 
those surveyed in the Pakhtun district. The As shown in the table from the small proportion 
remainder of the list is self-explanatory, it does of respondents in the rest of Pakistan with 
not need detailed analysis but is instead left for experience of litigation, the majority (62.7 per 
Options
Rest of Pakistan 
(%)
Provincial police authorities and their local representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP, etc.) 32.5
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and High Courts) 0.8
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District and Sessions Courts) 1
Federal Shariat Court 0.2
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 0.1
Ombudsman 0.1
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 0.1
Khandan (extended family) 25.4
Mohalla (neighbourhood) 1.1
Biradari (clan) 18.6
Large local landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 8.7
Village council (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon/faislo/Baloch jirga ) 5.4
Local influentials (local, provincial, national) 0.3
Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record keepers), nambardars (village
headmen), tehsildars
1
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district magistrates etc.) 0.5
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras) 0.1
Self-provision village organisations; community organisations 0.1
Local crime lords 0
Religious leader in the community 0.3
Musalihati council 1.9
Other 0.2
Don’t know 0.7
Not answered 0.8
Total 100
Who do you first contact in case of any conflict or dispute? 
cent) confirmed that they had approached the (village panchyat, faislo and Baloch jirga) to 
police authorities. This is an amazing finding and resolve their dispute. However, looking at the 
directly opposes what we found in Pakhtun Pakhtun data from the previous survey, a larger 
districts where only 16 per cent confirmed that group of respondents (17.5 per cent) who shared 
they had approached a police department. Out of that they had experienced litigation, accessed 
the small proportion of respondents in the rest of jirga.
Pakistan, 45.9 per cent had confirmed that they 
had approached their clan to resolve their The comparisons reflect startling contrasts and 
dispute, and 43.8 per cent confirmed that they reveal how informal justice systems are perceived, 
had accessed their extended family to resolve accessed and trusted in different regions under 
their dispute. different cultures and environments. The survey 
data confirms that the informal justice system is 
Surprisingly, only 15.2 per cent confirmed that more organised and practised in Pakhtun districts 
they had accessed local informal justice systems of KP and Balochistan, than in the rest of Pakistan. 
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Response Yes % No % Don’t know % No response 
%
Total %
Victim of theft or fraud 24.9 59.9 3 12.3 100
Victim of assault 12.7 65 4.3 18.1 100
Victim of domestic abuse 7.7 70 3.5 18.8 100
Victim of forced marriage 2.7 73.6 4 19.7 100
Victim of tribal customs such as swara/vani/karo 
kari,  bride price and jhag
4.6 71.1 4.7 19.7 100
Family member has gone missing or disappeared 4.8 70.7 4.6 19.8 100
Arrested without warrant by the administration or 
police
4 70.7 6 19.3 100
Accused of an offence under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1.1 72.3 6.3 20.3 100
Accused of committing sexual abuse/assault 
(under the Hudood Ordinances or the Pakistan 
Penal Code)
1.1 71.2 6.7 21 100
Accused of committing any other crime 4 70.4 7 18.6 100
Unlawful detention, search or arrest by the 
political administration
2.3 71 6.4 7.6 100
Bribery to police, Khasadar  or Levies force 5.5 68.1 6.4 20.1 100
Assault or torture by FC or Army 1.3 72.1 6.1 20.4 100
Money recovery, or debt/obligation settlement 1.3 72 6.9 19.9 100
Contract enforcement in business dealings 2 70.8 7.6 19.6 100
Purchase or sale of movable property 2.5 71 6.8 19.7 100
Lease and rental issues: disrepair, eviction etc. 1.5 72 5.7 20.7 100
Family law issues: divorce, maintenance, child 
custody, guardianship, inheritance
2.3 72 5.4 20.4 100
Dispute with employer for unpaid wages 2.4 71.9 5.3 20.4 100
Debt bondage 2.3 72.6 5 20.1 100
Found involved in sectarian violence 1 73.2 5.3 20.4 100
Found involved in tribal/family clashes 4 70.6 4.5 20.9 100
Injured in an accident (e.g. in motor vehicle etc.) 16.2 63.6 3.4 16.9 100
Have you or your household members experienced any of the following? 
This was also observed during round-table (Sardar, Wadera and Chaudhry) – which people 
39discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta – in scarcely trust.  The majority of participants at the 
Quetta the situation was different and Sindh and Punjab round-tables were more in 
participants from the Baloch ethnic group were favour of formal institutions and believed that 
more supportive of Baloch jirga than compared to people should access formal rather than informal 
38those in Punjab and Sindh.  Participants of the remedies. However they were also concerned 
round-table discussions also revealed that about the short-comings of the formal justice 
40informal justice systems – in their respective system.
regions – are under the influence of an elite 
38) Round-table discussions in Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan, August – December 2013
39) Ibid
40) Round-table discussion in Lahore and Karachi, August 2013
Household members experienced (Pakhtun 
districts) Yes % No %
Don’t 
know %
No 
response 
%
Total %
Victim of theft or fraud 11.5 84 3.3 1.3 100
Victim of assault 5.5 88.7 4.2 1.6 100
Victim of domestic abuse 3.8 88.3 5.3 2.5 100
Victim of forced marriage 0.8 90.9 6.2 2.1 100
Victim of tribal customs such as swara, bride price and 
jhag
0.6 89.4 7.9 2.1 100
Family member has gone missing or disappeared 2 90 6 2 100
Arrested without warrant by the administration or police 1.9 88.1 7.2 2.8 100
Accused of an offence under the Anti-Terrorism Act 0.8 87.9 7.7 3.7 100
Accused of committing sexual abuse/assault (under the 
Hudood Ordinances or the Pakistan Penal Code) 0.2 88.3 7.8 3.7 100
Accused of committing any other crime 1.2 88.1 7.9 2.8 100
Unlawful detention, search or arrest by the political 
administration 
0.8 89.7 7 2.6 100
Bribery by police, Khasadar or Levies force 3.6 86.3 7.8 2.3 100
Assault or torture by FC or Army 0.9 89.8 6.9 2.4 100
Money recovery, or debt/obligation settlement 1 87.5 9.3 2.3 100
Contract enforcement in business dealings 2.7 84.8 10 2.4 100
Purchase or sale of movable property 7.3 80.5 9.6 2.5 100
Lease and rental issues: disrepair, eviction etc. 2.5 85.8 8.9 2.9 100
Family law issues: divorce, maintenance, child custody, 
guardianship, inheritance
1.9 86.9 8.3 2.9 100
Dispute with employer for unpaid wages 0.6 87.5 9.5 2.4 100
Debt bondage 1.1 88 8.5 2.4 100
Found involved in sectarian violence 0.4 89.6 7.2 2.8 100
Found involved in tribal/family clashes 3.2 87.8 6.3 2.7 100
Injured in an accident (e.g. in motor vehicle) 12.9 79.2 4.8 3.1 100
Have you or your household members experienced any of the following? 
cent) confirmed that they had approached the (village panchyat, faislo and Baloch jirga) to 
police authorities. This is an amazing finding and resolve their dispute. However, looking at the 
directly opposes what we found in Pakhtun Pakhtun data from the previous survey, a larger 
districts where only 16 per cent confirmed that group of respondents (17.5 per cent) who shared 
they had approached a police department. Out of that they had experienced litigation, accessed 
the small proportion of respondents in the rest of jirga.
Pakistan, 45.9 per cent had confirmed that they 
had approached their clan to resolve their The comparisons reflect startling contrasts and 
dispute, and 43.8 per cent confirmed that they reveal how informal justice systems are perceived, 
had accessed their extended family to resolve accessed and trusted in different regions under 
their dispute. different cultures and environments. The survey 
data confirms that the informal justice system is 
Surprisingly, only 15.2 per cent confirmed that more organised and practised in Pakhtun districts 
they had accessed local informal justice systems of KP and Balochistan, than in the rest of Pakistan. 
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Response Yes % No % Don’t know % No response 
%
Total %
Victim of theft or fraud 24.9 59.9 3 12.3 100
Victim of assault 12.7 65 4.3 18.1 100
Victim of domestic abuse 7.7 70 3.5 18.8 100
Victim of forced marriage 2.7 73.6 4 19.7 100
Victim of tribal customs such as swara/vani/karo 
kari,  bride price and jhag
4.6 71.1 4.7 19.7 100
Family member has gone missing or disappeared 4.8 70.7 4.6 19.8 100
Arrested without warrant by the administration or 
police
4 70.7 6 19.3 100
Accused of an offence under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1.1 72.3 6.3 20.3 100
Accused of committing sexual abuse/assault 
(under the Hudood Ordinances or the Pakistan 
Penal Code)
1.1 71.2 6.7 21 100
Accused of committing any other crime 4 70.4 7 18.6 100
Unlawful detention, search or arrest by the 
political administration
2.3 71 6.4 7.6 100
Bribery to police, Khasadar  or Levies force 5.5 68.1 6.4 20.1 100
Assault or torture by FC or Army 1.3 72.1 6.1 20.4 100
Money recovery, or debt/obligation settlement 1.3 72 6.9 19.9 100
Contract enforcement in business dealings 2 70.8 7.6 19.6 100
Purchase or sale of movable property 2.5 71 6.8 19.7 100
Lease and rental issues: disrepair, eviction etc. 1.5 72 5.7 20.7 100
Family law issues: divorce, maintenance, child 
custody, guardianship, inheritance
2.3 72 5.4 20.4 100
Dispute with employer for unpaid wages 2.4 71.9 5.3 20.4 100
Debt bondage 2.3 72.6 5 20.1 100
Found involved in sectarian violence 1 73.2 5.3 20.4 100
Found involved in tribal/family clashes 4 70.6 4.5 20.9 100
Injured in an accident (e.g. in motor vehicle etc.) 16.2 63.6 3.4 16.9 100
Have you or your household members experienced any of the following? 
This was also observed during round-table (Sardar, Wadera and Chaudhry) – which people 
39discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta – in scarcely trust.  The majority of participants at the 
Quetta the situation was different and Sindh and Punjab round-tables were more in 
participants from the Baloch ethnic group were favour of formal institutions and believed that 
more supportive of Baloch jirga than compared to people should access formal rather than informal 
38those in Punjab and Sindh.  Participants of the remedies. However they were also concerned 
round-table discussions also revealed that about the short-comings of the formal justice 
40informal justice systems – in their respective system.
regions – are under the influence of an elite 
38) Round-table discussions in Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan, August – December 2013
39) Ibid
40) Round-table discussion in Lahore and Karachi, August 2013
Household members experienced (Pakhtun 
districts) Yes % No %
Don’t 
know %
No 
response 
%
Total %
Victim of theft or fraud 11.5 84 3.3 1.3 100
Victim of assault 5.5 88.7 4.2 1.6 100
Victim of domestic abuse 3.8 88.3 5.3 2.5 100
Victim of forced marriage 0.8 90.9 6.2 2.1 100
Victim of tribal customs such as swara, bride price and 
jhag
0.6 89.4 7.9 2.1 100
Family member has gone missing or disappeared 2 90 6 2 100
Arrested without warrant by the administration or police 1.9 88.1 7.2 2.8 100
Accused of an offence under the Anti-Terrorism Act 0.8 87.9 7.7 3.7 100
Accused of committing sexual abuse/assault (under the 
Hudood Ordinances or the Pakistan Penal Code) 0.2 88.3 7.8 3.7 100
Accused of committing any other crime 1.2 88.1 7.9 2.8 100
Unlawful detention, search or arrest by the political 
administration 
0.8 89.7 7 2.6 100
Bribery by police, Khasadar or Levies force 3.6 86.3 7.8 2.3 100
Assault or torture by FC or Army 0.9 89.8 6.9 2.4 100
Money recovery, or debt/obligation settlement 1 87.5 9.3 2.3 100
Contract enforcement in business dealings 2.7 84.8 10 2.4 100
Purchase or sale of movable property 7.3 80.5 9.6 2.5 100
Lease and rental issues: disrepair, eviction etc. 2.5 85.8 8.9 2.9 100
Family law issues: divorce, maintenance, child custody, 
guardianship, inheritance
1.9 86.9 8.3 2.9 100
Dispute with employer for unpaid wages 0.6 87.5 9.5 2.4 100
Debt bondage 1.1 88 8.5 2.4 100
Found involved in sectarian violence 0.4 89.6 7.2 2.8 100
Found involved in tribal/family clashes 3.2 87.8 6.3 2.7 100
Injured in an accident (e.g. in motor vehicle) 12.9 79.2 4.8 3.1 100
Have you or your household members experienced any of the following? 
Levels of satisfaction over dispute resolution resolution systems in resolving their legal issues, 
systems logically, the majority that had not responded 
'yes' to the previous question were not included. 
This question aims to determine how satisfied In addition, there is a need to compare 'access' 
respondents and their family members were after with 'contentment' responses, in order to assess 
experiencing institutions when facing litigation. As the level of respondent satisfaction.  
this question was asked only of those who had 
approached and had involved various dispute For instance, the majority (62.7 per cent) chose 
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their police department to resolve their legal Another surprising finding is respondents' access 
issues. However, the level of satisfaction of those to the lower courts in Pakistan and their 
who were very satisfied or somewhat satisfied experience. Only 13.6 per cent of respondents 
was 51.9 per cent, which is low when compared confirmed that they had accessed lower courts to 
to other options under analysis. Clans were resolve their legal issues and among those 
approached by 45.9 per cent of respondents in respondents 75.2 per cent shared that they were 
the previous question, and the level of satisfaction satisfied with the results – which is also very 
was very high (92.5 per cent were very satisfied or surprising, as the majority have a negative 
41somewhat satisfied). perception of the lower judiciary.
Extended family was chosen by 43.8 per cent of In recent years, the superior judiciary earned its 
respondents to resolve their legal issues, and their reputation and prestige due to the lawyers 
level of satisfaction was extremely high, topping movement during General (Retired) Pervez 
the list, 94 per cent of respondents very satisfied Musharraf's era, restoring the Chief Justice of 
or somewhat satisfied. Pakistan's Supreme Court. Despite that, only 6.8 
per cent of respondents confirmed that they had 
Another interesting finding is that of the 15.2 per accessed the superior judiciary for resolving their 
cent of respondents who accessed informal justice legal issues – depending on the complexity of the 
systems in three provinces, their level of case/dispute – and 71.1 per cent were satisfied 
satisfaction was quite high (76.4 per cent). with the outcome of their cases. 
Respondents had little regret in approaching 
informal justice systems for resolving their legal In Pakhtun districts of KP and Balochistan, more 
issues. than half (61.4 per cent) accessed Pakhtun jirga 
Options Rest of Pakistan (%)
Provincial police authorities and their local representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP, etc.) 62.7
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and High Courts) 6.8
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District and Sessions Courts) 13.6
Federal Shariat Court 2
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 3.7
Ombudsman 2.9
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2.4
Khandan (extended family) 43.8
Mohalla (neighborhood) 18.4
Biradari (clan) 45.9
Large local landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 23.1
Village council (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon /faislo/Baloch jirga) 15.2
Local influentials (local, provincial, national) 8.2
Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record keepers); nambardars (village headmen);
tehsildars
4.5
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district magistrates etc.) 4.4
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras) 1.9
Self-provision village organisations; community organisations 2.1
Local NGOs 2.3
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that charge a fee 1.1
Local crime lords 2.1
Religious leader in the community 2.4
Musalihati Council 0.8
Other 2.2
Don’t know 1.8
If yes, which of the following justice systems did you access for resolving your 
conflict/dispute? Pakhtun districts %
100
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Did not
 contact anyone
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Access to justice systems in the case of litigation - Pakhtun districts 
Levels of satisfaction over dispute resolution resolution systems in resolving their legal issues, 
systems logically, the majority that had not responded 
'yes' to the previous question were not included. 
This question aims to determine how satisfied In addition, there is a need to compare 'access' 
respondents and their family members were after with 'contentment' responses, in order to assess 
experiencing institutions when facing litigation. As the level of respondent satisfaction.  
this question was asked only of those who had 
approached and had involved various dispute For instance, the majority (62.7 per cent) chose 
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their police department to resolve their legal Another surprising finding is respondents' access 
issues. However, the level of satisfaction of those to the lower courts in Pakistan and their 
who were very satisfied or somewhat satisfied experience. Only 13.6 per cent of respondents 
was 51.9 per cent, which is low when compared confirmed that they had accessed lower courts to 
to other options under analysis. Clans were resolve their legal issues and among those 
approached by 45.9 per cent of respondents in respondents 75.2 per cent shared that they were 
the previous question, and the level of satisfaction satisfied with the results – which is also very 
was very high (92.5 per cent were very satisfied or surprising, as the majority have a negative 
41somewhat satisfied). perception of the lower judiciary.
Extended family was chosen by 43.8 per cent of In recent years, the superior judiciary earned its 
respondents to resolve their legal issues, and their reputation and prestige due to the lawyers 
level of satisfaction was extremely high, topping movement during General (Retired) Pervez 
the list, 94 per cent of respondents very satisfied Musharraf's era, restoring the Chief Justice of 
or somewhat satisfied. Pakistan's Supreme Court. Despite that, only 6.8 
per cent of respondents confirmed that they had 
Another interesting finding is that of the 15.2 per accessed the superior judiciary for resolving their 
cent of respondents who accessed informal justice legal issues – depending on the complexity of the 
systems in three provinces, their level of case/dispute – and 71.1 per cent were satisfied 
satisfaction was quite high (76.4 per cent). with the outcome of their cases. 
Respondents had little regret in approaching 
informal justice systems for resolving their legal In Pakhtun districts of KP and Balochistan, more 
issues. than half (61.4 per cent) accessed Pakhtun jirga 
Options Rest of Pakistan (%)
Provincial police authorities and their local representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP, etc.) 62.7
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and High Courts) 6.8
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District and Sessions Courts) 13.6
Federal Shariat Court 2
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 3.7
Ombudsman 2.9
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2.4
Khandan (extended family) 43.8
Mohalla (neighborhood) 18.4
Biradari (clan) 45.9
Large local landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 23.1
Village council (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon /faislo/Baloch jirga) 15.2
Local influentials (local, provincial, national) 8.2
Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record keepers); nambardars (village headmen);
tehsildars
4.5
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district magistrates etc.) 4.4
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras) 1.9
Self-provision village organisations; community organisations 2.1
Local NGOs 2.3
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that charge a fee 1.1
Local crime lords 2.1
Religious leader in the community 2.4
Musalihati Council 0.8
Other 2.2
Don’t know 1.8
If yes, which of the following justice systems did you access for resolving your 
conflict/dispute? Pakhtun districts %
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Access to justice systems in the case of litigation - Pakhtun districts 
because they believed it was fair and they trusted Results from previous questions suggest that 
it; 23.2 per cent chose the system because of its police, clan, extended family and informal justice 
effective implementation mechanism; and systems are dominant institutions which 
interestingly, only 18.0 per cent chose the system respondents believed that they could access 
because they thought it was speedy. The rest of during times of dispute. The same question was 
the data is self-explanatory. asked of respondents in Pakhtun districts but with 
fewer options, and with contrasting results. In 
Preference for choosing an institution for Pakhtun districts of KP and Balochistan, a higher 
criminal cases number of respondents (47.6 per cent) said they 
would approach 'Pakhtun jirga', and 37.7 per cent 
This single response question aims to document would approach the district administration and 
another dimension of respondents' trust on police. 
various institutions in cases of criminal nature.  
Interestingly, more than half (53.3 per cent) Findings for both regions and surveys draw 
confirmed that they would refer their cases of interesting comparisons. From this we conclude 
criminal nature to police authorities. Often, it that the police department, where all cases of a 
appears that the first reaction in a criminal case is criminal nature should go, is approached as a 
to visit a police station and lodge an FIR (First second option in Pakhtun districts.  In the rest of 
Information Report). However, 12.3 per cent Pakistan, people either have more trust in the 
confirmed that they would approach their clan if police department, or they may not have other 
they faced a criminal offence, 7.4 per cent would options available to them. 
refer the case to the informal justice system, and  
7.4 per cent would approach their extended The rest of the list is self-explanatory and does not 
family in such situations. need detailed analysis but instead is left for 
readers' observations.
for resolving their legal issues and 94.6 per cent Reasons for choosing various justice systems to 
confirmed that they were satisfied with the jirga deal with the dispute
decisions. Comparing Pakhtun districts with the 
data from the rest of Pakistan, it is evident that Respondents were asked to share their reasons 
Pakhtun jirga  is more trusted than other informal for choosing institutions to resolve their disputes. 
justice systems in Pakistan. Nonetheless, in the This question was general and was not asked in 
rest of Pakistan, we see that the overwhelming the context of each institution. 
majority access their clan and extended family 
and other informal mechanisms, as these A high number of respondents (43.2 per cent) said 
institutions run similar procedures to other that they chose the system because they believed 
informal justice systems. However, they are not it would be efficient and effective in resolving the 
very well organised or established when dispute. This was followed by 38.6 per cent who 
compared to village council, faislo or Baloch jirga. chose it because it was close to where they live 
The rest of the list is self-explanatory. and easily accessible.  
In addition, 32.6 per cent chose the system 
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Options Very
 satisfied %
Somewhat
satisfied %
Somewhat
unsatisfied %
Not
satisfied % Total %
Provincial police authorities and their local 14 37.9 21.9 26.2 100
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and 15.8 55.3 21.1 7.9 100
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, 34 41.2 11.8 13.1 100
Federal Shariat Court 30.4 52.2 8.7 8.7 100
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul 45.2 26.2 11.9 16.7 100
Ombudsman 14.7 29.4 44.1 11.8 100
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 32.1 39.3 21.4 7.1 100
Khandan  (extended family) 63.7 30.3 3.1 2.9 100
Mohalla  (neighborhood) 59.3 34 3.8 2.9 100
Biradari  (clan) 58.3 34.2 3.5 4.1 100
Large local landowner (Village 31.6 37.6 12.2 18.6 100
Village council (akhat, pareh, pareh 
panchayat, pareon) or faislo or Baloch  jirga
47.6 28.8 7.1 16.5 100
Local influentials (local, provincial, national) 12.6 30.5 24.2 32.6 100
Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record 
keepers); nambardars (village headmen); 
5.8 38.5 25 30.8 100
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district 29.4 21.6 23.5 25.5 100
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras) 8.3 45.8 29.2 16.7 100
Self-provision village organisations; community 64 16 16 4 100
Local NGOs 29.6 33.3 18.5 18.5 100
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that 15.4 38.5 23.1 23.1 100
Local crime lords 18.5 25.9 22.2 33.3 100
Religious leader in the community 33.3 25 22.2 19.4 100
Musalihati Council 13.3 6.7 46.7 33.3 100
How satisfied were you with these institutions involvement?
43
.2
38
.6
32
.1
6.
5
14
.3
7.
2 8.
2
23
.2
11
.8 18
3.
7
12
.5 11
.2
11
.1
9.
7
4.
1
2.
3
0 0
7.
1
2
Efficient and 
effective at 
resolving the 
dispute
Close to
where live
Fair and
trusted
Follows 
accepted local 
norms/values
Less
expensive
Less
corrupt
Less
vulnerable 
to influence
and pressure
Effective 
implementation 
mechanism
Formal legal 
remedy is 
mandated by 
the law
Speedy Other
Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun Districts %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0
What were the reasons for choosing the justice systems to deal with the dispute?
because they believed it was fair and they trusted Results from previous questions suggest that 
it; 23.2 per cent chose the system because of its police, clan, extended family and informal justice 
effective implementation mechanism; and systems are dominant institutions which 
interestingly, only 18.0 per cent chose the system respondents believed that they could access 
because they thought it was speedy. The rest of during times of dispute. The same question was 
the data is self-explanatory. asked of respondents in Pakhtun districts but with 
fewer options, and with contrasting results. In 
Preference for choosing an institution for Pakhtun districts of KP and Balochistan, a higher 
criminal cases number of respondents (47.6 per cent) said they 
would approach 'Pakhtun jirga', and 37.7 per cent 
This single response question aims to document would approach the district administration and 
another dimension of respondents' trust on police. 
various institutions in cases of criminal nature.  
Interestingly, more than half (53.3 per cent) Findings for both regions and surveys draw 
confirmed that they would refer their cases of interesting comparisons. From this we conclude 
criminal nature to police authorities. Often, it that the police department, where all cases of a 
appears that the first reaction in a criminal case is criminal nature should go, is approached as a 
to visit a police station and lodge an FIR (First second option in Pakhtun districts.  In the rest of 
Information Report). However, 12.3 per cent Pakistan, people either have more trust in the 
confirmed that they would approach their clan if police department, or they may not have other 
they faced a criminal offence, 7.4 per cent would options available to them. 
refer the case to the informal justice system, and  
7.4 per cent would approach their extended The rest of the list is self-explanatory and does not 
family in such situations. need detailed analysis but instead is left for 
readers' observations.
for resolving their legal issues and 94.6 per cent Reasons for choosing various justice systems to 
confirmed that they were satisfied with the jirga deal with the dispute
decisions. Comparing Pakhtun districts with the 
data from the rest of Pakistan, it is evident that Respondents were asked to share their reasons 
Pakhtun jirga  is more trusted than other informal for choosing institutions to resolve their disputes. 
justice systems in Pakistan. Nonetheless, in the This question was general and was not asked in 
rest of Pakistan, we see that the overwhelming the context of each institution. 
majority access their clan and extended family 
and other informal mechanisms, as these A high number of respondents (43.2 per cent) said 
institutions run similar procedures to other that they chose the system because they believed 
informal justice systems. However, they are not it would be efficient and effective in resolving the 
very well organised or established when dispute. This was followed by 38.6 per cent who 
compared to village council, faislo or Baloch jirga. chose it because it was close to where they live 
The rest of the list is self-explanatory. and easily accessible.  
In addition, 32.6 per cent chose the system 
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Options Very
 satisfied %
Somewhat
satisfied %
Somewhat
unsatisfied %
Not
satisfied % Total %
Provincial police authorities and their local 14 37.9 21.9 26.2 100
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and 15.8 55.3 21.1 7.9 100
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, 34 41.2 11.8 13.1 100
Federal Shariat Court 30.4 52.2 8.7 8.7 100
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul 45.2 26.2 11.9 16.7 100
Ombudsman 14.7 29.4 44.1 11.8 100
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 32.1 39.3 21.4 7.1 100
Khandan  (extended family) 63.7 30.3 3.1 2.9 100
Mohalla  (neighborhood) 59.3 34 3.8 2.9 100
Biradari  (clan) 58.3 34.2 3.5 4.1 100
Large local landowner (Village 31.6 37.6 12.2 18.6 100
Village council (akhat, pareh, pareh 
panchayat, pareon) or faislo or Baloch  jirga
47.6 28.8 7.1 16.5 100
Local influentials (local, provincial, national) 12.6 30.5 24.2 32.6 100
Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record 
keepers); nambardars (village headmen); 
5.8 38.5 25 30.8 100
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district 29.4 21.6 23.5 25.5 100
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras) 8.3 45.8 29.2 16.7 100
Self-provision village organisations; community 64 16 16 4 100
Local NGOs 29.6 33.3 18.5 18.5 100
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that 15.4 38.5 23.1 23.1 100
Local crime lords 18.5 25.9 22.2 33.3 100
Religious leader in the community 33.3 25 22.2 19.4 100
Musalihati Council 13.3 6.7 46.7 33.3 100
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cases of respondents (24.5 per cent) confirmed that 
they would resolve their civil cases through their 
In Pakistan, disputants rarely take their civil extended family, followed by 17 per cent who 
disputes to formal institutions. Instead they rely chose their clan. 
predominantly on informal institutions such as 
their clan, extended family, village council, In the previous question, 53.3 per cent of 
42landlords etc. respondents confirmed that they would prefer to 
take their criminal cases to police authorities. 
The survey aimed to document how respondents However, only 15.3 per cent of respondents said 
react to the question, 'which institution would you they would prefer to take civil cases to police 
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Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and High Courts) 2.5
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District and Sessions Courts) 8
Federal Shariat Court 0.5
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 0.6
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Mohalla (neighbourhood) 0.7
Biradari (clan) 17
Large, local landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 10.4
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2.1
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district magistrates etc.) 0.1
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Local NGOs 0.1
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Musalihati Council 1.7
Other 0.2
Don’t know 3.7
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Total 100
Where would you refer your civil dispute (land disputes/divorce etc) for resolution? 
42) Interview with Advocate Tahir Iqbal, Legal Reform Forum (NGO), 25 August 2013, Karachi
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Political groupings/vote banks (dharras) 0
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that charge a fee 0
Local crime lords 1.9
Religious leader in the community 0.1
Musalihati Council 0.4
Other 0.3
Don’t know 0.9
Not answered 0.2
Total 100
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In Pakistan, disputants rarely take their civil extended family, followed by 17 per cent who 
disputes to formal institutions. Instead they rely chose their clan. 
predominantly on informal institutions such as 
their clan, extended family, village council, In the previous question, 53.3 per cent of 
42landlords etc. respondents confirmed that they would prefer to 
take their criminal cases to police authorities. 
The survey aimed to document how respondents However, only 15.3 per cent of respondents said 
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Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 0.6
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 0.3
Khandan (extended family) 24.9
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Provincial police authorities and their local representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP, etc.) 53.3
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and High Courts) 2.1
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District and Sessions Courts) 3.3
Federal Shariat Court 0.3
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 0.5
Ombudsman 0.3
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 0.1
Khandan (extended family) 7.4
Mohalla (neighbourhood) 0.3
Biradari (clan) 12.3
Large local landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 6.9
Village panchayat (akhat pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon /faislo/Baloch jirga) 7.4
Local influentials (local, provincial, national) 1.5
Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record keepers); nambardars (village headmen); tehsildars 0.5
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district magistrates etc.) 0.1
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras) 0
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that charge a fee 0
Local crime lords 1.9
Religious leader in the community 0.1
Musalihati Council 0.4
Other 0.3
Don’t know 0.9
Not answered 0.2
Total 100
Where would you refer your serious criminal dispute (Murder/Theft/Robbery etc) for 
resolution? 
authorities, and 10.4 per cent said they would A high percentage of respondents (38.8 per cent) 
prefer to approach local large landowners for said they would take all criminal cases to formal 
settling their civil disputes. courts (Supreme court, High Courts, Session 
Courts etc); 31 per cent confirmed that they 
In considering Pakhtun jirga, which was the would take to the formal courts cases of a 
preferred choice by 59.1 per cent of respondents complex nature that informal justice systems 
in Pakhtun districts, only 8.9 per cent of could not resolve; 25.6 per cent confirmed that 
respondents in the rest of Pakistan chose to refer they would take cases concerning land or property 
their civil cases to informal justice systems such as to the formal courts; and 15.5 per cent believed 
the village panchyat, faislo, Baloch jirga. The rest that they would take all cases (both civil and 
of the list is self-explanatory and does not need criminal) to the formal courts. 
detailed analysis, but is instead left for readers' 
observations. The most significant result of these findings was in 
respondents' preferences in criminal cases. The 
Respondents' inclination towards different data showed that respondents preferred formal 
justice systems courts (38.8 per cent) over informal justice 
systems (9.2 per cent) for resolving criminal cases. 
To delve even deeper, this survey sought to They believed formal courts have the authority 
understand which formal and informal dispute and knowledge to resolve such cases while 
resolution systems respondents were inclined to informal justice systems lack not only the 
choose, depending on the nature of the dispute. authority to implement decisions, but they are ill-
They were asked which system they would prefer equipped with legal knowledge to resolve criminal 
if faced with a dispute. Several options were cases. 
provided to the respondents. 
The data also confirmed that informal justice 
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systems were preferred by respondents to resolve respondents preferred to take family cases (such 
cases concerning property: 25.6 per cent as divorce) to jirga and only 3.8 per cent preferred 
preferred formal systems and 34.1 per cent to take such cases to the formal justice system.  
preferred informal systems. In certain family cases 
such as divorce, 12.1 per cent preferred formal CONCLUSION
systems and 43 per cent (a significant majority) 
preferred informal systems. Another interesting Combining the evidence gathered from the 
comparison was in respondents' preferences in survey, key informants interviews and round-table 
cases of a complex nature – 31 per cent preferred discussions, conclusions for the rest of Pakistan 
formal systems and only 12.2 per cent preferred and Pakhtun districts can be drawn differently. 
informal systems.  
It is evident that ordinary people have a good 
In comparison with the 2012 survey of Pakhtun understanding of access to justice, and the media 
districts, the results are very different from the seems to have played a pivotal role in educating 
survey from the rest of Pakistan. the masses on this subject. However, the concept 
of justice and its inaccessibility is clear when 
For all cases, 38.0 per cent of respondents analysing the data. 
preferred the informal justice system and only 9.5 
per cent preferred the formal justice system. With For instance, in the rest of Pakistan respondents 
regards to complex cases, 44.5 per cent of show little trust of informal justice systems (village 
respondents preferred to approach the formal panchyat, faislo and Baloch jirga) as compared to 
courts, and 5.8 per cent preferred the informal formal justice systems. However, common 
justice system. In relation to cases of public perceptions favour the use of extended family, 
interest, 22.5 per cent preferred to approach the neighbourhood and clan – which are also informal 
jirga and only 2.1 per cent preferred the formal institutions and which have shared a fairly large 
courts. Another interesting finding is respondents' burden of cases with formal and informal justice 
preference in family cases. Twenty per cent of systems. If we are to consider extended family, 
Formal (%) Informal 
(%)
Formal (%) Informal 
(%)
All cases 15.5 18.5 9.5 38
All cases of public interest 4.7 6.3 2.1 22.5
Only complex cases that the informal systems 
cannot/could not solve
31 12.2 44.5 5.8
All cases of crime 38.8 9.2 9.8 4
Cases concerning land or other property 25.6 34.1 12.6 20.4
Certain family cases, for example, divorce 12.1 43 3.8 20
Business and commercial transactions 11.1 6.9 14.5 8.6
None 10.4 11.2 0.8 0.6
Other 1 1.9 11 8.9
Don’t know 5.8 7.3 0.1 0.1
What types of cases you prefer to take to the formal courts (Supreme Court, High would Court, Session 
Court etc) and what type of cases would you prefer to take to the informal dispute resolution mechanism?
dispute resolution mechanisms? 
Options
Pakhtun Districts (2012)Rest of Pakistan (2013)
authorities, and 10.4 per cent said they would A high percentage of respondents (38.8 per cent) 
prefer to approach local large landowners for said they would take all criminal cases to formal 
settling their civil disputes. courts (Supreme court, High Courts, Session 
Courts etc); 31 per cent confirmed that they 
In considering Pakhtun jirga, which was the would take to the formal courts cases of a 
preferred choice by 59.1 per cent of respondents complex nature that informal justice systems 
in Pakhtun districts, only 8.9 per cent of could not resolve; 25.6 per cent confirmed that 
respondents in the rest of Pakistan chose to refer they would take cases concerning land or property 
their civil cases to informal justice systems such as to the formal courts; and 15.5 per cent believed 
the village panchyat, faislo, Baloch jirga. The rest that they would take all cases (both civil and 
of the list is self-explanatory and does not need criminal) to the formal courts. 
detailed analysis, but is instead left for readers' 
observations. The most significant result of these findings was in 
respondents' preferences in criminal cases. The 
Respondents' inclination towards different data showed that respondents preferred formal 
justice systems courts (38.8 per cent) over informal justice 
systems (9.2 per cent) for resolving criminal cases. 
To delve even deeper, this survey sought to They believed formal courts have the authority 
understand which formal and informal dispute and knowledge to resolve such cases while 
resolution systems respondents were inclined to informal justice systems lack not only the 
choose, depending on the nature of the dispute. authority to implement decisions, but they are ill-
They were asked which system they would prefer equipped with legal knowledge to resolve criminal 
if faced with a dispute. Several options were cases. 
provided to the respondents. 
The data also confirmed that informal justice 
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systems were preferred by respondents to resolve respondents preferred to take family cases (such 
cases concerning property: 25.6 per cent as divorce) to jirga and only 3.8 per cent preferred 
preferred formal systems and 34.1 per cent to take such cases to the formal justice system.  
preferred informal systems. In certain family cases 
such as divorce, 12.1 per cent preferred formal CONCLUSION
systems and 43 per cent (a significant majority) 
preferred informal systems. Another interesting Combining the evidence gathered from the 
comparison was in respondents' preferences in survey, key informants interviews and round-table 
cases of a complex nature – 31 per cent preferred discussions, conclusions for the rest of Pakistan 
formal systems and only 12.2 per cent preferred and Pakhtun districts can be drawn differently. 
informal systems.  
It is evident that ordinary people have a good 
In comparison with the 2012 survey of Pakhtun understanding of access to justice, and the media 
districts, the results are very different from the seems to have played a pivotal role in educating 
survey from the rest of Pakistan. the masses on this subject. However, the concept 
of justice and its inaccessibility is clear when 
For all cases, 38.0 per cent of respondents analysing the data. 
preferred the informal justice system and only 9.5 
per cent preferred the formal justice system. With For instance, in the rest of Pakistan respondents 
regards to complex cases, 44.5 per cent of show little trust of informal justice systems (village 
respondents preferred to approach the formal panchyat, faislo and Baloch jirga) as compared to 
courts, and 5.8 per cent preferred the informal formal justice systems. However, common 
justice system. In relation to cases of public perceptions favour the use of extended family, 
interest, 22.5 per cent preferred to approach the neighbourhood and clan – which are also informal 
jirga and only 2.1 per cent preferred the formal institutions and which have shared a fairly large 
courts. Another interesting finding is respondents' burden of cases with formal and informal justice 
preference in family cases. Twenty per cent of systems. If we are to consider extended family, 
Formal (%) Informal 
(%)
Formal (%) Informal 
(%)
All cases 15.5 18.5 9.5 38
All cases of public interest 4.7 6.3 2.1 22.5
Only complex cases that the informal systems 
cannot/could not solve
31 12.2 44.5 5.8
All cases of crime 38.8 9.2 9.8 4
Cases concerning land or other property 25.6 34.1 12.6 20.4
Certain family cases, for example, divorce 12.1 43 3.8 20
Business and commercial transactions 11.1 6.9 14.5 8.6
None 10.4 11.2 0.8 0.6
Other 1 1.9 11 8.9
Don’t know 5.8 7.3 0.1 0.1
What types of cases you prefer to take to the formal courts (Supreme Court, High would Court, Session 
Court etc) and what type of cases would you prefer to take to the informal dispute resolution mechanism?
dispute resolution mechanisms? 
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neighbourhood and clan as forums of informal 
justice systems where a higher percentage of 
people take their cases, then it can be safely 
argued that the majority in Pakistan prefers the 
informal mechanism – despite a lower preference 
shown for (village panchayat, faislo and Baloch 
jirga). 
With regards to respondents from the Pakhtun 
dominated districts of KP and Balochistan, results 
are pretty straightforward and clear: they prefer 
Pakhtun jirga in all cases – both criminal and civil. 
With regards to disputes of a petty nature and the 
state's institutions inability to dispense justice on 
time and with affordability, sometimes leading to 
widespread anger, frustration, and violence, 
Pakistan is a case in point – formal judicial systems 
are failing to provide access to justice for all. 
Cases, which could easily be concluded and 
amicably resolved, often linger on for decades and 
develop more complexities. Poor people have 
little or no access to justice, whereas the wealthy 
elite not only dominate the system but are also 
part of the law-making. Nevertheless, the data 
still shows that people generally prefer to 
approach the formal courts for criminal and 
complex cases, and that they use other options as 
a last resort. 
Parallel informal justice systems that lack technical 
knowledge and flexibility often violate human 
rights, especially in relation to women and 
minority groups. 
The Pakistani justice system – both formal and 
informal – is in need of a complete overhaul. It is 
high time that the government of Pakistan takes 
measures to improve and reform its justice sector. 
Please refer to Chapter 7 for more details. 

FATA, the formal system described in previous INTRODUCTION
chapters applies to the entire country. In this 
chapter the descriptions and analysis of the two This chapter argues that traditional institutions 
disparate forms of justice systems in the survey (the informal justice system, extended family, 
area are based upon a conceptual division clans and neighbourhoods etc.) and customary 
between legality and legitimacy. laws are strong components of social control in 
under-developed societies like Pakistan. This 
The principle of legality is easier to define and chapter also analyses the weaknesses of the 
comprises the body of law established by the formal judicial system, which is based on English 
congress or parliament of the nation under a common law inherited from the British. In 
constitutional framework. Thus, its focus is on the presenting survey findings concerning trust, 
written rules that comprise a state's system of effectiveness and fairness, this chapter examines 
statutory law, and the application by decision-the perception of Pakistani society regarding the 
makers of those rules – which have been legality and legitimacy of formal and informal 
established beforehand – in a manner that does systems of justice.  
not entail discretionary departures from 
established law. In other words, the principle of At present, justice-related services in Pakistan are 
legality is closely related to the formalist approach offered by the state's sponsored judicial system, 
to the rule of law, which tends to focus on purely whereas the informal justice system is operational 
formal characteristics that a legal system must in all of Pakistan, especially in rural areas, without 
possess, and shies away from assessments of the the state's patronage. 
fairness of specific laws or legal decisions. 
According to Friedmann (1994) law is a Informal justice systems include Pakhtun jirga 
codification and replacement of traditional that operates in FATA, KP and Balochistan's 
1authority.  That does not alter the fact that the Pakhtun populated districts, while panchayat, 
courts have to decide many cases, often with faislo and Baloch jirga are practised by 
respect to immensely complex and interwoven communities in Punjab, Sindh and in Baloch areas 
2problems.  Sometimes the legitimacy of a court of Balochistan, respectively. With the exception of 
5decision is questioned because a decision in a According to Nonso Okafo (2009)
case runs contrary to public opinion that is often 
3quite superficially informed by the media.  'A system based on Customary Law, the 
Another problem is that formal legal procedures English Common Law, Constitutionalism, 
may take a long time, whereas the substance of Religious Law, or any other philosophy, 
individual consent to a process of decision- has to be effective and efficient to be 
making, that may initially attach to and legitimate sustained over a long period of time'.
outcomes, thins as the process expands in scope 
4and lengthens in time. This chapter analyses how formal and informal 
legal remedies are available to, and perceived by, 
On the other hand, the principle of legitimacy is the people of Pakistan, on the basis of their 
linked to criteria such as clarity, comprehensible, efficiency and effectiveness that make such 
non-arbitrary and non-retrospective application. institutions legal and legitimate. 
The ability of a legal system to deliver justice in a 
form that is acceptable to the people it governs is Survey findings and analysis
necessary for gaining legitimacy. Indeed, it is the 
notion of justice that makes laws meaningful to History of operations of various formal and 
ordinary people in their day-to-day lives. But the informal institutions
idea of justice is different for each society based 
on its particular assessment of 'right' versus The institutions listed above have been operating 
'wrong'. In other words, it is the values, norms, in the survey respondents' areas for differing 
and expectations of the people toward the legal lengths of time. 
system that convey legitimacy. As one would 
expect, in each society the notions of justice and The survey aimed to record respondents' opinion 
how it is rendered are not static, but rather on how long these institutions have been 
subject to change in response to evolving social, operating. This would indicate their level of 
political and economic conditions. In the end, for knowledge about these institutions and the way 
a particular legal system to be considered just, the they approach them. Background information on 
present normative values, sensibilities and these institutions is included in chapter 3 of this 
expectations of a society must be reflected in the study. The list is self-explanatory. 
legal system. In other words, social definitions of 
justice should coincide with the institutions, laws, Effectiveness of institutions dispensing justice 
and procedures of a state's justice system. In this and other services
respect, legitimacy conforms with substantive  
conceptions of the rule of law, which looks to the The opinion of 2700 adult respondents from 
outcome of laws against criteria such as justness Punjab, Sindh and Baloch districts of Balochistan 
or fairness. was recorded with regards to their views on the 
effectiveness of the 22 formal and informal 
Legality and legitimacy can further be dispute resolution systems listed in the table.
conceptualised and ensured on the basis of a 
system's effectiveness and efficiency.  The data clearly demonstrates that overall, 
respondents viewed informal institutions as more 
CHAPTER 4
87 88
EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF FORMAL
AND INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS
1. L.M. Friedmann, The Republic of Choice. Law, Authority and Culture,  p. 17. Harvard University Press: Cambridge Mass., 1994a (1990),
2. J.L.M. Gribnau, Legitimacy of the Judiciary https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/14735741/legitimacy-of-the-judiciary-jlm-gribnau-i-b-2-legitimacy-
3. Ibid
4. Vining 1995, p.280. In urgent cases, a party can resort to a speedy civil or administrative procedure (interim injunction proceedings or provisional relief) before the president of a district 
court; see Blankenburg and Bruinsma 1991, p. 23 ff.
5. Nonso Okafo, Reconstructing Law and Justice in a Postcolony, Ashgate Publishing Company, p.9. (2009)Ch
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FATA, the formal system described in previous INTRODUCTION
chapters applies to the entire country. In this 
chapter the descriptions and analysis of the two This chapter argues that traditional institutions 
disparate forms of justice systems in the survey (the informal justice system, extended family, 
area are based upon a conceptual division clans and neighbourhoods etc.) and customary 
between legality and legitimacy. laws are strong components of social control in 
under-developed societies like Pakistan. This 
The principle of legality is easier to define and chapter also analyses the weaknesses of the 
comprises the body of law established by the formal judicial system, which is based on English 
congress or parliament of the nation under a common law inherited from the British. In 
constitutional framework. Thus, its focus is on the presenting survey findings concerning trust, 
written rules that comprise a state's system of effectiveness and fairness, this chapter examines 
statutory law, and the application by decision-the perception of Pakistani society regarding the 
makers of those rules – which have been legality and legitimacy of formal and informal 
established beforehand – in a manner that does systems of justice.  
not entail discretionary departures from 
established law. In other words, the principle of At present, justice-related services in Pakistan are 
legality is closely related to the formalist approach offered by the state's sponsored judicial system, 
to the rule of law, which tends to focus on purely whereas the informal justice system is operational 
formal characteristics that a legal system must in all of Pakistan, especially in rural areas, without 
possess, and shies away from assessments of the the state's patronage. 
fairness of specific laws or legal decisions. 
According to Friedmann (1994) law is a Informal justice systems include Pakhtun jirga 
codification and replacement of traditional that operates in FATA, KP and Balochistan's 
1authority.  That does not alter the fact that the Pakhtun populated districts, while panchayat, 
courts have to decide many cases, often with faislo and Baloch jirga are practised by 
respect to immensely complex and interwoven communities in Punjab, Sindh and in Baloch areas 
2problems.  Sometimes the legitimacy of a court of Balochistan, respectively. With the exception of 
5decision is questioned because a decision in a According to Nonso Okafo (2009)
case runs contrary to public opinion that is often 
3quite superficially informed by the media.  'A system based on Customary Law, the 
Another problem is that formal legal procedures English Common Law, Constitutionalism, 
may take a long time, whereas the substance of Religious Law, or any other philosophy, 
individual consent to a process of decision- has to be effective and efficient to be 
making, that may initially attach to and legitimate sustained over a long period of time'.
outcomes, thins as the process expands in scope 
4and lengthens in time. This chapter analyses how formal and informal 
legal remedies are available to, and perceived by, 
On the other hand, the principle of legitimacy is the people of Pakistan, on the basis of their 
linked to criteria such as clarity, comprehensible, efficiency and effectiveness that make such 
non-arbitrary and non-retrospective application. institutions legal and legitimate. 
The ability of a legal system to deliver justice in a 
form that is acceptable to the people it governs is Survey findings and analysis
necessary for gaining legitimacy. Indeed, it is the 
notion of justice that makes laws meaningful to History of operations of various formal and 
ordinary people in their day-to-day lives. But the informal institutions
idea of justice is different for each society based 
on its particular assessment of 'right' versus The institutions listed above have been operating 
'wrong'. In other words, it is the values, norms, in the survey respondents' areas for differing 
and expectations of the people toward the legal lengths of time. 
system that convey legitimacy. As one would 
expect, in each society the notions of justice and The survey aimed to record respondents' opinion 
how it is rendered are not static, but rather on how long these institutions have been 
subject to change in response to evolving social, operating. This would indicate their level of 
political and economic conditions. In the end, for knowledge about these institutions and the way 
a particular legal system to be considered just, the they approach them. Background information on 
present normative values, sensibilities and these institutions is included in chapter 3 of this 
expectations of a society must be reflected in the study. The list is self-explanatory. 
legal system. In other words, social definitions of 
justice should coincide with the institutions, laws, Effectiveness of institutions dispensing justice 
and procedures of a state's justice system. In this and other services
respect, legitimacy conforms with substantive  
conceptions of the rule of law, which looks to the The opinion of 2700 adult respondents from 
outcome of laws against criteria such as justness Punjab, Sindh and Baloch districts of Balochistan 
or fairness. was recorded with regards to their views on the 
effectiveness of the 22 formal and informal 
Legality and legitimacy can further be dispute resolution systems listed in the table.
conceptualised and ensured on the basis of a 
system's effectiveness and efficiency.  The data clearly demonstrates that overall, 
respondents viewed informal institutions as more 
CHAPTER 4
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EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF FORMAL
AND INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS
1. L.M. Friedmann, The Republic of Choice. Law, Authority and Culture,  p. 17. Harvard University Press: Cambridge Mass., 1994a (1990),
2. J.L.M. Gribnau, Legitimacy of the Judiciary https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/14735741/legitimacy-of-the-judiciary-jlm-gribnau-i-b-2-legitimacy-
3. Ibid
4. Vining 1995, p.280. In urgent cases, a party can resort to a speedy civil or administrative procedure (interim injunction proceedings or provisional relief) before the president of a district 
court; see Blankenburg and Bruinsma 1991, p. 23 ff.
5. Nonso Okafo, Reconstructing Law and Justice in a Postcolony, Ashgate Publishing Company, p.9. (2009)Ch
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effective.  Out of the 22 institutions listed in the large local landowners as people who were 
table, a few are worth mentioning. (Please note effective in resolving disputes. This is 
that for ease of analysis, the data of 'very effective' understandable, as, according to participants of 
and 'somewhat effective' is combined to be round-table discussions, large landowners exert 
analysed as 'effective'). their influence for political gain, hence providing 
6services to locals for resolving  disputes.  
Looking at the list of institutions and respondents' 
reaction, clan, as an informal institution, was Out of the 22 institutions, the top five effective 
shown to be seen as an effective body when institutions in the list identified by the majority of 
dealing with dispute resolution, according to the respondents were informal institutions. Formal 
overwhelming majority (80.3 per cent). institutions remained lower in ranking for this 
particular question.  
According to two-thirds of respondents (76.2 per 
cent), the informal institution of extended family, As far as Pakistan's formal institutions were 
was an effective body to resolve legal issues. 73.3 concerned, 56.3 per cent of respondents believed 
per cent believed that the informal institution of that the lower courts were effective in dispensing 
the neighbourhood was an effective body in justice, and 54.8 per cent believed the superior 
resolving disputes. courts were effective institutions for dispensing 
justice. The police department was identified by 
Surprisingly, 66.3 per cent of respondents believed less than half of respondents (41.2 per cent) as 
that informal justice systems (village panchayat, effective. Interestingly, in the previous chapter, the 
faislo or Baloch jirga) are effective institutions for police was one of the institutions that most people 
dispensing justice. It is surprising because other said they would turn to (in order to make their 
data sets support assumptions that informal justice disputes official). However, this question discusses 
systems are rarely approached for resolving legal the effectiveness of institutions ? respondents 
issues. showed a clear lack of faith in the effectiveness of 
the police department.     
In addition, 50.1 per cent of respondents identified 
Fairness of formal and informal institutions that it's a fair institution when resolving people's 
dispensing justice services legal issues. Clan was second, identified by 55.9 
per cent of respondents as an institution which 
Survey respondents were asked to rate the fairness provides fair services to the local communities. In 
of the various formal and informal institutions third position, it's the neighbourhood, identified by 
listed below. This data can be triangulated with the 52.9 per cent of respondents, and in fourth place 
previous question and there is a need to analyse lies informal justice systems (panchayat, faislo and 
whether the results for this question reflect the Baloch jirga) identified by 48.4 per cent. 
results of the previous question. 
46.7 per cent of respondents believed that the 
Interestingly, extended family tops the list: the lower courts are fair in dealing with people's legal 
majority of respondents (56.1 per cent) believed issues, while 44.7 per cent of respondents 
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Provincial police authorities and their local 
representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP) 5.3 35.9 24.3 28.3 4.9 1.3 100
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court 
and High Courts) 19.1 35.7 12.4 3.6 26.4 2.8 100
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, 
District and Sessions Courts) 18.1 38.2 13.2 8.5 20.4 1.5 100
Federal Shariat Court 7.5 16.1 4.5 2.6 65.3 4 100
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul 
Madaris or other registered Madaris)
10.8 16.2 5.7 3.5 60.1 3.7 100
Ombudsman 2.9 13.6 4.7 3 71.8 4 100
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 7.5 17.5 5.4 3.7 62.5 3.3 100
Khandan (extended family) 41.9 34.3 4.4 1.7 14.4 3.4 100
Mohalla (neighbourhood) 31.7 41.6 7.6 2.7 11.7 4.7 100
Biradari (clan) 40.2 40.1 5.6 2.3 9 2.8 100
Large local landowner (Village 
Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera)
14.7 36.1 15.9 14.5 15.7 3 100
Village panchayat  (akhat, pareh, pareh 
panchayat, pareon) / faislo or Baloch jirga)
22.3 34 11.1 10.6 18.6 3.5 100
Local influentials (local, provincial, national) 6.3 26.1 17.9 18.2 28.1 3.3 100
Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record 
keepers); nambardars  (village headmen); 
tehsildars (Tehsil  administration/revenue 
collection heads) or others
3.5 16.3 21.5 20.7 34.4 3.7 100
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district 
magistrates etc.) 6 16.6 16.9 13.7 43.1 3.6 100
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras) 3.2 14.2 15.9 17.4 46 3.3 100
Self-provision village organisations; community 
organisations
6.4 16.3 5.6 4.9 63.1 3.8 100
Local NGOs 8.4 17.3 6 4.1 61.4 2.8 100
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that 
charge a fee
1 7.2 3.9 5.9 78.9 3.1 100
Local crime lords 1 5.4 7.9 10 72.3 3.3 100
Religious leader in the community 11.8 23.4 6.1 3.1 52.3 3.3 100
Musalihati Council 1.8 7.5 4.2 3.4 79.9 3.2 100
 For the following systems please indicate how effective they are for dispensing justice.
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6. Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
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Local/village panchayat or faislo  or Baloch jirga 1.2 4.1 6.4 52.3 14 20.1 1.9 100
Khandan  (extended family) 1.7 4.6 11.5 62.7 2.4 14.8 2.4 100
Mohalla  (neighbourhood) 2.4 5.7 13.9 53.4 3.7 17.4 3.5 100
Biradari  (clan) 1.4 4.1 10.7 59.6 4.3 17.1 2.8 100
Self-provision village organisations; community 
organisations
6.6 8.7 5.4 3.6 26.9 44.8 3.9 100
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that 
charge a fee
0.6 3.6 2.7 2.2 34.1 52.1 4.7 100
Local crime lords 0.5 4.7 4.9 6.6 29.6 48.9 4.9 100
Religious leader in the community 1.4 8.8 8.9 24.6 11 40.4 5 100
Large local landowner (Village Chaudhry, Malik, Wadera) 0.7 3.9 11.3 43.4 9.6 27.5 3.6 100
Local influentials (local, provincial, national) 1.3 7.9 12.7 21.9 11.3 40.3 4.7 100
Local NGOs 14.3 13 4 2.2 26 37.1 3.4 100
Musalihati Council 1.3 2.6 0 0 31.9 59.1 5.1 100
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras) 1.2 6.5 12.9 17.7 12 45.6 4 100
How long have any of the following informal justice systems been operating in your community/area?
effective.  Out of the 22 institutions listed in the large local landowners as people who were 
table, a few are worth mentioning. (Please note effective in resolving disputes. This is 
that for ease of analysis, the data of 'very effective' understandable, as, according to participants of 
and 'somewhat effective' is combined to be round-table discussions, large landowners exert 
analysed as 'effective'). their influence for political gain, hence providing 
6services to locals for resolving  disputes.  
Looking at the list of institutions and respondents' 
reaction, clan, as an informal institution, was Out of the 22 institutions, the top five effective 
shown to be seen as an effective body when institutions in the list identified by the majority of 
dealing with dispute resolution, according to the respondents were informal institutions. Formal 
overwhelming majority (80.3 per cent). institutions remained lower in ranking for this 
particular question.  
According to two-thirds of respondents (76.2 per 
cent), the informal institution of extended family, As far as Pakistan's formal institutions were 
was an effective body to resolve legal issues. 73.3 concerned, 56.3 per cent of respondents believed 
per cent believed that the informal institution of that the lower courts were effective in dispensing 
the neighbourhood was an effective body in justice, and 54.8 per cent believed the superior 
resolving disputes. courts were effective institutions for dispensing 
justice. The police department was identified by 
Surprisingly, 66.3 per cent of respondents believed less than half of respondents (41.2 per cent) as 
that informal justice systems (village panchayat, effective. Interestingly, in the previous chapter, the 
faislo or Baloch jirga) are effective institutions for police was one of the institutions that most people 
dispensing justice. It is surprising because other said they would turn to (in order to make their 
data sets support assumptions that informal justice disputes official). However, this question discusses 
systems are rarely approached for resolving legal the effectiveness of institutions ? respondents 
issues. showed a clear lack of faith in the effectiveness of 
the police department.     
In addition, 50.1 per cent of respondents identified 
Fairness of formal and informal institutions that it's a fair institution when resolving people's 
dispensing justice services legal issues. Clan was second, identified by 55.9 
per cent of respondents as an institution which 
Survey respondents were asked to rate the fairness provides fair services to the local communities. In 
of the various formal and informal institutions third position, it's the neighbourhood, identified by 
listed below. This data can be triangulated with the 52.9 per cent of respondents, and in fourth place 
previous question and there is a need to analyse lies informal justice systems (panchayat, faislo and 
whether the results for this question reflect the Baloch jirga) identified by 48.4 per cent. 
results of the previous question. 
46.7 per cent of respondents believed that the 
Interestingly, extended family tops the list: the lower courts are fair in dealing with people's legal 
majority of respondents (56.1 per cent) believed issues, while 44.7 per cent of respondents 
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Provincial police authorities and their local 
representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP) 5.3 35.9 24.3 28.3 4.9 1.3 100
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court 
and High Courts) 19.1 35.7 12.4 3.6 26.4 2.8 100
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, 
District and Sessions Courts) 18.1 38.2 13.2 8.5 20.4 1.5 100
Federal Shariat Court 7.5 16.1 4.5 2.6 65.3 4 100
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul 
Madaris or other registered Madaris)
10.8 16.2 5.7 3.5 60.1 3.7 100
Ombudsman 2.9 13.6 4.7 3 71.8 4 100
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 7.5 17.5 5.4 3.7 62.5 3.3 100
Khandan (extended family) 41.9 34.3 4.4 1.7 14.4 3.4 100
Mohalla (neighbourhood) 31.7 41.6 7.6 2.7 11.7 4.7 100
Biradari (clan) 40.2 40.1 5.6 2.3 9 2.8 100
Large local landowner (Village 
Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera)
14.7 36.1 15.9 14.5 15.7 3 100
Village panchayat  (akhat, pareh, pareh 
panchayat, pareon) / faislo or Baloch jirga)
22.3 34 11.1 10.6 18.6 3.5 100
Local influentials (local, provincial, national) 6.3 26.1 17.9 18.2 28.1 3.3 100
Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record 
keepers); nambardars  (village headmen); 
tehsildars (Tehsil  administration/revenue 
collection heads) or others
3.5 16.3 21.5 20.7 34.4 3.7 100
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district 
magistrates etc.) 6 16.6 16.9 13.7 43.1 3.6 100
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras) 3.2 14.2 15.9 17.4 46 3.3 100
Self-provision village organisations; community 
organisations
6.4 16.3 5.6 4.9 63.1 3.8 100
Local NGOs 8.4 17.3 6 4.1 61.4 2.8 100
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that 
charge a fee
1 7.2 3.9 5.9 78.9 3.1 100
Local crime lords 1 5.4 7.9 10 72.3 3.3 100
Religious leader in the community 11.8 23.4 6.1 3.1 52.3 3.3 100
Musalihati Council 1.8 7.5 4.2 3.4 79.9 3.2 100
 For the following systems please indicate how effective they are for dispensing justice.
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6. Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
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Local/village panchayat or faislo  or Baloch jirga 1.2 4.1 6.4 52.3 14 20.1 1.9 100
Khandan  (extended family) 1.7 4.6 11.5 62.7 2.4 14.8 2.4 100
Mohalla  (neighbourhood) 2.4 5.7 13.9 53.4 3.7 17.4 3.5 100
Biradari  (clan) 1.4 4.1 10.7 59.6 4.3 17.1 2.8 100
Self-provision village organisations; community 
organisations
6.6 8.7 5.4 3.6 26.9 44.8 3.9 100
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that 
charge a fee
0.6 3.6 2.7 2.2 34.1 52.1 4.7 100
Local crime lords 0.5 4.7 4.9 6.6 29.6 48.9 4.9 100
Religious leader in the community 1.4 8.8 8.9 24.6 11 40.4 5 100
Large local landowner (Village Chaudhry, Malik, Wadera) 0.7 3.9 11.3 43.4 9.6 27.5 3.6 100
Local influentials (local, provincial, national) 1.3 7.9 12.7 21.9 11.3 40.3 4.7 100
Local NGOs 14.3 13 4 2.2 26 37.1 3.4 100
Musalihati Council 1.3 2.6 0 0 31.9 59.1 5.1 100
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras) 1.2 6.5 12.9 17.7 12 45.6 4 100
How long have any of the following informal justice systems been operating in your community/area?
identified the superior judiciary as a fair which segments of society had faith in the 
institution dispensing justice. Also worth informal justice system. According to the survey 
mentioning is the police department, which was results, more than half (51.9 per cent) believed 
identified by 44.4 per cent of respondents as a fair that tribal elders displayed the highest levels of 
institution. faith in the informal justice system as compared to 
other members of society. This was followed by 
The findings here provide interesting dimensions. 33.6 per cent who thought that poor members of 
It appears that overall, the results of this question society displayed more faith in the informal justice 
complement the previous question's findings. system. This indeed makes sense, as the informal 
justice system is viewed as much cheaper, more 
Segments of Pakistani society which display accessible and quicker than the formal justice 
7more faith in the informal justice system system.  The 'community as a whole' was viewed 
by 26.3 per cent of respondents to show faith in 
Respondents were allowed to select more than the informal justice system. 
one institution when sharing their opinion about 
Other survey results are self-explanatory. informal justice system is its ability to provide 
Nonetheless, it is evident from the survey data people with a quick and affordable justice service, 
that respondents show a trend which supports according to the majority in the round-table 
9the typical narrative. discussions.  To test this notion, respondents were 
asked to share their view of the statement, 'the 
As explained earlier, poor people in Pakistani informal justice system is a speedy and affordable 
society face issues accessing the formal judicial justice system'. The data was further compared 
system and its related institutions, whereas the with the data from Pakhtun districts of Pakistan. 
informal justice system, despite all its flaws, is 
more accessible and feasible for poor people. Findings show that more than three quarters (75.8 
According to round-table discussion participants, per cent) agreed with this notion whereas only 
the informal justice system is very much rooted in 11.1 per cent disagreed. In the Pakhtun districts of 
8Pakistan's tribal structure and mentality.  Pakistan 85.7 per cent of respondents agreed with 
Interestingly, respondents seemed to concur with the notion – 10 per cent more than in the rest of 
this. Pakistan – whereas only 1.1 per cent of 
respondents disagreed in Pakhtun districts. The 
‘The informal justice system is a speedy and data shows that people in Pakhtun districts are 
affordable justice system' more in agreement with the statement, as 
compared to those in the rest of Pakistan. 
One of the strongest arguments favouring the 
91 92
8. Ibid
9. Ibid
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Provincial police authorities and their local 
representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP, etc.)
15.9 28.1 27.7 22.7 3.9 1.7 100
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and 
High Courts)
12.7 31.7 14.9 11.8 25.9 3 100
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, 
District and Sessions Courts)
9.9 36.8 17.4 14.6 19.4 1.9 100
Federal Shariat Court 4.2 14.3 6.3 5.9 65.2 4.1 100
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris 
or other registered Madaris)
6.1 16.1 6.6 7.7 59.5 3.9 100
Ombudsman 3.1 14 4.3 3.7 71 3.9 100
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 5.4 17.1 8.9 4.5 60.4 3.7 100
Khandan (extended family) 26.9 29.2 15.4 14.6 11.4 2.4 100
Mohalla (neighbourhood) 19.9 32.9 18.3 9.8 14.2 4.9 100
Biradari (clan) 25.8 30.1 17.4 13 11 2.8 100
Large local landowner (Village 
Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera)
14.4 27.3 22 13.6 19.9 2.7 100
Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, 
pareon) / faislo or Baloch jirga
20.3 28.1 15.6 11.3 22 2.7 100
Local influentials (local, provincial, national) 9.1 20.6 24 14.1 28.9 3.4 100
Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record 
keepers); nambardars (village headmen); 
tehsildars  (Tehsil  administration/revenue 
collection heads) or others
8.7 14.9 23.5 14.8 34.7 3.3 100
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district 
magistrates etc.)
11 19 18.1 8.6 39.9 3.4 100
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras) 8.6 11.7 19.3 13.4 43.5 3.4 100
Self-provision village organisations; community 
organisations
4.4 15.9 8 6.3 61.5 3.9 100
Local NGOs 6 15.1 8.3 8.1 59.3 3 100
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that charge 
a fee
2.5 7.4 4.8 5.9 76.4 3 100
Local crime lords 2.6 5.4 8.3 8.8 72.1 2.8 100
Religious leader in the community 9.9 23.5 5.7 4.1 53.9 3 100
Musalihati Council 2.9 7.4 3.3 1.7 81.8 3 100
 For the following systems please indicate how fair they are for resolving disputes.
Rest of Pakistan %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
51
.9
18
.9
14
.4 1
9.
6
1.
3 1.
2
26
.3
16
.8 16
.9
33
.6
12
7.
3 7 7
0.
8
7.
7
Tri
ba
l e
lde
rs
Re
lig
iou
s  l
ea
de
rs
Wo
me
n
Me
n
Eth
nic
 an
d  
rel
igi
ou
s  m
ino
rit
ies
Eth
nic
 an
d  
rel
igi
ou
s  m
ajo
rit
ies
Co
mm
un
ity
 as
 a 
wh
ole
Po
liti
cal
 an
d i
nfl
ue
nti
al 
 fa
mi
lie
s
Th
e m
ore
 af
flu
en
t
Th
e p
oo
r
Th
e l
an
de
d
Th
e l
an
dle
ss
Up
pe
r c
ast
e  
pe
op
le
Lo
we
r c
ast
e  
pe
op
le
Ot
he
r
Do
n’t
 kn
ow
Which sections of the community display more faith in informal dispute resolution systems? 
7. Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013 
identified the superior judiciary as a fair which segments of society had faith in the 
institution dispensing justice. Also worth informal justice system. According to the survey 
mentioning is the police department, which was results, more than half (51.9 per cent) believed 
identified by 44.4 per cent of respondents as a fair that tribal elders displayed the highest levels of 
institution. faith in the informal justice system as compared to 
other members of society. This was followed by 
The findings here provide interesting dimensions. 33.6 per cent who thought that poor members of 
It appears that overall, the results of this question society displayed more faith in the informal justice 
complement the previous question's findings. system. This indeed makes sense, as the informal 
justice system is viewed as much cheaper, more 
Segments of Pakistani society which display accessible and quicker than the formal justice 
7more faith in the informal justice system system.  The 'community as a whole' was viewed 
by 26.3 per cent of respondents to show faith in 
Respondents were allowed to select more than the informal justice system. 
one institution when sharing their opinion about 
Other survey results are self-explanatory. informal justice system is its ability to provide 
Nonetheless, it is evident from the survey data people with a quick and affordable justice service, 
that respondents show a trend which supports according to the majority in the round-table 
9the typical narrative. discussions.  To test this notion, respondents were 
asked to share their view of the statement, 'the 
As explained earlier, poor people in Pakistani informal justice system is a speedy and affordable 
society face issues accessing the formal judicial justice system'. The data was further compared 
system and its related institutions, whereas the with the data from Pakhtun districts of Pakistan. 
informal justice system, despite all its flaws, is 
more accessible and feasible for poor people. Findings show that more than three quarters (75.8 
According to round-table discussion participants, per cent) agreed with this notion whereas only 
the informal justice system is very much rooted in 11.1 per cent disagreed. In the Pakhtun districts of 
8Pakistan's tribal structure and mentality.  Pakistan 85.7 per cent of respondents agreed with 
Interestingly, respondents seemed to concur with the notion – 10 per cent more than in the rest of 
this. Pakistan – whereas only 1.1 per cent of 
respondents disagreed in Pakhtun districts. The 
‘The informal justice system is a speedy and data shows that people in Pakhtun districts are 
affordable justice system' more in agreement with the statement, as 
compared to those in the rest of Pakistan. 
One of the strongest arguments favouring the 
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Which sections of the community display more faith in informal dispute resolution systems? 
7. Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013 
‘The informal justice system compensates victims burden of responsibility on the offender.  
fairly'
The notion that 'the informal justice system 
A restorative informal justice system compensates compensates victims fairly' was put to 
victims, whereas the state's retributive formal respondents and then compared with the 
judicial system punishes the offender. The focus of previous study conducted in Pakhtun districts of 
the informal justice system is on reconciling both Pakistan. 
disputants, compensating the victim and putting a 
In the rest of Pakistan, 65.8 per cent agreed with and negative features. Various notions were 
the notion while only 18.4 per cent opposed it. tested under the survey to gather respondents' 
We see more acceptance in Pakhtun districts of opinions. 
Pakistan, where 82 per cent agreed with the 
notion as compared to only 3 per cent who Notion a) 'Both parties are provided with equal 
opposed it. opportunities to express their views in the 
informal dispute resolution system process.'
Therefore, it can be safely established that 
Pakhtun jirga is much stronger, better organised It is crucial to know whether both parties are 
and more widely accepted in Pakhtun districts of given opportunities to express their viewpoints in 
Pakistan, as compared to other informal justice proceedings of the informal justice system. This 
systems operating in other regions of Pakistan. aspect seems to have been addressed under the 
This survey also establishes the fact that the formal justice system according to the Rule of Law 
majority in Pakistan agreed that informal justice principles, at least on paper. However, in reality, 
10systems compensate victims (the formal justice the situation is very different.  Rich people in 
system of Pakistan does not). court are given ample opportunities to express 
their views, whilst poor and vulnerable groups 
11Salient features of the informal justice system – receive little ? if any ? opportunity.
testing some more notions of justice systems
Survey results amazingly support the notion that 
This section helps to understand how respondents both parties are provided with equal 
perceived the informal justice system's positive opportunities to express their views in the 
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majority in Pakistan agreed that informal justice principles, at least on paper. However, in reality, 
10systems compensate victims (the formal justice the situation is very different.  Rich people in 
system of Pakistan does not). court are given ample opportunities to express 
their views, whilst poor and vulnerable groups 
11Salient features of the informal justice system – receive little ? if any ? opportunity.
testing some more notions of justice systems
Survey results amazingly support the notion that 
This section helps to understand how respondents both parties are provided with equal 
perceived the informal justice system's positive opportunities to express their views in the 
93 94
Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun Districts %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
32
.4
43
.4
8
3.
1
13
.1
62
.6
23
.1
0.
7 0.4
13
.2
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know
‘The informal justice system is a speedy and affordable justice system’
Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun Districts %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know
21
.6
44
.2
14
.6
4
15
.6
48
.8
33
.2
2 1
15
‘The informal justice system compensates victims fairly’
47
.9
35
.5
4.
1
0.
9
11
.6
73
.6
15
.9
0.
6
0.
4
9.
5
a) 'Both parties are provided with equal opportunities to express their views in the informal
dispute resolution system process.'
Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun Districts %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know
Ch
ap
te
r 
4 
:  
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
an
d 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
Ch
ap
te
r 
4 
:  
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
an
d 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
10. Idid
11. Idid
14informal justice system. A staggering 83.4 per cent depending on the situation.   
of participants in the rest of Pakistan agreed with 
the notion. In Pakhtun districts, 89.5 per cent of The notion of nepotism or favouritism influencing 
respondents agreed with the notion. the decision-making process was tested in the 
previous survey conducted in Pakhtun districts in 
It is surprising to know the common view on this 2012 and again repeated in the rest of Pakistan 
dimension of the informal justice system. survey in 2013 (here under analysis). 
However, legal experts and human rights activists 
who are often well educated with a good The survey results showed that two-thirds (67  per 
understanding of the process, have a very cent) of respondents in the rest of Pakistan agreed 
different view. In general, they believe that the with the notion; only 17.1 per cent disagreed. 
wealthy elite dominate the process, while poor Surprisingly, 49.8 per cent of respondents in 
people are not given the opportunity to express Pakhtun districts agreed with the notion; 30.1 per 
12themselves openly.  cent opposed it. 
Notion b) 'Nepotism or favouritism influences The survey results from these two different 
the decision-making process of the informal periods and from these two distinct areas depict 
dispute resolution system.' interesting findings. It appears that the majority is 
sceptical about the credibility of the informal 
Participants of the round-table discussions and justice system with regards to nepotism or 
experts who were interviewed alleged that favouritism. It is obvious that such proceedings 
members of the informal justice system are can easily be influenced by the rich and politically 
13 15involved in favouritism and nepotism.  This could powerful.  
be true for both the formal and informal system, 
Notion c) 'Decisions given by the informal respondents' reaction contradicts this.  
dispute resolution system are unbiased and free 
from all kinds of pressure from the economically Notion d) 'Some decisions of the informal 
and politically powerful section of the society.' dispute resolution system are harsh and not 
commensurate with the deed under scrutiny.'
Respondents were provided with the notion that 
all decisions of the informal justice system are The informal justice system operates and provides 
unbiased and free from all kinds of pressures from services to ordinary people in Pakistan's rural 
economically and politically powerful elite of the areas; however, it is often criticised for its harsh 
16society. This notion is quite similar to the previous verdicts, which often make headline news.  
notion (b). The majority agreed with the notion According to media experts, local rich and 
(57.8 per cent) while 25.1 per cent disagreed. The influential landlords manipulate situations and 
views from Pakhtun districts were relatively force informal justice systems to reach verdicts 
17different ? two-thirds (66.6 per cent) agreed with which favour their interests.  
the notion while just 11.9 per cent disagreed. 
Findings are self-explanatory and support the 
The above two notions (b) and (c) are two of the notion: 53 per cent agreed that some decisions of 
main arguments that critics of informal justice informal dispute resolution systems are harsh and 
systems convey when opposing informal justice not commensurate with the deed carried out, 
institutions' role in society ? instead they often whereas 23.6 per cent disagreed with the notion. 
favour the modern western judicial system which 
is seen as serving all equally. However, the In the Pakhtun districts of Pakistan, 35 per cent 
95 96
Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun Districts %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know
20
.9
46
.1
13
.4
3.
7
15
.8
18
.5
31
.3
10
.2
20 20
.1
b) ‘Nepotism or favouritism influences the decision - making process of the informal dispute resolution system.’
12. Ibid
13. Ibid
14. Interview with Jawad Hassan, former Additional Attorney General of Pakistan, 7 August 2013, Islamabad
th15. Interview with Abdul Razaaq Gumrani, Manager Sindh province, HANDS (NGO), 25  August 2014, KarachiCh
ap
te
r 
4 
:  
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
an
d 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
Ch
ap
te
r 
4 
:  
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
an
d 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
19
38
.8
19
.4
5.
7
17
.1
42
24
.4
7.
7
4.
2
21
.8
c) ‘Decisions given by the informal dispute resolution system are unbiased and free from 
pressure from the economically and politically powerful section of the society.’
all kinds of
Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun Districts %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know
16. Ibid
17. Interview with Rizwan Tariq, Editor Daily Jang newspaper, 25 August 2013, Karachi
14informal justice system. A staggering 83.4 per cent depending on the situation.   
of participants in the rest of Pakistan agreed with 
the notion. In Pakhtun districts, 89.5 per cent of The notion of nepotism or favouritism influencing 
respondents agreed with the notion. the decision-making process was tested in the 
previous survey conducted in Pakhtun districts in 
It is surprising to know the common view on this 2012 and again repeated in the rest of Pakistan 
dimension of the informal justice system. survey in 2013 (here under analysis). 
However, legal experts and human rights activists 
who are often well educated with a good The survey results showed that two-thirds (67  per 
understanding of the process, have a very cent) of respondents in the rest of Pakistan agreed 
different view. In general, they believe that the with the notion; only 17.1 per cent disagreed. 
wealthy elite dominate the process, while poor Surprisingly, 49.8 per cent of respondents in 
people are not given the opportunity to express Pakhtun districts agreed with the notion; 30.1 per 
12themselves openly.  cent opposed it. 
Notion b) 'Nepotism or favouritism influences The survey results from these two different 
the decision-making process of the informal periods and from these two distinct areas depict 
dispute resolution system.' interesting findings. It appears that the majority is 
sceptical about the credibility of the informal 
Participants of the round-table discussions and justice system with regards to nepotism or 
experts who were interviewed alleged that favouritism. It is obvious that such proceedings 
members of the informal justice system are can easily be influenced by the rich and politically 
13 15involved in favouritism and nepotism.  This could powerful.  
be true for both the formal and informal system, 
Notion c) 'Decisions given by the informal respondents' reaction contradicts this.  
dispute resolution system are unbiased and free 
from all kinds of pressure from the economically Notion d) 'Some decisions of the informal 
and politically powerful section of the society.' dispute resolution system are harsh and not 
commensurate with the deed under scrutiny.'
Respondents were provided with the notion that 
all decisions of the informal justice system are The informal justice system operates and provides 
unbiased and free from all kinds of pressures from services to ordinary people in Pakistan's rural 
economically and politically powerful elite of the areas; however, it is often criticised for its harsh 
16society. This notion is quite similar to the previous verdicts, which often make headline news.  
notion (b). The majority agreed with the notion According to media experts, local rich and 
(57.8 per cent) while 25.1 per cent disagreed. The influential landlords manipulate situations and 
views from Pakhtun districts were relatively force informal justice systems to reach verdicts 
17different ? two-thirds (66.6 per cent) agreed with which favour their interests.  
the notion while just 11.9 per cent disagreed. 
Findings are self-explanatory and support the 
The above two notions (b) and (c) are two of the notion: 53 per cent agreed that some decisions of 
main arguments that critics of informal justice informal dispute resolution systems are harsh and 
systems convey when opposing informal justice not commensurate with the deed carried out, 
institutions' role in society ? instead they often whereas 23.6 per cent disagreed with the notion. 
favour the modern western judicial system which 
is seen as serving all equally. However, the In the Pakhtun districts of Pakistan, 35 per cent 
95 96
Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun Districts %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know
20
.9
46
.1
13
.4
3.
7
15
.8
18
.5
31
.3
10
.2
20 20
.1
b) ‘Nepotism or favouritism influences the decision - making process of the informal dispute resolution system.’
12. Ibid
13. Ibid
14. Interview with Jawad Hassan, former Additional Attorney General of Pakistan, 7 August 2013, Islamabad
th15. Interview with Abdul Razaaq Gumrani, Manager Sindh province, HANDS (NGO), 25  August 2014, KarachiCh
ap
te
r 
4 
:  
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
an
d 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
Ch
ap
te
r 
4 
:  
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
an
d 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
19
38
.8
19
.4
5.
7
17
.1
42
24
.4
7.
7
4.
2
21
.8
c) ‘Decisions given by the informal dispute resolution system are unbiased and free from 
pressure from the economically and politically powerful section of the society.’
all kinds of
Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun Districts %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know
16. Ibid
17. Interview with Rizwan Tariq, Editor Daily Jang newspaper, 25 August 2013, Karachi
disagreed with the notion whereas 32.3 per cent According to the data, a high number of 
agreed. On this aspect of the informal justice respondents (46.3 per cent) agreed with the 
system, Pakhtun respondents seem uncertain. 
The data shows that people in Pakistan generally 
perceive the informal justice system as a harsh 
system. 
Notion e) 'The informal dispute resolution 
system verdicts come into conflict with modern 
notions of justice or human rights.'
According to key informants and participants of 
the round-table discussions, the informal justice 
system violates some basic human rights, 
especially those of women and minority groups, 
and the system fails to ensure that parties to the 
conflict/dispute receive justice according to 
18international norms and standards.  Such cases of 
human rights violation have been highlighted in 
the media and have given the country a negative 
19image.  
notion that informal dispute resolution system Notion g) 'The informal dispute resolution 
verdicts come into conflict with modern notions system violates women's rights.'
of justice or human rights; 28.6 per cent disagreed 
with the notion. For your information, a detailed account has been 
 provided in Chapter 6 on how the informal justice 
This is interesting and shows that ordinary men system violates human rights, especially with 
and women in Pakistan are aware of this issue. regards to women and minority groups. Here, we 
analyse the data provided from the survey.
Notion f) 'The informal dispute resolution system 
fails to resolve disputes effectively.' With regards to the notion that the informal 
justice system violates women's rights, 49.1 per 
Respondents from the rest of Pakistan seemed to cent of respondents, close to half, agreed, 
be in two minds about how effective informal whereas 27.5 per cent did not agree. It is 
dispute resolution systems are in resolving encouraging that respondents were generally 
disputes. While 36.9 per cent agreed with the aware of the issues here. 
notion, 37.8 per cent disagreed, and a quarter of 
respondents did not have an opinion. Notion: h) 'The informal dispute resolution 
system violates minority rights.'
Data from Pakhtun districts from the previous 
survey showed slightly different trends. Only 14.7 In testing this notion, a high number of 
per cent believed that informal dispute resolution respondents (44.3 per cent) agreed that informal 
systems (jirga) fail to resolve issues effectively justice systems violate minority rights, whereas 
whereas 63.5 per cent thought they were 29.3 per cent disagreed with the notion. Chapter 
effective. Trends are different for both regions and 6 discusses this issue in more detail. 
show uncertainty in the rest of Pakistan over the 
effectiveness of the informal justice system.  Notion i) 'The informal dispute resolution system 
maintains social order and restores harmony in a 
community.'
97 98
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disagreed with the notion whereas 32.3 per cent According to the data, a high number of 
agreed. On this aspect of the informal justice respondents (46.3 per cent) agreed with the 
system, Pakhtun respondents seem uncertain. 
The data shows that people in Pakistan generally 
perceive the informal justice system as a harsh 
system. 
Notion e) 'The informal dispute resolution 
system verdicts come into conflict with modern 
notions of justice or human rights.'
According to key informants and participants of 
the round-table discussions, the informal justice 
system violates some basic human rights, 
especially those of women and minority groups, 
and the system fails to ensure that parties to the 
conflict/dispute receive justice according to 
18international norms and standards.  Such cases of 
human rights violation have been highlighted in 
the media and have given the country a negative 
19image.  
notion that informal dispute resolution system Notion g) 'The informal dispute resolution 
verdicts come into conflict with modern notions system violates women's rights.'
of justice or human rights; 28.6 per cent disagreed 
with the notion. For your information, a detailed account has been 
 provided in Chapter 6 on how the informal justice 
This is interesting and shows that ordinary men system violates human rights, especially with 
and women in Pakistan are aware of this issue. regards to women and minority groups. Here, we 
analyse the data provided from the survey.
Notion f) 'The informal dispute resolution system 
fails to resolve disputes effectively.' With regards to the notion that the informal 
justice system violates women's rights, 49.1 per 
Respondents from the rest of Pakistan seemed to cent of respondents, close to half, agreed, 
be in two minds about how effective informal whereas 27.5 per cent did not agree. It is 
dispute resolution systems are in resolving encouraging that respondents were generally 
disputes. While 36.9 per cent agreed with the aware of the issues here. 
notion, 37.8 per cent disagreed, and a quarter of 
respondents did not have an opinion. Notion: h) 'The informal dispute resolution 
system violates minority rights.'
Data from Pakhtun districts from the previous 
survey showed slightly different trends. Only 14.7 In testing this notion, a high number of 
per cent believed that informal dispute resolution respondents (44.3 per cent) agreed that informal 
systems (jirga) fail to resolve issues effectively justice systems violate minority rights, whereas 
whereas 63.5 per cent thought they were 29.3 per cent disagreed with the notion. Chapter 
effective. Trends are different for both regions and 6 discusses this issue in more detail. 
show uncertainty in the rest of Pakistan over the 
effectiveness of the informal justice system.  Notion i) 'The informal dispute resolution system 
maintains social order and restores harmony in a 
community.'
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promote peace, unity, harmony, a sense of 
21common purpose, and progress.  The survey 
aimed to test the hypothesis of whether informal 
dispute resolution systems maintain social order 
and restore harmony in a community. 
Interestingly, the majority of respondents (61.8 
per cent) agreed with the notion, whereas only 
11.7 per cent disagreed. 
In Pakhtun districts 76.2 per cent agreed with the 
notion whereas only 4.9 per cent disagreed. 
This demonstrates that informal justice systems 
have achieved credibility in restoring peace and 
harmony within communities. It's an important 
aspect and needs to be noted by the policy-
makers, keeping in view the current crisis which 
the government institutions are facing (and failing 
to restore thus far). 
Given the data here, it is interesting to explore 
why the Pakhtun region is facing militancy and Informal dispute management and social control 
 20 crisis despite having indigenous institutions are prevalent in our rural society. Generally, 
already in place which are rooted strongly within these endorse norms and values which serve to 
the masses. Experts and participants of the round-
table discussions (organised for the previous 
survey) were of the view that indigenous 
institutions and tribal elders were never given the 
opportunity to resolve issues in the beginning. 
When problems later escalated out of control, it 
was too difficult for the elders and jirga to 
intervene at that stage. It is clear that institutions 
should be given the chance to help resolve issues 
from the beginning. 
Notion j) 'The informal dispute resolution system 
plays a positive role in conflict transformation 
and conflict resolution.'
This survey aimed to investigate the notion that 
informal justice systems play a positive role in 
conflict resolution, and transform conflict into 
peace. The data revealed that the majority of 
respondents (61.3 per cent) agreed with the 
28
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notion, and only 11.1 per cent disagreed. communal unrest into peaceful co-existence.  
In Pakhtun districts, more respondents (73.4 per Notion k) 'The informal dispute resolution 
cent) agreed with the notion whereas just 5.3 per system plays a positive role in reducing the level 
cent disagreed. of militancy in the region.'
The common perception was that informal justice Experience suggests that the employment of 
systems help resolve conflicts and transform traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution 
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promote peace, unity, harmony, a sense of 
21common purpose, and progress.  The survey 
aimed to test the hypothesis of whether informal 
dispute resolution systems maintain social order 
and restore harmony in a community. 
Interestingly, the majority of respondents (61.8 
per cent) agreed with the notion, whereas only 
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makers, keeping in view the current crisis which 
the government institutions are facing (and failing 
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 20 crisis despite having indigenous institutions are prevalent in our rural society. Generally, 
already in place which are rooted strongly within these endorse norms and values which serve to 
the masses. Experts and participants of the round-
table discussions (organised for the previous 
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helps develop community resilience against decisions often conflict with international human 
22internal or external aggression. When such rights standards.  However, its role in resolving 
23traditional approaches to dispute resolution are civil issues is by-and-large appreciated.  The 
overlooked, small disputes can turn into large notion that informal dispute resolution systems 
conflicts, leading to difficult, complex situations. are well placed to resolve civil disputes was tested 
through the survey. A high number of respondents 
Respondents were asked whether they agreed or (47  per cent) agreed with the notion, while 27.6 
disagreed with the notion. Surprisingly, 52.8 per per cent disagreed. A quarter (25.4 per cent) of 
cent of respondents agreed with the notion, respondents did not have an opinion.  
whereas only 15.5 per cent disagreed. A sizeable 
percentage (31.6 per cent) did not have an In Pakhtun districts 40.5 per cent agreed with the 
opinion. notion (less than in the rest of Pakistan), whereas 
29.1 per cent disagreed (a similar percentage to 
Respondents from Pakhtun districts showed more the rest of Pakistan). 
certainty. Close to two-thirds (65.6 per cent) 
agreed with the notion, whereas only 5.7 per cent Notion m) 'The informal dispute resolution 
did not agree. system reintegrates and rehabilitates offenders 
into the community.'
Notion l) 'The informal dispute resolution system 
is well placed to resolve civil disputes only.' Available literature suggests that one of the 
positive sides of informal justice systems is the 
The informal justice system is often criticised for reconciliation between or among disputants, and 
its role in handling criminal cases. It is seen as the reintegration (following rehabilitation) of 
violating the state's law, and in addition, its offenders and criminals into the community. This 
notion was tested through the survey and Surprisingly, in Pakhtun districts 41.8 per cent 
surprisingly, 48.5 per cent of respondents agreed agreed (less than in the rest of Pakistan), 17.2 
with the notion, whereas less than a quarter (22.3 disagreed, and 40.9 per cent did not have an 
per cent) disagreed. opinion – considerably higher than in the rest of 
Pakistan. 
However, a sizeable percentage of respondents 
(29.4 per cent) were indecisive for reasons 
unknown. 
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helps develop community resilience against decisions often conflict with international human 
22internal or external aggression. When such rights standards.  However, its role in resolving 
23traditional approaches to dispute resolution are civil issues is by-and-large appreciated.  The 
overlooked, small disputes can turn into large notion that informal dispute resolution systems 
conflicts, leading to difficult, complex situations. are well placed to resolve civil disputes was tested 
through the survey. A high number of respondents 
Respondents were asked whether they agreed or (47  per cent) agreed with the notion, while 27.6 
disagreed with the notion. Surprisingly, 52.8 per per cent disagreed. A quarter (25.4 per cent) of 
cent of respondents agreed with the notion, respondents did not have an opinion.  
whereas only 15.5 per cent disagreed. A sizeable 
percentage (31.6 per cent) did not have an In Pakhtun districts 40.5 per cent agreed with the 
opinion. notion (less than in the rest of Pakistan), whereas 
29.1 per cent disagreed (a similar percentage to 
Respondents from Pakhtun districts showed more the rest of Pakistan). 
certainty. Close to two-thirds (65.6 per cent) 
agreed with the notion, whereas only 5.7 per cent Notion m) 'The informal dispute resolution 
did not agree. system reintegrates and rehabilitates offenders 
into the community.'
Notion l) 'The informal dispute resolution system 
is well placed to resolve civil disputes only.' Available literature suggests that one of the 
positive sides of informal justice systems is the 
The informal justice system is often criticised for reconciliation between or among disputants, and 
its role in handling criminal cases. It is seen as the reintegration (following rehabilitation) of 
violating the state's law, and in addition, its offenders and criminals into the community. This 
notion was tested through the survey and Surprisingly, in Pakhtun districts 41.8 per cent 
surprisingly, 48.5 per cent of respondents agreed agreed (less than in the rest of Pakistan), 17.2 
with the notion, whereas less than a quarter (22.3 disagreed, and 40.9 per cent did not have an 
per cent) disagreed. opinion – considerably higher than in the rest of 
Pakistan. 
However, a sizeable percentage of respondents 
(29.4 per cent) were indecisive for reasons 
unknown. 
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Notion n) 'The informal dispute resolution Notion o) 'The informal dispute resolution 
system is well placed to resolve both civil and system contributes to the rule of law.'
criminal disputes.'
According to the experts and civil society 
The ability of the informal justice system to members who attended the round-table 
resolve both criminal and civil disputes is doubted discussions organised under this research project, 
by civil society and public institutions. The survey informal and traditional institutions contribute to 
aimed to test this notion. More respondents (40.1 the rule of law. However often they impact it 
25per cent) agreed that the informal dispute negatively.  The term 'contribution' is taken as a 
resolution system is well placed to resolve both positive attribute in the context of this notion. 
civil and criminal disputes, whereas a sizable 29.9 
per cent disagreed with the notion, and 30  per The data shows that 47.5 per cent of respondents 
cent of respondents who did not have an opinion. agreed with the notion, 20.7 per cent did not 
The results show a diversity of viewpoints on this agree, and 31.8 per cent did not have an opinion. 
issue. 
Notion p) 'The informal dispute resolution 
In Pakhtun districts, 72.6 per cent agreed with the system resolves some very serious crimes'.
notion, whereas 6.7 per cent disagreed. As 
suggested by earlier data sets and this one too, Legal experts and human rights activists believe 
the data for Pakhtun districts shows jirga as the that informal justice systems cannot resolve 
more organised and accessed form of legal system complex or serious issues and often cause 
for both criminal and civil cases. There are more situations leading to the breakdown of law and 
24 26cases of a civil nature than criminal cases. order and the violation of human rights.  
Surprisingly, a high number of respondents in our 
favour the informal justice system on this issue. 
However, in reality there are numerous challenges 
to overcome with regards to resolving serious 
issues through either formal or informal justice 
systems. 
Notion q) 'The informal dispute resolution 
system is organised, well established, 
transparent and an efficient institution in 
society.'
Key informants and participants of the round-
table discussions had reservations about the 
capacity of both institutions – formal and 
informal. They believed that neither system is well 
 27organised, transparent and efficient. However, in 
our survey, the opposite view was expressed.
According to the findings, more than half of 
respondents (53.8 per cent) agreed with the 
notion, compared to only 19.6 per cent who did 
survey (41.3 per cent) opposed this view, and not agree. It may be the case that people in rural 
agreed with the notion that informal justice regions are more likely to agree with the notion, 
systems resolve some very serious crimes; 27.9 than those living in urban areas. For example, the 
per cent did not agree. provincial data below shows than there was a high 
percentage of people in Punjab (62.5 per cent) 
Our survey showed that common perceptions who agreed with the notion, and there was a 
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the data for Pakhtun districts shows jirga as the that informal justice systems cannot resolve 
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for both criminal and civil cases. There are more situations leading to the breakdown of law and 
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Surprisingly, a high number of respondents in our 
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However, in reality there are numerous challenges 
to overcome with regards to resolving serious 
issues through either formal or informal justice 
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Key informants and participants of the round-
table discussions had reservations about the 
capacity of both institutions – formal and 
informal. They believed that neither system is well 
 27organised, transparent and efficient. However, in 
our survey, the opposite view was expressed.
According to the findings, more than half of 
respondents (53.8 per cent) agreed with the 
notion, compared to only 19.6 per cent who did 
survey (41.3 per cent) opposed this view, and not agree. It may be the case that people in rural 
agreed with the notion that informal justice regions are more likely to agree with the notion, 
systems resolve some very serious crimes; 27.9 than those living in urban areas. For example, the 
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smaller percentage in Sindh (48.3 per cent) who 
agreed with it. Notion r) 'The informal dispute resolution system 
creates lasting peace among disputants and 
Respondents in Pakhtun districts appeared to reduces the possibility of future disputes and 
have more acceptability of jirga: 84 per cent long-running vendettas.'
agreed with the notion. 
Informal justice systems have their roots within this reason that we see common support for the 
31societies, especially in rural areas where people informal justice system.
face disputes over land, water distribution, 
inheritance, etc. These issues often lead to violent Notion s) 'The informal dispute resolution 
conflicts if not resolved timely and according to mechanism will always be a simpler and more 
28local customs and traditions.  Experience shows intelligible option than the formal courts.'
that disputants often end up committing serious 
29 crimes against each other. Therefore, the role of The survey aimed to document common 
the informal justice system appears quite strongly perceptions on this subject. However, the informal 
30 justice system is not simple and is not based on to minimise tensions and resolve conflicts.   
intelligent data or knowledge. Detailed accounts  
of the informal justice system and its positive and To understand common perceptions, this notion 
negative aspects have already been discussed in was tested in the survey. According to the 
the opening chapters. findings, surprisingly, 60.8 per cent agreed with 
the notion while only 12.4 per cent did not agree. 
Interestingly, nearly two-thirds of respondents In Pakhtun districts, 83 per cent of respondents 
(65.7 per cent) agreed that informal dispute agreed with the notion – this was significantly 
resolution mechanisms would always be a simpler higher than in the rest of Pakistan. 
and more intelligible option than the formal 
courts. A minority of 9.2 per cent disagreed with The survey results support the argument that the 
the notion. The survey findings are interesting and formal justice system is unable to compensate 
reflect ordinary people's faith in the informal victims, and cases are often resolved out of the 
justice system as opposed to the formal courts. court – where victims get compensation. It is for 
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This is indeed an incredible finding and conveys a disagreed with the idea.  
strong message to the state's institutions to 
improve their performance. In Pakhtun districts, fewer respondents than the 
rest of Pakistan were in agreement. 
Involvement of government officials during 
proceedings in informal justice systems Well-informed views are different than common 
perceptions. According to experts who attended 
As we are aware, the informal justice system round-table discussions, people are reluctant to 
operates in parallel to the government's judicial involve government officials in the proceedings or 
system. This often creates tension between the other processes of informal dispute resolution 
two systems, leading to a situation whereby the systems, as by doing so they would lose the true 
33government takes stern action against the essence of the informal justice mechanism.  
informal justice system. However, to improve the Some experts are of the view that the beauty of 
performance of the informal justice system, one informal justice systems would disappear if 
suggestion is to involve government officials in the government officials were involved in the process. 
informal proceedings. This idea is tested in the An added complication is that many people in 
survey to find out what people think of this Pakistan have negative views of government 
proposal. officials. 
The data illustrated below shows that the majority The implementation mechanism of an informal 
(57.6 per cent) is supportive of government justice system's decisions
officials' involvement in the proceedings of 
informal justice systems. Only 20.9 per cent To implement the decisions of formal courts, 
Notion t) 'Informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms will always be less time-consuming 
and more expeditious than the formal courts.'
The formal justice system has always been 
criticised for its delays in dispensing justice, and 
often disputants have to wait for decades to get 
32justice.  The survey aimed to understand how 
ordinary people in Pakistan feel about this. The 
findings show that the majority of respondents 
(65 per cent) agreed that informal dispute 
resolution mechanisms would always be less time-
consuming and more expeditious than the formal 
courts. Only 7.3 per cent of respondents did not 
agree with the notion.
In Pakhtun districts, respondents were very much 
of the opinion that the informal justice system is 
less time-consuming and more expeditious than 
the formal system: 85.7 per cent agreed with the 
notion whereas only 1.1 per cent disagreed. This 
shows that the Pakhtun population has a more 
favourable view than the rest of Pakistan on the 
reliability of jirga.
108
Ch
ap
te
r 
4 
:  
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
an
d 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
29
.1
38
.6
6.
6
2.
6
23
.2
s) ‘The informal dispute resolution mechanism will
always be a simpler and more intelligible option
than the formal courts.’
Rest of Pakistan %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly
agree
Somewhat
agree
Somewhat
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Don’t know
18
.2
39
.4
17
.4
8.
8
16
.1
15
.8
30
.4
11
.7
23
.3
18
.8
How strongly do you support the involvement of government officials in informal dispute resolution
system proceedings? 
Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun Districts %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know
33
.1
31
.9
4.
6
2.
7
27
.6
62
.6
23
.1
0.
7
0.
4
13
.2
Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun Districts %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know
t) 'Informal dispute resolution mechanisms will always be less time-consuming and more expeditious
than the formal courts.'
107
Ch
ap
te
r 
4 
:  
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
an
d 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
32. Interview with Advocate Tahir Iqbal, Legal Reform Forum (NGO), 25 August 2013, Karachi
33. Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
This is indeed an incredible finding and conveys a disagreed with the idea.  
strong message to the state's institutions to 
improve their performance. In Pakhtun districts, fewer respondents than the 
rest of Pakistan were in agreement. 
Involvement of government officials during 
proceedings in informal justice systems Well-informed views are different than common 
perceptions. According to experts who attended 
As we are aware, the informal justice system round-table discussions, people are reluctant to 
operates in parallel to the government's judicial involve government officials in the proceedings or 
system. This often creates tension between the other processes of informal dispute resolution 
two systems, leading to a situation whereby the systems, as by doing so they would lose the true 
33government takes stern action against the essence of the informal justice mechanism.  
informal justice system. However, to improve the Some experts are of the view that the beauty of 
performance of the informal justice system, one informal justice systems would disappear if 
suggestion is to involve government officials in the government officials were involved in the process. 
informal proceedings. This idea is tested in the An added complication is that many people in 
survey to find out what people think of this Pakistan have negative views of government 
proposal. officials. 
The data illustrated below shows that the majority The implementation mechanism of an informal 
(57.6 per cent) is supportive of government justice system's decisions
officials' involvement in the proceedings of 
informal justice systems. Only 20.9 per cent To implement the decisions of formal courts, 
Notion t) 'Informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms will always be less time-consuming 
and more expeditious than the formal courts.'
The formal justice system has always been 
criticised for its delays in dispensing justice, and 
often disputants have to wait for decades to get 
32justice.  The survey aimed to understand how 
ordinary people in Pakistan feel about this. The 
findings show that the majority of respondents 
(65 per cent) agreed that informal dispute 
resolution mechanisms would always be less time-
consuming and more expeditious than the formal 
courts. Only 7.3 per cent of respondents did not 
agree with the notion.
In Pakhtun districts, respondents were very much 
of the opinion that the informal justice system is 
less time-consuming and more expeditious than 
the formal system: 85.7 per cent agreed with the 
notion whereas only 1.1 per cent disagreed. This 
shows that the Pakhtun population has a more 
favourable view than the rest of Pakistan on the 
reliability of jirga.
108
Ch
ap
te
r 
4 
:  
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
an
d 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
29
.1
38
.6
6.
6
2.
6
23
.2
s) ‘The informal dispute resolution mechanism will
always be a simpler and more intelligible option
than the formal courts.’
Rest of Pakistan %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly
agree
Somewhat
agree
Somewhat
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Don’t know
18
.2
39
.4
17
.4
8.
8
16
.1
15
.8
30
.4
11
.7
23
.3
18
.8
How strongly do you support the involvement of government officials in informal dispute resolution
system proceedings? 
Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun Districts %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know
33
.1
31
.9
4.
6
2.
7
27
.6
62
.6
23
.1
0.
7
0.
4
13
.2
Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun Districts %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know
t) 'Informal dispute resolution mechanisms will always be less time-consuming and more expeditious
than the formal courts.'
107
Ch
ap
te
r 
4 
:  
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
an
d 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 f
or
m
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
32. Interview with Advocate Tahir Iqbal, Legal Reform Forum (NGO), 25 August 2013, Karachi
33. Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
there is an infrastructure of institutions Based on the information gathered from the field 
responsible for the task – such as police, rangers, and through literature review, several options 
and in some cases even Pakistani military. were provided to respondents (they were allowed 
However, for the informal justice system, no such to choose more than one option). 
institution exists to implement its decisions. 
Decisions of the informal justice system are The majority (53.4 per cent) identified 
honoured voluntarily and with the help of social 'social/community pressure' as the most viable 
pressure – making this institution somewhat option for the traditional justice mechanism to 
organised but not very strong, it could be apply when implementing its decisions –  
34argued.  In FATA, however, traditional institutions incompliance would lead to disrepute within 
have strong roots within society, and the use society. In Pakhtun districts, an overwhelming 
community force (lashkar) is also available as an majority of 86.8 per cent also chose this option. 
35option to implement the decisions of jirga.
The second most popular choice from 
respondents in the rest of Pakistan (47.7 per cent) Nonetheless, voluntary action, which forms the 
was 'riwaj and other local norms', followed by essence of the informal justice system, is highly 
32.9 per cent who chose a 'financial penalty' in esteemed by the people living in traditional 
36 the case of a violation of the decision. This option societies in Pakistan.
is considered fairly viable to implement. The rest 
of the data in the figure is self-explanatory. The survey aimed to document how the decisions 
of informal justice systems are implemented. 
What happens if the decision is not acceptable to thought that the accused party could take the 
a disputing party case to another group of community elders for 
another round of proceedings under the informal 
Based on respondents' experience and knowledge justice system – whereas in Pakhtun districts 18.2 
about the subject, several options were provided per cent believed this.   
and respondents were allowed to select more 
than one option. According to the survey result, a In the rest of Pakistan, 21.1 per cent of 
high percentage of respondents (48.6 per cent) respondents said that the accused party can 
thought that the accused party could take its case simply defy the decision of the informal justice 
to the formal court if it wasn't satisfied with the system, whereas in Pakhtun districts 28.3 per cent 
decision. In Pakhtun districts only 34.2 per cent thought this. Since the decisions are to be 
thought this. honoured voluntarily, this suggests that parties to 
the disputes could completely reject the decisions 
In the rest of Pakistan, 44.1 per cent of of informal justice systems. However, in cases 
respondents thought that the accused party could where this happens, other social norms and 
take its case to the police authorities, whereas 25 traditional mechanisms are often mobilised by the 
per cent in Pakhtun districts thought this. community in order that both parties to the 
(Disputants usually take their cases to the police disputes will honour the decisions. 
in order to pressurise opposing parties to agree to 
terms). Accused parties can lodge an appeal for a review 
to the same informal dispute resolution system, 
Another high group of respondents (43.3 per cent) according to 18.1 per cent of respondents in the 
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rest of Pakistan and 50.3 per cent in Pakhtun compensation was also discussed and 
district. It is generally observed that accused respondents were mindful of the fact that the 
parties do appeal for review against the decisions, formal justice system has no such mechanism to 
which they believe, do not meet the justice compensate a victim's family, whereas the 
criteria.   informal justice system does offer such remedies. 
With regards to the notion that the informal CONCLUSION
justice system can help reduce militancy in the 
country, the majority of respondents agreed. This Traditional methods of dispute resolution are a 
should not be oversimplified as the current strong component of social control in the rural 
context of militancy is too complex, and we have areas of Pakistan. Pakistan's legal system needs to 
unfortunately reached a stage where the informal be effective and efficient if it is to be sustained for 
justice system seems helpless.  a long time. Once it is established that Pakistan's 
judicial system is efficient and effective then the 
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considered just, the present normative values, considerably reduced. However, general 
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such verdicts that violate the Constitution of 
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Various assumptions were tested through several 
questions with options. The results favoured the 
informal justice system, surprisingly. However, 
there were certain assumptions, issues and 
challenges identified relating to the informal 
justice system – for example, the majority believes 
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under political influence. 
Interestingly, the majority agreed that the 
informal justice system reconciles disputing 
parties and restores harmony within rural 
societies – which formal justice can not ensure, 
according to the respondents. The issue of 111 112
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in the culture and history of every society; they INTRODUCTION
are, in many important ways, unique to each 
culture.This chapter deals with the operations of informal 
justice systems and their importance for the 
The existence of informal justice systems people of rural Pakistan. The chapter documents 
operating independently from the state is an people's perceptions regarding the existing legal 
empirical reality in Pakistan. 'Informal justice' existing system for Pakistani rural communities so 
systems refer to those forms of justice that are that an analytical view of the informal justice 
said to take place outside of the formal system in different contexts and under different 
courtroom, in settings that are less rule-bound cultures can be drafted. 
2and adversarial.  Such informal justice systems are 
operating under different customs and traditions Historically, individuals, social groups and 
in Pakistan's heterogeneous society. However, this societies have disputed and competed against 
study aims to focus on the systems operating in one another over scarce commodities and 
four different Pakistani cultures (and languages), resources ? land, money, political power, and 
1 namely panchayat (in Punjab), Pakhtun jirga (in ideology.  In many parts of the world, traditional 
KP, Balochistan's Pashtu speaking districts and methods of administering justice, or locally 
FATA), faislo (in Sindh) and Baloch jirga (in integrated conflict transformation or resolution 
Balochistan's Baloch districts). In one form or institutions, are being approached to resolve 
another, informal justice systems exist in every conflicts and to ensure peace and stability within 
village or community in Pakistan. local societies or tribes. Such institutions are 
often appropriate in the circumstances in which 
Despite the prevalence of informal justice they operate because they satisfy the local 
systems, their legitimacy within the masses, and cultural and religious sentiments. Such 
the growing academic recognition of their circumstances often make them more successful 
existence, Pakistani state's institutions and civil than contemporary or modern justice systems. 
society have been very critical of their existence The existing body of literature confirms that the 
for providing parallel justice services, often nature and causes of conflicts and the 
violating the Constitution as well as international mechanisms for resolving them are deeply rooted 
human rights standards. However, the state's 
formal justice system, which is seen as an alien ltribal chiefs who inherited this position;
system by the masses, can not provide cheap and tribal elders or white beard respected 
3timely access to justice for poor people.  ones (sufaid rishaan);
lvarious political leaders – at local, district, 
Critics of the formal justice system believe that provincial and national levels;
informal justice systems and practices hold the lreligious clergy;
promise of a justice that is more accessible, teachers, in some cases;
empowering and participatory, less costly and less lsocial workers;
4 retired judges;adversarial.
llawyers or other educated members from 
the community.Evidence shows that informal justice systems 
irrefutably manage the majority of disputes and 
In addition, there are other well-respected the resolution of conflict in every rural 
individuals from the community who take part in community in Pakistan. There are instances where 
such proceedings, providing their wisdom and the state judicial system has some level of 
knowledge on various matters.  involvement with the traditional justice system, 
5informally.  The central idea of the traditional 
Types, procedures and proceedings of informal ways of dispute management is that tribal or 
justice systemscommunity elders have responsibility to resolve 
conflicts and restore communal harmony. They 
Informal justice systems operate at different acquire this authority from their fellow 
levels, depending on the nature and magnitude of community members and hold public meetings 
a dispute or conflict. Composition, nature, with the parties involved. Following the selection 
proceedings and practices are different in of representatives or mediators, evidence is 
different areas and cultures. This helps us to shared by the parties' mediators during public 
identify various forms of informal justice systems meetings, conflict is extensively discussed and 
6in Pakistan.  Pakhtun jirga is practised in Pakhtun both parties are provided with the opportunity to 
communities across the region (even in speak and share their points of view. Finally, after 
Afghanistan's Pakhtun population), panchayat in getting consent, responsibilities are allocated to 
Punjab, faislo in Sindh and Baloch jirga in each party. The entire process is claimed to be 
Balochistan's Baloch inhabited districts. transparent and the community observes this 
process as a witness. 
Each type of system has a distinct nature with 
procedural variations. Local customs and People in charge of the informal justice system
sometime Islamic principles are drawn upon to 
reach a decision – after getting consent from A wide variety of individuals and groups are 
disputants. Cases of a petty nature are often responsible for the management of conflicts and 
resolved at a lower, more localised level. In such petty disputes in different ethnic groups and 
proceedings, only a few relevant individuals or cultures in Pakistan. It is often assumed that it is 
families, directly or indirectly involved, participate exclusively tribal chiefs who are responsible, but 
in the process. there are other actors too including: 
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often appropriate in the circumstances in which 
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promise of a justice that is more accessible, teachers, in some cases;
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llawyers or other educated members from 
the community.Evidence shows that informal justice systems 
irrefutably manage the majority of disputes and 
In addition, there are other well-respected the resolution of conflict in every rural 
individuals from the community who take part in community in Pakistan. There are instances where 
such proceedings, providing their wisdom and the state judicial system has some level of 
knowledge on various matters.  involvement with the traditional justice system, 
5informally.  The central idea of the traditional 
Types, procedures and proceedings of informal ways of dispute management is that tribal or 
justice systemscommunity elders have responsibility to resolve 
conflicts and restore communal harmony. They 
Informal justice systems operate at different acquire this authority from their fellow 
levels, depending on the nature and magnitude of community members and hold public meetings 
a dispute or conflict. Composition, nature, with the parties involved. Following the selection 
proceedings and practices are different in of representatives or mediators, evidence is 
different areas and cultures. This helps us to shared by the parties' mediators during public 
identify various forms of informal justice systems meetings, conflict is extensively discussed and 
6in Pakistan.  Pakhtun jirga is practised in Pakhtun both parties are provided with the opportunity to 
communities across the region (even in speak and share their points of view. Finally, after 
Afghanistan's Pakhtun population), panchayat in getting consent, responsibilities are allocated to 
Punjab, faislo in Sindh and Baloch jirga in each party. The entire process is claimed to be 
Balochistan's Baloch inhabited districts. transparent and the community observes this 
process as a witness. 
Each type of system has a distinct nature with 
procedural variations. Local customs and People in charge of the informal justice system
sometime Islamic principles are drawn upon to 
reach a decision – after getting consent from A wide variety of individuals and groups are 
disputants. Cases of a petty nature are often responsible for the management of conflicts and 
resolved at a lower, more localised level. In such petty disputes in different ethnic groups and 
proceedings, only a few relevant individuals or cultures in Pakistan. It is often assumed that it is 
families, directly or indirectly involved, participate exclusively tribal chiefs who are responsible, but 
in the process. there are other actors too including: 
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Major cases (criminal and political) are managed cent) of respondents confirmed that the informal 
with much more care and with the involvement of justice system in their respective community is 
the community as a whole. In such situations, comprised of clan or tribal elders. In Pakhtun 
mediators, the entire community and other districts, 81.4 per cent confirmed this. In addition, 
stakeholders take part in the proceedings. During 43 per cent of respondents in the rest of Pakistan 
the field work for this research document, experts said that local respected citizens (who are not 
divulged that government representatives, lawyers politicians) make up the informal justice system 
and police authorities do take part in such (this option wasn't offered to respondents in the 
proceedings, informally, if there is a major issue 2012 survey in Pakhtun districts); and 40.5 per cent 
faced by a community. said that the informal justice system is comprised 
of local wealthy and influential people (28.9 per 
The following survey results document cent of respondents in Pakhtun districts confirmed 
respondents' level of knowledge and views of the this). 
operations of informal justice systems.
It is quite obvious that tribal elders and religious 
leaders take a keen interest in resolving people's Survey findings and analysis
disputes. This work benefits them immensely, both 
politically and financially. Composition of the informal justice system
A striking comparison lies in the subject of the role The membership composition of informal justice 
of religious leaders – in the rest of Pakistan, 29.6 systems varies from place to place. This question is 
per cent identified religious leaders as part of intended to gauge the level of respondents' 
informal justice systems, whereas in Pakhtun understanding and knowledge on the matter. 
districts more than half (52.9 per cent) confirmed 
that religious leaders are part of the system. This Looking at the multiple response choices from the 
shows that the role of religious leaders is seen as survey in the table, more than two-thirds (71.7 per 
more important in KP and Balochistan than in the women are excluded from informal justice 
7rest of Pakistan. One obvious reason for the rise in systems.  The women are neither part of mediation 
importance of religious leaders is their role in nor attend as a witness. According to one female 
Afghan Jihad. round-table participant in Karachi, no-one listens 
to women, they are treated as property, and 
Surprisingly, the role of civil society in informal women receive punishment, even without 
8justice systems is seen by respondents as twice as participation.  However, there are exceptional 
strong (29.5 per cent) in the rest of Pakistan as circumstances where women are allowed to take 
compared to respondents in Pakhtun districts (14.3 part in such proceedings. This inquiry aims to 
per cent). understand if there is any involvement of women 
in the informal justice systems of various areas of 
Due to establishment of Musalihati Councils under Pakistan. 
the Local Government Ordinance, councillors of 
union councils were also mandated to mediate and Respondents were given a list of informal 
resolve petty disputes within their areas of institutions and they were asked if women were 
jurisdiction. According to the data, 19.9 per cent in represented in any of those institutions (they could 
Pakistan and 18.2 per cent in Pakistan districts select 'yes' for more than one option). 
thought that councillors play a part in the jirga 
process. The informal justice system – panchayat, faislo, 
Baloch jirga 
Women representation in the informal justice 
system According to the data, 73.3 per cent confirmed 
that women are not given representation in the 
Women are not allowed to take part in the informal justice systems proceedings. Surprisingly 
proceedings of informal justice systems, due to however, 12.6 per cent said that women do have 
traditional barriers. In Karachi, many participants at representation in such proceedings. This is a fairly 
the round-table discussion were of the view that large percentage, and might be due to 
115 116
Options
Rest of 
Pakistan (%)
Pakhtun 
districts (%) 
Local respected citizens (who are not politicians) 43.2 Did not ask
Local wealthy and influential people (who are not 
politicians)
40.5 28.9
Local politicians 25.1 Did not ask
Councillors of the union councils 19.9 18.2
Religious leaders 29.6 52.9
Civil society members 29.5 14.3
Clan or tribal elders 71.7 81.4
Local members of civil bureaucracy 4.2 Did not ask
Local police, other government representatives 5 Did not ask
Other 2.2 8.5
What is the composition of the informal justice system in your 
 – Who are the members? 
community/area?
Response Yes No
Don't 
know
Not 
answered
Total
Local village panchayat  or faislo  or Baloch jirga 12.6 73.3 11.3 2.9 100
Khandan  (extended family) 48.4 42.4 6.7 2.5 100
Mohalla (neighbourhood) 37.1 53.2 7 2.8 100
Biradari (clan) 39.6 50.6 7.1 2.7 100
Self-provision village organisations; community organisations 11.8 47.4 37.6 3.1 100
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that charge a fee 5.3 45.9 45.1 3.6 100
Religious leaders in the community 14 49.7 32.8 3.4 100
Large local landowners (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 12.8 60.9 22.9 3.4 100
Local influentials (local, provincial, national) 16.7 49.7 29.9 3.7 100
Local NGOs 20.5 36.8 39.6 3.1 100
Musalihati Council 5.5 38.8 52.1 3.5 100
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras ) 17.8 41 37.9 3.4 100
Do women have representation in the following?
7. Round-table discussion in Karachi, 28 August 2013, Karachi
8. A woman activists from the civil society sector shared her views at the Round-table discussion in Karachi – 28 August 2013
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with much more care and with the involvement of justice system in their respective community is 
the community as a whole. In such situations, comprised of clan or tribal elders. In Pakhtun 
mediators, the entire community and other districts, 81.4 per cent confirmed this. In addition, 
stakeholders take part in the proceedings. During 43 per cent of respondents in the rest of Pakistan 
the field work for this research document, experts said that local respected citizens (who are not 
divulged that government representatives, lawyers politicians) make up the informal justice system 
and police authorities do take part in such (this option wasn't offered to respondents in the 
proceedings, informally, if there is a major issue 2012 survey in Pakhtun districts); and 40.5 per cent 
faced by a community. said that the informal justice system is comprised 
of local wealthy and influential people (28.9 per 
The following survey results document cent of respondents in Pakhtun districts confirmed 
respondents' level of knowledge and views of the this). 
operations of informal justice systems.
It is quite obvious that tribal elders and religious 
leaders take a keen interest in resolving people's Survey findings and analysis
disputes. This work benefits them immensely, both 
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per cent identified religious leaders as part of intended to gauge the level of respondents' 
informal justice systems, whereas in Pakhtun understanding and knowledge on the matter. 
districts more than half (52.9 per cent) confirmed 
that religious leaders are part of the system. This Looking at the multiple response choices from the 
shows that the role of religious leaders is seen as survey in the table, more than two-thirds (71.7 per 
more important in KP and Balochistan than in the women are excluded from informal justice 
7rest of Pakistan. One obvious reason for the rise in systems.  The women are neither part of mediation 
importance of religious leaders is their role in nor attend as a witness. According to one female 
Afghan Jihad. round-table participant in Karachi, no-one listens 
to women, they are treated as property, and 
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strong (29.5 per cent) in the rest of Pakistan as circumstances where women are allowed to take 
compared to respondents in Pakhtun districts (14.3 part in such proceedings. This inquiry aims to 
per cent). understand if there is any involvement of women 
in the informal justice systems of various areas of 
Due to establishment of Musalihati Councils under Pakistan. 
the Local Government Ordinance, councillors of 
union councils were also mandated to mediate and Respondents were given a list of informal 
resolve petty disputes within their areas of institutions and they were asked if women were 
jurisdiction. According to the data, 19.9 per cent in represented in any of those institutions (they could 
Pakistan and 18.2 per cent in Pakistan districts select 'yes' for more than one option). 
thought that councillors play a part in the jirga 
process. The informal justice system – panchayat, faislo, 
Baloch jirga 
Women representation in the informal justice 
system According to the data, 73.3 per cent confirmed 
that women are not given representation in the 
Women are not allowed to take part in the informal justice systems proceedings. Surprisingly 
proceedings of informal justice systems, due to however, 12.6 per cent said that women do have 
traditional barriers. In Karachi, many participants at representation in such proceedings. This is a fairly 
the round-table discussion were of the view that large percentage, and might be due to 
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Local respected citizens (who are not politicians) 43.2 Did not ask
Local wealthy and influential people (who are not 
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40.5 28.9
Local politicians 25.1 Did not ask
Councillors of the union councils 19.9 18.2
Religious leaders 29.6 52.9
Civil society members 29.5 14.3
Clan or tribal elders 71.7 81.4
Local members of civil bureaucracy 4.2 Did not ask
Local police, other government representatives 5 Did not ask
Other 2.2 8.5
What is the composition of the informal justice system in your 
 – Who are the members? 
community/area?
Response Yes No
Don't 
know
Not 
answered
Total
Local village panchayat  or faislo  or Baloch jirga 12.6 73.3 11.3 2.9 100
Khandan  (extended family) 48.4 42.4 6.7 2.5 100
Mohalla (neighbourhood) 37.1 53.2 7 2.8 100
Biradari (clan) 39.6 50.6 7.1 2.7 100
Self-provision village organisations; community organisations 11.8 47.4 37.6 3.1 100
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that charge a fee 5.3 45.9 45.1 3.6 100
Religious leaders in the community 14 49.7 32.8 3.4 100
Large local landowners (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 12.8 60.9 22.9 3.4 100
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Local NGOs 20.5 36.8 39.6 3.1 100
Musalihati Council 5.5 38.8 52.1 3.5 100
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7. Round-table discussion in Karachi, 28 August 2013, Karachi
8. A woman activists from the civil society sector shared her views at the Round-table discussion in Karachi – 28 August 2013
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respondents' lack of knowledge or understanding Khandan (extended family)
of the informal justice system. Further enquiry 
into this matter is required focusing only on According to the data, slightly less than half (48.4 
women's participation in informal justice systems per cent) confirmed that women have 
proceedings. representation in khandan matters, while 42.4 per 
cent said that women do not take part in such 
Provincial data shows that 27 per cent of proceedings. Key informants and participants of 
respondents in Sindh said that women do round-table discussions thought that women do 
participate in their informal justice system; 7.7 per take part in such matters inside their extended 
cent of respondents said this in Baluchistan; and family structures ? especially older women who 
3.2 per cent in Punjab. This suggests that Sindh is have gained considerable control within the family 
9more liberal and accepting of women's due to their age.  
participation in society. Punjab's result is 
disturbing, particularly as this province has the Mohallah (neighbourhood)
highest literacy rate of the three.
The above observation could be true for mohallah 
With regards to the 7.7 per cent result from too. In neighbourhood politics, women do play 
10Baloch districts, this comes as a surprise because their role, in certain matters and situations.  The 
both Baloch and Pakhtun ethnic groups are very majority of respondents (53.2 per cent) believed 
conservative with tribal structures which are still that women do not take part in mohallah matters; 
intact and operational. Cross tabulation by gender 37.1 per cent said that women do take part in 
shows that more female respondents said 'yes' mohallah politics in their respective regions. 
(7.4 per cent) than male respondents (5.3 per 
cent). Interestingly, when the data was compared by 
province, Sindh's result demonstrated high 
participation by women: 69.6 per cent of Biradari (clan)
respondents confirmed that women do play a part 
in neighbourhood matters. Sindh is a liberal Half of respondents (50.6 per cent) confirmed that 
society where women are given more space and women are not allowed to take part in matters 
respect to make decisions. Sindh's survey result settled within the clan. However, 39.6 per cent, 
was followed by Punjab (42.3 per cent), and the which is a considerable proportion, said that 
Baloch districts of Balochistan (33.3 per cent). women are given space to take part in decision-
making within the clan. 
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respondents' lack of knowledge or understanding Khandan (extended family)
of the informal justice system. Further enquiry 
into this matter is required focusing only on According to the data, slightly less than half (48.4 
women's participation in informal justice systems per cent) confirmed that women have 
proceedings. representation in khandan matters, while 42.4 per 
cent said that women do not take part in such 
Provincial data shows that 27 per cent of proceedings. Key informants and participants of 
respondents in Sindh said that women do round-table discussions thought that women do 
participate in their informal justice system; 7.7 per take part in such matters inside their extended 
cent of respondents said this in Baluchistan; and family structures ? especially older women who 
3.2 per cent in Punjab. This suggests that Sindh is have gained considerable control within the family 
9more liberal and accepting of women's due to their age.  
participation in society. Punjab's result is 
disturbing, particularly as this province has the Mohallah (neighbourhood)
highest literacy rate of the three.
The above observation could be true for mohallah 
With regards to the 7.7 per cent result from too. In neighbourhood politics, women do play 
10Baloch districts, this comes as a surprise because their role, in certain matters and situations.  The 
both Baloch and Pakhtun ethnic groups are very majority of respondents (53.2 per cent) believed 
conservative with tribal structures which are still that women do not take part in mohallah matters; 
intact and operational. Cross tabulation by gender 37.1 per cent said that women do take part in 
shows that more female respondents said 'yes' mohallah politics in their respective regions. 
(7.4 per cent) than male respondents (5.3 per 
cent). Interestingly, when the data was compared by 
province, Sindh's result demonstrated high 
participation by women: 69.6 per cent of Biradari (clan)
respondents confirmed that women do play a part 
in neighbourhood matters. Sindh is a liberal Half of respondents (50.6 per cent) confirmed that 
society where women are given more space and women are not allowed to take part in matters 
respect to make decisions. Sindh's survey result settled within the clan. However, 39.6 per cent, 
was followed by Punjab (42.3 per cent), and the which is a considerable proportion, said that 
Baloch districts of Balochistan (33.3 per cent). women are given space to take part in decision-
making within the clan. 
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According to the provincial data, Sindh once again confirmed that women have representation in 
demonstrated a more forward-thinking nature. VOs/COs while 47.4 per cent said women have no 
Results confirmed that women's involvement in role to play in VOs/COs. More than one-third (37.6 
the clan is more acceptable in Sindh than in per cent) did not have an opinion. 
Punjab or Balochistan. Respondents in Punjab and 
Balochistan confirmed some degree of women's Private dispute resolution mechanisms (DRMs) 
participation in clan proceedings which is that charge a fee
interesting and encouraging. (During round-table 
discussions in Balochistan, participants had Research shows that private DRMs do exist in 
described women's involvement in the processes Pakistani society although their presence is 
of Balochistan's tribal set-up as going against the minimal and negligible. Some participants of 
11culture.) round-table discussions also confirmed the 
12existence of DRMs in their respective regions.  A 
Self-provision village organisation (VO); negligible number of respondents, 5.3 per cent, 
community organisation (CO) confirmed that women participate in such 
mechanisms. In terms of provincial differences, 
Formation of VOs or COs is mainly facilitated by 10.9 per cent of respondents from Sindh 
NGOs during the process of community-driven confirmed women's presence in DRMs, followed 
development. Nonetheless, in some cases, by 4.1 per cent of respondents from Baloch 
villagers do initiate such processes on their own. districts, and only 0.9 per cent from Punjab. 
The survey results for this inquiry are slightly 
surprising because during such processes Religious leaders in the community
women's participation is often required by NGOs 
in order to address gender equality issues. From When they are approached, religious leaders play 
the survey, only 11.8 per cent of respondents a role in resolving communities' religious and civil 
matters. However, in some cases they also play a participation in such matters. The data reveals a 
role in resolving local political issues and criminal huge gap between provinces, with Sindh as a 
13disputes.  According to the survey, 14  per cent of leading province in including women in matters 
respondents said that women are given led by a religious leader. 
opportunities to take part in such proceedings; 
however, it is not clear what role women play in Large local landowners (Village 
such proceedings. Almost half of the respondents, Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera)
49.7 per cent, confirmed that women are not 
given representation in proceedings led by Punjab and Sindh are agrarian economies 
16religious leaders. Personal observations, dominated by large landowners.  There is a 
information gathered through round-table perception that large landowners treat their 
sessions and key informants' interviews reveal labourers (kisan or haris) as their subjects and 
17that women's involvement in such proceedings some of them run their own prisons.  The case of 
depends on the type and complexity of the issue Baloch districts in Balochistan is not different from 
14or case.  In cases relating to child custody, Sindh and Punjab where sardars (tribal chiefs) 
divorce, inheritance or any other civil matter, a have complete control over the lives of the local 
18woman may be able to represent her case people.  The patriarchal feudal mindset of this 
15 directly. rural set-up does not offer opportunities for 
women to participate and represent themselves in 
19The provincial data reveals that the religious legal disputes and matters.  According to the 
leadership of Sindh is more forward-thinking and data, only 12.8 per cent of respondents confirmed 
has provided opportunities for women's that women are given representation, whereas 
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According to the provincial data, Sindh once again confirmed that women have representation in 
demonstrated a more forward-thinking nature. VOs/COs while 47.4 per cent said women have no 
Results confirmed that women's involvement in role to play in VOs/COs. More than one-third (37.6 
the clan is more acceptable in Sindh than in per cent) did not have an opinion. 
Punjab or Balochistan. Respondents in Punjab and 
Balochistan confirmed some degree of women's Private dispute resolution mechanisms (DRMs) 
participation in clan proceedings which is that charge a fee
interesting and encouraging. (During round-table 
discussions in Balochistan, participants had Research shows that private DRMs do exist in 
described women's involvement in the processes Pakistani society although their presence is 
of Balochistan's tribal set-up as going against the minimal and negligible. Some participants of 
11culture.) round-table discussions also confirmed the 
12existence of DRMs in their respective regions.  A 
Self-provision village organisation (VO); negligible number of respondents, 5.3 per cent, 
community organisation (CO) confirmed that women participate in such 
mechanisms. In terms of provincial differences, 
Formation of VOs or COs is mainly facilitated by 10.9 per cent of respondents from Sindh 
NGOs during the process of community-driven confirmed women's presence in DRMs, followed 
development. Nonetheless, in some cases, by 4.1 per cent of respondents from Baloch 
villagers do initiate such processes on their own. districts, and only 0.9 per cent from Punjab. 
The survey results for this inquiry are slightly 
surprising because during such processes Religious leaders in the community
women's participation is often required by NGOs 
in order to address gender equality issues. From When they are approached, religious leaders play 
the survey, only 11.8 per cent of respondents a role in resolving communities' religious and civil 
matters. However, in some cases they also play a participation in such matters. The data reveals a 
role in resolving local political issues and criminal huge gap between provinces, with Sindh as a 
13disputes.  According to the survey, 14  per cent of leading province in including women in matters 
respondents said that women are given led by a religious leader. 
opportunities to take part in such proceedings; 
however, it is not clear what role women play in Large local landowners (Village 
such proceedings. Almost half of the respondents, Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera)
49.7 per cent, confirmed that women are not 
given representation in proceedings led by Punjab and Sindh are agrarian economies 
16religious leaders. Personal observations, dominated by large landowners.  There is a 
information gathered through round-table perception that large landowners treat their 
sessions and key informants' interviews reveal labourers (kisan or haris) as their subjects and 
17that women's involvement in such proceedings some of them run their own prisons.  The case of 
depends on the type and complexity of the issue Baloch districts in Balochistan is not different from 
14or case.  In cases relating to child custody, Sindh and Punjab where sardars (tribal chiefs) 
divorce, inheritance or any other civil matter, a have complete control over the lives of the local 
18woman may be able to represent her case people.  The patriarchal feudal mindset of this 
15 directly. rural set-up does not offer opportunities for 
women to participate and represent themselves in 
19The provincial data reveals that the religious legal disputes and matters.  According to the 
leadership of Sindh is more forward-thinking and data, only 12.8 per cent of respondents confirmed 
has provided opportunities for women's that women are given representation, whereas 
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60.9 per cent said that women are not given any reflects similar findings), only 16.7 per cent of 
representation. It might be the case that women respondents believed that women are 
are only given representation in civil matters, as represented in the influential class, whereas 
was the case with other data sets. almost half, 49.7 per cent, said that women have 
no representation in this class. 
The following provincial data shows Sindh once 
again as a forward-thinking region where women There is a need to examine the data by region as 
are given a role in proceedings led by large this will give us some idea of the local dynamics 
landowners. pertaining to women's representation in the 
influential class. 
Local influentials (local, provincial, national)
The table clearly shows that Sindh has more 
The stature of influentials in this context is larger influential women than in Punjab and the Baloch 
than tribal elders, local politicians, religious districts of Balochistan. 
leaders, landowners, etc. Influentials can be rich 
individuals, landowners, politicians or non- Local NGOs
political figures, tribal elders, or religious leaders – 
depending on their area of influence. Patterns in Like VO/COs, there is a network of local NGOs in 
Pakistani society suggest that there are some Pakistan. In recent years, during the Afghan 
women influentials as well, and that the majority conflict (1979-89), Pakistani society has witnessed 
of these have a political background and/or come a mushrooming of NGOs in Pakistan. However, a 
20from a feudal family.  However, according to the large part of Pakistan is still inaccessible for NGOs 
participants of the round-table discussions, the and their presence is restricted to urban centres 
22ratio of influential women to influential men is and other rural areas.  One of the predominant 
21quite low.  According to the survey data  (which themes in the work of NGOs is women's 
empowerment, and they strongly encourage Musharraf's regime, in 22 districts of Pakistan. 
23women's participation and inclusion.  
Disappointingly, the data does not reflect this. According to the survey, more than half of 
This could be due to respondents' lack of respondents (52.1 per cent) did not have an 
exposure to NGOs, or that their personal opinion on women's representation in MCs; only 
interactions and experiences with NGOs have not 5.5 per cent of respondents confirmed that 
involved women. Only 20.5 per cent of women are represented in MCs; and 38.8 per cent 
respondents confirmed that women are said women are not represented. This is surprising 
represented in local NGOs structures; 36.8 per as MCs are mandated to ensure women's 
cent said women were not represented; and 39.6 participation in decision-making – each MC has at 
per cent (a considerable proportion), did not have least two women councillors at union council 
an opinion. level. Respondents are clearly unaware of this.
With regards to provincial differences, 31.3 per Political groupings/vote banks (dharras)
cent of respondents in Sindh confirmed that 
women are represented in NGOs; 22.8 per cent The representation and participation of women in 
confirmed this in Balochistan; and 7.3 per cent in the political process is very much part of the 
Punjab. democratic process. The Pakistani parliament has 
a 33 per cent quota for women, other than the 
Musalihati Council (MC) elected women members. Therefore, women are 
part of political groupings/vote bank (dharras) in 
Musalihati Councils or Musalihati Anjuman were Pakistan. 
set-up during General (Retired) President Parvez 
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60.9 per cent said that women are not given any reflects similar findings), only 16.7 per cent of 
representation. It might be the case that women respondents believed that women are 
are only given representation in civil matters, as represented in the influential class, whereas 
was the case with other data sets. almost half, 49.7 per cent, said that women have 
no representation in this class. 
The following provincial data shows Sindh once 
again as a forward-thinking region where women There is a need to examine the data by region as 
are given a role in proceedings led by large this will give us some idea of the local dynamics 
landowners. pertaining to women's representation in the 
influential class. 
Local influentials (local, provincial, national)
The table clearly shows that Sindh has more 
The stature of influentials in this context is larger influential women than in Punjab and the Baloch 
than tribal elders, local politicians, religious districts of Balochistan. 
leaders, landowners, etc. Influentials can be rich 
individuals, landowners, politicians or non- Local NGOs
political figures, tribal elders, or religious leaders – 
depending on their area of influence. Patterns in Like VO/COs, there is a network of local NGOs in 
Pakistani society suggest that there are some Pakistan. In recent years, during the Afghan 
women influentials as well, and that the majority conflict (1979-89), Pakistani society has witnessed 
of these have a political background and/or come a mushrooming of NGOs in Pakistan. However, a 
20from a feudal family.  However, according to the large part of Pakistan is still inaccessible for NGOs 
participants of the round-table discussions, the and their presence is restricted to urban centres 
22ratio of influential women to influential men is and other rural areas.  One of the predominant 
21quite low.  According to the survey data  (which themes in the work of NGOs is women's 
empowerment, and they strongly encourage Musharraf's regime, in 22 districts of Pakistan. 
23women's participation and inclusion.  
Disappointingly, the data does not reflect this. According to the survey, more than half of 
This could be due to respondents' lack of respondents (52.1 per cent) did not have an 
exposure to NGOs, or that their personal opinion on women's representation in MCs; only 
interactions and experiences with NGOs have not 5.5 per cent of respondents confirmed that 
involved women. Only 20.5 per cent of women are represented in MCs; and 38.8 per cent 
respondents confirmed that women are said women are not represented. This is surprising 
represented in local NGOs structures; 36.8 per as MCs are mandated to ensure women's 
cent said women were not represented; and 39.6 participation in decision-making – each MC has at 
per cent (a considerable proportion), did not have least two women councillors at union council 
an opinion. level. Respondents are clearly unaware of this.
With regards to provincial differences, 31.3 per Political groupings/vote banks (dharras)
cent of respondents in Sindh confirmed that 
women are represented in NGOs; 22.8 per cent The representation and participation of women in 
confirmed this in Balochistan; and 7.3 per cent in the political process is very much part of the 
Punjab. democratic process. The Pakistani parliament has 
a 33 per cent quota for women, other than the 
Musalihati Council (MC) elected women members. Therefore, women are 
part of political groupings/vote bank (dharras) in 
Musalihati Councils or Musalihati Anjuman were Pakistan. 
set-up during General (Retired) President Parvez 
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According to results from our survey, more than than in the other provinces. Even in Balochistan, 
17.8 per cent of respondents confirmed that 12.8 per cent of respondents confirmed that 
women are represented in such political women participate in such political groupings. 
groupings. However, 41 per cent believed that 
women are not represented. According to the Representation of non-local ethnic and/or tribal 
provincial data, 34.7 per cent of Sindh groups/minorities in the informal justice system
respondents are aware of women's participation 
in political groupings, as opposed to only 6 per This question aims to gather perceptions on 
cent of respondents from Punjab. This is whether non-local ethnic and/or tribal groups 
surprising as the literacy rate in Punjab is higher have representation in informal justice 
institutions. This question refers to ethnic ethnic groups/minorities, in order to ensure 
groups/minorities, mainly Muslims and not participation for all: 31  per cent of respondents 
necessarily religious minorities. Pertinent findings confirmed that non-local ethnic groups are 
are analysed here, in particular in relation to a few represented in village panchayat, faislo, or Baloch 
institutions which are highlighted by high number jirga.  However, 47.2 per cent of respondents said 
of survey respondents. that non-local ethnic groups were not 
represented.
Mohallah (neighbourhood)
Further analysis of provincial data shows that 42.6 
Mohallah (neighbourhood) is identified by 36.6 per cent of respondents in Sindh confirmed that 
per cent of respondents who confirm that non- other ethnic groups/minorities are represented in 
local ethnic and/or tribal groups are given their informal justice system; 28 per cent 
representation in matters inside the confirmed this in the Baloch districts of 
neighbourhood. This is heartening and shows that Balochistan; and 16.2 per cent confirmed this in 
Pakistani society is not very biased against non- Punjab. This suggests that Sindh's people are the 
local ethnic groups. However, this might not most accepting of other ethnic groups. 
always be the case, as 42.5 per cent of Participants in round-table discussions also 
respondents confirmed that non-local ethnic confirmed that Sindh is a pluralist society, which 
groups are not represented in collective matters has opened its doors to other religious and ethnic 
24dealt with by a neighbourhood institution.   groups.
Informal justice systems Biradari (clan)
The data shows that informal justice mechanisms The biradari (or clan) system works in close 
do provide some representation for non-local confines and prefers to keep matters restricted 
123 124
Ch
ap
te
r 
5 
:  
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
of
 in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
Ch
ap
te
r 
5 
:  
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
of
 in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
Women representation in - Political groupings/vote banks (dharras)
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Yes No Don't know Not answered
Punjab % Sindh % Balochistan %
6
53
.9
40
0.
1
34
.7
17
.7
43
.4
4.
2
12
.8
51
.3
30
.1
5.
8
Non - local ethnic and/or tribal groups/minorities representation in - panchayat, faislo, Baloch jirga.
14
.4
59
.7
25
.6
0.
3
45
.4
32
.8
18
.7
3.
1
33
.2
49
.2
15
2.
6
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Yes No Don't know Not answered
Punjab % Sindh % Balochistan %
Response Yes % No %
Don't 
know %
Not 
answered %
Total %
Local village punchayat  or faislo  or Baloch jirga 31 47.2 19.7 2 100
Khandan  (extended family) 29 50.3 17.5 3.3 100
Mohalla  (neighbourhood) 36.6 42.5 17.5 3.4 100
Biradari  (clan) 29.6 47.7 19.4 3.3 100
Self-provision village organisations; community organisations 20 30.8 46.3 2.9 100
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that charge a fee 7.3 34.6 54.7 3.4 100
Local crime lords 8.8 34.4 53.2 3.6 100
Religious leaders in the community 22.2 34.9 39 4 100
Large local landowners (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 21.5 43.6 31.6 3.3 100
Local influentials (local, provincial, national) 20.1 38.8 36.4 4.7 100
Local NGOs 18.3 32 46.3 3.4 100
Musalihati Council 7.6 29.6 59 3.8 100
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras) 17.9 31.8 47 3.4 100
Do non-local ethnic and/or tribal groups have representation in the informal justice system? 
24 Round-table discussion in Karachi, 28 August 2013
According to results from our survey, more than than in the other provinces. Even in Balochistan, 
17.8 per cent of respondents confirmed that 12.8 per cent of respondents confirmed that 
women are represented in such political women participate in such political groupings. 
groupings. However, 41 per cent believed that 
women are not represented. According to the Representation of non-local ethnic and/or tribal 
provincial data, 34.7 per cent of Sindh groups/minorities in the informal justice system
respondents are aware of women's participation 
in political groupings, as opposed to only 6 per This question aims to gather perceptions on 
cent of respondents from Punjab. This is whether non-local ethnic and/or tribal groups 
surprising as the literacy rate in Punjab is higher have representation in informal justice 
institutions. This question refers to ethnic ethnic groups/minorities, in order to ensure 
groups/minorities, mainly Muslims and not participation for all: 31  per cent of respondents 
necessarily religious minorities. Pertinent findings confirmed that non-local ethnic groups are 
are analysed here, in particular in relation to a few represented in village panchayat, faislo, or Baloch 
institutions which are highlighted by high number jirga.  However, 47.2 per cent of respondents said 
of survey respondents. that non-local ethnic groups were not 
represented.
Mohallah (neighbourhood)
Further analysis of provincial data shows that 42.6 
Mohallah (neighbourhood) is identified by 36.6 per cent of respondents in Sindh confirmed that 
per cent of respondents who confirm that non- other ethnic groups/minorities are represented in 
local ethnic and/or tribal groups are given their informal justice system; 28 per cent 
representation in matters inside the confirmed this in the Baloch districts of 
neighbourhood. This is heartening and shows that Balochistan; and 16.2 per cent confirmed this in 
Pakistani society is not very biased against non- Punjab. This suggests that Sindh's people are the 
local ethnic groups. However, this might not most accepting of other ethnic groups. 
always be the case, as 42.5 per cent of Participants in round-table discussions also 
respondents confirmed that non-local ethnic confirmed that Sindh is a pluralist society, which 
groups are not represented in collective matters has opened its doors to other religious and ethnic 
24dealt with by a neighbourhood institution.   groups.
Informal justice systems Biradari (clan)
The data shows that informal justice mechanisms The biradari (or clan) system works in close 
do provide some representation for non-local confines and prefers to keep matters restricted 
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Biradari  (clan) 29.6 47.7 19.4 3.3 100
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Do non-local ethnic and/or tribal groups have representation in the informal justice system? 
24 Round-table discussion in Karachi, 28 August 2013
within its own circles. Nonetheless, the data limits, with little openness for others to enter. 
reveals an interesting finding: 29.6 per cent of However, according to the survey data, 29 per 
respondents confirmed that non-local ethnic cent of respondents confirmed that non-local 
groups are given representation in the clan ethnic groups are given space to participate in 
system. Here, there is a need to understand the matters dealt with by khandan. Following 
context, as this might be the case only in certain provincial cross-examination, Sindh is at the top of 
situations where a conflict or dispute arises the list once again for its acceptance of non-local 
between a certain biradari and a non-local ethnic ethnic groups participating in khandan affairs. 
group. In such situations, a clan might show 
willingness to allow non-local ethnic groups to Representation of religious minorities 
participate so that the issue is resolved amicably, (Christians, Sikhs and Hindus) in informal 
without resorting to violence. Of the respondents, institutions
47.7 per cent said that there is no representation 
of non-local ethnic groups within the clan system. The survey results show some interesting findings 
which contradict the current religious-political 
The following graph investigates the provincial situation in Pakistan. Minorities are faced with 
differences. numerous issues – the most important is their 
25protection and safety.  Access to justice for 
Once again data from respondents in Sindh minority religious groups, or being included in 
province showed more acceptance of non-local various processes of informal systems, might not 
ethnic groups within the clan system, followed by be the most urgent issues for them at this stage. 
data from Balochistan and lastly Punjab. However, there are some encouraging signs from 
the survey which indicate that minorities are 
Khandan (extended family) given some representation in informal justice 
systems. The data shown in the table is self-
After immediate family, khandan is the smallest explanatory. 
unit in Pakistani rural society. Khandan has its 
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Please note that the information provided above Attendance at the informal dispute resolution 
does not necessarily confirm factual reality, but system proceedings
shows respondents' perceptions.  
Information gathered from key informants and 
experts, and through round-table discussions in 
125 126
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Yes No Don't know Not answered
Punjab % Sindh % Balochistan %
16
.2
61
.1
22
.7
42
.6
41
14
.1
2.
3
28
.2
48
.7
15
.7
7.
4
Non-local ethnic and/or tribal groups/minorities representation in - Khandan (extended family)
25. Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
Ch
ap
te
r 
5 
:  
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
of
 in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
Ch
ap
te
r 
5 
:  
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
of
 in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
61
.6
17
.8
12
.7
71
.1
7.
1 7.
2
2.
5
68
.5
17
.5
17
.8
55
0.
9 3 3.
5
Only members of the 
dispute resolution 
mechanism
The entire
community,
including
minorities
The entire 
community,
except minorities
Only the heads
of the families
involved in the
 dispute
Women allowed
to attend
Government
officials
Other
Who attends the proceedings of the informal dispute resolution system?
Rest of Pakistan % Pakhtun Districts %
within its own circles. Nonetheless, the data limits, with little openness for others to enter. 
reveals an interesting finding: 29.6 per cent of However, according to the survey data, 29 per 
respondents confirmed that non-local ethnic cent of respondents confirmed that non-local 
groups are given representation in the clan ethnic groups are given space to participate in 
system. Here, there is a need to understand the matters dealt with by khandan. Following 
context, as this might be the case only in certain provincial cross-examination, Sindh is at the top of 
situations where a conflict or dispute arises the list once again for its acceptance of non-local 
between a certain biradari and a non-local ethnic ethnic groups participating in khandan affairs. 
group. In such situations, a clan might show 
willingness to allow non-local ethnic groups to Representation of religious minorities 
participate so that the issue is resolved amicably, (Christians, Sikhs and Hindus) in informal 
without resorting to violence. Of the respondents, institutions
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of non-local ethnic groups within the clan system. The survey results show some interesting findings 
which contradict the current religious-political 
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differences. numerous issues – the most important is their 
25protection and safety.  Access to justice for 
Once again data from respondents in Sindh minority religious groups, or being included in 
province showed more acceptance of non-local various processes of informal systems, might not 
ethnic groups within the clan system, followed by be the most urgent issues for them at this stage. 
data from Balochistan and lastly Punjab. However, there are some encouraging signs from 
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respondents confirmed that this happens. With 
regards to women's attendance, the result reflects 
previous data sets of this survey – only 7.1 per 
cent of respondents confirmed that women are 
allowed to attend (this usually depends on the 
nature of a dispute – for example, these could be 
predominantly family disputes). 
This data was compared with the data for the 
previous survey from the Pakhtun districts, and 
the results and pattern of responses are fairly 
26similar.
Attendance at proceedings
In attempting to identify how many respondents 
had attended proceedings of the informal justice 
system, the survey found that 28.1 per cent of 
respondents had attended such proceedings, 
whereas 71.9 per cent said that they had never Karachi, Lahore, and Quetta, confirms that the 
attended proceedings of the informal justice attendance in proceedings of the informal justice 
system in any capacity – whether as a member, a system depends on the type and size of the 
party or a community member.  dispute. The question was presented in a 
multiple-choice format, and respondents could 
Cross-tabulation by gender clearly demonstrates select more than one option. Respondents' 
that out of the 28.1 per cent of respondents who answers are based on their own experience and 
knowledge. 
More than two-thirds of respondents (71.1 per 
cent) believed that only the heads of the 
families/parties involved in a dispute could attend 
proceedings, along with mediators or members of 
the informal justice system; and 61.6 per cent said 
that attendance was only permitted by members 
of the informal justice system. It appears that for 
some of the time only members attend and 
mediate, although at some stage they have to 
involve the parties to the dispute ? without their 
participation a decision can not be reached. 
In some cases, where a communal issue is 
involved, the entire community is given an 
opportunity to attend the proceedings and 
witness the entire process – only 17.8 per cent of 
had attended the informal justice system, only a government officials were not on official duty, but 
fraction of the sample size (4.1 per cent) were instead they were attending in a personal 
women. capacity. 
The data from Pakhtun districts in KP and 
Balochistan is similar, but rather more 
conservative for women, than the data from the 
districts in the rest of Pakistan. 
Capacity in which respondents attended
Those who confirmed that they had attended the 
proceedings of the informal justice system were 
further asked in what capacity they had attended. 
Out of 402 respondents who confirmed their 
experience of the informal justice system, more 
than half (53 per cent) said that they had 
attended as observers; 30.6 per cent had 
attended as disputants; 13.9 per cent had 
attended as a member; and 2.5 per cent as 
government officials. 
Presumably, respondents who attended as 
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previous data sets of this survey – only 7.1 per 
cent of respondents confirmed that women are 
allowed to attend (this usually depends on the 
nature of a dispute – for example, these could be 
predominantly family disputes). 
This data was compared with the data for the 
previous survey from the Pakhtun districts, and 
the results and pattern of responses are fairly 
26similar.
Attendance at proceedings
In attempting to identify how many respondents 
had attended proceedings of the informal justice 
system, the survey found that 28.1 per cent of 
respondents had attended such proceedings, 
whereas 71.9 per cent said that they had never Karachi, Lahore, and Quetta, confirms that the 
attended proceedings of the informal justice attendance in proceedings of the informal justice 
system in any capacity – whether as a member, a system depends on the type and size of the 
party or a community member.  dispute. The question was presented in a 
multiple-choice format, and respondents could 
Cross-tabulation by gender clearly demonstrates select more than one option. Respondents' 
that out of the 28.1 per cent of respondents who answers are based on their own experience and 
knowledge. 
More than two-thirds of respondents (71.1 per 
cent) believed that only the heads of the 
families/parties involved in a dispute could attend 
proceedings, along with mediators or members of 
the informal justice system; and 61.6 per cent said 
that attendance was only permitted by members 
of the informal justice system. It appears that for 
some of the time only members attend and 
mediate, although at some stage they have to 
involve the parties to the dispute ? without their 
participation a decision can not be reached. 
In some cases, where a communal issue is 
involved, the entire community is given an 
opportunity to attend the proceedings and 
witness the entire process – only 17.8 per cent of 
had attended the informal justice system, only a government officials were not on official duty, but 
fraction of the sample size (4.1 per cent) were instead they were attending in a personal 
women. capacity. 
The data from Pakhtun districts in KP and 
Balochistan is similar, but rather more 
conservative for women, than the data from the 
districts in the rest of Pakistan. 
Capacity in which respondents attended
Those who confirmed that they had attended the 
proceedings of the informal justice system were 
further asked in what capacity they had attended. 
Out of 402 respondents who confirmed their 
experience of the informal justice system, more 
than half (53 per cent) said that they had 
attended as observers; 30.6 per cent had 
attended as disputants; 13.9 per cent had 
attended as a member; and 2.5 per cent as 
government officials. 
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Provision for appeal in the informal dispute 
resolution system proceedings
Respondents seemed to be uncertain on this 
issue, as the survey results showed: 46.8 per cent 
of respondents believed that either party can 
lodge an appeal to the council of members to 
revisit or reconsider the decision – and that 
means, that the decision is not based on 
consensus; however, 38.6 per cent of respondents 
said that decisions can not be challenged and that 
there is no such provision for appeal. 
29community.  However, cases of human rights 
violations have been often reported, leading to 
widespread criticism nationally and 
internationally. As the existence of such 
institutions is illegal and the superior judiciary has 
banned such informal institutions, the finality of 
30their decisions is legally questionable.
However, participants of round-table discussions 
said that within the rural communities of Pakistan, 
decisions of the informal justice system are 
31generally accepted and honoured.  This was 
confirmed through the survey results too. 
According to the survey data, 72.5 per cent of 
respondents thought that the decisions of the With regards to Pakhtun jirga, research suggests 
informal justice system are final, while 26.2 per that jirga decisions are based on both parties' 
cent contest their validity. consent, and therefore decisions are announced 
after getting approval from both parties. Hence, 
The survey data for respondents in Pakhtun such decisions are accepted voluntarily and the 
districts was slightly different and so were the provision for appeal does not have any place. 
responses. Data is self-explanatory. Nonetheless, it has been observed in some cases 
that if a party to the dispute is not happy with the 
decision, the party can request that community 
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Is there provision for appeal in the informal dispute
resolution system proceedings?
Venue for informal dispute resolution system 
proceedings
Generally, dispute resolution systems are 
convened in an open area – depending on the 
magnitude and nature of the issue. Such 
proceedings are held in places accessible to both 
27parties and to the community.  However, cases 
related to matrimonial matters are usually settled 
present in such proceedings. However, in certain 
circumstances, a disputant may be able to 
nominate a representative. The overwhelming 
majority of respondents (87.3 per cent) said that 
both parties to the dispute are always present at 
the hearing. 
Data from Pakhtun district is very similar to the 
rest of Pakistan. 
Finality of the decision of the informal dispute inside. With regards to the survey results, 
resolution systemrespondents' views reflect the general trends: 
82.6 per cent thought that informal justice system 
In rural areas of Pakistan – in all provinces – it is proceedings are convened in an open space, 
believed that informal dispute resolution systems whereas 14.5 per cent said that such proceedings 
work parallel to the formal court systems in a way take place behind closed doors. 
that challenges the writ of the state but is, at the 
same time, more acceptable to the local The data from Pakhtun districts of Pakistan is not 28population.  Unanimous views were gathered different from the rest of Pakistan data. 
during the round-table discussions that confirmed 
that parties to the dispute either accept the Presence of both parties to the dispute at the 
decisions of the informal justice system hearing
voluntarily, or members/mediators impose their 
decisions with the help of social pressure from the Generally, parties to the dispute are always 
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elders organise another jirga led by different Taking disputes to formal courts and tribunals in 
elders. If the party faces the same fate at the end case the disputants are not satisfied with 
of the second jirga then the decision is considered outcomes/decisions of informal dispute 
final. However, honouring the jirga's decision is resolution mechanisms 
voluntary, and anyone not happy with the jirga 
32decision can access the formal justice system. Survey data shows that affirmative responses 
totalled 82.7 per cent ? this is an overwhelming 
In-built allocation for appeal in  informal dispute majority who believed a disputant could take his 
resolution mechanism case to the formal court and tribunals. 
This aspect is discussed in the previous section 
and it means that there is some cushion available 
for disputants to appeal to the council members 
to revisit a decision. Here we examine how 
respondents perceive this aspect.  
A high percentage of respondents (42.5 per cent) 
thought that there is no such arrangement 
available in the informal justice system, whereas 
36.4 per cent of respondents thought that there is 
provision for this. 
The data from respondents in Pakhtun district 
shows that there is some variation in thinking.
Generally an appeal can not be lodged in a court 
of law against a verdict issued by the informal 
justice system, as the informal justice system has 
no recognition within the formal judicial system of 
Pakistan. Therefore, all actions of the informal 
33justice system are considered against the law.  
However, if a losing party is not satisfied with the 
verdict, it can lodge an appeal to the community 
to organise additional proceedings so that the 
34case can be heard again.
Decision under informal dispute resolution participants of the round-table discussions in 
system Lahore also pointed out that the final decision lies 
37with the head of panchayat.  Interestingly, 4.2 
Although decisions are made after receiving per cent of respondents confirmed that decisions 
consent from disputants, it has been noted are taken through a voting system. However, no 
through key informants' interviews and other such factual information was gathered during field 
sources, that council members often influence research regarding this aspect. Council members 
35decisions.  A high percentage of respondents (48  are selected or nominated and not elected, and 
per cent) believed that decisions under the their decisions are reached following 
38informal justice system are reached through consultations within the council.
consensus. However, 20.8 per cent believed that 
the council members make decisions unanimously The graph also shows the data from Pakhtun 
without consent from the parties to the dispute. districts ? where the majority of respondents (56  
Therefore, in cases of a unanimous decision, there per cent) said that decisions were taken by 
might be a possibility that consent is not taken consensus.
36from disputants.  
Procedures/rules applied to resolve 
Interestingly, 18.8 per cent of respondents said conflicts/disputes through the informal dispute 
that members of the informal justice system take resolution system 
a decision on their own and conduct consultations 
for the sake of consultation only. Some We are aware that informal dispute resolution 
131 13232. Interview with Saif Anjum, Special Home Secretary, Punjab, 22 August 2013, Lahore
33. Interview with Jawad Hassan, former Additional Attorney General of Pakistan, 7 August 2013, Islamabad
34. Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
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of the second jirga then the decision is considered outcomes/decisions of informal dispute 
final. However, honouring the jirga's decision is resolution mechanisms 
voluntary, and anyone not happy with the jirga 
32decision can access the formal justice system. Survey data shows that affirmative responses 
totalled 82.7 per cent ? this is an overwhelming 
In-built allocation for appeal in  informal dispute majority who believed a disputant could take his 
resolution mechanism case to the formal court and tribunals. 
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and it means that there is some cushion available 
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to revisit a decision. Here we examine how 
respondents perceive this aspect.  
A high percentage of respondents (42.5 per cent) 
thought that there is no such arrangement 
available in the informal justice system, whereas 
36.4 per cent of respondents thought that there is 
provision for this. 
The data from respondents in Pakhtun district 
shows that there is some variation in thinking.
Generally an appeal can not be lodged in a court 
of law against a verdict issued by the informal 
justice system, as the informal justice system has 
no recognition within the formal judicial system of 
Pakistan. Therefore, all actions of the informal 
33justice system are considered against the law.  
However, if a losing party is not satisfied with the 
verdict, it can lodge an appeal to the community 
to organise additional proceedings so that the 
34case can be heard again.
Decision under informal dispute resolution participants of the round-table discussions in 
system Lahore also pointed out that the final decision lies 
37with the head of panchayat.  Interestingly, 4.2 
Although decisions are made after receiving per cent of respondents confirmed that decisions 
consent from disputants, it has been noted are taken through a voting system. However, no 
through key informants' interviews and other such factual information was gathered during field 
sources, that council members often influence research regarding this aspect. Council members 
35decisions.  A high percentage of respondents (48  are selected or nominated and not elected, and 
per cent) believed that decisions under the their decisions are reached following 
38informal justice system are reached through consultations within the council.
consensus. However, 20.8 per cent believed that 
the council members make decisions unanimously The graph also shows the data from Pakhtun 
without consent from the parties to the dispute. districts ? where the majority of respondents (56  
Therefore, in cases of a unanimous decision, there per cent) said that decisions were taken by 
might be a possibility that consent is not taken consensus.
36from disputants.  
Procedures/rules applied to resolve 
Interestingly, 18.8 per cent of respondents said conflicts/disputes through the informal dispute 
that members of the informal justice system take resolution system 
a decision on their own and conduct consultations 
for the sake of consultation only. Some We are aware that informal dispute resolution 
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systems are mainly based on local customs, tribal Satisfaction with the evidence collection and 
laws/rules. Islamic law also plays a crucial role and fact-finding mechanism of informal dispute 
members of the council often consult with this for resolution mechanisms
39guidance and clarity.  Members of the informal 
justice system often take into account both Islamic In terms of satisfaction with regards to evidence 
law and tribal customs. However, tribal law often collection, the respondents are surprisingly 
40 supportive of the informal justice system. More prevails over Islamic law.  This is particularly 
than three-quarters of respondents (76.9 per applicable in cases relating to vulnerable groups 
41  cent) showed satisfaction with regards to (women, children and minorities). According to 
evidence collection in the informal justice system the data more than half of respondents (51.6 per 
process. Only 16 per cent of respondents said that cent) confirmed that customary or tribal law is 
they were not satisfied with the evidence taken into consideration when cases are decided; 
collection standards in the informal justice 35.7 per cent of respondents said that cases are 
system.  decided using both customary and Islamic law 
principles; and 10.3 per cent said that the 
The survey results in the previous chapter show decisions of the informal justice system are only 
respondents' lack of trust in the ability of the influenced by Islamic law.   
informal justice system to deliver justice. 
However, the majority of respondents (76.9 per In Pakhtun districts, it appears from the data that 
cent) believed that evidence collection under this informal justice systems are more likely to draw 
system is of a satisfactory level. This contradiction on a combination of both religious and customary 
indicates that respondents may be confused or laws in reaching a decision. 
have a lack of understanding on these issues. 
In Pakhtun districts, respondents seemed to be 
more satisfied than in the rest of Pakistan: 85.7 
per cent of Pakhtun respondents said that they 
were satisfied. 
Fee for disputes resolved through informal 
dispute resolution system
Participants of the round-table discussions were 
unanimous in their views regarding the high costs 
involved in formal courts systems – court fees, 
lawyers' fees, and finally elements of bribery 
42and/or corruption.  Participants further 
emphasised that in considering the widespread 
poverty across Pakistan, the high cost involved in 
the formal legal system has helped informal 
43remedies to survive.
According to the data, the majority of 
respondents (63.9 per cent) confirmed that 
133 134
39. Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
40. Ibid 
41. Round-table discussion in Quetta, 11 December 2013
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laws/rules. Islamic law also plays a crucial role and fact-finding mechanism of informal dispute 
members of the council often consult with this for resolution mechanisms
39guidance and clarity.  Members of the informal 
justice system often take into account both Islamic In terms of satisfaction with regards to evidence 
law and tribal customs. However, tribal law often collection, the respondents are surprisingly 
40 supportive of the informal justice system. More prevails over Islamic law.  This is particularly 
than three-quarters of respondents (76.9 per applicable in cases relating to vulnerable groups 
41  cent) showed satisfaction with regards to (women, children and minorities). According to 
evidence collection in the informal justice system the data more than half of respondents (51.6 per 
process. Only 16 per cent of respondents said that cent) confirmed that customary or tribal law is 
they were not satisfied with the evidence taken into consideration when cases are decided; 
collection standards in the informal justice 35.7 per cent of respondents said that cases are 
system.  decided using both customary and Islamic law 
principles; and 10.3 per cent said that the 
The survey results in the previous chapter show decisions of the informal justice system are only 
respondents' lack of trust in the ability of the influenced by Islamic law.   
informal justice system to deliver justice. 
However, the majority of respondents (76.9 per In Pakhtun districts, it appears from the data that 
cent) believed that evidence collection under this informal justice systems are more likely to draw 
system is of a satisfactory level. This contradiction on a combination of both religious and customary 
indicates that respondents may be confused or laws in reaching a decision. 
have a lack of understanding on these issues. 
In Pakhtun districts, respondents seemed to be 
more satisfied than in the rest of Pakistan: 85.7 
per cent of Pakhtun respondents said that they 
were satisfied. 
Fee for disputes resolved through informal 
dispute resolution system
Participants of the round-table discussions were 
unanimous in their views regarding the high costs 
involved in formal courts systems – court fees, 
lawyers' fees, and finally elements of bribery 
42and/or corruption.  Participants further 
emphasised that in considering the widespread 
poverty across Pakistan, the high cost involved in 
the formal legal system has helped informal 
43remedies to survive.
According to the data, the majority of 
respondents (63.9 per cent) confirmed that 
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members of the informal justice system do not 
take fees from the disputants. Only 8.8 per cent of 
respondents thought that members of the 
informal justice system charge a fee. More than a 
quarter of respondents did not have an opinion 
on this issue. 
It is observed that widespread materialism is 
increasing and becoming a powerful driver in 
informal mechanisms ? this means that money 
often becomes the deciding factor in reaching a 
44decision.  
Fee amount and method of payment
The 237 respondents (8.8 per cent) who 
confirmed that members of the informal justice 
system take a fee were asked how much this fee 
is, and how is it paid. They were presented with 
different options.  
Out of the 237 respondents, a high number (29.5 
per cent) believed that it depends on the 
affordability of a disputant – which means there is 
no fixed fee but whatever a disputant offers is 
acceptable; 24.1 per cent thought that the fee 
varies according to the seriousness of a dispute Role of police/local administration in the 
and the stakes involved; 15.2 per cent said that functioning of the informal dispute resolution 
the fee aims to cover expenses incurred during system
the process and proceedings; and a small number 
of respondents, 27 out of 237, said that there is a Participants of the round-table discussions in 
standard fee charged for different kinds of Balochistan and Sindh said that the police and 
disputes. However, according to the participants administration do play a role in high profile, 
of the round-table discussions, there has been no political cases but that the role is not official ? 45such standard fee reported.   Some participants instead they seek to engage with the conflicting 
said that in cases of a commercial nature – such as parties so as to avoid any possible incidents 
47a dispute over a business contract etc – mediators leading to a breakdown of law and order.  
do charge a fee from the parties, but not in other 
46cases.  According to the survey findings, the majority of 
respondents (61.1 per cent) believed that the 
police/local administration has no role in the 
functioning of the informal justice system. 
However, a sizeable 26.3 per cent of respondents 
believed that the police/local administration does informal justice system has no such provision play a role in the functioning of the informal available for any disputant to appoint a legal justice system. representative. However, 30 per cent of 
respondents contradicted this. The data from Role of police/local administration in the Pakhtun districts is slightly different. implementation of the informal dispute 
resolution system's decisions Officially, there is no such practice to appoint a 
legal representative because informal institutions Respondents were further asked whether the have no legal backing. However, a jirga police/local administration plays any role in member/mediator could be a lawyer or a judge implementing the decisions of the informal justice (retired). A party can nominate its representative system. The majority of respondents (60.6 per – regardless of his qualification or background, cent) said that the police/local administration is and that means that the nominee could be a not involved in such matters; 29.7 per cent said lawyer too. However, a nominee does not that the police/administration is involved in the necessarily represent himself as a lawyer or legal implementation of the informal justice system's representative but as a representative on behalf decisions. These figures reflect similar findings to 48of a party.  Nevertheless, according to the those from the previous question. majority in round-table discussions, members 
who have a legal background have more relevance Provision for the parties to appoint a legal and technical experience, so people might prefer representative (similar to a lawyer in the formal 49nominating such members.justice system) in the informal dispute resolution 
system proceedings
According to the participants of the round-table 
discussions, rich and powerful individuals and According to the data, around half of the 
families generally become members of the respondents (49.5 per cent) believed that the 
informal justice system in their areas, in order to 135 136
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members of the informal justice system do not 
take fees from the disputants. Only 8.8 per cent of 
respondents thought that members of the 
informal justice system charge a fee. More than a 
quarter of respondents did not have an opinion 
on this issue. 
It is observed that widespread materialism is 
increasing and becoming a powerful driver in 
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often becomes the deciding factor in reaching a 
44decision.  
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disputes. However, according to the participants administration do play a role in high profile, 
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that women are participating in other informal 
mechanisms – such as khandan (extended family), 
mohallah (neighbourhood), and biradari (clan) 
etc. Interestingly, Sindh is credited for the highest 
levels of women's participation in the proceedings 
of informal institutions.   
A sizeable percentage of respondents said that the 
informal justice system offers opportunities for 
the involvement of minority groups and women in 
its proceedings.  However, our knowledge and 
experience contradicts this. Nonetheless, there 
may be certain situations where vulnerable 
groups are provided with the opportunity to 
participate in the proceedings. 
The participation of ethnic groups in the process – 
in the context of all informal institutions – is also 
seen as particularly challenging in Punjab and 
Balochistan. However, data from Sindh conveyed a 
pluralistic openness towards ethnic and religious 
minorities. exert pressure on the local people and sway 
50decisions in their favour.   The data showed that the proceedings of the 
informal justice system take place in the open. CONCLUSION However, it is noted that in certain sensitive cases 
– such as a family's civil matters (divorce, custody This chapter focused on respondents' opinions of a child or distribution of inheritance etc) – such about the proceedings and operations of informal proceedings take place inside. justice systems and its links with the formal 
institutions of Pakistan. The majority believed that the decisions of the 
informal justice system are reached through It is interesting to discover that most of our consensus, and are accepted voluntarily by both respondents are aware of the existence of various parties, leaving little need for appeal or for informal institutions and that they have an accessing the formal judicial system. understanding of the way such institutions 
operate in their respective communities. Another interesting finding here is that the 
majority of respondents were satisfied about the Participation by women in the proceedings – as levels of evidence collection under the informal decision makers, witnesses or parties – presents a justice system. In reality, there is very little major challenge. The majority of respondents evidence collected, as the local residents and confirms that women are not allowed to attend mediators often presume to know the facts in proceedings of panchayat, faislo or Baloch jirga. 51advance.   However, it is encouraging that the data suggests 
Links between the informal justice system and 
formal institutions have no formal recognition. 
This is due to the fact that it is illegal for a formal 
institution to associate itself with the informal 
justice system. However, in reality officials from 
the formal system are involved informally to sort 
out cases. According to the experts, this helps to 
resolve conflicts amicably and prevents further 
52bloodshed.  
According to the majority of respondents, the 
informal justice system is a quick and less 
expensive option, when compared to the formal 
system. Experts and participants of the round-
table discussions also confirmed this. The majority 
believes that these two features make the 
informal justice system the only viable option for 
poor people to access, despite the availability of 
formal remedies. 
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compliance is complex. Both informal justice INTRODUCTION
systems and formal systems need to be analysed 
together in terms of their ability to deliver human the ability of 
rights-compliant structures, procedures and people to seek and obtain a remedy through 
outcomes. In some circumstances, the human formal or informal institutions of justice, and in 
1 rights deficiencies will be common to the formal conformity with human rights standards'.
system and the informal justice system alike; in According to another report, 'providing accessible 
others, the informal justice system might show justice is a state obligation under international 
3benefits over the formal justice system’.  For human rights standards, but this obligation does 
example, informal justice systems could be a not require that all justice be provided through 
positive tool to divert juveniles from the more formal justice systems. If done in ways to respect 
retributive aspects of formal criminal justice and uphold human rights, the provision of justice 
4systems.  Where there is limited or no access to through the informal justice system is not against 
formal juvenile justice mechanisms, informal human rights standards and the informal justice 
justice systems can emphasise restorative justice system can be a mechanism to enhance the 
that, seeking harmony in the local community, fulfilment of human rights obligations by 
attempts to reintegrate young offenders into the delivering accessible justice to individuals and 
5community.communities where the formal justice system 
does not have the capacity or geographical 
2 The current state of justice system in Pakistan reach’. The report further explains that 'human 
clearly demonstrates that poor and vulnerable rights obligations apply to informal justice 
people have difficulties in accessing the formal systems and states have an obligation to ensure 
justice system ? due to affordability, reach the respect, protection and fulfilment of human 
(geographical consideration) and the lengthy rights, including where informal justice systems 
timeframe involved. On the other hand, the are the main provider of justice. Analysing 
informal justice system and its associated informal justice systems for human rights 
UNDP defines 'access to justice' as '
 
 
institutions (khandan, mohalla, biradari etc) Familiarity with international benchmarks and 
provide accessible, cheap and quick justice standards for human rights and human rights 
services ? this fact is confirmed through this protection
survey's findings. 
It is important to know the level of respondents' 
Although informal justice systems may be knowledge of international human rights 
preferred for the reasons cited above, there are standards and benchmarks. According to the 
strong concerns over their tendency to violate survey result, only 4.6 per cent confirmed that 
human rights, especially the rights of women and they were 'very familiar' with international 
minority groups. This may explain why a survey benchmarks and standards for human rights and 
conducted by Thomson Reuters in 2011 ranked human rights protection; 48.3 per cent confirmed 
Pakistan the 'third most dangerous country' in the that they were 'somewhat familiar'; and 45 per 
world for women, after Afghanistan and the cent confirmed that they were 'not at all familiar' 
6Democratic Republic of Congo.  Informal justice with this.
systems are seen to have abetted inhuman 
cultural practices against women such as swara It can be safely assumed that the overwhelming 
7 majority is not familiar with the subject under and wani or sangh chatti  and these have 
discussion; those who confirmed that they were contributed significantly to the rise of cases of 
'somewhat familiar' with the subject show a lack violence against women in Pakistan. For instance, 
of confidence in this area. in cases of murder, informal justice systems may 
recommend direct vengeance or the exchange of 
a woman as swara/wani/sang chatti. In addition, 
approximately 1000 women are killed in Pakistan 
each year in the name of honour. This is 25 per 
8cent of the total honour killings in the world.
This chapter discusses the human rights situation 
generally perceived in Pakistan, and the challenge 
to protect human rights under both the formal 
and informal justice systems existing in Pakistan's 
diverse social settings. The chapter is divided into 
several sections and each section addresses 
formal and informal institutions and their various 
dimensions. 
In addition, this chapter aims to document 
respondents' perceptions on various formal and 
informal institutions and their compliance with 
international human rights standards, the 
Constitution of Pakistan, Islamic principles and 
legal injunctions. 
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systems are seen to have abetted inhuman 
cultural practices against women such as swara It can be safely assumed that the overwhelming 
7 majority is not familiar with the subject under and wani or sangh chatti  and these have 
discussion; those who confirmed that they were contributed significantly to the rise of cases of 
'somewhat familiar' with the subject show a lack violence against women in Pakistan. For instance, 
of confidence in this area. in cases of murder, informal justice systems may 
recommend direct vengeance or the exchange of 
a woman as swara/wani/sang chatti. In addition, 
approximately 1000 women are killed in Pakistan 
each year in the name of honour. This is 25 per 
8cent of the total honour killings in the world.
This chapter discusses the human rights situation 
generally perceived in Pakistan, and the challenge 
to protect human rights under both the formal 
and informal justice systems existing in Pakistan's 
diverse social settings. The chapter is divided into 
several sections and each section addresses 
formal and informal institutions and their various 
dimensions. 
In addition, this chapter aims to document 
respondents' perceptions on various formal and 
informal institutions and their compliance with 
international human rights standards, the 
Constitution of Pakistan, Islamic principles and 
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familiar' with this; and 21 per cent confirmed that people shared different perceptions on the 
they are 'not at all familiar' with the subject. If credibility of such institutions when it comes to 
respondents are 'somewhat familiar', this does human rights protection. 
not mean that they are knowledgeable on the 
subject. The data, therefore, leads us to assume Provincial police authorities and their local 
that the overwhelming majority in Pakistan is not representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP, etc.)
aware of human rights under Islamic principles 
and legal injunctions. A high number of respondents (47.7 per cent) did 
not agree that the policies and procedures of 
Various systems and their compliance with police authorities are in compliance with 
international human rights standards international human rights standards. It is worth 
mentioning here that the policies and procedures 
To document respondents' perceptions on the of police department may well be in compliance 
compliance of various institutions with with the international human rights standards, 
international human rights standards, although the actions and behaviour of individual 
respondents were provided with a list of officials may not reflect these standards ? and this 
institutions and they were asked if the institutions reflects negatively on the entire police 
meet the standards. department, leaving people critical of the police 
department as a whole for such violations.  
Several institutions were listed that do not 
necessarily possess any policy or procedures in A quarter of respondents (24.8 per cent) agreed 
written form, but it was important to document with the notion that the police department is in 
how people see them as an institution working to compliance with international human rights 
protect their rights. While there were institutions standards.   
on the list which were established constitutionally 
and according to the international standards, 
Familiarity with the rights, protections and per cent confirmed that they are 'not at all 
remedies available under the Constitution and familiar' with this. 
general laws and procedures of Pakistan
Familiarity with Islamic legal principles and legal 
To document another dimension of having any injunctions pertaining to human rights
familiarity with the rights, protection and 
remedies available under the Constitution of After recording perceptions on international 
Pakistan, respondents were asked another human rights standards and the Constitution of 
question. Surprisingly, the data shows that only Pakistan, respondents were asked whether they 
4.8 per cent of respondents confirmed that they were familiar with Islamic principles and legal 
are 'very familiar'. Those who confirmed that they injunctions pertaining to human rights. 
are 'somewhat familiar' constitute a majority of 
56.3 per cent. However, keeping in view the Pakistani society is religious in outlook, and 
technicalities involved when it comes to the members perform routine religious duties and 
Constitution of Pakistan and the laws and rituals, following the fundamentals of Islam. 
procedures of the land, one can easily assume However, most people are unaware of the true 
that the level of knowledge and awareness of nature of Islamic principles, especially people's 
9ordinary men and women in Pakistan is low. In rights under Islamic principles.   
addition, there is a widespread low literacy rate 
compared to other developing nations. According to the data, only 8.7 per cent of 
respondents thought that they are 'very familiar' 
With regards to the subject under discussion, 37.4 with Islamic legal principles and legal injunctions; 
68.7 per cent confirmed that they are 'somewhat 
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of Pakistani people is Muslim, the majority of 
respondents (62.9 per cent) did not have an 
opinion. Only 23.4 per cent agreed that religious 
seminary boards are in compliance with 
international human rights standards. 
Ombudsman
The general public seems to lack knowledge 
about the existence of the Ombudsman office: 
72.3 per cent of survey respondents did not know 
whether the Ombudsman office and its policies 
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul 
Madaris or other registered Madaris)
Again, the survey shows some astonishing results. 
Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority 
and procedures are in compliance with 
international human rights standards. Only 13.6 
per cent agreed with the notion, and 11.4 per 
cent disagreed. 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
The HRCP is very popular within civil society 
organisations for its struggle to protect and 
uphold human rights in Pakistan. The majority of 
respondents had already shown their lack of 
awareness of the existence of the HRCP in 
Chapter 2 of this study (the findings shown in 
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and 
High Courts)
Superior Courts are mandated to safeguard the 
rights of Pakistani citizens and migrants, tourists, 
and refugees in Pakistan. The Superior Courts 
have developed significant credibility over the last 
few years, thus improving people's perceptions of 
their work. According to the survey data, a high 
percentage of respondents (39 per cent) agreed 
that the Superior Courts in Pakistan are in 
compliance with international human rights 
standards, whereas 17.3 per cent of respondents 
disagreed. Surprisingly, a higher group of 
respondents (41.4 per cent) did not have an 
opinion. 
The data shows surprising results: 39.3 per cent of 
respondents said that the lower courts in Pakistan 
are in compliance with international human rights 
standards; 21 per cent disagreed with the notion; 
and a sizeable portion (38.1 per cent) did not 
know.
Federal Shariat Court (FSC)
As stated in the previous chapter (with regards to 
people's awareness of institutions), ordinary 
Pakistani people have little idea of the existence 
of the Federal Shariat Court (FSC). Despite 
respondents' lack of knowledge, the survey 
documented whether respondents agreed with 
the notion that the FSC is in compliance with 
international human rights standards set out by 
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, the international community. 
District and Sessions Courts)
According to the survey data, nearly seven out of 
Unfortunately, the lower courts are widely ten respondents (69.8 per cent) did not have an 
criticised for: delays in reaching decisions; opinion; and 20.3 per cent said that the FSC is in 
corruption; and political influence by the rich compliance with international human rights 
10(usually at the expense of the poor).  standards.
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of Pakistani people is Muslim, the majority of 
respondents (62.9 per cent) did not have an 
opinion. Only 23.4 per cent agreed that religious 
seminary boards are in compliance with 
international human rights standards. 
Ombudsman
The general public seems to lack knowledge 
about the existence of the Ombudsman office: 
72.3 per cent of survey respondents did not know 
whether the Ombudsman office and its policies 
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul 
Madaris or other registered Madaris)
Again, the survey shows some astonishing results. 
Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority 
and procedures are in compliance with 
international human rights standards. Only 13.6 
per cent agreed with the notion, and 11.4 per 
cent disagreed. 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
The HRCP is very popular within civil society 
organisations for its struggle to protect and 
uphold human rights in Pakistan. The majority of 
respondents had already shown their lack of 
awareness of the existence of the HRCP in 
Chapter 2 of this study (the findings shown in 
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and 
High Courts)
Superior Courts are mandated to safeguard the 
rights of Pakistani citizens and migrants, tourists, 
and refugees in Pakistan. The Superior Courts 
have developed significant credibility over the last 
few years, thus improving people's perceptions of 
their work. According to the survey data, a high 
percentage of respondents (39 per cent) agreed 
that the Superior Courts in Pakistan are in 
compliance with international human rights 
standards, whereas 17.3 per cent of respondents 
disagreed. Surprisingly, a higher group of 
respondents (41.4 per cent) did not have an 
opinion. 
The data shows surprising results: 39.3 per cent of 
respondents said that the lower courts in Pakistan 
are in compliance with international human rights 
standards; 21 per cent disagreed with the notion; 
and a sizeable portion (38.1 per cent) did not 
know.
Federal Shariat Court (FSC)
As stated in the previous chapter (with regards to 
people's awareness of institutions), ordinary 
Pakistani people have little idea of the existence 
of the Federal Shariat Court (FSC). Despite 
respondents' lack of knowledge, the survey 
documented whether respondents agreed with 
the notion that the FSC is in compliance with 
international human rights standards set out by 
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, the international community. 
District and Sessions Courts)
According to the survey data, nearly seven out of 
Unfortunately, the lower courts are widely ten respondents (69.8 per cent) did not have an 
criticised for: delays in reaching decisions; opinion; and 20.3 per cent said that the FSC is in 
corruption; and political influence by the rich compliance with international human rights 
10(usually at the expense of the poor).  standards.
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Again, the perception does not appear to be Large local landowners (Village 
based on accurate and factual information. Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera)
Mohalla does provide protection against external 
aggression; although mohalla also sometimes Survey results, with regards to respondents' 
11  violates human rights within its internal domain. perceptions of whether large local landowners 
comply with international human rights 
standards, are lower than for biradari, khandan Biradari (clan)
and mohalla: 31.3% of respondents disagreed 
that large local landowners meet the international The biradari system in Pakistani society is very 
human rights standards; and 28.6 per cent agreed strong and provides protection against other clans 
with the notion. or tribes in times of conflicts/disputes with 
12 regards to politics, personal feuds and land etc.
Although, the landowner result here is Biradari, as an institution might not be aware of 
encouraging, there is a general negative feeling international human rights standards. However, it 
does understand how to protect its own members 
against outsiders, and it will go to extreme lengths 
to do this – sometimes violating the rights of 
 13others in order to protect its own members.  
This is reflected in the data: 54.4 per cent of 
respondents agreed that the biradari system is in 
compliance with international human rights 
standards, whereas only 12 per cent disagreed. 
towards landowners and it is reported that they 
violate the rights of their agricultural labourers 
14. working in their fields.
Informal justice systems - village panchayat, 
faislo or Baloch jirga
Informal justice systems are widely condemned 
for their failure to ensure human rights. However, 
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Mohalla (neighbourhood)Chapter 2 reflect the data here). According to the 
data, the majority of respondents (64.2 per cent) 
With regards to mohalla too respondents seemed did not know about this institution and therefore 
to be surprisingly supportive ? 50.9 per cent did not know if the HRCP meets international 
agreed that mohalla complies with international human rights standards; 22.9 per cent said that 
human rights standards and only 11.9 per cent the HRPC did comply with international 
disagreed. standards; 11.4 per cent said that it didn't. 
Khandan (extended family)
As stated earlier in Chapter 2 of this study, 
khandan, depending on its level of influence as an 
informal institution, plays an important role in 
resolving criminal and civil disputes, and prevents 
further tensions within and outside its domain. 
The system is widely respected and relied upon to 
resolve some complex issues ? this has been 
supported by survey results on more than one 
occasion. 
According to the data, the majority of 
respondents (54.7 per cent) agreed with the 
notion that khandan complies with international 
human rights standards, whereas only 11.2 per 
cent disagreed. The percentage of those who did 
not know is significant (32 per cent). 
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Again, the perception does not appear to be Large local landowners (Village 
based on accurate and factual information. Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera)
Mohalla does provide protection against external 
aggression; although mohalla also sometimes Survey results, with regards to respondents' 
11  violates human rights within its internal domain. perceptions of whether large local landowners 
comply with international human rights 
standards, are lower than for biradari, khandan Biradari (clan)
and mohalla: 31.3% of respondents disagreed 
that large local landowners meet the international The biradari system in Pakistani society is very 
human rights standards; and 28.6 per cent agreed strong and provides protection against other clans 
with the notion. or tribes in times of conflicts/disputes with 
12 regards to politics, personal feuds and land etc.
Although, the landowner result here is Biradari, as an institution might not be aware of 
encouraging, there is a general negative feeling international human rights standards. However, it 
does understand how to protect its own members 
against outsiders, and it will go to extreme lengths 
to do this – sometimes violating the rights of 
 13others in order to protect its own members.  
This is reflected in the data: 54.4 per cent of 
respondents agreed that the biradari system is in 
compliance with international human rights 
standards, whereas only 12 per cent disagreed. 
towards landowners and it is reported that they 
violate the rights of their agricultural labourers 
14. working in their fields.
Informal justice systems - village panchayat, 
faislo or Baloch jirga
Informal justice systems are widely condemned 
for their failure to ensure human rights. However, 
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Mohalla (neighbourhood)Chapter 2 reflect the data here). According to the 
data, the majority of respondents (64.2 per cent) 
With regards to mohalla too respondents seemed did not know about this institution and therefore 
to be surprisingly supportive ? 50.9 per cent did not know if the HRCP meets international 
agreed that mohalla complies with international human rights standards; 22.9 per cent said that 
human rights standards and only 11.9 per cent the HRPC did comply with international 
disagreed. standards; 11.4 per cent said that it didn't. 
Khandan (extended family)
As stated earlier in Chapter 2 of this study, 
khandan, depending on its level of influence as an 
informal institution, plays an important role in 
resolving criminal and civil disputes, and prevents 
further tensions within and outside its domain. 
The system is widely respected and relied upon to 
resolve some complex issues ? this has been 
supported by survey results on more than one 
occasion. 
According to the data, the majority of 
respondents (54.7 per cent) agreed with the 
notion that khandan complies with international 
human rights standards, whereas only 11.2 per 
cent disagreed. The percentage of those who did 
not know is significant (32 per cent). 
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union council level bureaucracy. Generally people cent of respondents disagreed with the notion; 
have negative views concerning patwaris, and more than half of the respondents (54.5 per 
15 nambardars, tehsildars etc. These bureaucrats cent) said they did not know. 
hold positions which are small in grade but their 
influence in their respective localities is huge. 
Local people usually yield to their pressure and 
pay what the local bureaucracy demands, 
16unfortunately.
According to the data, 36.6 per cent of 
respondents believed that local bureaucracy is 
not in compliance with international human rights 
standards, and 13.2 per cent believed the 
opposite. Again, a high number of respondents 
(47.6 per cent) said they did not know. 
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district 
magistrates etc.)
Respondents' perceptions about district civil 
bureaucracy are not very encouraging. Only 14.7 
per cent of respondents agreed that district civil 
bureaucracy, as an institution, is compliant with 
international human rights standards; 28.2 per 
in Chapter 4, survey respondents seem to be 
supportive of informal justice systems ? this 
contradicts data here where respondents seem to 
be divided on the notion. The results here show 
that only 33.2 per cent agreed that the informal 
justice system is compliant with international 
human rights standards; 25 per cent disagreed; 
and a significant number of respondents (39.4 per 
cent) did not know, surprisingly. 
Local influentials (local, provincial, national)
One would argue that large local landowners 
(discussed above) also fall under the category of 
'local influentials', because the wealth they 
possess also makes them influential. However, in 
this survey, they are dealt with separately. 
According to the data, 35.2 per cent of 
respondents disagreed that local influentials 
Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record comply with international human rights 
keepers); nambardars (village headmen); standards, whereas 15.2 per cent agreed with the 
tehsildars (Tehsil administration/revenue notion. The highest number of respondents (45.4 
collection heads) or othersper cent) did not know.  
The survey results highlight an interesting aspect 
of respondents' opinions about local village or 
Ch
ap
te
r 
6 
:  
Th
e 
st
at
e 
of
 h
um
an
 r
ig
ht
s 
un
de
r 
in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
Ch
ap
te
r 
6 
:  
Th
e 
st
at
e 
of
 h
um
an
 r
ig
ht
s 
un
de
r 
in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
10
.5
0%
22
.7
0%
12
.4
0%
12
.6
0%
39
.4
0%
2.
30
%
Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon), faislo or Baloch jirga
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know Not answered
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
3.
20
%
13
%
16
.1
0%
19
.1
0%
45
.4
0%
3.
20
%
Local influentials (local, provincial, national)
Strongly
agree
Somewhat
agree
Somewhat
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Don’t know Not
answered
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Local bureaucracy - 
(Tehsil administration/revenue collection heads) or others
patwaris (land record keepers); nambardars (village headmen); 
tehsildars 
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know Not answered
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2.
90
% 1
0.
30
%
13
.7
0%
22
.9
0%
47
.6
0%
2.
60
%
District civil bureaucracy
(DROs, DCOs, district magistrates etc.)
Strongly
agree
Somewhat
agree
Somewhat
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Don’t know Not
answered
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
4%
10
.7
0%
12
.9
0%
15
.3
0%
54
.5
0%
2.
60
%
15. Round-table discussions in Lahore, Karachi and Quetta, August – December 2013
16. Ibid
149 150
union council level bureaucracy. Generally people cent of respondents disagreed with the notion; 
have negative views concerning patwaris, and more than half of the respondents (54.5 per 
15 nambardars, tehsildars etc. These bureaucrats cent) said they did not know. 
hold positions which are small in grade but their 
influence in their respective localities is huge. 
Local people usually yield to their pressure and 
pay what the local bureaucracy demands, 
16unfortunately.
According to the data, 36.6 per cent of 
respondents believed that local bureaucracy is 
not in compliance with international human rights 
standards, and 13.2 per cent believed the 
opposite. Again, a high number of respondents 
(47.6 per cent) said they did not know. 
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district 
magistrates etc.)
Respondents' perceptions about district civil 
bureaucracy are not very encouraging. Only 14.7 
per cent of respondents agreed that district civil 
bureaucracy, as an institution, is compliant with 
international human rights standards; 28.2 per 
in Chapter 4, survey respondents seem to be 
supportive of informal justice systems ? this 
contradicts data here where respondents seem to 
be divided on the notion. The results here show 
that only 33.2 per cent agreed that the informal 
justice system is compliant with international 
human rights standards; 25 per cent disagreed; 
and a significant number of respondents (39.4 per 
cent) did not know, surprisingly. 
Local influentials (local, provincial, national)
One would argue that large local landowners 
(discussed above) also fall under the category of 
'local influentials', because the wealth they 
possess also makes them influential. However, in 
this survey, they are dealt with separately. 
According to the data, 35.2 per cent of 
respondents disagreed that local influentials 
Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record comply with international human rights 
keepers); nambardars (village headmen); standards, whereas 15.2 per cent agreed with the 
tehsildars (Tehsil administration/revenue notion. The highest number of respondents (45.4 
collection heads) or othersper cent) did not know.  
The survey results highlight an interesting aspect 
of respondents' opinions about local village or 
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whether NGOs are in compliance with international human rights standards; 11.2 per 
international human rights standards. In practice, cent did not agree; and an overwhelming majority 
NGOs usually make significant efforts to ensure of 80.1 per cent did not know. 
that the rights of their beneficiaries are protected, 
but unfortunately this is rarely understood by the Local crime lords
17general public.  Only 16.3 per cent of 
respondents agreed that NGOs comply with The phrase 'crime lord' in itself carries negative 
international human rights standards; and 10.2 connotations. It is interesting to see from the 
per cent disagreed. 
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that 
charge a fee
The survey results also show respondents' lack of 
faith in private dispute resolution mechanisms 
that charge a fee. Other data sets in this report 
suggest that private dispute resolution systems 
scarcely exist in Pakistan – there may only be a 
few in existence. Respondents shared their 
opinions based on their (little) knowledge or 
experience. 
Looking at the data, surprisingly only 6.5 per cent 
of respondents agreed that private dispute 
resolution mechanisms are in compliance with 
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras)
The key finding for this institution is respondents' 
lack of knowledge: 58.8 per cent of respondents 
said they did not know if political groupings 
complied with international human rights 
standards; 31 per cent believed that they do not 
comply; and only 9.7 per cent said that they do 
 comply. 
Local NGOs (Non Governmental Organisations)
The survey results for NGOs is very similar to the 
results for CBOs. More than two-thirds of 
respondents (71.4 per cent) did not know 
Self-provision village organisations; community 
organisations
As explained in the chapter dealing with 
respondents' awareness of institutions, people 
are not very familiar with the concept of CBOs 
(Community Based Organisations), and therefore, 
the result from the survey is not surprising. More 
than two-thirds of respondents (68.6 per cent) did 
not know if CBOs comply with international 
human rights standards; only 14.8 per cent 
agreed that they do comply; and 13.1 per cent 
disagreed with the notion. 
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whether NGOs are in compliance with international human rights standards; 11.2 per 
international human rights standards. In practice, cent did not agree; and an overwhelming majority 
NGOs usually make significant efforts to ensure of 80.1 per cent did not know. 
that the rights of their beneficiaries are protected, 
but unfortunately this is rarely understood by the Local crime lords
17general public.  Only 16.3 per cent of 
respondents agreed that NGOs comply with The phrase 'crime lord' in itself carries negative 
international human rights standards; and 10.2 connotations. It is interesting to see from the 
per cent disagreed. 
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that 
charge a fee
The survey results also show respondents' lack of 
faith in private dispute resolution mechanisms 
that charge a fee. Other data sets in this report 
suggest that private dispute resolution systems 
scarcely exist in Pakistan – there may only be a 
few in existence. Respondents shared their 
opinions based on their (little) knowledge or 
experience. 
Looking at the data, surprisingly only 6.5 per cent 
of respondents agreed that private dispute 
resolution mechanisms are in compliance with 
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras)
The key finding for this institution is respondents' 
lack of knowledge: 58.8 per cent of respondents 
said they did not know if political groupings 
complied with international human rights 
standards; 31 per cent believed that they do not 
comply; and only 9.7 per cent said that they do 
 comply. 
Local NGOs (Non Governmental Organisations)
The survey results for NGOs is very similar to the 
results for CBOs. More than two-thirds of 
respondents (71.4 per cent) did not know 
Self-provision village organisations; community 
organisations
As explained in the chapter dealing with 
respondents' awareness of institutions, people 
are not very familiar with the concept of CBOs 
(Community Based Organisations), and therefore, 
the result from the survey is not surprising. More 
than two-thirds of respondents (68.6 per cent) did 
not know if CBOs comply with international 
human rights standards; only 14.8 per cent 
agreed that they do comply; and 13.1 per cent 
disagreed with the notion. 
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According to the data, an overwhelming majority 
of respondents (81 per cent) said they did not Various systems and their compliance with the 
know if MCs are compliant with international fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
human rights standards; 7.1 per cent agreed that Constitution of Pakistan
they are compliant; and 9.4 per cent said they are 
not compliant. Provincial police authorities and their local 
representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP, etc.)
The above analysis of the 22 formal and informal 
institutions and their compliance with the With regards to whether provincial police 
international human rights standards, was based authorities and their local representatives are in 
on respondents' perceptions gathered through compliance with the fundamental rights 
the survey. The analysis was also informed by the guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan, a high 
opinions collected during the round-table group of respondents (47.7 per cent) did not 
discussions, which were organised in each of the agree that this was the case; and surprisingly, 28.1 
provincial capital cities of Punjab, Sindh and per cent did agree with the notion. The police 
Balochistan. department is a formal institution set-up under 
the Constitution of Pakistan. Unfortunately, 
The survey furthered its enquiry by documenting however, the general perception of the police is 
what respondents thought about the compliance negative, due to its low performance and alleged 
of various formal and informal institutions with corrupt practices ? hence the high number of 
regards to the fundamental rights guaranteed by respondents who did not see the police as 
the Constitution of Pakistan. The list of compliant with the fundamental rights 
20institutions remains the same as in the previous guaranteed in the Constitution.  
section; however, the question has a different 
angle and so produced different survey results. 
results that three-quarters of respondents (75.6 resolving disputes within their local settings, 
per cent) said they did not know if local crime whereas 10.3 per cent disagreed with the notion. 
lords are compliant with international human The majority of respondents (59.7 per cent) said 
rights - it is possible that they were frightened to they did not know, which seems surprising due to 
share their thoughts, or perhaps they have not the fact that religious leaders exists in each and 
encountered any such criminal gang or 'crime every village of Pakistan's overwhelmingly Muslim 
lord'. However, 5.6 per cent did agree that crime country. This might lead us to assume that the 
lords are compliant with international human majority was unsure if religious leaders complied 
rights standards; 15.2 per cent did not agree with with international human rights standards but, in 
this notion. wishing to be respectful to this institution, 
decided not to risk offence. 
Religious leaders in the community
Musalihati Council (MC)
According to participants of round-table 
discussions, disputants generally approach local As explained previously in this report, local 
community elders, tribal leaders, family elders, bodies/government systems were set-up during 
and influentials to resolve their disputes General (retired) Parvaiz Musharraf's era in 22 
18 amicably. However, local religious leaders have districts of Pakistan and Musalihati Councils were 
also gained considerable prominence in recent part of these. MCs were mandated to provide 
times and they can also play a role in resolving assistance to the local population as well as to 
19 local police stations to help resolve people's petty people's disputes.  
criminal and civil disputes. Since 2007, MCs have 
stopped providing their services, as this system In the survey results, 27.4 per cent of respondents 
was not continued. agreed that religious leaders comply with 
international human rights standards when 
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this notion. wishing to be respectful to this institution, 
decided not to risk offence. 
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Musalihati Council (MC)
According to participants of round-table 
discussions, disputants generally approach local As explained previously in this report, local 
community elders, tribal leaders, family elders, bodies/government systems were set-up during 
and influentials to resolve their disputes General (retired) Parvaiz Musharraf's era in 22 
18 amicably. However, local religious leaders have districts of Pakistan and Musalihati Councils were 
also gained considerable prominence in recent part of these. MCs were mandated to provide 
times and they can also play a role in resolving assistance to the local population as well as to 
19 local police stations to help resolve people's petty people's disputes.  
criminal and civil disputes. Since 2007, MCs have 
stopped providing their services, as this system In the survey results, 27.4 per cent of respondents 
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offer an opinion about this institution. This is 
evident from the striking 67.5 per cent who said 
they didn't know if the Federal Shariat Court is 
compliant with the fundamental rights 
guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan. Only 
19.5 per cent agreed with the notion and 10.2 per 
cent disagreed. 
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul 
Madaris or other registered Madaris)
The majority of respondents (62.6 per cent) did 
not know if the religious seminary is compliant 
with the fundamental rights guaranteed in the 
Constitution of Pakistan. However, a sizeable 25.6 
per cent said it is compliant, and only 9.3 per cent 
said it is not compliant. 
Federal Shariat Court
As stated earlier in this study, the general public in 
Pakistan are not fully aware of the Federal Shariat 
Court, and so it was difficult for respondents to 
Ombudsman
As was the case in the previous questions, again 
the majority of respondents (70.7 per cent) did 
not know whether the office of the Ombudsman 
is compliant with the fundamental rights 
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High Courts) residing in Pakistan. A high percentage of 
respondents (41.9 per cent) agreed that the 
The Superior Courts are constitutionally Superior Courts in Pakistan are compliant with the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution 
of Pakistan. Surprisingly, 17.4 per cent disagreed 
with the notion. A sizeable proportion of the 
sample (38.1 per cent) did not know what to 
think. 
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, 
District and Sessions Courts)
According to round-table participants, corruption 
and political influence manipulate lower courts 
21processes.  However, despite common negative 
perceptions about the lower courts due to alleged 
corrupt practices, 41.4 per cent of respondents 
said that the lower courts in Pakistan are 
compliant with the fundamental rights 
guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan.  Only 
17.4 per cent disagreed with the notion; a 
sizeable 34.6 per cent did not know.
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offer an opinion about this institution. This is 
evident from the striking 67.5 per cent who said 
they didn't know if the Federal Shariat Court is 
compliant with the fundamental rights 
guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan. Only 
19.5 per cent agreed with the notion and 10.2 per 
cent disagreed. 
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul 
Madaris or other registered Madaris)
The majority of respondents (62.6 per cent) did 
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with the fundamental rights guaranteed in the 
Constitution of Pakistan. However, a sizeable 25.6 
per cent said it is compliant, and only 9.3 per cent 
said it is not compliant. 
Federal Shariat Court
As stated earlier in this study, the general public in 
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Ombudsman
As was the case in the previous questions, again 
the majority of respondents (70.7 per cent) did 
not know whether the office of the Ombudsman 
is compliant with the fundamental rights 
7.
60
% 11
.9
0%
6%
4.
20
%
67
.5
0%
2.
90
%
Federal Shariat Court
Strongly 
agree
Somewhat 
agree
Somewhat 
disagree
Strongly 
disagree
Don’t know Not 
answered
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and mandated to protect the rights of the people 
High Courts) residing in Pakistan. A high percentage of 
respondents (41.9 per cent) agreed that the 
The Superior Courts are constitutionally Superior Courts in Pakistan are compliant with the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution 
of Pakistan. Surprisingly, 17.4 per cent disagreed 
with the notion. A sizeable proportion of the 
sample (38.1 per cent) did not know what to 
think. 
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and political influence manipulate lower courts 
21processes.  However, despite common negative 
perceptions about the lower courts due to alleged 
corrupt practices, 41.4 per cent of respondents 
said that the lower courts in Pakistan are 
compliant with the fundamental rights 
guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan.  Only 
17.4 per cent disagreed with the notion; a 
sizeable 34.6 per cent did not know.
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15.3 per cent did not agree with this notion. 
However, mohalla as an institution apparently has 
never been mentioned in the Constitution of 
Pakistan. 
Biradari (clan)
Biradari also gained majority approval from 
respondents once again, when 52.4 per cent 
agreed that biradari is compliant with the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution 
of Pakistan; only 15.8 per cent did not agree with 
this notion.
Mohalla (neighbourhood)
Around half of respondents (49.9 per cent) agreed 
that mohalla and its support mechanism is 
compliant with the fundamental rights 
guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan; only 
Large local landowners (Village 
Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera)
With regards to large local landowners, 35.8 per 
cent of respondents said that these landowners 
do not comply with the fundamental rights 
guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan.
Most people in Pakistan's rural areas are poor and 
they rely on their village landowners for work and 
other favours. There is a negative perception 
guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan. not know if the HRCP is compliant with the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution 
of Pakistan. As stated earlier in this report, the 
general public in Pakistan do not know much 
about the HRCP and its efforts to protect the 
rights of the citizens of Pakistan. Nevertheless, a 
significant proportion of respondents (23 per 
cent) said that the HRCP is compliant with the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution 
of Pakistan; 10.4 per cent did not agree with this. 
Khandan (extended family)
The survey result for khandan is again 
encouraging and consistent with the previous 
survey findings. A majority of 55.3 per cent 
agreed that khandan, as an informal institution, is 
compliant with fundamental rights guaranteed in 
the Constitution of Pakistan. 
Only 11.2 per cent of respondents did not agree 
with the notion. A sizeable proportion (31.3 per 
cent) did not know what to think. 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
The majority of respondents (63.8 per cent) did 
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cent of respondents said that these landowners 
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Most people in Pakistan's rural areas are poor and 
they rely on their village landowners for work and 
other favours. There is a negative perception 
guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan. not know if the HRCP is compliant with the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution 
of Pakistan. As stated earlier in this report, the 
general public in Pakistan do not know much 
about the HRCP and its efforts to protect the 
rights of the citizens of Pakistan. Nevertheless, a 
significant proportion of respondents (23 per 
cent) said that the HRCP is compliant with the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution 
of Pakistan; 10.4 per cent did not agree with this. 
Khandan (extended family)
The survey result for khandan is again 
encouraging and consistent with the previous 
survey findings. A majority of 55.3 per cent 
agreed that khandan, as an informal institution, is 
compliant with fundamental rights guaranteed in 
the Constitution of Pakistan. 
Only 11.2 per cent of respondents did not agree 
with the notion. A sizeable proportion (31.3 per 
cent) did not know what to think. 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
The majority of respondents (63.8 per cent) did 
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associated with these landowners – however, a 
significant proportion of respondents (26.9 per 
cent) still agreed with the notion that these 
landowners do comply with the fundamental 
rights guaranteed in the Constitution.
Village panchayat, faislo or Baloch jirga – 
informal justice systems
Respondents of the survey seemed divided on the 
issue of whether informal justice systems comply 
with the fundamental rights of the Constitution: 
34.6 per cent of respondents agreed that informal 
justice systems are in compliance with the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution 
of Pakistan, whereas 27.3 per cent did not agree. 
Generally, informal justice systems are seen as 
institutions which perpetrate human rights 
violations, especially against women and 
vulnerable groups. However, despite this, the 
majority in rural areas still access these 
institutions for resolving their criminal and civil Local influentials (local, provincial, national)22matters.
With regards to local influentials, the survey result 
reveals that a high number of respondents (37.4 
Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat,
pareon), faislo or Baloch jirga
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per cent) disagreed with the notion that local Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record 
influentials comply with the fundamental rights keepers); nambardars (village headmen); 
guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan; 16.8 tehsildars (Tehsil administration/revenue 
per cent agreed with the notion; and a significant collection heads) or others
43.2 per cent did not know. 
As stated earlier, people hold negative 
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associated with these landowners – however, a 
significant proportion of respondents (26.9 per 
cent) still agreed with the notion that these 
landowners do comply with the fundamental 
rights guaranteed in the Constitution.
Village panchayat, faislo or Baloch jirga – 
informal justice systems
Respondents of the survey seemed divided on the 
issue of whether informal justice systems comply 
with the fundamental rights of the Constitution: 
34.6 per cent of respondents agreed that informal 
justice systems are in compliance with the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution 
of Pakistan, whereas 27.3 per cent did not agree. 
Generally, informal justice systems are seen as 
institutions which perpetrate human rights 
violations, especially against women and 
vulnerable groups. However, despite this, the 
majority in rural areas still access these 
institutions for resolving their criminal and civil Local influentials (local, provincial, national)22matters.
With regards to local influentials, the survey result 
reveals that a high number of respondents (37.4 
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per cent) disagreed with the notion that local Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record 
influentials comply with the fundamental rights keepers); nambardars (village headmen); 
guaranteed in the Constitution of Pakistan; 16.8 tehsildars (Tehsil administration/revenue 
per cent agreed with the notion; and a significant collection heads) or others
43.2 per cent did not know. 
As stated earlier, people hold negative 
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perceptions of local bureaucracy, and this is 
reflected clearly in the survey findings: 40.4 per 
cent believed that local bureaucracy does not 
comply with the fundamental rights guaranteed in 
the Constitution of Pakistan; only 12.7 per cent 
agreed with the notion; and a significant number 
(44.3 per cent) said they did not know.  
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district 
magistrates etc.)
For district civil bureaucracy, unsurprisingly, 
respondents seemed to hold a negative opinion. 
groupings/vote banks are compliant with the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution 
of Pakistan; more than double (28.6 per cent) did 
not agree; and more than half of respondents (55 
per cent) did not know.
Self-provision village organisations (VOs); 
community organisations (COs)
As was the case in previous questions, two-thirds 
More respondents (31.5 per cent) disagreed with 
the notion that district civil bureaucracy is 
compliant with the fundamental rights of 
Pakistan's Constitution; 15.6 per cent agreed with 
the notion; and half of the sample (50.2 per cent) 
did not know.
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras)
Respondents were vocal in sharing negative 
opinions about political groupings/dharras. Only 
11.7 per cent of respondents agreed that political 
4.
60
%
13
.6
0%
7% 5.
30
%
66
.3
0%
3.
20
%
Self-provision village organisations;
community organisations
Strongly
 agree
Somewhat 
agree
Somewhat
 disagree
Strongly
 disagree
Don’t know Not 
answered
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
161 162
of respondents (66.3 per cent) did not know 
whether self-provision VOs and COs are compliant 
with the fundamental rights guaranteed in the 
Constitution of Pakistan; only 18.2 per cent 
agreed that they are compliant; and 12.3 per cent 
said they are not compliant. 
Local NGOs
More than two-thirds of respondents (68.1 per 
cent) did not know if NGOs are compliant with the 
fundamental rights of the Constitution; only 19.2 
per cent said that NGOs are compliant; and just 
over 10 per cent said they are not compliant. The 
reasons for the lack of awareness about the work 
of NGOs was elaborated upon in the previous 
parts of this study. 
respondents agreed that these mechanisms are 
compliant, whereas 11.1 per cent said they are 
not compliant.
Local crime lords
The term 'crime lord' clearly has a negative 
Mechanisms that charge a fee
It is not a surprise that more than three-quarters 
of respondents (78.1 per cent) did not know 
whether mechanisms that charge a fee are 
compliant with the fundamental rights of the 
Constitution. As stated earlier, these mechanisms 
scarcely exist in Pakistan. Just 8.4 per cent of 
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perceptions of local bureaucracy, and this is 
reflected clearly in the survey findings: 40.4 per 
cent believed that local bureaucracy does not 
comply with the fundamental rights guaranteed in 
the Constitution of Pakistan; only 12.7 per cent 
agreed with the notion; and a significant number 
(44.3 per cent) said they did not know.  
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district 
magistrates etc.)
For district civil bureaucracy, unsurprisingly, 
respondents seemed to hold a negative opinion. 
groupings/vote banks are compliant with the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution 
of Pakistan; more than double (28.6 per cent) did 
not agree; and more than half of respondents (55 
per cent) did not know.
Self-provision village organisations (VOs); 
community organisations (COs)
As was the case in previous questions, two-thirds 
More respondents (31.5 per cent) disagreed with 
the notion that district civil bureaucracy is 
compliant with the fundamental rights of 
Pakistan's Constitution; 15.6 per cent agreed with 
the notion; and half of the sample (50.2 per cent) 
did not know.
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of respondents (66.3 per cent) did not know 
whether self-provision VOs and COs are compliant 
with the fundamental rights guaranteed in the 
Constitution of Pakistan; only 18.2 per cent 
agreed that they are compliant; and 12.3 per cent 
said they are not compliant. 
Local NGOs
More than two-thirds of respondents (68.1 per 
cent) did not know if NGOs are compliant with the 
fundamental rights of the Constitution; only 19.2 
per cent said that NGOs are compliant; and just 
over 10 per cent said they are not compliant. The 
reasons for the lack of awareness about the work 
of NGOs was elaborated upon in the previous 
parts of this study. 
respondents agreed that these mechanisms are 
compliant, whereas 11.1 per cent said they are 
not compliant.
Local crime lords
The term 'crime lord' clearly has a negative 
Mechanisms that charge a fee
It is not a surprise that more than three-quarters 
of respondents (78.1 per cent) did not know 
whether mechanisms that charge a fee are 
compliant with the fundamental rights of the 
Constitution. As stated earlier, these mechanisms 
scarcely exist in Pakistan. Just 8.4 per cent of 
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agreed that the Superior Courts in Pakistan are 
compliant with the rights guaranteed under 
Islamic principles and legal injunctions; whereas a 
substantial proportion of the sample (24.2 per 
cent) did not agree ? a surprisingly significant 
proportion, especially given that Superior Courts 
also try cases under Islamic Jurisprudence (which 
means they are compliant with the Islamic 
principles and legal injunctions). Nevertheless, 
the common perception contradicts this and to 
some extent reflects negatively on the Superior 
Courts in this regard, unfortunately.  
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, 
District and Sessions Courts)
Respondents' views of the Lower Courts is very 
similar to their views of the Superior courts in 
Pakistan: 42 per cent agreed that the Lower 
Courts are compliant with the rights enshrined 
under Islamic principles and legal injunctions, 
whereas 24.2 per cent did not agree. Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and 
High Courts)
A high percentage of respondents (43.8 per cent) 
The respondents' opinions of both types of court 
is startling – as both institutions aim to uphold 
connotations. More than two-thirds of 
respondents (72.1 per cent) did not know if crime 
lords are compliant with the fundamental rights 
of the Constitution. Some 6.9 per cent said that 
local crime lords are compliant with these 
fundamental rights, whereas 17.3 per cent did not 
agree with this notion. 
Religious leaders in the community
Once again, the survey result for religious leaders 
is not encouraging. Only 27.8 per cent of 
respondents said that religious leaders meet the 
standards of fundamental rights guaranteed in 
Do you agree that the following systems are in 
compliance with Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions? 
Here we investigate respondents' opinions of the 
listed institutions and their compliance under the 
Islamic principles and legal injunctions. 
Institutions are analysed and discussed in the 
same manner and sequence as discussed in the 
previous two questions. 
Provincial police authorities and their local 
representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP, etc.)
The majority of respondents (63.3 per cent) said 
the Constitution of Pakistan; 10.9 per cent that provincial police authorities do not comply 
disagreed with this notion. More than half (57 per with the rights enshrined under Islamic principles 
cent) said they did not know. and legal injunctions;  only 21.2 per cent said that 
the police do comply with these principles. 
Musalihati Council
It is interesting to see how ordinary men and 
The data shown in the table is self-explanatory. In women view the police authorities with regards 
past, the media has focused much attention on to their rights which are protected under Islamic 
Musalihati Councils and their roles. Unfortunately, principles and legal injunctions. 
however, the overwhelming majority is still 
unaware of this institution and its work. 
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agreed that the Superior Courts in Pakistan are 
compliant with the rights guaranteed under 
Islamic principles and legal injunctions; whereas a 
substantial proportion of the sample (24.2 per 
cent) did not agree ? a surprisingly significant 
proportion, especially given that Superior Courts 
also try cases under Islamic Jurisprudence (which 
means they are compliant with the Islamic 
principles and legal injunctions). Nevertheless, 
the common perception contradicts this and to 
some extent reflects negatively on the Superior 
Courts in this regard, unfortunately.  
Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, 
District and Sessions Courts)
Respondents' views of the Lower Courts is very 
similar to their views of the Superior courts in 
Pakistan: 42 per cent agreed that the Lower 
Courts are compliant with the rights enshrined 
under Islamic principles and legal injunctions, 
whereas 24.2 per cent did not agree. Superior Courts in Pakistan (Supreme Court and 
High Courts)
A high percentage of respondents (43.8 per cent) 
The respondents' opinions of both types of court 
is startling – as both institutions aim to uphold 
connotations. More than two-thirds of 
respondents (72.1 per cent) did not know if crime 
lords are compliant with the fundamental rights 
of the Constitution. Some 6.9 per cent said that 
local crime lords are compliant with these 
fundamental rights, whereas 17.3 per cent did not 
agree with this notion. 
Religious leaders in the community
Once again, the survey result for religious leaders 
is not encouraging. Only 27.8 per cent of 
respondents said that religious leaders meet the 
standards of fundamental rights guaranteed in 
Do you agree that the following systems are in 
compliance with Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions? 
Here we investigate respondents' opinions of the 
listed institutions and their compliance under the 
Islamic principles and legal injunctions. 
Institutions are analysed and discussed in the 
same manner and sequence as discussed in the 
previous two questions. 
Provincial police authorities and their local 
representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP, etc.)
The majority of respondents (63.3 per cent) said 
the Constitution of Pakistan; 10.9 per cent that provincial police authorities do not comply 
disagreed with this notion. More than half (57 per with the rights enshrined under Islamic principles 
cent) said they did not know. and legal injunctions;  only 21.2 per cent said that 
the police do comply with these principles. 
Musalihati Council
It is interesting to see how ordinary men and 
The data shown in the table is self-explanatory. In women view the police authorities with regards 
past, the media has focused much attention on to their rights which are protected under Islamic 
Musalihati Councils and their roles. Unfortunately, principles and legal injunctions. 
however, the overwhelming majority is still 
unaware of this institution and its work. 
Ch
ap
te
r 
6 
:  
Th
e 
st
at
e 
of
 h
um
an
 r
ig
ht
s 
un
de
r 
in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
Ch
ap
te
r 
6 
:  
Th
e 
st
at
e 
of
 h
um
an
 r
ig
ht
s 
un
de
r 
in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
Religious leaders in the community
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly 
agree
Somewhat
 agree
Somewhat 
disagree
Strongly
 disagree
Don’t know Not
 answered
7.
70
%
22
.1
0%
5% 5
.9
0%
57
%
2.
30
%
Musalihati Council
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1.
20
% 8.
90
%
3.
50
%
5%
79
.3
0%
2.
20
%
Strongly 
agree
Somewhat
 agree
Somewhat 
disagree
Strongly
 disagree
Don’t know Not
 answered Strongly 
agree
Somewhat
 agree
Somewhat 
disagree
Strongly
 disagree
Don’t know Not
 answered
Provincial police authorities and their local
representatives (e.g. SHO, DSP, etc.)
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2.
10
%
19
.1
0%
20
.3
0%
43
%
14
.2
0%
1.
40
%
12
.1
0%
31
.7
0%
15
.3
0%
8.
90
%
29
.4
0%
2.
60
%
Superior Courts in Pakistan
(Supreme Court and High Courts)
Strongly 
agree
Somewhat
 agree
Somewhat
 disagree
Strongly 
disagree
Don’t know Not
 answered
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
14
%
28
%
18
.1
0%
13
.1
0%
25
%
1.
70
%
Lower Courts in Pakistan
(Judicial Magistrate, District and Sessions Courts)
Strongly
 agree
Somewhat 
agree
Somewhat 
disagree
Strongly
 disagree
Don’t know Not 
answered
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
165 166
(68.8 per cent) could not share their opinion, as 
was the case in previous questions for this 
institution. Only 16.7 per cent agreed that office 
of the Ombudsman complies with the rights 
enshrined under Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions, whereas 10.6 per cent did not agree 
with this notion.  
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
The majority of respondents (63.4 per cent) said 
they did not know if the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan was in compliance with 
cent did not agree with the notion. It is interesting 
to see that Pakistani rural society is quite certain 
on this issue, and feels so strongly about family 
values.
Mohalla (neighbourhood)
Respondents also hold mohalla in high esteem: a 
the human rights standards enshrined in Islamic 
principles and injunctions; 22.8 per cent agreed 
with the notion; and 11.5 per cent did not agree 
with the notion. 
Khandan (extended family)
With regards to khandan, an overwhelming two-
thirds of respondents (65.8 per cent) agreed that 
as an informal institution khandan meets the 
human rights standards enshrined under Islamic 
principles and legal injunctions. Only 11.2 per 
the rights of the people protected under Islamic 
principles and legal injunctions. 
Federal Shariat Court
The Federal Shariat Court is expected to interpret 
and apply Islamic principles and legal injunctions. 
However, surprisingly, 63.3 per cent of 
respondents were not aware of the FSC and did 
principles, whereas only 9.3 per cent did not 
agree with the notion. 
Ombudsman
Once again, more than two-thirds of respondents 
not have an opinion on this. Only 21.2 per cent 
agreed with the notion that the FSC complies with 
the human rights standards enshrined in Islamic 
principles, whereas, astonishingly, a sizeable 11.9 
per cent disagreed. 
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul 
Madaris or other registered Madaris)
The survey result for this institution shows 
another striking revelation as 58.3 per cent did 
not know if religious seminary boards comply 
with the human rights standards enshrined in 
Islamic principles and injunctions. However, more 
than one quarter (29.6 per cent) agreed that 
religious seminary boards do comply with Islamic 
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(68.8 per cent) could not share their opinion, as 
was the case in previous questions for this 
institution. Only 16.7 per cent agreed that office 
of the Ombudsman complies with the rights 
enshrined under Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions, whereas 10.6 per cent did not agree 
with this notion.  
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
The majority of respondents (63.4 per cent) said 
they did not know if the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan was in compliance with 
cent did not agree with the notion. It is interesting 
to see that Pakistani rural society is quite certain 
on this issue, and feels so strongly about family 
values.
Mohalla (neighbourhood)
Respondents also hold mohalla in high esteem: a 
the human rights standards enshrined in Islamic 
principles and injunctions; 22.8 per cent agreed 
with the notion; and 11.5 per cent did not agree 
with the notion. 
Khandan (extended family)
With regards to khandan, an overwhelming two-
thirds of respondents (65.8 per cent) agreed that 
as an informal institution khandan meets the 
human rights standards enshrined under Islamic 
principles and legal injunctions. Only 11.2 per 
the rights of the people protected under Islamic 
principles and legal injunctions. 
Federal Shariat Court
The Federal Shariat Court is expected to interpret 
and apply Islamic principles and legal injunctions. 
However, surprisingly, 63.3 per cent of 
respondents were not aware of the FSC and did 
principles, whereas only 9.3 per cent did not 
agree with the notion. 
Ombudsman
Once again, more than two-thirds of respondents 
not have an opinion on this. Only 21.2 per cent 
agreed with the notion that the FSC complies with 
the human rights standards enshrined in Islamic 
principles, whereas, astonishingly, a sizeable 11.9 
per cent disagreed. 
Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul 
Madaris or other registered Madaris)
The survey result for this institution shows 
another striking revelation as 58.3 per cent did 
not know if religious seminary boards comply 
with the human rights standards enshrined in 
Islamic principles and injunctions. However, more 
than one quarter (29.6 per cent) agreed that 
religious seminary boards do comply with Islamic 
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majority of 59.9 per cent agreed that the mohalla 
system protects the rights of the people 
enshrined under Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions, whereas only 14.4 per cent did not 
agree with the notion.  
Biradari (clan)
Biradari, as an institution, is also held in high 
esteem: a majority of 65.7 per cent of 
respondents agreed with the notion that biradari 
meets the human rights standards enshrined in 
Islamic principles; only 14 per cent did not agree 
with this notion. 
The informal justice system - village panchayat 
(akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon), faislo 
or Baloch jirga
Less than half of respondents (41.7 per cent) 
agreed that informal justice systems (panchayat, 
faislo and Baloch jirga) comply with the rights 
enshrined under Islamic principles and legal 
Large local landowners (Village 
Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera)
Respondents seemed to be divided on their 
perspective of local large landowners. A quarter 
of respondents (25.4 per cent) said they did not 
know if these landowners comply with the human 
rights standards enshrined in Islamic principles. As 
discussed earlier, we are aware that large 
landowners for their own political gain help to 
resolve local disputes by exerting their influence 
on communities. This makes them a powerful 
23institution.
Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat,
pareon) / faislo or Baloch jirga
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injunctions, whereas a significant size of 
respondents (27.6 per cent) disagreed, 
surprisingly.  
Local influentials (local, provincial, national)
Respondents continued to show negative 
opinions of local influentials that work within 
their communities for their own political gain, 
24according to general perceptions.  The data 
showed that 38.5 per cent of respondents 
disagreed that local influentials comply with the 
rights enshrined under Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions. Nevertheless a substantial 21.7 per 
bureaucrats comply with the human rights 
standards enshrined in Islamic principles, whereas 
13.6 per cent agreed with the notion. On the 
whole, the general public hold a negative opinion 
of the local bureaucracy due to allegedly corrupt 
25 practices.
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district 
magistrates etc.)
The data showed that 38 per cent disagreed with 
the notion that the district civil bureaucracy is 
compliant with the human rights standards 
cent agreed with the notion, surprisingly. This 
indicates that influentials are successful in 
manipulating local matters in their favour. 
Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record 
keepers); nambardars (village headmen); 
tehsildars (Tehsil administration/revenue 
collection heads) or others
The results showed that 40.9 per cent of 
respondents disagreed with the notion that local C
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majority of 59.9 per cent agreed that the mohalla 
system protects the rights of the people 
enshrined under Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions, whereas only 14.4 per cent did not 
agree with the notion.  
Biradari (clan)
Biradari, as an institution, is also held in high 
esteem: a majority of 65.7 per cent of 
respondents agreed with the notion that biradari 
meets the human rights standards enshrined in 
Islamic principles; only 14 per cent did not agree 
with this notion. 
The informal justice system - village panchayat 
(akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon), faislo 
or Baloch jirga
Less than half of respondents (41.7 per cent) 
agreed that informal justice systems (panchayat, 
faislo and Baloch jirga) comply with the rights 
enshrined under Islamic principles and legal 
Large local landowners (Village 
Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera)
Respondents seemed to be divided on their 
perspective of local large landowners. A quarter 
of respondents (25.4 per cent) said they did not 
know if these landowners comply with the human 
rights standards enshrined in Islamic principles. As 
discussed earlier, we are aware that large 
landowners for their own political gain help to 
resolve local disputes by exerting their influence 
on communities. This makes them a powerful 
23institution.
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injunctions, whereas a significant size of 
respondents (27.6 per cent) disagreed, 
surprisingly.  
Local influentials (local, provincial, national)
Respondents continued to show negative 
opinions of local influentials that work within 
their communities for their own political gain, 
24according to general perceptions.  The data 
showed that 38.5 per cent of respondents 
disagreed that local influentials comply with the 
rights enshrined under Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions. Nevertheless a substantial 21.7 per 
bureaucrats comply with the human rights 
standards enshrined in Islamic principles, whereas 
13.6 per cent agreed with the notion. On the 
whole, the general public hold a negative opinion 
of the local bureaucracy due to allegedly corrupt 
25 practices.
District civil bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, district 
magistrates etc.)
The data showed that 38 per cent disagreed with 
the notion that the district civil bureaucracy is 
compliant with the human rights standards 
cent agreed with the notion, surprisingly. This 
indicates that influentials are successful in 
manipulating local matters in their favour. 
Local bureaucracy – patwaris (land record 
keepers); nambardars (village headmen); 
tehsildars (Tehsil administration/revenue 
collection heads) or others
The results showed that 40.9 per cent of 
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Private dispute resolution mechanisms (DRMs) 
that charge a fee
Respondents seemed to have little knowledge 
about private DRMs: the overwhelming majority 
(78.9 per cent) said they did not know if private 
DRMs comply with the human rights standards 
enshrined in Islamic principles; only 6.6 per cent 
held a positive opinion and agreed with the 
notion. 
Religious leaders in the community
One-third of respondents (33.9 per cent) agreed 
that religious leaders meet the human rights 
standards enshrined in Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions; only 9.4 per cent did not agree with 
Local crime lords
With regards to perceptions about crime lords, in 
this questions as well as in previous questions, a 
large number of respondents held negative views, 
and the majority (73.8 per cent) said they did not 
know if crime lords comply with the human rights 
standards enshrined in Islamic principles. Only 4.7 
per cent thought local crime lords are in 
compliance with Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions.  
enshrined in Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions, whereas 16.6 per cent agreed with 
the notion. Survey results are not surprising, as 
general perceptions of any bureaucratic 
institution are negative. Unfortunately, people 
have generally lost their faith in public 
institutions. 
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras)
More than half of respondents did not know if 
political groupings comply with the human rights 
standards enshrined in Islamic principles; a large 
Local NGOs
Again, the case for NGOs is very similar to 
community-based organisations (CBOs) ? reasons 
for this were discussed in the first question of this 
section. More than two-thirds of respondents 
(67.9 per cent) seemed to have no knowledge of 
NGOs and did not share an opinion.  
number of respondents (33.6 per cent) seem to 
hold a negative opinion of political groupings and 
they disagreed with the notion; and only 12.4 per 
cent agreed with the notion.
Self-provision village organisations (VOs); 
community organisations (COs)
Due to a lack of knowledge about VOs/COs, close 
to two-thirds of respondents (65.6 per cent) did 
not know if they comply with the human rights 
standards enshrined in Islamic principles. 
Ch
ap
te
r 
6 
:  
Th
e 
st
at
e 
of
 h
um
an
 r
ig
ht
s 
un
de
r 
in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
Ch
ap
te
r 
6 
:  
Th
e 
st
at
e 
of
 h
um
an
 r
ig
ht
s 
un
de
r 
in
fo
rm
al
 ju
st
ic
e 
sy
st
em
s
1.
50
% 1
0.
90
%
13
.5
0% 20
.1
0%
51
.1
0%
2.
90
%
Political groupings/vote banks (dharras)
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly 
agree
Somewhat
 agree
Somewhat 
disagree
Strongly 
disagree
Don’t know Not 
answered
5.
10
% 1
1.
60
%
8%
6.
20
%
65
.6
0%
3.
60
%
Self-provision village organisations; community
organisations
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly 
agree
Somewhat
 agree
Somewhat 
disagree
Strongly
disagree
Don’t know Not 
answered
Local NGOs
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
3.
70
% 1
2.
60
%
6.
70
%
7.
10
%
67
.9
0%
2.
10
%
Strongly 
agree
Somewhat 
agree
Somewhat 
disagree
Strongly
 disagree
Don’t know Not 
answered
0.
80
% 5.
80
%
4.
50
%
7.
10
%
78
.9
0%
3%
Private dispute resolution mechanisms that
charge a fee
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly 
agree
Somewhat 
agree
Somewhat 
disagree
Strongly
 disagree
Don’t know Not
 answered
Local crime lords
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0.
60
%
4.
10
%
7.
30
% 11
.4
0%
73
.8
0%
2.
70
%
Strongly
 agree
Somewhat
 agree
Somewhat 
disagree
Strongly 
disagree
Don’t know Not
 answered
12
.6
0% 2
1.
30
%
4.
90
%
4.
50
%
53
.9
0%
2.
80
%
Religious leaders in the community
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Strongly 
agree
Somewhat
 agree
Somewhat 
disagree
Strongly 
disagree
Don’t know Not
 answered
169 170
Private dispute resolution mechanisms (DRMs) 
that charge a fee
Respondents seemed to have little knowledge 
about private DRMs: the overwhelming majority 
(78.9 per cent) said they did not know if private 
DRMs comply with the human rights standards 
enshrined in Islamic principles; only 6.6 per cent 
held a positive opinion and agreed with the 
notion. 
Religious leaders in the community
One-third of respondents (33.9 per cent) agreed 
that religious leaders meet the human rights 
standards enshrined in Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions; only 9.4 per cent did not agree with 
Local crime lords
With regards to perceptions about crime lords, in 
this questions as well as in previous questions, a 
large number of respondents held negative views, 
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standards enshrined in Islamic principles. Only 4.7 
per cent thought local crime lords are in 
compliance with Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions.  
enshrined in Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions, whereas 16.6 per cent agreed with 
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have generally lost their faith in public 
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sample (28 per cent) disagreed with the notion. formal or informal justice system. This is echoed 
26during the round-table discussions.
Respondents in Pakhtun districts had a very 
different opinion, as only 23.5 per cent agreed Support/opposion for  the informal dispute 
with the notion, whereas the majority of 56.5 per resolution system making decisions in favour of 
cent disagreed. This is surprising, and shows a honour killing 
lack of awareness of gender bias by Pakhtun 
respondents. There is no justification to support killings in the 
name of honour and no law, or societal norm 
Informal dispute resolution mechanisms should support such heinous acts against 
biasness against poor people
Interestingly, respondents show less positivity 
than they displayed in their previous opinions of 
informal justice systems, for example, that 
informal justice systems reconcile disputants and 
are affordable, speedy, transparent, etc. In the 
data, 60.9 per cent of respondents agreed with 
the notion that informal justice systems are 
biased against poor people; 32.6 per cent did not 
agree. 
It is generally considered that poor and vulnerable 
people do not receive justice from either the 
27humanity.  However, media reports and other 
research studies argue that informal justice 
28systems often justify cases of honour killings.  
However it was shocking to discover that more 
than half of respondents in our survey (52.6 per 
cent) supported informal justice systems making 
decisions in favour of honour killings; 41 per cent 
opposed this. According to the data, respondents 
in Pakhtun districts were more in favour of 
decisions which support honour killing. 
With regards to this issue, respondents were 
the notion. Surprisingly, more than half said they 80.7 per cent was completely unaware of this 
did not know. institution and therefore they did not know if it 
complies with the human rights standards 
Musalihati Council (MC) enshrined in Islamic principles; only 8.3 per cent 
agreed with this notion. 
In the case of MCs an overwhelming majority of 
Informal dispute resolution systems biasness 
against women when resolving matrimonial 
disputes including divorce and custody of 
children
It is generally perceived that informal dispute 
resolution systems are biased against women 
when resolving matrimonial disputes including 
cases of divorce and the custody of children. 
Women are not allowed to take part in the 
proceedings of informal justice systems mainly 
because of the patriarchal mindset of Pakistan's 
rural society where a woman's role is generally 
restricted to the household. The survey aimed to 
document respondents' opinion on this notion, 
and it found that people are generally aware of a 
gender bias: 64.6 per cent of respondents agreed 
with the notion that informal dispute resolution 
systems are at times biased again women in 
matrimonial disputes; a sizeable portion of the 
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sample (28 per cent) disagreed with the notion. formal or informal justice system. This is echoed 
26during the round-table discussions.
Respondents in Pakhtun districts had a very 
different opinion, as only 23.5 per cent agreed Support/opposion for  the informal dispute 
with the notion, whereas the majority of 56.5 per resolution system making decisions in favour of 
cent disagreed. This is surprising, and shows a honour killing 
lack of awareness of gender bias by Pakhtun 
respondents. There is no justification to support killings in the 
name of honour and no law, or societal norm 
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the notion that informal justice systems are 
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agree. 
It is generally considered that poor and vulnerable 
people do not receive justice from either the 
27humanity.  However, media reports and other 
research studies argue that informal justice 
28systems often justify cases of honour killings.  
However it was shocking to discover that more 
than half of respondents in our survey (52.6 per 
cent) supported informal justice systems making 
decisions in favour of honour killings; 41 per cent 
opposed this. According to the data, respondents 
in Pakhtun districts were more in favour of 
decisions which support honour killing. 
With regards to this issue, respondents were 
the notion. Surprisingly, more than half said they 80.7 per cent was completely unaware of this 
did not know. institution and therefore they did not know if it 
complies with the human rights standards 
Musalihati Council (MC) enshrined in Islamic principles; only 8.3 per cent 
agreed with this notion. 
In the case of MCs an overwhelming majority of 
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disputes including divorce and custody of 
children
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when resolving matrimonial disputes including 
cases of divorce and the custody of children. 
Women are not allowed to take part in the 
proceedings of informal justice systems mainly 
because of the patriarchal mindset of Pakistan's 
rural society where a woman's role is generally 
restricted to the household. The survey aimed to 
document respondents' opinion on this notion, 
and it found that people are generally aware of a 
gender bias: 64.6 per cent of respondents agreed 
with the notion that informal dispute resolution 
systems are at times biased again women in 
matrimonial disputes; a sizeable portion of the 
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districts were supportive of indirect protect people's human rights. Promoting 
representation for women. equality is a difficult task in these rural areas, as 
these traditions which violate human rights are so 
Role of swara/wani, karo kari/ marrying women entrenched in the way of the life and so deeply 
30to the Quran/ bride price and jhag, in suitably rooted in society.
and fairly resolving some complex issues which 
cannot be solved otherwise or by the formal 
legal system
The response to this question is mixed and shows 
a diversity of opinion. A higher number of 
respondents (38.9 per cent) believed that local 
customs such as swara/wani, karo kari, marrying 
women to the Quran, bride price and jhag can 
suitably and fairly resolve some complex disputes 
which cannot be resolved otherwise or by the 
formal legal system, whereas 33.7 per cent 
believed the opposite. More than a quarter said 
they did not know, which shows that there are 
mixed feelings on the subject. 
The result should not be too surprising as in 
Pakistan's rural areas many people seem to be 
completely unaware of the grave consequences 
and after effects of such ill practices. This is 
frustrating for those who are aware of the need to 
quite vocal ? only 6.4 per cent said they did not 
know if they supported or opposed this. 
Direct or indirect representation of women in 
the informal dispute resolution system
Women are not allowed to take part in 
proceedings of informal justice systems. However, 
the survey intended to find out if respondents 
have had a different experience.  
dispute resolution system; 26.3 per cent did not 
agree with the notion. The survey result is 
interesting and conforms to the general view.  
Agreement/disagreement over effective indirect 
representation of women (through male 
relatives) in the informal dispute resolution 
system
According to the data, 71.2 per cent of Women are usually indirectly represented 
respondents agreed and confirmed that women through their male family members – usually 
are not directly represented in the proceedings of brother, father, or son or in some cases in-laws. 
informal justice systems, whereas 18.9 per cent The survey aimed to understand respondents' 
disagreed ? these people may have seen or heard views on the level of effectiveness of the indirect 
of women taking part in the proceedings of representation of women in the informal justice 
informal justice systems. system: 46.9 per cent agreed that indirect 
representation is effective, whereas 31.8 per cent 
Interestingly, results for Pakhtun districts are did not agree. A sizable 21.4 per cent said they 
similar. did not know.
Representation of poor people in the informal According to key informants, the indirect 
dispute resolution system representation of women is not effective, as it 
always leads to more confusion and produces an 
29In response to this question, nearly two-thirds of unsatisfactory result for the women concerned.
respondents (65.2 per cent) agreed that there is 
 no representation for poor people in the informal More respondents (62.2 per cent) in Pakhtun 
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informal institutions and their compliance with 
these human rights standards. 
A considerable portion of this chapter is 
dedicated to women and the informal justice 
system. Survey findings reveal that the issue of 
how the informal justice system treats women is 
controversial, and viewpoints vary considerably. 
After cross-tabulation of several datasets, 
generally, men were more inclined than women 
to state that the informal justice system 
supported women; educated women were more 
inclined to be critical of the informal justice 
system (although not always) than uneducated 
women; and women from the rural sector 
claimed that they were treated more unfairly than 
urban women. There were also many who 
complained about the way the informal justice 
system treated women. 
This chapter suggests that there is a need for an 
extensive awareness campaign at the grassroots 
level with regards to the protection of human 
rights – human rights that are enshrined in 
international human rights law, Pakistan's 
Constitution and Islamic principles. 
The belief that swara/wani/karo kari/ marrying CONCLUSION 
women to the Quran/ bride price and jhag 
violate women's rights This chapter is full of surprises and has revealed 
many interesting facets of formal and informal 
Interestingly, the results for this question institutions which either offer justice services 
contradict the previous question's result. In the directly to the masses or help provide easy access 
previous question, a significant number of to justice. On several occasions respondents 
respondents believed and justified showed a good understanding. However, many 
swara/wani/kro kari/ marrying women to Quran/ were also oblivious of certain facts too. 
bride price and jhag and believed that such 
practices can help resolve some very complex Overall, the chapter reveals respondents' faith in 
family disputes. However, in this question, the informal institutions – more precisely, those 
majority of respondents in the rest of Pakistan institutions that are closer to them and more 
(56.9 per cent) and the overwhelming majority accessible – such as khandan, mohalla, biradari 
(82.7 per cent) in Pakhtun districts believed that and the informal justice system. Although these 
such practices violate the rights of women. This institutions have no formal recognition, this does 
leads us to assume that while the majority of not mean that they are free of any obligations. 
respondents consider that these types of Cases have been reported where human rights 
practices can be used to resolve complex were violated, and the state machinery had to 
disputes, they also recognise that they violate react and declared the informal justice system 
women's rights. illegal. However, as the majority show their 
support for these institutions (this is reflected in 
our survey results), these informal institutions 
continue to survive and operate informally and 
without state patronage. This chapter also 
divulges how respondents have lost their faith in 
the state's institutions ? which, in turn, makes it 
easy for people to approach informal institutions 
for dispute resolution and other matters. People 
are also often unaware of the formal judicial 
system and its network. It is for these reasons 
that informal institutions are surviving and 
thriving. 
Various state and non-state institutions were 
tested under various human rights standards – 
international standards, the Pakistan Constitution 
and Islamic principles. This chapter uncovered the 
fact that the overwhelming majority of 
respondents sadly did not know whether the 
various institutions complied with the 
international human rights standards, and the 
human rights enshrined in the Constitution of 
Pakistan and Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions. Nonetheless, respondents generally 
gave favourable verdicts with regards to the 
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continue to survive and operate informally and 
without state patronage. This chapter also 
divulges how respondents have lost their faith in 
the state's institutions ? which, in turn, makes it 
easy for people to approach informal institutions 
for dispute resolution and other matters. People 
are also often unaware of the formal judicial 
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INTRODUCTION operations of informal justice systems in Pakistan, 
and rightly so. However, others argue that instead 
This chapter is divided into two sections: the first of completely abandoning the system altogether, 
section analyses respondents' perceptions of the it would be possible to revamp it and make it 
informal justice system and its future face in usable for people living in far-flung areas of 
Pakistan; the second section discusses more Pakistan where access to formal justice 
technical aspects of the legal system in Pakistan institutions is very difficult. The state's justice 
which could be based on legal plurality under the system itself is criticised for its delays in 
state's patronage – gradually integrating the dispensing justice, and for the fact that it can only 
informal justice system into the formal judicial be accessed by the wealthy elite who can afford 
system of Pakistan, in consultation with all the to pay the huge sums to lawyers etc.
stakeholders.   
The first question that comes to mind is 'how can 
This chapter delves into deep academic discussion the informal justice system be integrated into the 
to support various arguments, and provides a list formal judicial system?'. Levels of integration 
of recommendations for future reforms within could be different and various. To chalk out a way 
both the formal and informal justice systems. We forward for the judicial system of Pakistan, one 
highlight how informal justice systems have can not completely rely on the common 
impacted the formal justice system and vice perceptions gathered from this survey using a 
versa; we show why the informal justice system is structured questionnaire. Therefore, various steps 
still relevant to the present day context and has are discussed in the second part of this chapter 
legitimacy within the masses; we identify gaps using secondary data from available literature. 
between the formal and informal justice systems; 
and we explain how to bridge those gaps with COMMON PERCEPTIONS TO REFORM THE 
modern knowledge whilst keeping traditions INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
intact and respecting traditional sentiments.
This section discusses certain questions and 
The informal justice system works in parallel to notions gathered from the survey, which provide 
the state's judicial system. It challenges the writ of interesting evidence to support this study's 
the state, especially in cases of murder wherein argument for a plural judicial system in Pakistan 
the exchange of girls (swara, wani etc.) is usually under the state's patronage. The following shows 
involved to settle disputes. The international a series of questions that were put to 
community and civil society is critical of the respondents in our survey, and then analysed. 
Popular support in case informal justice system per cent) from Pakhtun districts said they did not 
is recognised and integrated into the state’s know.
formal justice system
Nature of such recognition
Firstly, we need to know whether people will 
support such integration and whether the state The respondents who were in support of 
will incorporate the informal justice system under integrating the informal justice system into the 
its patronage. According to the survey results, a formal judicial system were asked 'what should be 
large group of respondents (44.5 per cent) the nature of such recognition and integration?'. 
confirmed their support for the informal justice 
system if recognised by the government, whereas A list of various technical options was shared with 
24.9 per cent did not favour this integration. More the respondents in order to extract their 
than a quarter (30.1 per cent), which is a collective wisdom.
considerable proportion of the sample, said they  
did not know. If these people had been able to The results from the data show that a high group 
give an opinion, their judgement could have of respondents (24.7 per cent) thought that the 
changed the whole result significantly. state/courts should decide which kinds of 
disputes should be exclusively heard and decided 
The respondents from Pakhtun districts did not by informal mechanisms, but that there are 
appear to be very interested in integrating certain situations where an appeal can lie with 
Pakhtun jirga into the state's judicial system: 25.6 the courts even in these cases. This was followed 
per cent of respondents showed their support, by 23.3 per cent of respondents who believed 
whereas 34 per cent said they did not support that the state should determine which kinds of 
this. A significant number of respondents (40.5 disputes should be heard and decided exclusively 
by informal dispute resolution mechanisms. In 
that case, the state exerts its control and keeps a 
constant check on the informal justice system, 
and disputants do not enjoy the right to appeal 
under this option. 
Another 19.9 per cent of respondents thought 
that the state/courts should promote, recognise 
and monitor all decisions of the informal dispute 
resolution mechanism and intervene wherever 
they think fit; and 19.8 per cent of respondents 
thought that the informal justice system should 
be allowed to decide all cases if they follow a 
certain basic process laid down by the 
state/courts, and that such decisions should have 
legal recognition and be binding but that such 
mechanisms can't hear or decide any dispute 
which involves the violation of fundamental rights 
under the Constitution of Pakistan and/or affects 
any vulnerable groups in society. This option 
could cause confusion in terms of deciding which 
cases may have violated fundamental human 
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The first question that comes to mind is 'how can 
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to support various arguments, and provides a list formal judicial system?'. Levels of integration 
of recommendations for future reforms within could be different and various. To chalk out a way 
both the formal and informal justice systems. We forward for the judicial system of Pakistan, one 
highlight how informal justice systems have can not completely rely on the common 
impacted the formal justice system and vice perceptions gathered from this survey using a 
versa; we show why the informal justice system is structured questionnaire. Therefore, various steps 
still relevant to the present day context and has are discussed in the second part of this chapter 
legitimacy within the masses; we identify gaps using secondary data from available literature. 
between the formal and informal justice systems; 
and we explain how to bridge those gaps with COMMON PERCEPTIONS TO REFORM THE 
modern knowledge whilst keeping traditions INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
intact and respecting traditional sentiments.
This section discusses certain questions and 
The informal justice system works in parallel to notions gathered from the survey, which provide 
the state's judicial system. It challenges the writ of interesting evidence to support this study's 
the state, especially in cases of murder wherein argument for a plural judicial system in Pakistan 
the exchange of girls (swara, wani etc.) is usually under the state's patronage. The following shows 
involved to settle disputes. The international a series of questions that were put to 
community and civil society is critical of the respondents in our survey, and then analysed. 
Popular support in case informal justice system per cent) from Pakhtun districts said they did not 
is recognised and integrated into the state’s know.
formal justice system
Nature of such recognition
Firstly, we need to know whether people will 
support such integration and whether the state The respondents who were in support of 
will incorporate the informal justice system under integrating the informal justice system into the 
its patronage. According to the survey results, a formal judicial system were asked 'what should be 
large group of respondents (44.5 per cent) the nature of such recognition and integration?'. 
confirmed their support for the informal justice 
system if recognised by the government, whereas A list of various technical options was shared with 
24.9 per cent did not favour this integration. More the respondents in order to extract their 
than a quarter (30.1 per cent), which is a collective wisdom.
considerable proportion of the sample, said they  
did not know. If these people had been able to The results from the data show that a high group 
give an opinion, their judgement could have of respondents (24.7 per cent) thought that the 
changed the whole result significantly. state/courts should decide which kinds of 
disputes should be exclusively heard and decided 
The respondents from Pakhtun districts did not by informal mechanisms, but that there are 
appear to be very interested in integrating certain situations where an appeal can lie with 
Pakhtun jirga into the state's judicial system: 25.6 the courts even in these cases. This was followed 
per cent of respondents showed their support, by 23.3 per cent of respondents who believed 
whereas 34 per cent said they did not support that the state should determine which kinds of 
this. A significant number of respondents (40.5 disputes should be heard and decided exclusively 
by informal dispute resolution mechanisms. In 
that case, the state exerts its control and keeps a 
constant check on the informal justice system, 
and disputants do not enjoy the right to appeal 
under this option. 
Another 19.9 per cent of respondents thought 
that the state/courts should promote, recognise 
and monitor all decisions of the informal dispute 
resolution mechanism and intervene wherever 
they think fit; and 19.8 per cent of respondents 
thought that the informal justice system should 
be allowed to decide all cases if they follow a 
certain basic process laid down by the 
state/courts, and that such decisions should have 
legal recognition and be binding but that such 
mechanisms can't hear or decide any dispute 
which involves the violation of fundamental rights 
under the Constitution of Pakistan and/or affects 
any vulnerable groups in society. This option 
could cause confusion in terms of deciding which 
cases may have violated fundamental human 
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not only recognise and monitor informal justice Fears of the informal dispute resolution system 
systems and their decisions but also assist in the (after it is recognised)  being plagued by the 
implementation of decisions. This seems relatively same weaknesses that afflict the existing formal 
practical and reasonable, the state holds control justice system 
over delegating cases which it deems appropriate,  
and at the same time helps the informal justice In some parts of the world, informal justice 
system in implementing its decisions. This seems systems have been recognised and incorporated 
a fairly feasible option and the majority of experts into the formal judicial system of the state so that 
approved of this scenario. However, they people can access justice easily. Conversely, the 
reiterated that formal courts should not delegate formal courts in Pakistan have not recognised the 
complex criminal cases to the informal justice informal justice system ? instead they have taken 
2system.   stern measures to ban it in all parts of the 
country. 
It appears from the results that 9.2 per cent of 
respondents believed that the state/courts should This question highlights a different aspect of the 
identify and recognise existing informal dispute informal justice system. If recognised and 
resolution mechanisms or establish and recognise incorporated into the formal justice system, 
new informal dispute resolution mechanisms, and would it be plagued by the same weaknesses that 
nothing beyond these should have any legal afflict the formal justice system of Pakistan, 
recognition for their dispute adjudication. This including the problems associated with the 
scenario seems confusing because on the one Supreme Court, High Court, and Session Court? 
hand the state will recognise the existence of the 
informal justice system; however, on the other 
hand it will not allow the informal justice system 
to provide services legally. 
The data showed that 7.1 per cent of respondents 
thought that all informal dispute resolution 
systems should be exclusively directed by the 
formal courts and in conjunction with, through, or 
under the supervision of the district courts. Again 
under this arrangement the state court system 
has complete control over the informal justice 
system mechanisms. 
Interestingly, 23.7 per cent of respondents 
thought that a combination of all options 
mentioned above should be accepted by the 
state. 
It appears that some of the scenarios in the graph 
seem reasonable and acceptable to the 
respondents surveyed. However some scenarios 
were completely rejected by experts.  
rights under the Constitution, particularly  justice but that a provision for appeal to the 
because members of the informal justice system formal courts should be incorporated in the 
are not necessarily qualified lawyers or trained in regulation. On technical grounds, this portrays a 
law practice. For this reason, it may not be complex scenario whereby the members of the 
prudent to allow informal justice systems to deal informal justice system are fully empowered to 
with complex cases. deal with all cases, including criminal and other 
complex cases – such as homicide, terrorism, 
In addition, 19.3 per cent of respondents said that sectarian violence, cases of violence against 
the courts should decide which kinds of disputes women, etc. Experts interviewed were not very 
should be heard and decided exclusively by the much in favour of this notion and rejected this 
informal dispute resolution mechanisms. due to the lack of members' technical/legal 
1knowledge.
The results also showed that 16.3 per cent of 
respondents thought that the informal justice The data showed that 10.1 per cent of 
system should be the first forum for access to respondents thought that the state/courts should 
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Rest of
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The state determines which kinds of disputes should be heard and decided exclusively by informal 
dispute resolution  mechanisms. 23.3
The courts determine which kinds of disputes should be heard and decided exclusively by informal
dispute resolution  mechanisms. 19.3
The state/courts should decide which kinds of disputes should be exclusively heard and decided by informal 
mechanism but that there are certain situations where an appeal can lie with the courts even in these cases. 24.7
The informal mechanisms should have the power to be the first forum for hearing all kinds of disputes 
but that  everything can be potentially appealed to the courts. 16.3
The informal dispute resolution mechanisms should decide all disputes if they follow a certain basic process
 laid down  by the state/courts and that such decisions will have legal recognition and be binding but that
such mechanisms can’t  hear or decide any disputes which involve a violation of fundamental rights under
the Constitution of Pakistan and/or  affect any vulnerable groups in society.
19.8
That the state/courts will promote, recognise and monitor all decisions of the informal
dispute resolution mechanism  and intervene wherever they think fit. 19.9
The state/courts will identify and recognise existing informal dispute resolution mechanisms, or establish
and recognise new informal mechanisms and nothing beyond these will have any legal recognition for their
 dispute  adjudication.
9.2
The state/courts will not only recognise and monitor informal dispute resolution mechanisms and their 
decisions but will also assist in the implementation of decisions. 10.1
All informal dispute resolution should be exclusively directed by the formal courts and conducted in 
conjunction with,  through, or under the supervision of the district courts. 7.1
A combination of the above. 23.7
Other 6.3
What should be the nature of such recognition and integration? 
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In terms of the survey results, an overwhelming Contrary to the majority-view above, a staggering 
majority of respondents (83.4 per cent) agreed 80.4 per cent of respondents said that the 
that decisions should be recorded for record decisions of informal justice systems should be 
keeping and transparency, and only 8.7 per cent enforced officially; only 9 per cent disagreed. 
disagreed with this. 
Results from Pakhtun districts show similar 
The results from Pakhtun districts show a similar trends. 
trend, revealing that the popular mind-set is 
changing as people realise that there is a crucial ‘There should be provision for a right to appeal 
need to protect human rights. to the courts against informal dispute resolution 
system decisions.’
‘Informal dispute resolution system decisions 
should be officially enforced.’ In Pakhtun districts of Pakistan, a jirga decision is 
always accepted as a voluntary gesture agreed by 
According to the majority of participants in the both parties and it is not legally-binding for either 
11round-table discussions, the informal justice party.   Social pressure (discussed earlier) helps 
system will lose its essence if government enforce jirga decisions, and parties are free to 
9department and officials are formally involved.  take their cases to the formal courts if they are 
12However, some of the key informants were of the not satisfied with the decisions.
view that official involvement could assist the 
informal justice system in striving to improve its The survey aimed to discover respondents' views 
performance, and in starting to take decisions on this dimension of the informal justice system 
which consider the rights of women and minority and results are startling. More than three-
10groups.  quarters of respondents (78.5 per cent) agreed 
Respondents' reaction is divided: 40 per cent clearly reveal that the majority of respondents 
confirmed that it would be plagued with the same support the informal justice system because they 
weaknesses, and 35.9 per cent had the opposite find it speedy, affordable and less corrupt than 
view. Some 24.1 per cent said they did not know.  the formal system. In addition, the majority of 
participants at the round-table discussions 
This is a fairly technical question and needs to be echoed views that the informal justice system is 
addressed by experts. The majority of civil society less corrupt, cheaper and faster in dispensing 
4experts at the round-table discussions shared the justice in the rural parts of Pakistan.  However, 
same reservations. They were of the view that the close to a quarter of respondents (25.6 per cent) 
informal justice system should remain showed a lack of clarity, and said they did not 
independent, however, there should be some know if the informal justice system would lose its 
monitoring from the state, particularly in terms of advantage if it became part of the formal judicial 
5the verdicts dispensed, in order to prevent any system.
3violation of human rights.  
Other respondents were divided: a high 
Fear of informal dispute resolution system losing percentage (41.8 per cent) agreed that informal 
the advantages it has over the formal justice dispute mechanisms would lose their advantages, 
system, after it is recognised whereas 32.6 per cent opposed this.  
Data sets in the previous chapters on this topic How strongly do you agree/disagree with the 
statements listed below?
Respondents were asked to state how strongly 
they agreed or disagreed with various 
assumptions pertaining to the integration of the 
informal justice system into the formal judicial 
system. The aim was to help policy-makers to 
identify areas of intervention for reforming the 
overall justice sector in Pakistan.  
‘Informal justice system decisions should be 
officially recorded.’
Not all the decisions of informal justice systems 
are recorded. However the majority in the round-
table discussions argued that in certain cases it is 
imperative to record decisions so that parties to 
6the dispute can not back out.  In cases of civil 
disputes, decisions are usually recorded on 
7paper.  In criminal cases, it is also observed that in 
some cases, members of the council do record 
8proceedings and statements.   
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majority of respondents (83.4 per cent) agreed 80.4 per cent of respondents said that the 
that decisions should be recorded for record decisions of informal justice systems should be 
keeping and transparency, and only 8.7 per cent enforced officially; only 9 per cent disagreed. 
disagreed with this. 
Results from Pakhtun districts show similar 
The results from Pakhtun districts show a similar trends. 
trend, revealing that the popular mind-set is 
changing as people realise that there is a crucial ‘There should be provision for a right to appeal 
need to protect human rights. to the courts against informal dispute resolution 
system decisions.’
‘Informal dispute resolution system decisions 
should be officially enforced.’ In Pakhtun districts of Pakistan, a jirga decision is 
always accepted as a voluntary gesture agreed by 
According to the majority of participants in the both parties and it is not legally-binding for either 
11round-table discussions, the informal justice party.   Social pressure (discussed earlier) helps 
system will lose its essence if government enforce jirga decisions, and parties are free to 
9department and officials are formally involved.  take their cases to the formal courts if they are 
12However, some of the key informants were of the not satisfied with the decisions.
view that official involvement could assist the 
informal justice system in striving to improve its The survey aimed to discover respondents' views 
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186
13informal justice systems work together. with the statement that decisions of informal 
justice systems need to be subject to the approval 
‘The final decisions of informal dispute of human rights bodies, whereas 17.5 per cent 
resolution systems need to be subject to the disagreed. A considerable percentage of 36.9 per 
approval of appropriate Pakistani human rights cent said they did not know.  
bodies.’
‘Women should be given the right to observe 
As stated earlier, informal justice systems are informal dispute resolution system proceedings.’
heavily criticised by state institutions and civil 
society, including the media, due to their lack of Women are not allowed to take part in informal 
transparency and their tendency to violate human justice system proceedings as observers, decision-
rights, especially the rights of women and makers or even as a party in most cases. Women's 
minority groups. In addition, the council of elders lack of participation raises important questions 
for informal justice systems generally lack formal about gender inequality and women's lack of 
15education and are unaware of the consequences inclusivity.  Respondents were asked about 
14of their decisions on people's basic rights.  various dimensions of women's involvement in 
informal justice systems. 
The survey result is encouraging: three quarters 
of respondents (75.3 per cent) agreed that The first question seeks to gauge respondents' 
decisions of informal justice systems need to be agreement/disagreement on women's 
subject to the approval of human rights bodies; participation in informal justice system 
only 9.3  per cent disagreed. proceedings as an observer.  
The trend Pakhtun areas is different. In Pakhtun The survey findings are encouraging: the majority 
districts, 45.6 per cent of respondents agreed of respondents (59.4 per cent) agreed that 
that there should be provision for appeal, free Trends in Pakhtun districts are similar, although 
from social pressure, so that if a party is not fewer respondents agree with the statement than 
happy with the decision of the informal justice in the rest of Pakistan. 
system, they can appeal to the court against this 
decision. This provision cannot be arranged by the informal 
justice system in isolation of the formal justice 
system – it can only happen if both formal and 
185
‘The final decisions of informal dispute resolution systems need to be subject to the approval 
appropriate Pakistani human rights bodies.’
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if women should be given representation in the ‘Religious and ethnic minorities should be 
decision-making body of an informal dispute allowed to observe informal dispute resolution 
resolution system, the majority of respondents system proceedings.’
(58.2 per cent) agreed that they should, whereas 
a quarter of respondents (25.6 per cent) There are exceptional circumstances where 
disagreed with the idea.    religious minorities have been allowed to observe 
the proceedings of informal dispute resolution 
17It might take some time before we reach a systems.  However minority groups are not 
18situation where we see women holding positions usually allowed to do this  because unfortunately 
as decision-makers in informal justice systems. they are generally unaccepted and shunned by 
However, every society, including Pakistan, has the overwhelmingly Muslim population (only 
capable women leaders; we look forward to such around 3 per cent of the population is non-
women becoming part of the decision-making Muslim, consisting of Hindu, Christians and Sikh 
19process at every level in Pakistan, including within communities).
16the informal justice system.
The survey aimed to document respondents' 
In Pakhtun districts, a higher proportion of the reactions to this aspect of the informal justice 
sample (46.9 per cent) disagreed with the notion, system. It is very encouraging to note that two-
whereas 38 per cent agreed. Although the thirds of respondents (66.5 per cent) agreed that 
response level is lower than in the rest of religious and ethnic minorities should be allowed 
Pakistan, this data from Pakhtun districts still to witness the  proceedings of such informal 
shows encouraging signs of the need to empower justice systems, whereas only 17 per cent did not 
women. agree. 
women should be allowed to take part in the cent) disagreed that women should be allowed to 
proceedings of informal justice systems; 27.4 per observe jirga proceedings; 39.7 per cent agreed.
cent did not agree. As a first step this is very 
positive, and shows that Pakistani society might ‘Women should be given representation in the 
soon be ready to involve women in traditional decision-making body of an informal dispute 
justice systems. resolution system as member.’
However, the data from Pakhtun districts is Once again, respondents showed a positive mind-
different. Nearly half of all respondents (48.9 per set towards women's empowerment. When asked 
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23with ancient traditions.  Interestingly, during the 
field work for this report, some people stated that ‘Informal dispute resolution system members 
they opposed integration because they did not should be elected through a proper electoral 
want to see the informal justice system become process.’
polluted and corrupted by the formal justice 
24 Members of the informal justice system are system.   
selected by local communities. These members 
are usually well-known and respected individuals With regards to the survey, two-thirds of 
who have attained their prominent position in the respondents (67.8 per cent) surprisingly endorsed 
village due to their wisdom, piety, political the idea of integration, whereas only 11.9 per 
influence, wealth (in most cases), and family cent did not agree.  
25background.  For such rural communities, these 
These results are very encouraging and convey a qualities give reassurance that justice will prevail 
strong message: the state's institutions should with transparency and according to the local 
take account of the sentiments of its people and norms and religious sentiments, and that these 
begin work on the technicalities and modalities of members will ensure that decisions are 
26integrating the informal and formal justice implemented due to the power they hold.  
systems. 
It is clear from this that the essential element of 
Pakhtun respondents were less enthusiastic about accountability is missing from this equation. 
integration, but there was still a significant Elected people who agree to take on a role should 
27proportion of respondents (41.5 per cent) who be accountable to the people they represent.  
agreed with the idea. The underlying concept of local organisations 
According to the data, sentiments in Pakhtun Data from Pakhtun districts gathered in 2012 
districts appear to be similar. shows a similar trend.
‘Religious minorities should be given a fair ‘The informal dispute resolution system should 
chance to resolve their disputes according to be integrated into the formal justice system.’
their customs and religious beliefs.’
As discussed in previous chapters, available 
According to one of the key informants during literature suggests that a number of developing 
field work in FATA, religious minorities are countries in Africa, Latin America, and Europe 
sometimes allowed to resolve their disputes have integrated informal systems into their formal 
20according to their religion and customs.  justice systems, in one form or another, in order 
However, this is generally not the case. Minority that poor people, especially those living in remote 
groups have been complaining quietly for years rural areas, can access justice services. They also 
that they are not permitted to take part in village ensure that such informal justice systems do not 
meetings pertaining to resolve their communal violate people's rights, especially the rights of 
21 women, children, minority groups and people and family disputes.  
with disabilities. In Pakistan, as in other countries 
in the Sub-continent, the laws and systems In terms of respondents' reaction to this aspect, 
inherited from Britain have seen little reform in more than two-thirds of respondents (71.6 per 
22cent) agreed that minorities should be given a fair the 67 years since independence.  Formal 
chance to resolve their disputes according to their institutions appear to be against the integration 
customs and religious beliefs. A negligible of informal justice systems into formal law due to 
percentage of 7.4 per cent did not agree. a number of technical reasons and the fact that 
they do not want to see modern methods merged 
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working for grassroots development, and the ‘Members of the informal dispute resolution 
setting up of Musalihati Councils, was to ensure system should be sensitised through an 
this accountability. educational programme on human rights, 
women's rights, rights in Shariah, and the 
The survey data shows some very positive signs: fundamental rights of the Constitution of 
more than two-thirds (69.3 per cent) of Pakistan.’
respondents agreed that members of informal 
justice systems should be elected and not During the course of implementation of its Rule of 
selected, whereas only 10.9 per cent did not Law Project in FATA, KP and Balochistan, CAMP 
agree. observed that traditional decision-makers of 
informal justice systems have traditional 
The results for Pakhtun districts show a similar knowledge and wisdom however, they lack 
(but slightly lower) trend in relation to jirga exposure to, and understanding of, the dynamics 
members. of today's modern world. It is for this reason that 
their  decisions sometimes violate not only 
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‘Members of the informal dispute resolution system should be sensitised through an 
programme on human rights, women’s rights, rights in Shariah, and the fundamental rights of the
Constitution of Pakistan.’
educational
international human rights standards but also the (74.9 per cent) agreed that women-led informal 
Constitution of Pakistan and even rights dispute resolution systems should be set up; only 
28enshrined in Shariah.  There is a need for them to 10.8 per cent did not agree. 
understand what is acceptable by today's modern 
standards, that can only happen if they are The idea of setting-up women-led informal 
exposed to new ways of thinking and dispute resolution systems (or women's jirga) for 
29 resolving issues relating to women has already opportunities to learn.  
been piloted by UNDP Pakistan in a few districts 
of the Malakand region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa The results of the survey confirm that more than 
province. Apparently, women's jirgas have been three-quarters of respondents (76.5 per cent) 
active in responding to cases of domestic agree that there is a need for members of 
violence, child custody, early/child marriages and informal dispute resolution systems to be 
other family related disputes. Although they have sensitised through an educational programme on 
been fairly instrumental and successful in human rights, women's rights, rights in Shariah, 
advocating for the rights of local women, there is and the fundamental rights in the Constitution of 
still a long way to go in terms of changing views Pakistan. Only 8.7 per cent did not agree. 
within the conservative setup of the rural 
30Results from Pakhtun districts were very similar. communities of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.  
Nonetheless, women's jirgas should be 
‘Women's informal dispute resolution system appreciated and encouraged as a forum for 
institutions should be formed to resolve women to redress their grievances. Hopefully, 
women's issues.’ given time, these institutions will become a 
31standard part of the local cultural set-up.  
This idea, to develop women's dispute resolution 
systems, was met with a very positive reaction in The number of respondents in Pakhtun districts 
our survey. Almost three quarters of the sample who supported the idea of women's jirgas was 
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34conflict.  However, here we try to understand 
what respondents' views are of the future role ‘In the case of integration, the state should only 
that such systems should play under the allow certain categories of cases to be 
patronage of government. Today we are undertaken by informal dispute resolution 
witnessing law and order breakdowns in all systems.’
provinces of Pakistan, and such informal dispute 
resolution systems can arguably play a vital role in Here we examine if respondents agree that only 
reducing the level of militancy and political certain categories of cases ? delegated by the 
violence. formal courts ? should be undertaken by informal 
dispute resolution systems, in the case of 
According to the data, nearly three quarters of integration. 
respondents (73.2 per cent) agreed that informal 
dispute resolution system institutions should play Interestingly, respondents were supportive on this 
a role in conflict transformation/resolution; only aspect: more than two-thirds of respondents 
7.1 per cent did not agree. (69.2 per cent) agreed with the notion; only 11.1 
per cent did not agree. Respondents are mindful 
If the government decides to implement a of the fact that traditional informal justice 
strategy based on these findings, there will be a systems might not be able to resolve complex 
great deal of popular support for this. disputes, which would be better dealt with by the 
formal courts. The role of both systems would 
According to the data from Pakhtun districts, an need to be clearly defined so as to avoid any 
overwhelming majority of 86.9 per cent also confusion. 
showed their agreement.  
fractionally lower, but the data shows a very Surprisingly, more than two-thirds of respondents 
similar trend. (69.4 per cent) agreed that informal dispute 
resolution systems should be utilised to bring 
‘Informal dispute resolution systems should be reform to local customs or traditional practices 
utilised effectively to bring reform to local that violate women's rights. Only 11.4 per cent 
customs and to ban traditional practices such as did not agree. This finding is very encouraging and 
swara/wani/karo kari /marrying women to the suggests that, if undertaken sensitively, such 
Quran, bride price and jhag.’ reform could be successful in eliminating these 
ancient practices that deny women their rights. 
Traditional customs which are centuries old and 
deeply rooted in societies often do not reflect the Surprisingly, more respondents in Pakhtun 
realities of today's world or modern ways of districts agreed with the need for reform. 
32thinking.  However, interfering with such local 
customs without involving local communities ‘Informal dispute resolution system institutions 
33 should play a role in conflict always leads to conflict.  Based on CAMP's past 
transformation/resolution.’experience of bringing reforms to local customs 
through the traditional jirga system in FATA, it was 
There is no doubt that informal dispute resolution felt there was a need to test the notion of reform 
systems do play a crucial role in resolving local on respondents from the rest of Pakistan.    
conflicts and the minimising the impact of 
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Traditional customs which are centuries old and 
deeply rooted in societies often do not reflect the Surprisingly, more respondents in Pakhtun 
realities of today's world or modern ways of districts agreed with the need for reform. 
32thinking.  However, interfering with such local 
customs without involving local communities ‘Informal dispute resolution system institutions 
33 should play a role in conflict always leads to conflict.  Based on CAMP's past 
transformation/resolution.’experience of bringing reforms to local customs 
through the traditional jirga system in FATA, it was 
There is no doubt that informal dispute resolution felt there was a need to test the notion of reform 
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content with the decisions of the informal justice 
system. In addition, for those disputants involved 
in a case in the informal justice system, disputants 
are not bound to accept decisions; they are 
merely forced to comply by the social pressure 
that is intrinsic to such a conservative and 
35traditional social set-up.
This question is asked in the context of informal 
justice systems becoming part of the formal 
justice system. In that given arrangement we 
wanted to find out if respondents agreed with the 
notion that disputants should have the right to 
appeal to the formal courts, in cases where a 
violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed in 
the Constitution of Pakistan is feared. 
The survey results showed that 73.2 per cent of 
‘In all cases involving fundamental rights under respondents endorsed the notion; just 4 per cent 
the Constitution, disputants should have the disagreed with the notion. 
right to appeal for any decisions made by the 
informal justice system.’ ‘The state should approve membership of a 
recognised informal dispute resolution 
As stated earlier, at present disputants can take mechanism following some selection criteria.’
their cases to the formal courts if they are not 
This proposal means that once the informal 
justice system is integrated into the formal judicial 
system then the state has to define some 
standards to improve the performance of informal 
justice systems and to ensure transparency and 
accountability. Interestingly, the majority of 
respondents (64.4 per cent) agreed with this 
proposal; only 6.9 per cent did not agree. 
The first section of this chapter concludes here. It 
is very encouraging to see that most respondents 
would like to see reform and changes to the 
informal justice system – changes that address 
some of the key problems within the system 
through raising awareness, providing information 
and introducing new techniques. 
A surprising finding of our survey with regards to 
respondents' opinions is their overwhelming 
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agreement on utilising the informal justice system POSSIBILITIES OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN 
to change unjust customs in their area. This PAKISTANevidence is something that CAMP has referred to 
when convincing tribal elders to ban detrimental 
This section discusses the possibilities available, practices that violate women's rights in FATA .
and the lessons that can be drawn from our 
research.  The overall results are very encouraging and there 
is sufficient evidence for policy-makers to bring 
Based on academic literature review, this section reforms to the informal justice system through 
argues how formal and informal justice systems various steps including: educational programmes; 
which function separately can be linked together incentives schemes for informal institutions; and 
so that their efforts complement rather then assistance to comply with international human 
contradict each other, avoiding confusion for rights standards, the Constitution of Pakistan, and 
Pakistan's people. This chapter explains what Islamic principles and legal injunctions.  
steps the government of Pakistan should take in 
order to manage the functions of the formal and The next part of this chapter argues for a 
informal justice systems, so that each performs its programme of reform and for legal pluralism in 
role effectively.Pakistan under the state's patronage. These 
arguments are based on research from available 
The theory of legal pluralism has enormous literature, cases studies of other countries, key 
relevance to the study of the informal justice informants interviews, round-table discussions 
system, opening up many possibilities and with well-informed experts and human rights 
revealing lessons to be learned. According to activists, as well as key findings from our survey 
Forsyth (2009), 'Legal pluralism has therefore on the perceptions of ordinary Pakistani men and 
been shown to be potentially very helpful in women. 
addressing cognitive-type questions about how 195 196
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plural legal systems operate in practice in any so far. Forsyth further adds, 'in this regard, it is 
given jurisdiction. It does not, however, currently noteworthy that a number of legal pluralists state 
have a great deal to offer in relation to answering explicitly that the theory ends up advocating 
40normative questions about how plural legal immobility.'
systems could best relate to each other or other 
issues involving what Woodman (1999) calls 'The second factor limiting legal pluralism's 
36'planned pluralism'.   Forsyth further argues that relevance to law reform is its political nature,' 
'this type of inquiry involves asking such questions according to Forsyth. 'It is clear that the 
as “How can we try to ensure that the different relationship between the state and other legal 
legal orders that exist in any particular jurisdiction systems is at the heart of the debates about legal 
operate in a way that maximises their ability to pluralism. This is because law making and 
cross-fertilise, support and enrich each other, enforcing are two of the core functions of a state, 
rather than to undermine and conflict with each arising from what certain political theorists term 
other.” The fact that legal pluralism does not the 'social contract' between members of society 
41currently greatly assist in addressing such and the state.'  In the context of Pakistan, this 
questions is possibly one reason why to date it factor has some relevance. Since civil society and 
has been largely overlooked by development the highly educated class (Pakistan's 'legal 
agencies such as the World Bank and the United fraternity') are quite powerful and influential, and 
Kingdom's Department for International because they are the principal beneficiaries of the 
Development, which have recently started to status quo, they have deliberately inhibited any 
become involved in the development and reform such academic debate on legal pluralism, 
37of non-state systems.'  unfortunately. This has resulted in a general lack 
of trust in the formal judicial system by the 
42Research suggests that in Pakistan legal reforms ordinary people in Pakistan.    
have largely not been on the agenda for policy-
makers, and legal pluralism has never been Finally, and most significantly, the theory has had 
discussed academically. Forsyth discussed three limited relevance for law reform because the 
factors that have contributed to inhibiting the material produced has tended to be largely 
development of legal pluralism into a useful descriptive rather than normative, and has been 
theory in the context of practical law reform – in limited to one site of study. This means that it has 
38its general context.  However, we have to see not been comparative, and has inhibited the 
whether those factors have relevance in the development of overarching theories that could 
43context of Pakistan. be used in a law reform context.   This is relevant 
to the international context, but, as stated earlier, 
According to Forsyth, in the past decade or so, no theoretical discussion has ever been initiated 
despite having made such large advances early in Pakistan on the possibilities of legal pluralism. 
on, legal pluralism has fallen into a theoretical Had it been discussed, we might have witnessed 
morass out of which it appears unable to drag some emerging possibilities. One cannot deny the 
39itself.  This could be the case for other developing fact that each country is faced with a different 
countries too. Unfortunately, in Pakistan, as environment and different possibilities ? failure in 
stated above, very little debate has been initiated one environment does not necessarily denote 
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36. Miranda Forsyth, A bird that flies with two wings: Kastum and state justice systems in Vanuatu, p.46. (The Australian National University E Press, 2009)
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42. This can be substantiated with the data from this study and previous studies compiled by CAMP as well as other organisations/institutions in Pakistan
43. Forsyth (2009), p.48.
failure in another. primary as well as secondary information 
gathered during research for this study. 
It has been pointed out by many scholars that in 
today's Western world, the state is becoming 1. Understand the functions and operations of 
increasingly 'hollowed-out', meaning that more the formal and informal justice systems
and more state functions are being devolved to 
44non-state actors.  This has particularly been the This involves thorough and extensive fieldwork in 
case in countries emerging from periods of weak each and every corner of Pakistan – focusing on 
or scattered government (such as those emerging all the major ethnic groups with their distinct 
45from civil war) to a stronger state.  In Pakistan, cultural values and investigating their justice 
like many other developing countries the opposite systems in terms of their environments, particular 
of this has occurred. The state has taken over jurisdictions, the operation and procedures of 
more and more of the functions which used to be various institutions, their strengths and weakness, 
performed by traditional society in the absence of and their relationship between/among 
the state system. themselves. Various methods can be offered to 
undertake this exercise – for example, carrying 
On the one hand, the formal institutions and out a comprehensive survey in the whole country 
educated urban class of Pakistan is critical of the (with male and female respondents), in-depth 
traditional local governance at village level which interviews of experts and leaders (both formal 
addresses local people's issues and needs. On the and informal, respectively), and finally interviews 
other hand, there is a complete vacuum of village- with key actors and policy-makers to understand 
level local governance, which has created how the system works and how they see the 
numerous problems leading to widespread system developing in the future. This may take a 
despair and violent retaliation against the state's considerable amount of time as it is imperative to 
institutions. This means that in any particular gather as much data as possible about each and 
environment there is always a need for the every aspect of both systems. This will inform the 
division of labour and functions between state design of a new system to offer efficient, effective 
and informal institutions, both of which are and practical services to Pakistan's citizens. Such 
serving the population and addressing grievances. an exercise is long-overdue ? no institution has 
In the context of developing countries, although ever undertaken any such investigation in the 
there has recently been a degree of recognition of past.
this and of the consequent need to develop 
capacity at state and non-state levels, and 2. Decide the overall aim of the justice system 
46effective linkages between these levels,  there is 
currently a lack of a methodology for how to go National consensus through a country-wide 
47about doing this.  dialogue is imperative in order to consider the 
aims of the overall justice system – this could be 
Let us examine what steps and methods the state decided at the end of the research process. In 
should undertake to devise a formula for each different community or environment, 
managing a shift in functions between formal and priorities for the local population may vary. For 
informal justice systems, so that poor and example, communities might be concerned 
vulnerable groups have easy access to justice. The about: access to justice; or human rights 
following steps articulate this, and are based on protection; or security; or a breakdown of 
44. Clifford Shearing and Les Johnston, Governing Security: Explorations of Policing and Justice, p.145 (2003)
45. Forsyth – p.48.
46. Sinclai Dinnen, 'Violence and governance in Melanesia', p.70.(Pacific Economic Bulletin, vol. 14, no. 1, 1999 
47. Jennifer Corrin Care, 'A green stick or a fresh stic? locating customary penalties in the post-colonial era’',Oxford University Commonwealth Law6, no. 1.  p.59 2006. 
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plural legal systems operate in practice in any so far. Forsyth further adds, 'in this regard, it is 
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36. Miranda Forsyth, A bird that flies with two wings: Kastum and state justice systems in Vanuatu, p.46. (The Australian National University E Press, 2009)
37. Ibid
38. Ibid. p.46.
39. Ibid. p.46.
40. Ibid. p.4.
41. Ibid. p.47.
42. This can be substantiated with the data from this study and previous studies compiled by CAMP as well as other organisations/institutions in Pakistan
43. Forsyth (2009), p.48.
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traditions and customs; or indeed a range of through the informal justice system. 
other issues. Pakistan has gone to extreme 
lengths in deciding and devising justice systems Thorough research needs to be undertaken, and 
for its various regions and environments. For key people – who could be instrumental in 
instance, in the case of the Malakand Division of building bridges between both systems – should 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (or to be more be interviewed. There is also a need to examine 
precise, the case of Swat), the local communities case studies of selected areas – areas where there 
are faced with formal legal pluralism which is legal pluralism and areas where a single judicial 
includes the traditional justice system (jirga), system is in operation. This will help us to 
Nizam-e-Adal (Sharia Law) and the formal judicial understand how justice systems work in different 
system. However, the way this has been set-up environments, to recognise their strengths and 
has only served to cause confusion for local weaknesses, and to analyse the relationships 
people, and has led to widespread anger and between them.  
despair, which in turn has fuelled violent reactions 
against the state institutions. 4. Organise a national dialogue and share the 
model of a new system for adaptation and 
On the other hand, FATA, an area in Pakistan's recognition 
constitutional as well as geographical boundary, 
operates just one justice system – a formal jirga It is crucial to share the new draft recommended 
system (FCR jirga) which is mainly based on local model with key stakeholders, and to initiate a 
traditions but is led by government officials in the dialogue for the validation of a new model, which 
political administration. is acceptable to all on an experimental basis. 
Views of all stakeholders should be taken into 
There should be one aim for the overall justice account, in order to ensure wider adoptability and 
system – based on research from existing formal acceptance, mutual recognition and regulation. 
and informal justice systems – and that aim 
should involve serving all people equally and Before recognising and regulating the new judicial 
fairly. system, the state should determine the 
relationship between the formal and informal 
3. Investigate the positive and problematic judicial system. 
features in the relationship between the 
formal and informal justice systems 5. Develop methods and infrastructure for 
implementation and a system for evaluating 
Investigation is required to understand the the changes
operation of the formal and informal justice 
systems and to identify areas where they interact, For any new law or Act to be implemented, 
to discover positive and negative features of their proper infrastructure and institutional 
relationship. In the case of Pakistan, there is no arrangements are required. This needs sufficient 
official recognition or acknowledgement of any funding and human resources. A method for 
such interaction. However, there is evidence implementation needs to be devised which not 
available to suggest that an informal mechanism only helps to smooth implementation of the new 
of interaction exists. For instance, in cases of civil regulation but also evaluates changes. State and 
and criminal disputes where there is a lack of non-state systems are viewed as existing in a 
strong evidence available, cases can linger on for dynamic relationship ? this requires institutions to 
decades ? in such cases litigants often end up modify certain aspects of their relationships 
eventually settling their disputes out of court (externally and internally), while retaining their 
199 200
48own integrity.  Following consultation with all dynamic, changing over time following rigorous 
stakeholders, whatever method is devised should evaluation and critical analysis. 
begin with a minimum mandate and should take 
on more tasks with the passage of time and after It is hoped that if adopted, evaluated periodically, 
evaluating changes. A further principle that and reformed accordingly, the overall justice 
informs this approach is Selznick's concept of sector will improve markedly as a result; hopefully 
responsiveness, which 'entails reconstruction of in the not too distant future, we will see all 
49 Pakistani citizens benefiting from easy access to the self as well as outreach to others.  
the fair, efficient and effective justice system that 
they deserve.6. Revise the model 
The final step is to make sure that the model 
developed is constantly revised in consultation 
with all stakeholders. The model also needs to be 
updated in light of new empirical experiences 
from other countries around the world. 
The above steps illustrate a suggested way 
forward to revamp the judicial system in order to: 
minimise the risk of human rights violations (from 
both the formal and informal judicial systems); 
improve security for ordinary people; increase 
access to justice; and improve law and order in 
the country. The restorative and reparative justice 
system in rural areas – which functions 
successfully through communities rather than 
individuals – should be encouraged and 
patronised by the state for improving law and 
order in the troubled areas of Pakistan. 
CONCLUSION
The way forward is clear. The findings of this 
research on the formal and informal systems of 
justice are encouraging, but questions have been 
raised too. One thing is absolutely certain: both 
the informal justice system and the formal judicial 
system need to be reformed. 
The suggested steps for reform outlined above 
can be used as a first point for discussion, and can 
be debated with experts and policy-makers alike. 
The reform agenda that develops must be 
48. Bougainville Constitutional Commission, Report on the Third and Final Draft of the Bougainville Constitution, p.197.
49. Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community, p.338.(1992)
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model of a new system for adaptation and 
On the other hand, FATA, an area in Pakistan's recognition 
constitutional as well as geographical boundary, 
operates just one justice system – a formal jirga It is crucial to share the new draft recommended 
system (FCR jirga) which is mainly based on local model with key stakeholders, and to initiate a 
traditions but is led by government officials in the dialogue for the validation of a new model, which 
political administration. is acceptable to all on an experimental basis. 
Views of all stakeholders should be taken into 
There should be one aim for the overall justice account, in order to ensure wider adoptability and 
system – based on research from existing formal acceptance, mutual recognition and regulation. 
and informal justice systems – and that aim 
should involve serving all people equally and Before recognising and regulating the new judicial 
fairly. system, the state should determine the 
relationship between the formal and informal 
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features in the relationship between the 
formal and informal justice systems 5. Develop methods and infrastructure for 
implementation and a system for evaluating 
Investigation is required to understand the the changes
operation of the formal and informal justice 
systems and to identify areas where they interact, For any new law or Act to be implemented, 
to discover positive and negative features of their proper infrastructure and institutional 
relationship. In the case of Pakistan, there is no arrangements are required. This needs sufficient 
official recognition or acknowledgement of any funding and human resources. A method for 
such interaction. However, there is evidence implementation needs to be devised which not 
available to suggest that an informal mechanism only helps to smooth implementation of the new 
of interaction exists. For instance, in cases of civil regulation but also evaluates changes. State and 
and criminal disputes where there is a lack of non-state systems are viewed as existing in a 
strong evidence available, cases can linger on for dynamic relationship ? this requires institutions to 
decades ? in such cases litigants often end up modify certain aspects of their relationships 
eventually settling their disputes out of court (externally and internally), while retaining their 
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begin with a minimum mandate and should take 
on more tasks with the passage of time and after It is hoped that if adopted, evaluated periodically, 
evaluating changes. A further principle that and reformed accordingly, the overall justice 
informs this approach is Selznick's concept of sector will improve markedly as a result; hopefully 
responsiveness, which 'entails reconstruction of in the not too distant future, we will see all 
49 Pakistani citizens benefiting from easy access to the self as well as outreach to others.  
the fair, efficient and effective justice system that 
they deserve.6. Revise the model 
The final step is to make sure that the model 
developed is constantly revised in consultation 
with all stakeholders. The model also needs to be 
updated in light of new empirical experiences 
from other countries around the world. 
The above steps illustrate a suggested way 
forward to revamp the judicial system in order to: 
minimise the risk of human rights violations (from 
both the formal and informal judicial systems); 
improve security for ordinary people; increase 
access to justice; and improve law and order in 
the country. The restorative and reparative justice 
system in rural areas – which functions 
successfully through communities rather than 
individuals – should be encouraged and 
patronised by the state for improving law and 
order in the troubled areas of Pakistan. 
CONCLUSION
The way forward is clear. The findings of this 
research on the formal and informal systems of 
justice are encouraging, but questions have been 
raised too. One thing is absolutely certain: both 
the informal justice system and the formal judicial 
system need to be reformed. 
The suggested steps for reform outlined above 
can be used as a first point for discussion, and can 
be debated with experts and policy-makers alike. 
The reform agenda that develops must be 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE 
PLAN
substitution, over 3300 sample contacts were 
made. Although there may be slightly unequal 
numbers of males and females in each district due 
to seasonal migration and the emigration of males, INTRODUCTION
plus the cultural tendency to prevent women from 
working away, an exact sample based on gender is The subject of the current year's research is the 
not possible because current statistics are not opinion of adult Pakistani men and women with 
available. It is assumed that the unknown deviation regards to the systems of justice in Pakistan, with 
from the actual male/female proportion is slight more emphasis on the informal remedies accessed 
and that it will not cause doubt of the conclusions by common Pakistanis, especially in rural areas. In 
and descriptive statistics herein. this report, comparisons between Pakistan's four 
provinces and four major cultures are presented.
RESEARCH METHODS AND INSTRUMENTS
This report is based on both qualitative and 
I. Qualitativequantitative data. For the qualitative information, 
around 75 key informant interviews and three 
Key informant interviews round-table discussions – each in Punjab, Sindh 
and Balochistan – were organised and used to 
Sixty key informant interviews (KIIs) were gather opinions. Minutes were recorded, analysed, 
conducted in twelve districts representative of the and utilised to both write this report and to inform 
three provinces, and 15 KIIs were conducted in the the questionnaire design. 
provincial capitals of three provinces to inform and 
complement data collected in the quantitative Background and historical material used in the 
surveys and round-table discussions. The purpose report came from a review of historical books, 
of the key informant interviews was to collect newspapers, reports, articles, journals, and from 
information from a wide range of people ? the experience of CAMP programmes. 
community leaders or elders, lawyers/civil 
servants, religious leaders, teachers and civil The quantitative data was collected through 
society professionals ? who have first-hand structured questionnaires. The objective was to 
knowledge about the community and informal sample enough adult males and females, from 
justice systems in general. A total of 75 key both urban and rural areas, to ascertain their 
informant interviews were conducted in three opinions on key issues related to the formal and 
provinces as per the following plan (table on the informal systems of justice for the people of 
next page).Punjab, Sindh and Baloch districts of Balochistan 
with a 95 per cent confidence interval. Because 
Desk reviewgender plays such an important role in public 
opinion, equal numbers of males and females were 
For the historical background of the people and interviewed at all levels of the community 
the area, facts about the governance system of hierarchy in both village and urban 
Pakistan, and constitutional standing of formal and neighbourhoods in twelve districts of Punjab, 
informal justice systems, a desk review was Sindh and Baloch districts of Balochistan. The 
conducted using books, newspapers, reports, sample goal was 2,700 respondents in total, and to 
articles, journals, and CAMP experience in prior accomplish that, using a trustworthy system of 
research and project implementation.
Themes for the qualitative discussions (round- system; 
table discussions) and key informants interviews lThe state of the rights of women in the jirga 
(KIIs) system and the inclusion of women in the 
decision-making process;
The following themes were used to focus the lA way forward for reforming the judicial system 
interviews on the research subject: of Pakistan.
lAwareness of formal and informal justice II. Quantitative – perception survey
systems; 
lConflict dynamics and access to justice; In addition to a well-structured questionnaire, the 
Legality and legitimacy of formal and informal key to successful social research is in the sampling 
justice systems; frame. If well-designed, then the population and 
lHearings and proceedings used in the informal segments will be represented by a manageable 
justice system; number of interviews. The objective was to sample 
lImplementation of informal justice system's all of the 12 districts of Punjab, Sindh and 
verdicts; Balochistan so that the margin of error would be 
lThe state of fundamental rights in the jirga 
S. # District Province 
Lo
ca
l 
jo
ur
na
lis
t
SH
O
 (p
ol
ic
e 
st
at
io
n)
 
La
w
ye
r/
ci
vi
l 
se
rv
an
t 
Lo
ca
l 
po
lit
ic
ia
n 
Co
m
m
un
ity
 
el
de
r 
1 Rawalpindi Punjab 1 1 1 1 1 
2 Sargodha Punjab 1 1 1 1 1 
3 Muzaffargarh  Punjab 1 1 1 1 1 
4 Kasur Punjab 1 1 1 1 1 
5 Dadu Sindh 1 1 1 1 1 
6 Khairpur Sindh 1 1 1 1 1 
7 Sanghar Sindh 1 1 1 1 1 
8 Benazirabad Nawabshah Sindh 1 1 1 1 1 
9 Jafarabad Balochistan 1 1 1 1 1 
10 Khuzdar Balochistan 1 1 1 1 1 
11 Bolan Balochistan 1 1 1 1 1 
12 Mastung Balochistan 1 1 1 1 1 
13 Lahore (provincial capital)  Punjab 1 1 1 1 1 
14 Karachi (provincial capital)  Sindh 1 1 1 1 1 
15 Quetta (provincial capital)  Balochistan 1 1 1 1 1 
 Total   15 15 15 15 15 
ANNEX I
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provincial capitals of three provinces to inform and 
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small. The desired margin of error for all 12 
districts of Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan remains Margin of error
2 per cent.* This margin of error, in reference to 
the selected 12 districts with an estimated The overall margin of error with all interviews 
population** of approximately 18.12 million, pooled under 'Punjab, Sindh and Baloch districts of 
called for a sample of 2,700 interviews.  Balochistan – Pakistan' for single questions of a 
'Yes/No' nature was planned to not exceed 1.89 
The sample size of 2700 was drawn from the 12 per cent at the 95 per cent confidence level.  That 
districts of Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan. The is, if a random sample was drawn 100 times, then 
sample per district used a Proportionate Stratified in 95 of the cases, one would expect there to be 
Sampling Method (PSSM) to ensure a plus or minus 1.89 per cent difference around a 
representative sample for the entire population as sample mean. That being said, once one begins to 
well as for each district, as per the table: partition the data set and look at specific district of 
the three provinces, then, within those units, the 
Thus, based on the use of small samples per margin of error increases because of the smaller 
district, it is possible to make inferences about the population size and sample size.  The right-hand 
sampled population which is, in this case, the column in the table above summarises the margin 
people of Punjab, Sindh and Baloch districts of of error by district.
Balochistan within the planned margin of error.  
Sampling plan and field implementation the culture of the region, female enumerators 
interviewed females, and male enumerators 
Accessibility interviewed males. The resulting sampling frame is 
shown in the following table:
At the beginning of this project, CAMP gathered 
information on the accessible areas within Punjab, Selection of interviews 
Sindh and Balochistan by making a list of villages, 
towns and tehsils that were not accessible because Method of selecting starting points 
of security concerns, government imposed 
curfews, and/or extreme weather conditions. That In villages, the survey universe was divided into 
list was deducted from the master list of four areas i.e. two for male enumerators and two 
approximately 1180 villages and urban locations of for female enumerators. In each area two starting 
the master list across Punjab, Sindh and points were selected by male and two by female 
Balochistan were located in inaccessible areas. enumerators. Male and female enumerators 
interviewed three respondents from one point and 
Two stages were used to select the sample. In the two from the other point. These starting points 
first stage, CAMP randomly selected from the were local landmarks such as the house of a 
accessible tehsils. In the second stage, CAMP prominent landlord or tribal leader, famous shops, 
randomly selected 405 villages/towns in the tehsils a mosque, Imam Bargah of Shiite community, 
that were selected in the first stage. In addition to schools and hospitals, etc. From each point, the 
the evenly divided male to female ratio, the second enumerators (both male and female) would 
stage was planned so that both urban and rural interview five respondents. In cities or towns, five 
locations were sampled 50/50 and not according to respondents male or female were interviewed with 
the rural/urban population distribution. two starting points for each urban location. In the 
city or town, male and female enumerators were 
In each village and urban location, five interviews assigned different urban locations for interviewing 
of males and females were conducted. Because of respondents. 
District
 
Province
 
Total
 
Area 
Urban Rural 
Rawalpindi  Punjab 270 140 130 
Sargodha  Punjab 220 110 110 
Muzaffargarh  Punjab 210 100 110 
Kasur Punjab 200 100 100 
Dadu Sindh 260 130 130 
Khairpur  Sindh 240 120 120 
Sanghar Sindh 230 110 120 
Nawabshah Sindh 170 90 80 
Jafarabad Balochistan 300 150 150 
Khuzdar  Balochistan 280 140 140 
Bolan  Balochistan 200 100 100 
Mastung  Balochistan 120 60 60 
Total  2700 1350 1350 
Sample districts Province Population 1998 Census 
Sample 
size 
Margin 
of error 
Rawalpindi Punjab 3363911 270 5.96 
Sargodha Punjab 2665979 220 6.61 
Muzaffargarh Punjab 2635903 210 6.76 
Kasur Punjab 2375875 200 6.93 
Sub-total   11041668 900 3.27 
Dadu Sindh 1688811 260 6.06 
Khairpur Sindh 1546587 240 6.33 
Sanghar Sindh 1453028 230 6.46 
Shaheed Benazirabad-Nawabshah Sindh 1071533 170 7.52 
Sub-total   5759959 900 3.27 
Jafarabad Balochistan 432817 300 5.66 
Khuzdar Balochistan 417466 280 5.85 
Bolan Balochistan 288056 200 6.93 
Mastung Balochistan 179784 120 8.94 
Sub-total   1318123 900 3.27 
Grand total   18119750  2700 1.89 
205 206
A
n
n
ex
-I
: R
es
ea
rc
h 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
A
n
n
ex
-I
: R
es
ea
rc
h 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
Note-1:  Stratified Sampling Method was used for sampling among provinces (2700 Sample size with 95% confidence level and +1.89% 
confidence interval)
Note-2: Proportionate Stratified Sampling Method was used for sampling within provinces at districts level (900 Sample size with 95% confidence 
level and + 3.27% confidence interval)
* Note that for smaller samples of smaller populations, the margin of error increases.   
** Current population statistics for Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan are not available; it was assumed that the 1998 census figures would be accurate enough.
small. The desired margin of error for all 12 
districts of Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan remains Margin of error
2 per cent.* This margin of error, in reference to 
the selected 12 districts with an estimated The overall margin of error with all interviews 
population** of approximately 18.12 million, pooled under 'Punjab, Sindh and Baloch districts of 
called for a sample of 2,700 interviews.  Balochistan – Pakistan' for single questions of a 
'Yes/No' nature was planned to not exceed 1.89 
The sample size of 2700 was drawn from the 12 per cent at the 95 per cent confidence level.  That 
districts of Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan. The is, if a random sample was drawn 100 times, then 
sample per district used a Proportionate Stratified in 95 of the cases, one would expect there to be 
Sampling Method (PSSM) to ensure a plus or minus 1.89 per cent difference around a 
representative sample for the entire population as sample mean. That being said, once one begins to 
well as for each district, as per the table: partition the data set and look at specific district of 
the three provinces, then, within those units, the 
Thus, based on the use of small samples per margin of error increases because of the smaller 
district, it is possible to make inferences about the population size and sample size.  The right-hand 
sampled population which is, in this case, the column in the table above summarises the margin 
people of Punjab, Sindh and Baloch districts of of error by district.
Balochistan within the planned margin of error.  
Sampling plan and field implementation the culture of the region, female enumerators 
interviewed females, and male enumerators 
Accessibility interviewed males. The resulting sampling frame is 
shown in the following table:
At the beginning of this project, CAMP gathered 
information on the accessible areas within Punjab, Selection of interviews 
Sindh and Balochistan by making a list of villages, 
towns and tehsils that were not accessible because Method of selecting starting points 
of security concerns, government imposed 
curfews, and/or extreme weather conditions. That In villages, the survey universe was divided into 
list was deducted from the master list of four areas i.e. two for male enumerators and two 
approximately 1180 villages and urban locations of for female enumerators. In each area two starting 
the master list across Punjab, Sindh and points were selected by male and two by female 
Balochistan were located in inaccessible areas. enumerators. Male and female enumerators 
interviewed three respondents from one point and 
Two stages were used to select the sample. In the two from the other point. These starting points 
first stage, CAMP randomly selected from the were local landmarks such as the house of a 
accessible tehsils. In the second stage, CAMP prominent landlord or tribal leader, famous shops, 
randomly selected 405 villages/towns in the tehsils a mosque, Imam Bargah of Shiite community, 
that were selected in the first stage. In addition to schools and hospitals, etc. From each point, the 
the evenly divided male to female ratio, the second enumerators (both male and female) would 
stage was planned so that both urban and rural interview five respondents. In cities or towns, five 
locations were sampled 50/50 and not according to respondents male or female were interviewed with 
the rural/urban population distribution. two starting points for each urban location. In the 
city or town, male and female enumerators were 
In each village and urban location, five interviews assigned different urban locations for interviewing 
of males and females were conducted. Because of respondents. 
District
 
Province
 
Total
 
Area 
Urban Rural 
Rawalpindi  Punjab 270 140 130 
Sargodha  Punjab 220 110 110 
Muzaffargarh  Punjab 210 100 110 
Kasur Punjab 200 100 100 
Dadu Sindh 260 130 130 
Khairpur  Sindh 240 120 120 
Sanghar Sindh 230 110 120 
Nawabshah Sindh 170 90 80 
Jafarabad Balochistan 300 150 150 
Khuzdar  Balochistan 280 140 140 
Bolan  Balochistan 200 100 100 
Mastung  Balochistan 120 60 60 
Total  2700 1350 1350 
Sample districts Province Population 1998 Census 
Sample 
size 
Margin 
of error 
Rawalpindi Punjab 3363911 270 5.96 
Sargodha Punjab 2665979 220 6.61 
Muzaffargarh Punjab 2635903 210 6.76 
Kasur Punjab 2375875 200 6.93 
Sub-total   11041668 900 3.27 
Dadu Sindh 1688811 260 6.06 
Khairpur Sindh 1546587 240 6.33 
Sanghar Sindh 1453028 230 6.46 
Shaheed Benazirabad-Nawabshah Sindh 1071533 170 7.52 
Sub-total   5759959 900 3.27 
Jafarabad Balochistan 432817 300 5.66 
Khuzdar Balochistan 417466 280 5.85 
Bolan Balochistan 288056 200 6.93 
Mastung Balochistan 179784 120 8.94 
Sub-total   1318123 900 3.27 
Grand total   18119750  2700 1.89 
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Note-1:  Stratified Sampling Method was used for sampling among provinces (2700 Sample size with 95% confidence level and +1.89% 
confidence interval)
Note-2: Proportionate Stratified Sampling Method was used for sampling within provinces at districts level (900 Sample size with 95% confidence 
level and + 3.27% confidence interval)
* Note that for smaller samples of smaller populations, the margin of error increases.   
** Current population statistics for Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan are not available; it was assumed that the 1998 census figures would be accurate enough.
Punjab, on 26-27 August 2013 for Sindh, and on 2- enumerators, the pre-tests, and the field 
3 September 2013 for Balochistan. implementation. During the implementation of the 
survey, CAMP's senior management regularly 
The purposes of the pre-testing were to: followed up on the PC and SM. 
lDetermine the time length of the interview Description of field team 
Check questionnaire content  
lCheck the skipping and coding patterns 1. The enumerators were from the areas in 
Correct and improve translation which they interviewed.
2. The content of the questionnaire focused 
The pre-tests were conducted with adult Pakistani mainly on justice systems, and respondents 
males and females aged 18 and above in the appeared willing and happy to participate in 
Punjabi Community at Lahore and suburbs on 20 this study.
August 2013. The average time of the interview 3. Because the sampling plan was based on the 
during the pre-tests was 50 minutes. The minimum feedback received from the field teams, the 
time taken to complete the interview was 40 areas where these interviews took place 
minutes while the maximum time taken to were relatively safe and accessible to the 
complete the interview was 60 minutes. Hence, enumerators.
the general understanding of the enumerators on 
the questionnaire was found to be adequate and Back-checking and method of contact
satisfactory. The enumerators were able to handle 
the questionnaire well and they read the questions The table below provides the breakdown of the 
to the respondents as written on the questionnaire number of questionnaires back-checked per 
without introduction of bias. Enumerators were agency. Back-checking was done by the PC and the 
also able to comply with the field methodology for SM. The following table is a summary by type of 
data collection. Their understanding of the house- back-checking derived from the contact sheets 
skipping pattern and following the left hand/right used by the enumerators:
hand rule was also at par. The supervisors were 
able to manage the field supervision through 
different checking methods. Feedback related to Back-checking of the data collection process was 
the substance and structure of the questionnaire made through different methods: 8.56 per cent of 
was shared with the senior management of CAMP. the total interviews was personally observed by 
the supervisors during the interviews; 9.56 per 
Data entry and cleaning cent of the sample was back-checked by the 
supervisors during the data collection process by 
Upon the completion of the survey, CAMP revisiting the villages and was confirmed by the 
performed the data entry of the 2700 respondents, their family members, or locals; 8.59 
questionnaires using a database entry programme. per cent of the interviews was back-checked and 
The data was then checked and cleaned using confirmed by telephone contacts from the CAMP 
SPSS. office. A total 26.7 per cent of the interviews was 
back-checked for quality control.  All the back-
Survey management and monitoring checked interviews were confirmed by the 
respondents. Not finding evidence to the contrary, 
The CAMP Project Coordinator (PC) coordinated it is assumed that all the data collected was from 
the survey with the Survey Manager (SM). CAMP's actually conducted interviews.
PC and SM coordinated the initial training of the 
After selecting the starting points, the male would skip three houses and knock at the forth for 
enumerators selected a household on their left a substitute.
hand while female enumerators selected a 
household on their right hand. In some areas The substitution system was a crucial part of this 
where the houses were scattered and this rule research.  As is shown in the final table of this 
could not be applied precisely, the survey annex, in order to achieve the sample of 2700 
enumerators made a note of this difficulty on the interviewees, 3,300 contacts had to be made 
contact sheet. because for various reasons, 600 of the randomly 
selected interviewees did not meet the criteria. 
Bias due to 'starting point' methodology
In summary, the overall sampling design was 
 As stated above, the starting points in each robust and limited the margin of error for Punjab, 
village/town were local landmarks. From each Sindh and Baloch areas of Balochistan statistics. 
point the enumerators (both male and female) When specific districts are noted, the margin of 
would interview five respondents by counting off error in the table above must be considered. 
every third door or compound. This approach Overall, the urban and accessibility biases must be 
biased the sample toward the centre of villages. kept in mind when reviewing the findings.
Typically the wealthy or more established families 
are located at these locations or in close proximity. Questionnaire 
These are generally the more urban and educated 
citizens of the community and their status The 2013 survey used a structured questionnaire 
probably influences statistics such as literacy rate, with both opened and closed response possibilities 
the use of media, educational status etc. when to replicate the methodology used for 2012 Jirga 
compared with the general population in those Perception Survey in FATA. After consultation with 
same villages and in other parts of Pakistan. the donor, the previous questionnaires were 
revised for use in the 2012 Jirga Perception Survey 
Method of respondent selection in Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan. 
Before selecting the interviewees, the enumerators The Pakhtun survey of 2012 had generally 
made sure that the respondents were 18 years old discussed Pakhtun jirga as the only informal justice 
or above, that they were Pakistanis of Punjab, system, whereas the recent survey had enhanced 
Sindh and Balochistan, and that they were from the list of choice for respondents with more 
the selected village or urban location in the district. informal institutions to choose from including 
The survey enumerators also ensured that the khandan, mohalla, and biradari. This might have 
respondents had not participated in any survey in divided respondents' choice and affected the 
the last six months. overall result.  
Guidelines for replacing respondents Interviewer training
(substitution)
Prior to conducting the survey, CAMP enumerators 
During the respondents' selection, if a desired were trained by independent consultants, under 
respondent was not available or refused to be the supervision of CAMP senior management who 
interviewed, the enumerator would try three times observed the training and pre-test interviews. The 
to interview the designated sampled household. If training for field enumerators and supervisors on 
the interview was refused, or three attempts to the quantitative survey tool, methodology and pre-
interview did not work, then the enumerator testing was conducted on 19-20 August 2013 for 
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Punjab, on 26-27 August 2013 for Sindh, and on 2- enumerators, the pre-tests, and the field 
3 September 2013 for Balochistan. implementation. During the implementation of the 
survey, CAMP's senior management regularly 
The purposes of the pre-testing were to: followed up on the PC and SM. 
lDetermine the time length of the interview Description of field team 
Check questionnaire content  
lCheck the skipping and coding patterns 1. The enumerators were from the areas in 
Correct and improve translation which they interviewed.
2. The content of the questionnaire focused 
The pre-tests were conducted with adult Pakistani mainly on justice systems, and respondents 
males and females aged 18 and above in the appeared willing and happy to participate in 
Punjabi Community at Lahore and suburbs on 20 this study.
August 2013. The average time of the interview 3. Because the sampling plan was based on the 
during the pre-tests was 50 minutes. The minimum feedback received from the field teams, the 
time taken to complete the interview was 40 areas where these interviews took place 
minutes while the maximum time taken to were relatively safe and accessible to the 
complete the interview was 60 minutes. Hence, enumerators.
the general understanding of the enumerators on 
the questionnaire was found to be adequate and Back-checking and method of contact
satisfactory. The enumerators were able to handle 
the questionnaire well and they read the questions The table below provides the breakdown of the 
to the respondents as written on the questionnaire number of questionnaires back-checked per 
without introduction of bias. Enumerators were agency. Back-checking was done by the PC and the 
also able to comply with the field methodology for SM. The following table is a summary by type of 
data collection. Their understanding of the house- back-checking derived from the contact sheets 
skipping pattern and following the left hand/right used by the enumerators:
hand rule was also at par. The supervisors were 
able to manage the field supervision through 
different checking methods. Feedback related to Back-checking of the data collection process was 
the substance and structure of the questionnaire made through different methods: 8.56 per cent of 
was shared with the senior management of CAMP. the total interviews was personally observed by 
the supervisors during the interviews; 9.56 per 
Data entry and cleaning cent of the sample was back-checked by the 
supervisors during the data collection process by 
Upon the completion of the survey, CAMP revisiting the villages and was confirmed by the 
performed the data entry of the 2700 respondents, their family members, or locals; 8.59 
questionnaires using a database entry programme. per cent of the interviews was back-checked and 
The data was then checked and cleaned using confirmed by telephone contacts from the CAMP 
SPSS. office. A total 26.7 per cent of the interviews was 
back-checked for quality control.  All the back-
Survey management and monitoring checked interviews were confirmed by the 
respondents. Not finding evidence to the contrary, 
The CAMP Project Coordinator (PC) coordinated it is assumed that all the data collected was from 
the survey with the Survey Manager (SM). CAMP's actually conducted interviews.
PC and SM coordinated the initial training of the 
After selecting the starting points, the male would skip three houses and knock at the forth for 
enumerators selected a household on their left a substitute.
hand while female enumerators selected a 
household on their right hand. In some areas The substitution system was a crucial part of this 
where the houses were scattered and this rule research.  As is shown in the final table of this 
could not be applied precisely, the survey annex, in order to achieve the sample of 2700 
enumerators made a note of this difficulty on the interviewees, 3,300 contacts had to be made 
contact sheet. because for various reasons, 600 of the randomly 
selected interviewees did not meet the criteria. 
Bias due to 'starting point' methodology
In summary, the overall sampling design was 
 As stated above, the starting points in each robust and limited the margin of error for Punjab, 
village/town were local landmarks. From each Sindh and Baloch areas of Balochistan statistics. 
point the enumerators (both male and female) When specific districts are noted, the margin of 
would interview five respondents by counting off error in the table above must be considered. 
every third door or compound. This approach Overall, the urban and accessibility biases must be 
biased the sample toward the centre of villages. kept in mind when reviewing the findings.
Typically the wealthy or more established families 
are located at these locations or in close proximity. Questionnaire 
These are generally the more urban and educated 
citizens of the community and their status The 2013 survey used a structured questionnaire 
probably influences statistics such as literacy rate, with both opened and closed response possibilities 
the use of media, educational status etc. when to replicate the methodology used for 2012 Jirga 
compared with the general population in those Perception Survey in FATA. After consultation with 
same villages and in other parts of Pakistan. the donor, the previous questionnaires were 
revised for use in the 2012 Jirga Perception Survey 
Method of respondent selection in Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan. 
Before selecting the interviewees, the enumerators The Pakhtun survey of 2012 had generally 
made sure that the respondents were 18 years old discussed Pakhtun jirga as the only informal justice 
or above, that they were Pakistanis of Punjab, system, whereas the recent survey had enhanced 
Sindh and Balochistan, and that they were from the list of choice for respondents with more 
the selected village or urban location in the district. informal institutions to choose from including 
The survey enumerators also ensured that the khandan, mohalla, and biradari. This might have 
respondents had not participated in any survey in divided respondents' choice and affected the 
the last six months. overall result.  
Guidelines for replacing respondents Interviewer training
(substitution)
Prior to conducting the survey, CAMP enumerators 
During the respondents' selection, if a desired were trained by independent consultants, under 
respondent was not available or refused to be the supervision of CAMP senior management who 
interviewed, the enumerator would try three times observed the training and pre-test interviews. The 
to interview the designated sampled household. If training for field enumerators and supervisors on 
the interview was refused, or three attempts to the quantitative survey tool, methodology and pre-
interview did not work, then the enumerator testing was conducted on 19-20 August 2013 for 
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CONCLUSION
The methods chosen produced both the 
quantitative and the qualitative information 
desired for ascertaining the opinions of the people 
of Punjab, Sindh and Baloch areas of Balochistan. 
Although compromises or assumptions had to be 
made due to a lack of current statistics and also 
because of the accessibility issue, the sampling 
frame was executed and this provided the 
confidence intervals and margin of error desired. 
When interpreting the results, it is important to 
keep the accessibility and the starting point biases 
in mind. The knowledge of bias is crucial to the 
rational interpretation of the apparent opinions; it 
is not a weakness (whereas hidden bias would be 
considered a weakness).
District Sample 
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 Rawalpindi 270 25 20 30 75 27.78 
Sargodha 220 15 20 15 50 22.73 
Muzaffargarh  210 17 17 17 51 24.29 
Kasur 200 30 20 27 77 38.5 
Dadu 260 8 10 12 30 11.54 
Khairpur 240 35 35 40 110 45.83 
Sanghar 230 16 16 20 52 22.61 
Benazirabad Nawabshah 170 5 32 22 59 34.71 
Jafarabad 300 34 25 27 86 28.67 
Khuzdar 280 10 18 12 40 14.29 
Bolan 200 15 10 20 45 22.50 
Mastung 120 21 9 16 46 38.33 
Total  2700 231 232 258 721 
  %   8.56 8.59 9.56 26.7 
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Rawalpindi 270 112 150 34 59  0  0  270  625  100  
Sargodha 220 0 0 0 0  0  0  220  220  100  
Muzaffargarh 210 6 6 0 0  0  0  210  222  100  
Kasur 200 28 7 0 7  0  0  200  242  100  
Dadu 260 7 20 6 3  0  5  260  301  100  
Khairpur 240 66 41 0 2  0  5  240  354  100  
Sanghar 230 31 31 0 0  0  0  230  292  100  
Benazirabad 
Nawabshah 
170 0 0 0 0  0  0  170  170  100  
Jafarabad 300 0 0 0 0  0  0  300  300  100  
Khuzdar 280 0 0 0 0  0  0  280  280  100  
Bolan 200 1 4 4 4  0  0  200  213  100  
Mastung 120 2 2 0 1  0  0  120  125  100  
Overall total 2700 253 261 44 76  0  10  2700  3344   
Overall %
7.57
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CONCLUSION
The methods chosen produced both the 
quantitative and the qualitative information 
desired for ascertaining the opinions of the people 
of Punjab, Sindh and Baloch areas of Balochistan. 
Although compromises or assumptions had to be 
made due to a lack of current statistics and also 
because of the accessibility issue, the sampling 
frame was executed and this provided the 
confidence intervals and margin of error desired. 
When interpreting the results, it is important to 
keep the accessibility and the starting point biases 
in mind. The knowledge of bias is crucial to the 
rational interpretation of the apparent opinions; it 
is not a weakness (whereas hidden bias would be 
considered a weakness).
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Rawalpindi 270 112 150 34 59  0  0  270  625  100  
Sargodha 220 0 0 0 0  0  0  220  220  100  
Muzaffargarh 210 6 6 0 0  0  0  210  222  100  
Kasur 200 28 7 0 7  0  0  200  242  100  
Dadu 260 7 20 6 3  0  5  260  301  100  
Khairpur 240 66 41 0 2  0  5  240  354  100  
Sanghar 230 31 31 0 0  0  0  230  292  100  
Benazirabad 
Nawabshah 
170 0 0 0 0  0  0  170  170  100  
Jafarabad 300 0 0 0 0  0  0  300  300  100  
Khuzdar 280 0 0 0 0  0  0  280  280  100  
Bolan 200 1 4 4 4  0  0  200  213  100  
Mastung 120 2 2 0 1  0  0  120  125  100  
Overall total 2700 253 261 44 76  0  10  2700  3344   
Overall %
7.57
 
7.81
 
1.32
 
2.27
 
0
 
0.3
 
80.74
 
Response 
rate
 
Contact sheet and response rate
Successful interviews / successful contact as per specification
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Understanding Justice Systems, Pakistan 2015
QUESTIONNAIRE
SERIAL NUMBER:    
PROVINCE: 
DISTRICT: 
URBAN/RURAL: 
CITY/VILLAGE NAME: 
AREA NAME:
MALE/FEMALE: 
SUPERVISOR NAME: 
SURVEYOR NAME: 
DATE OF INTERVIEW:
Response Code Response Code
 
1:  SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
 
Q1: What sources of information do you have access to? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box) - 
Multiple responses are allowed)   
  
    
Pakistani Newspapers 1 Internet, books and films  10 
Pakistani radio 2 Friends & family  11 
Pakistan TV 3 Work colleagues 12 
British Newspapers 4 Neighbours 13 
British TV channels 5 Friday sermon 14 
British radio 6 Communal gathering 15 
American Newspapers 7 Government officials 16 
American TV 8 Village or Clan or Tribal elders 17 
American radio 9 Other (specify) 77 
 
Q2: Which sources of information do you trust the most? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box) 
- Multiple responses are allowed) 
Response Code Response Code 
Pakistani Newspapers 1 Internet, books and films  10 
Pakistani radio 2 Friends & family  11 
Pakistan TV 3 Work colleagues 12 
British Newspapers 4 Neighbours 13 
British TV channels 5 Friday sermon 14 
British radio 6 Communal gathering 15 
American Newspapers 7 Government officials 16 
American TV 8 Village or Clan or Tribal elders 17 
American radio 9 Other (specify) 77 
 
2.  AWARENESS OF THE INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS 
 
Q3: Are you aware of the following institutions and actors? (Multiple-choice question) 
 
Name of Institution
 
/ Actor
 
Yes
 
No
 Don’t 
Know 
a) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High Courts) 1 2 88 
b) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & Sessions Courts) 1 2 88 
c) Specialized Anti-Terrorism or Narcotics Courts  1 2 88 
d) Federal Shariat Court 1 2 88 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris and other registered 
Madaris) 1 2 88 
f) Ombudsman 1 2 88 
ANNEX II
Understanding the informal justice system:
Opportunities and possibilities for legal pluralism in Pakistan 
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Understanding Justice Systems, Pakistan 2015
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SERIAL NUMBER:    
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DISTRICT: 
URBAN/RURAL: 
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SUPERVISOR NAME: 
SURVEYOR NAME: 
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Response Code Response Code
 
1:  SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
 
Q1: What sources of information do you have access to? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box) - 
Multiple responses are allowed)   
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Pakistan TV 3 Work colleagues 12 
British Newspapers 4 Neighbours 13 
British TV channels 5 Friday sermon 14 
British radio 6 Communal gathering 15 
American Newspapers 7 Government officials 16 
American TV 8 Village or Clan or Tribal elders 17 
American radio 9 Other (specify) 77 
 
Q2: Which sources of information do you trust the most? (Don’t read the list – check appropriate box) 
- Multiple responses are allowed) 
Response Code Response Code 
Pakistani Newspapers 1 Internet, books and films  10 
Pakistani radio 2 Friends & family  11 
Pakistan TV 3 Work colleagues 12 
British Newspapers 4 Neighbours 13 
British TV channels 5 Friday sermon 14 
British radio 6 Communal gathering 15 
American Newspapers 7 Government officials 16 
American TV 8 Village or Clan or Tribal elders 17 
American radio 9 Other (specify) 77 
 
2.  AWARENESS OF THE INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS 
 
Q3: Are you aware of the following institutions and actors? (Multiple-choice question) 
 
Name of Institution
 
/ Actor
 
Yes
 
No
 Don’t 
Know 
a) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High Courts) 1 2 88 
b) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & Sessions Courts) 1 2 88 
c) Specialized Anti-Terrorism or Narcotics Courts  1 2 88 
d) Federal Shariat Court 1 2 88 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris and other registered 
Madaris) 1 2 88 
f) Ombudsman 1 2 88 
ANNEX II
Understanding the informal justice system:
Opportunities and possibilities for legal pluralism in Pakistan 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 1 2 88 
h) Jirga system, Panchayat, Faislo  or other informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms . 1 2 88 
i) Police Department 1 2 88 
j) Musalihati Council  1 2 88 
 
Q4: What is your opinion/perception of the following institutions and actors? Perceptions of 
Institutions and Actors – Codes: Affordable (01) Speedy (02) Bribes (03) Influence Peddling (04) 
Unresponsive to Criticism (05) Ignores Human Rights (06) Gender Equality (07) Class Bias (8) Don’t know 
(99). (Multiple-choice question) 
Name of Institution / Actor 
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a) Provincial Police Authorities and 
their local representatives (e.g. 
S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( 
Supreme Court and High Courts) 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial 
Magistrate, District & Sessions 
Courts) 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88 
d) Federal Shariat Court 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. 
Wafaq ul Madaris or other 
registered Madaris) 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88 
f) Ombudsman 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
g) Human Rights Commission of 
Pakistan 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
j) Biradari (clan) 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village 
Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
l) Village panchayat (akhat)(pareh, 
pareh panchayat, pareon) or faislo 
or Baloch jirga 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, 
provincial, national) 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris 
(Land Record Keepers); 
nambardars (Village Headmen); 
tehsildars (Tehsil) 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
   
administration/revenue collection 
heads) or others 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, 
DCOs, District magistrates etc.)          
p) Political Groupings/vote banks 
(dharras) 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
q) Self-Provision Village 
Organizations; Community 
Organizations 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
r) Local NGOs 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
s) Private Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms that charge a Fee 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
t) Local Crime lords 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
u) Religious leader in the community 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88 
v) Musalihati Council  01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88 
 
3.  LINKAGES BETWEEN FORMAL AND INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
 
3.1  CONFLICT DYNAMICS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
 
Q5: Do you have the following institutions in your community/area? (Multiple-choice response is 
allowed) 
Response Code 
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives (e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., e tc.) 1 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High Courts) 2 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & Sessions Courts) 3 
d) Federal Shariat Court 4 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 5 
f) Ombudsman 6 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 7 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  8 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 9 
j) Biradari (clan) 10 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 11 
l) Village panchayat (akhat)(pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon)/faislo/Baloch Jirga 12 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 13 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); nambardars (Village Headmen); 
tehsildars (Tehsil administration/revenue collection heads) or others  
14 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates etc.) 15 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 16 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community Organizations 17 
r) Local NGOs 18 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 19 
t) Local Crime lords 20 
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g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 1 2 88 
h) Jirga system, Panchayat, Faislo  or other informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms . 1 2 88 
i) Police Department 1 2 88 
j) Musalihati Council  1 2 88 
 
Q4: What is your opinion/perception of the following institutions and actors? Perceptions of 
Institutions and Actors – Codes: Affordable (01) Speedy (02) Bribes (03) Influence Peddling (04) 
Unresponsive to Criticism (05) Ignores Human Rights (06) Gender Equality (07) Class Bias (8) Don’t know 
(99). (Multiple-choice question) 
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S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( 
Supreme Court and High Courts) 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial 
Magistrate, District & Sessions 
Courts) 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88 
d) Federal Shariat Court 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. 
Wafaq ul Madaris or other 
registered Madaris) 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88 
f) Ombudsman 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
g) Human Rights Commission of 
Pakistan 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
j) Biradari (clan) 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village 
Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
l) Village panchayat (akhat)(pareh, 
pareh panchayat, pareon) or faislo 
or Baloch jirga 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, 
provincial, national) 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris 
(Land Record Keepers); 
nambardars (Village Headmen); 
tehsildars (Tehsil) 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
   
administration/revenue collection 
heads) or others 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, 
DCOs, District magistrates etc.)          
p) Political Groupings/vote banks 
(dharras) 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
q) Self-Provision Village 
Organizations; Community 
Organizations 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
r) Local NGOs 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
s) Private Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms that charge a Fee 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
t) Local Crime lords 01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
u) Religious leader in the community 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88 
v) Musalihati Council  01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 88 
 
3.  LINKAGES BETWEEN FORMAL AND INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
 
3.1  CONFLICT DYNAMICS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
 
Q5: Do you have the following institutions in your community/area? (Multiple-choice response is 
allowed) 
Response Code 
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives (e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., e tc.) 1 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High Courts) 2 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & Sessions Courts) 3 
d) Federal Shariat Court 4 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 5 
f) Ombudsman 6 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 7 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  8 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 9 
j) Biradari (clan) 10 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 11 
l) Village panchayat (akhat)(pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon)/faislo/Baloch Jirga 12 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 13 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); nambardars (Village Headmen); 
tehsildars (Tehsil administration/revenue collection heads) or others  
14 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates etc.) 15 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 16 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community Organizations 17 
r) Local NGOs 18 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 19 
t) Local Crime lords 20 
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01 02 03 04 05 06) 07 08 88 
u) Religious leader in the community 21 
v) Musalihati Council  22 
w) Other (Specify:______________________________________________) 77 
x) Don’t know 88 
 
Q6:  Who do you first contact in case of any conflict or dispute? (Single Response) 
Response Code 
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives (e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  1 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High Courts) 2 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & Sessions Courts) 3 
d) Federal Shariat Court 4 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 5 
f) Ombudsman 6 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 7 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  8 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 9 
j) Biradari (clan) 10 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 11 
l) Village panchayat (akhat)(pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon) or faislo or Baloch Jirga 12 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 13 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); nambardars (Village Headmen); 
tehsildars (Tehsil administrati on/revenue collection heads) or others 
14 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates etc.) 15 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 16 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community Organizations 17 
r) Local NGOs 18 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 19 
t) Local Crime lords 20 
u) Religious leader in the community 21 
v) Musalihati Council  22 
w) Other (Specify:______________________________________________) 77 
x) Don’t know 88 
 
Q7: What are the main issues that instigate conflict in your community? (Multiple-choice response 
is allowed) 
Response Code 
a) Agricultural land  1 
b) Urban property – (Private) 2 
c) Urban property – (Commercial) 3 
d) Land grabbing 4 
e) Distribution of water sources (warabandi)  5 
f) Neighborhood (position of shared wall, property, etc)  6 
g) Political violence 7 
h) Grazing animals 8 
i) Sectarian  9 
j) Family issues (forced marriages, divorce, child custody, shared property, wedding 
expenses) 
10 
k) Youth/children quarrelling and fighting 11 
l) Family honour issues 12 
m) Tribal clashes 13 
n) Tribal customs such as swara/vani/karo kari, bride price and jhag  14 
o) Militancy 15 
p) Terrorism 16 
q) Unequal distribution of aid 17 
r) Theft/robbery 18 
s) Murder/homicide/rising crimes 19 
t) Other (specify) 77 
 
Q8: Have you or your household members experienced any of the following? (Multiple-choice 
response is allowed) 
Issues Yes No Don’t Know 
No 
Response  
a) Victim of theft or fraud 1 2 88 99 
b) Victim of assault 1 2 88 99 
c) Victim of domestic abuse 1 2 88 99 
d) Victim of forced marriage 1 2 88 99 
e) Victim of tribal customs such as Swara/Vani/Karo Kari, Bride 
price and Jhag 
1 2 88 99 
f) Family member has gone missing or disappeared 1 2 88 99 
g) Arrested without warrant by the administration or police  1 2 88 99 
h) Accused of an offence under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1 2 88 99 
i) Accused of committing sexual abuse/assault (under the 
Hudood Ordinances or the Pakistan Penal Code) 
1 2 88 99 
j) Accused of committing any other crime 1 2 88 99 
k) Unlawful detention, search or arrest by the political 
administration  
1 2 88 99 
l) Bribery to police, Khasadar or levies force 1 2 88 99 
m) Assault or torture by FC or Army  1 2 88 99 
n) Money Recovery, or Debt/Obligation Settlement  1 2 88 99 
o) Contract enforcement in business dealings 1 2 88 99 
p) Purchase or sale of movable property 1 2 88 99 
q) Lease and rental issues: disrepair, eviction etc.  1 2 88 99 
r) Family law issues: divorce, maintenance, child custody, 
guardianship, inheritance 
1 2 88 99 
s) Dispute with employer for unpaid wages 1 2 88 99 
t) Debt bondage 1 2 88 99 
u) Found involved in sectarian violence 1 2 88 99 
v) Found involved in tribal/family clashes 1 2 88 99 
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u) Religious leader in the community 21 
v) Musalihati Council  22 
w) Other (Specify:______________________________________________) 77 
x) Don’t know 88 
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f) Ombudsman 6 
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h) Khandaan (extended family)  8 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 9 
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t) Local Crime lords 20 
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v) Musalihati Council  22 
w) Other (Specify:______________________________________________) 77 
x) Don’t know 88 
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is allowed) 
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f) Neighborhood (position of shared wall, property, etc)  6 
g) Political violence 7 
h) Grazing animals 8 
i) Sectarian  9 
j) Family issues (forced marriages, divorce, child custody, shared property, wedding 
expenses) 
10 
k) Youth/children quarrelling and fighting 11 
l) Family honour issues 12 
m) Tribal clashes 13 
n) Tribal customs such as swara/vani/karo kari, bride price and jhag  14 
o) Militancy 15 
p) Terrorism 16 
q) Unequal distribution of aid 17 
r) Theft/robbery 18 
s) Murder/homicide/rising crimes 19 
t) Other (specify) 77 
 
Q8: Have you or your household members experienced any of the following? (Multiple-choice 
response is allowed) 
Issues Yes No Don’t Know 
No 
Response  
a) Victim of theft or fraud 1 2 88 99 
b) Victim of assault 1 2 88 99 
c) Victim of domestic abuse 1 2 88 99 
d) Victim of forced marriage 1 2 88 99 
e) Victim of tribal customs such as Swara/Vani/Karo Kari, Bride 
price and Jhag 
1 2 88 99 
f) Family member has gone missing or disappeared 1 2 88 99 
g) Arrested without warrant by the administration or police  1 2 88 99 
h) Accused of an offence under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1 2 88 99 
i) Accused of committing sexual abuse/assault (under the 
Hudood Ordinances or the Pakistan Penal Code) 
1 2 88 99 
j) Accused of committing any other crime 1 2 88 99 
k) Unlawful detention, search or arrest by the political 
administration  
1 2 88 99 
l) Bribery to police, Khasadar or levies force 1 2 88 99 
m) Assault or torture by FC or Army  1 2 88 99 
n) Money Recovery, or Debt/Obligation Settlement  1 2 88 99 
o) Contract enforcement in business dealings 1 2 88 99 
p) Purchase or sale of movable property 1 2 88 99 
q) Lease and rental issues: disrepair, eviction etc.  1 2 88 99 
r) Family law issues: divorce, maintenance, child custody, 
guardianship, inheritance 
1 2 88 99 
s) Dispute with employer for unpaid wages 1 2 88 99 
t) Debt bondage 1 2 88 99 
u) Found involved in sectarian violence 1 2 88 99 
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215 216
A
n
n
ex
 II
: Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
A
n
n
ex
 II
: Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
w) Injured in an accident (motor vehicle, etc) 1 2 88 99 
x) Any other act of violence/ crime or dispute (specify)     
 
Instruction: If respondent experienced any then ask Q9, 10 and 11 otherwise move to Q12.  
 
Q9: If yes, which of the following justice systems did you access for resolving your conflict/dispute? 
(Multiple-choice response is allowed) 
Response Code 
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives (e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P.,  etc.) 1 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High Courts) 2 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & Sessions Courts) 3 
d) Federal Shariat Court 4 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 5 
f) Ombudsman 6 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 7 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  8 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 9 
j) Biradari (clan) 10 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 11 
l) Village panchayat (akhat)(pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon) or faislo or Baloch jirga 12 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 13 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); nambardars (Village Headmen); 
tehsildars (Tehsil administration/revenue collection heads) or others   
14 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates etc.) 15 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 16 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community Organizations 17 
r) Local NGOs 18 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 19 
t) Local Crime lords 20 
u) Religious leader in the community 21 
v) Musalihati Council  22 
w) Other (Specify:______________________________________________) 77 
x) Don’t know 88 
 
Q10: What were the reasons for choosing the justice systems to deal with the dispute? (Multiple-
choice response is allowed – Maximum of three responses per option mentioned in Q. 9).  
Response Code 
Efficient and effective at resolving the dispute 01 
Close to where I live 02 
Fair and trusted 03 
Follows accepted local norms/values 04 
Less expensive 05 
Less corrupt 06 
less vulnerable to influence and pressure 07 
Effective implementation mechanism  08 
Formal legal remedy is mandated by the law 09 
Speedy  10 
Other (Specify: __________) 77 
 
Q11: How satisfied were you with their involvement? 
Response
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a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local 
representatives (e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  1 2 3 4 88 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High 
Courts) 1 2 3 4 88 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & 
Sessions Courts)      
d) Federal Shariat Court 1 2 3 4 88 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or 
other registered Madaris) 1 2 3 4 88 
f) Ombudsman 1 2 3 4 88 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 1 2 3 4 88 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  1 2 3 4 88 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 1 2 3 4 88 
j) Biradari (clan) 1 2 3 4 88 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village 
Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 1 2 3 4 88 
l) Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, 
pareon) or faislo  or Baloch Jirga 1 2 3 4 88 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 1 2 3 4 88 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); 
nambardars (Village Headmen); tehsildars (Tehsil 
administration/revenue collection heads) or others 
 
1 2 3 4 88 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District 
magistrates etc.) 1 2 3 4 88 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 1 2 3 4 88 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community 
Organizations 1 2 3 4 88 
r) Local NGOs 1 2 3 4 88 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a 
Fee 1 2 3 4 88 
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w) Injured in an accident (motor vehicle, etc) 1 2 88 99 
x) Any other act of violence/ crime or dispute (specify)     
 
Instruction: If respondent experienced any then ask Q9, 10 and 11 otherwise move to Q12.  
 
Q9: If yes, which of the following justice systems did you access for resolving your conflict/dispute? 
(Multiple-choice response is allowed) 
Response Code 
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives (e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P.,  etc.) 1 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High Courts) 2 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & Sessions Courts) 3 
d) Federal Shariat Court 4 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 5 
f) Ombudsman 6 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 7 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  8 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 9 
j) Biradari (clan) 10 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 11 
l) Village panchayat (akhat)(pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon) or faislo or Baloch jirga 12 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 13 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); nambardars (Village Headmen); 
tehsildars (Tehsil administration/revenue collection heads) or others   
14 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates etc.) 15 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 16 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community Organizations 17 
r) Local NGOs 18 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 19 
t) Local Crime lords 20 
u) Religious leader in the community 21 
v) Musalihati Council  22 
w) Other (Specify:______________________________________________) 77 
x) Don’t know 88 
 
Q10: What were the reasons for choosing the justice systems to deal with the dispute? (Multiple-
choice response is allowed – Maximum of three responses per option mentioned in Q. 9).  
Response Code 
Efficient and effective at resolving the dispute 01 
Close to where I live 02 
Fair and trusted 03 
Follows accepted local norms/values 04 
Less expensive 05 
Less corrupt 06 
less vulnerable to influence and pressure 07 
Effective implementation mechanism  08 
Formal legal remedy is mandated by the law 09 
Speedy  10 
Other (Specify: __________) 77 
 
Q11: How satisfied were you with their involvement? 
Response
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a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local 
representatives (e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  1 2 3 4 88 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High 
Courts) 1 2 3 4 88 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & 
Sessions Courts)      
d) Federal Shariat Court 1 2 3 4 88 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or 
other registered Madaris) 1 2 3 4 88 
f) Ombudsman 1 2 3 4 88 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 1 2 3 4 88 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  1 2 3 4 88 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 1 2 3 4 88 
j) Biradari (clan) 1 2 3 4 88 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village 
Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 1 2 3 4 88 
l) Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, 
pareon) or faislo  or Baloch Jirga 1 2 3 4 88 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 1 2 3 4 88 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); 
nambardars (Village Headmen); tehsildars (Tehsil 
administration/revenue collection heads) or others 
 
1 2 3 4 88 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District 
magistrates etc.) 1 2 3 4 88 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 1 2 3 4 88 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community 
Organizations 1 2 3 4 88 
r) Local NGOs 1 2 3 4 88 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a 
Fee 1 2 3 4 88 
217 218
A
n
n
ex
 II
: Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
A
n
n
ex
 II
: Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
t) Local Crime lords 1 2 3 4 88 
u) Religious leader in the community 1 2 3 4 88 
v) Musalihati Council  1 2 3 4 88 
w) Other 
(Specify:___________________________________) 1 2 3 4 88 
 
Q12: Where would you refer your serious criminal dispute (Murder/Theft/Robbery etc) for 
resolution? (Single Response)  
Response Code 
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives (e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  1 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High Courts) 2 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & Sessions Courts) 3 
d) Federal Shariat Court 4 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 5 
f) Ombudsman 6 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 7 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  8 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 9 
j) Biradari (clan) 10 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 11 
l) Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon) or faislo or Baloch jirga 12 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 13 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); nambardars (Village Headmen); 
tehsildars (Tehsil administration/revenue collection heads) or others  
14 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates etc.) 15 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 16 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community Organizations 17 
r) Local NGOs 18 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 19 
t) Local Crime lords 20 
u) Religious leader in the community 21 
v) Musalihati Council  22 
w) Other (Specify:______________________________________________) 77 
x) Don’t know 88 
 
Q13: Where would you refer your civil dispute (Land Disputes/Divorce etc) for resolution? (Single 
Response) 
Response Code 
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives (e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P, etc.)  1 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High Courts) 2 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & Sessions Courts) 3 
d) Federal Shariat Court 4 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 5 
f) Ombudsman 6 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 7 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  8 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 9 
j) Biradari (clan) 10 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 11 
l) Village panchayat (akhat)(pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon) or faislo or Baloch jirga  12 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 13 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); nambardars (Village Headmen); 
tehsildars (Tehsil administration/revenue collection heads) or others  
14 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates etc.) 15 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 16 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community Organizations 17 
r) Local NGOs 18 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 19 
t) Local Crime lords 20 
u) Religious leader in the community 21 
v) Musalihati Council  22 
w) Other (Specify:______________________________________________) 77 
x) Don’t know 88 
 
Q14: What types of cases you would prefer to take to the formal courts (Supreme Court, High Court, 
Session Court etc)? Multiple-choice response is allowed) 
Response Code 
a) All cases 1 
b) All cases of public interest  2 
c) Only complex cases that the informal systems cannot/could not solve 3 
d) All cases of crime 4 
e) Cases concerning land or other property  5 
f) Certain family cases like divorce 6 
g) Business and commercial transactions  7 
h) None 8 
i) Other (specify) 77 
j) Don’t know 88 
 
Q15: What types of cases you would prefer to take to the informal dispute resolution mechanisms? 
Multiple-choice response is allowed) 
Response Code 
a) All cases 1 
b) All cases of public interest  2 
c) all cases that involve community interests and stakes 3 
d) All cases of crime 4 
e) Cases concerning land property  5 
f) Certain family cases like divorce 6 
g) Business and commercial transactions 7 
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t) Local Crime lords 1 2 3 4 88 
u) Religious leader in the community 1 2 3 4 88 
v) Musalihati Council  1 2 3 4 88 
w) Other 
(Specify:___________________________________) 1 2 3 4 88 
 
Q12: Where would you refer your serious criminal dispute (Murder/Theft/Robbery etc) for 
resolution? (Single Response)  
Response Code 
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives (e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  1 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High Courts) 2 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & Sessions Courts) 3 
d) Federal Shariat Court 4 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 5 
f) Ombudsman 6 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 7 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  8 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 9 
j) Biradari (clan) 10 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 11 
l) Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon) or faislo or Baloch jirga 12 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 13 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); nambardars (Village Headmen); 
tehsildars (Tehsil administration/revenue collection heads) or others  
14 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates etc.) 15 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 16 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community Organizations 17 
r) Local NGOs 18 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 19 
t) Local Crime lords 20 
u) Religious leader in the community 21 
v) Musalihati Council  22 
w) Other (Specify:______________________________________________) 77 
x) Don’t know 88 
 
Q13: Where would you refer your civil dispute (Land Disputes/Divorce etc) for resolution? (Single 
Response) 
Response Code 
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives (e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P, etc.)  1 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High Courts) 2 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & Sessions Courts) 3 
d) Federal Shariat Court 4 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other registered Madaris) 5 
f) Ombudsman 6 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 7 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  8 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 9 
j) Biradari (clan) 10 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 11 
l) Village panchayat (akhat)(pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon) or faislo or Baloch jirga  12 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 13 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); nambardars (Village Headmen); 
tehsildars (Tehsil administration/revenue collection heads) or others  
14 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates etc.) 15 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 16 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community Organizations 17 
r) Local NGOs 18 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 19 
t) Local Crime lords 20 
u) Religious leader in the community 21 
v) Musalihati Council  22 
w) Other (Specify:______________________________________________) 77 
x) Don’t know 88 
 
Q14: What types of cases you would prefer to take to the formal courts (Supreme Court, High Court, 
Session Court etc)? Multiple-choice response is allowed) 
Response Code 
a) All cases 1 
b) All cases of public interest  2 
c) Only complex cases that the informal systems cannot/could not solve 3 
d) All cases of crime 4 
e) Cases concerning land or other property  5 
f) Certain family cases like divorce 6 
g) Business and commercial transactions  7 
h) None 8 
i) Other (specify) 77 
j) Don’t know 88 
 
Q15: What types of cases you would prefer to take to the informal dispute resolution mechanisms? 
Multiple-choice response is allowed) 
Response Code 
a) All cases 1 
b) All cases of public interest  2 
c) all cases that involve community interests and stakes 3 
d) All cases of crime 4 
e) Cases concerning land property  5 
f) Certain family cases like divorce 6 
g) Business and commercial transactions 7 
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h) None 8 
i) Other (specify) 77 
j) Don’t know 88 
 
Q16: What is your understanding of access to justice? Multiple-choice response is allowed) 
Response Code 
Right to fair and just trial 1 
Access to justice for all, specially women and vulnerable groups (minorities etc) 2 
Proper hearing, trial and remedies against grievances. 3 
Better access to opportunities for employment and income generation  4 
Better distribution of society’s resources 5 
Other (specify) 77 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q17: To what extent do you think there has been access to justice in your district/area? 
Response Code 
Not at all 1 
To a moderate extent  2 
To a large extent  3 
Don’t know 88 
 
 
Q18:  What categories of individuals/groups do not have access to justice in your district/area under 
the formal justice system such as the Supreme Court, High Courts and Lower Courts? (Multiple-choice 
response is allowed) 
Response Code 
Women 1 
Minorities 2 
Low caste groups  3 
Poor 4 
Disabled 5 
Landless peasants and agriculture laborers 6 
Other (specify) 77 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q19: What categories of individuals/groups do not have access to justice in your district/area under 
informal justice system such as jirga/pancahyat/faislo? (Multiple-choice response is allowed) 
Response Code 
a) Women 1 
b) Minorities 2 
c) Low cast groups  3 
d) Poor 4 
e) Disabled 5 
f) Landless peasants and agriculture laborers 6 
g) Other (specify) 77 
h) Don’t know 88 
 
Q19A. Apart from formal justice system are other informal justice systems like NGOs, religious groups 
etc. showing their interest about people access to justice.  
YES NO DON’T KNOW 
1 2 88 
 
 
Q20: What are the reasons for limited access to formal justice as well reluctance to access formal 
courts? (Multiple-choice response is allowed) 
Response Code 
Time consuming and cases not expedited 1 
Legal aid department understaffed 2 
Unavailability of legal aid 3 
Accused overstay without trial due to lack of understanding of their legal rights 4 
High Legal fees of lawyers  5 
Not all cases reported 6 
Long distances to courts 7 
High level of corruption in the courts 8 
Justice structures concentrated in towns 9 
Not aware of how to access justice by those in remote areas 10 
Widespread confusion about the legal system 11 
Dissatisfied with the fairness of the court process 12 
Interviewee ill-equipped to fight a legal battle due to lack of experience or legal know-how 13 
Interviewee under social/community pressure to settle out of court with opponent 14 
Interviewee facing threats/coercion from opponent to settle out of court 15 
Interviewee concerned with the quality and/or commitment of the lawyer 16 
Legal opponent is able to unfairly influence the court process 17 
An out of court solution seems simpler and quicker in comparison 18 
Laws and formal procedures are complex and unintelligible 19 
Laws are complex as they are in English 20 
Other (specify) 77 
Don’t know 88 
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h) None 8 
i) Other (specify) 77 
j) Don’t know 88 
 
Q16: What is your understanding of access to justice? Multiple-choice response is allowed) 
Response Code 
Right to fair and just trial 1 
Access to justice for all, specially women and vulnerable groups (minorities etc) 2 
Proper hearing, trial and remedies against grievances. 3 
Better access to opportunities for employment and income generation  4 
Better distribution of society’s resources 5 
Other (specify) 77 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q17: To what extent do you think there has been access to justice in your district/area? 
Response Code 
Not at all 1 
To a moderate extent  2 
To a large extent  3 
Don’t know 88 
 
 
Q18:  What categories of individuals/groups do not have access to justice in your district/area under 
the formal justice system such as the Supreme Court, High Courts and Lower Courts? (Multiple-choice 
response is allowed) 
Response Code 
Women 1 
Minorities 2 
Low caste groups  3 
Poor 4 
Disabled 5 
Landless peasants and agriculture laborers 6 
Other (specify) 77 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q19: What categories of individuals/groups do not have access to justice in your district/area under 
informal justice system such as jirga/pancahyat/faislo? (Multiple-choice response is allowed) 
Response Code 
a) Women 1 
b) Minorities 2 
c) Low cast groups  3 
d) Poor 4 
e) Disabled 5 
f) Landless peasants and agriculture laborers 6 
g) Other (specify) 77 
h) Don’t know 88 
 
Q19A. Apart from formal justice system are other informal justice systems like NGOs, religious groups 
etc. showing their interest about people access to justice.  
YES NO DON’T KNOW 
1 2 88 
 
 
Q20: What are the reasons for limited access to formal justice as well reluctance to access formal 
courts? (Multiple-choice response is allowed) 
Response Code 
Time consuming and cases not expedited 1 
Legal aid department understaffed 2 
Unavailability of legal aid 3 
Accused overstay without trial due to lack of understanding of their legal rights 4 
High Legal fees of lawyers  5 
Not all cases reported 6 
Long distances to courts 7 
High level of corruption in the courts 8 
Justice structures concentrated in towns 9 
Not aware of how to access justice by those in remote areas 10 
Widespread confusion about the legal system 11 
Dissatisfied with the fairness of the court process 12 
Interviewee ill-equipped to fight a legal battle due to lack of experience or legal know-how 13 
Interviewee under social/community pressure to settle out of court with opponent 14 
Interviewee facing threats/coercion from opponent to settle out of court 15 
Interviewee concerned with the quality and/or commitment of the lawyer 16 
Legal opponent is able to unfairly influence the court process 17 
An out of court solution seems simpler and quicker in comparison 18 
Laws and formal procedures are complex and unintelligible 19 
Laws are complex as they are in English 20 
Other (specify) 77 
Don’t know 88 
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Q21: What are the reasons for limited access to informal justice mechanisms as well as reluctance 
to access informal mechanisms? (Multiple-choice response is allowed) 
Response Code 
a) Informal systems lack authority to implement their decisions 1 
b) Members of informal systems are not qualified to resolve complex disputes 2 
c) Informal systems are inaccessible for women 3 
d) Informal systems are inaccessible for minorities 4 
e) Sometime members of informal systems take bribes 5 
f) Members of informal systems are biased at times 6 
g) Sometime their solutions are unsustainable/unworkable 7 
h) No precedents of previous decisions 8 
i) People don’t have faith in the capacity and efficiency of such mechanisms 9 
j) These mechanisms are vulnerable to private pressure and influence 10 
k) Such mechanisms are outdated and unfamiliar with modern ideas of fairness and 
justice 
11 
l) No such viable mechanisms exist anymore in my area/locality 12 
m) People have greater faith in the fairness of the court system 13 
n) The court system is more easily accessible 14 
o) Influential people feel more confident of manipulating the informal systems 15 
p) Weaker parties feel more empowered by the formal legal/court system  16 
q) The law mandates going to the formal legal system for certain kinds of disputes 17 
r) Lack of satisfaction with past outcomes of non-court dispute resolution 
mechanisms 
18 
s) Often one of the parties is a trouble-maker and needs to be taught a lesson in 
court 
19 
t) Often one of the parties is a trouble maker and wants to embroil his/her 
opponents in court contestations 
20 
u) Other (specify) 77 
v) Don’t know 88 
 
3.2 LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
 
Q22: For the following systems please indicate how effective they are for dispensing justice. 
Response 
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a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives 
(e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  
01 02 03 04 88 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High 
Courts) 
01 02 03 04 88 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & 
Sessions Courts) 
01 02 03 04 88 
d) Federal Shariat Court 01 02 03 04 88 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other 
registered Madaris) 
01 02 03 04 88 
f) Ombudsman 01 02 03 04 88 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 01 02 03 04 88 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  01 02 03 04 88 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 03 04 88 
j) Biradari (clan) 01 02 03 04 88 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 01 02 03 04 88 
l) Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon) 
/ faislo or Baloch jirga  
01 02 03 04 88 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 03 04 88 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); 
nambardars (Village Headmen); tehsildars (Tehsil 
administration/revenue collection heads) or others 
01 02 03 04 88 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates 
etc.) 
01 02 03 04 88 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 03 04 88 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community 
Organizations 
01 02 03 04 88 
r) Local NGOs 01 02 03 04 88 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 01 02 03 04 88 
t) Local Crime lords 01 02 03 04 88 
u) Religious leader in the community 01 02 03 04 88 
v) Musalihati Council  01 02 03 04 88 
 
Q23: For the following systems please indicate how fair they are for resolving disputes. 
Response
 
Ve
ry
 fa
ir
 
So
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fa
ir 
So
m
ew
ha
t
un
fa
ir  
Ve
ry
 
un
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ir 
Do
n’
t 
kn
ow 
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives 
(e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  
01 02 03 04 88 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High Courts) 01 02 03 04 88 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & 
Sessions Courts) 
01 02 03 04 88 
d) Federal Shariat Court 01 02 03 04 88 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other 
registered Madaris) 
01 02 03 04 88 
f) Ombudsman 01 02 03 04 88 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 01 02 03 04 88 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  01 02 03 04 88 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 03 04 88 
j) Biradari (clan) 01 02 03 04 88 
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Q21: What are the reasons for limited access to informal justice mechanisms as well as reluctance 
to access informal mechanisms? (Multiple-choice response is allowed) 
Response Code 
a) Informal systems lack authority to implement their decisions 1 
b) Members of informal systems are not qualified to resolve complex disputes 2 
c) Informal systems are inaccessible for women 3 
d) Informal systems are inaccessible for minorities 4 
e) Sometime members of informal systems take bribes 5 
f) Members of informal systems are biased at times 6 
g) Sometime their solutions are unsustainable/unworkable 7 
h) No precedents of previous decisions 8 
i) People don’t have faith in the capacity and efficiency of such mechanisms 9 
j) These mechanisms are vulnerable to private pressure and influence 10 
k) Such mechanisms are outdated and unfamiliar with modern ideas of fairness and 
justice 
11 
l) No such viable mechanisms exist anymore in my area/locality 12 
m) People have greater faith in the fairness of the court system 13 
n) The court system is more easily accessible 14 
o) Influential people feel more confident of manipulating the informal systems 15 
p) Weaker parties feel more empowered by the formal legal/court system  16 
q) The law mandates going to the formal legal system for certain kinds of disputes 17 
r) Lack of satisfaction with past outcomes of non-court dispute resolution 
mechanisms 
18 
s) Often one of the parties is a trouble-maker and needs to be taught a lesson in 
court 
19 
t) Often one of the parties is a trouble maker and wants to embroil his/her 
opponents in court contestations 
20 
u) Other (specify) 77 
v) Don’t know 88 
 
3.2 LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
 
Q22: For the following systems please indicate how effective they are for dispensing justice. 
Response 
Ve
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a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives 
(e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  
01 02 03 04 88 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High 
Courts) 
01 02 03 04 88 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & 
Sessions Courts) 
01 02 03 04 88 
d) Federal Shariat Court 01 02 03 04 88 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other 
registered Madaris) 
01 02 03 04 88 
f) Ombudsman 01 02 03 04 88 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 01 02 03 04 88 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  01 02 03 04 88 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 03 04 88 
j) Biradari (clan) 01 02 03 04 88 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 01 02 03 04 88 
l) Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon) 
/ faislo or Baloch jirga  
01 02 03 04 88 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 03 04 88 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); 
nambardars (Village Headmen); tehsildars (Tehsil 
administration/revenue collection heads) or others 
01 02 03 04 88 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates 
etc.) 
01 02 03 04 88 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 03 04 88 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community 
Organizations 
01 02 03 04 88 
r) Local NGOs 01 02 03 04 88 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 01 02 03 04 88 
t) Local Crime lords 01 02 03 04 88 
u) Religious leader in the community 01 02 03 04 88 
v) Musalihati Council  01 02 03 04 88 
 
Q23: For the following systems please indicate how fair they are for resolving disputes. 
Response
 
Ve
ry
 fa
ir
 
So
m
ew
ha
t
fa
ir 
So
m
ew
ha
t
un
fa
ir  
Ve
ry
 
un
fa
ir 
Do
n’
t 
kn
ow 
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives 
(e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  
01 02 03 04 88 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High Courts) 01 02 03 04 88 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & 
Sessions Courts) 
01 02 03 04 88 
d) Federal Shariat Court 01 02 03 04 88 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other 
registered Madaris) 
01 02 03 04 88 
f) Ombudsman 01 02 03 04 88 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 01 02 03 04 88 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  01 02 03 04 88 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 03 04 88 
j) Biradari (clan) 01 02 03 04 88 
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k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 01 02 03 04 88 
l) Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon) / 
faislo or Baloch jirga  
01 02 03 04 88 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 03 04 88 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); 
nambardars (Village Headmen); tehsildars (Tehsil 
administration/revenue collection heads) or others 
01 02 03 04 88 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates 
etc.) 
01 02 03 04 88 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 03 04 88 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community 
Organizations 
01 02 03 04 88 
r) Local NGOs 01 02 03 04 88 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 01 02 03 04 88 
t) Local Crime lords 01 02 03 04 88 
u) Religious leader in the community 01 02 03 04 88 
v) Musalihati Council  01 02 03 04 88 
 
Q24. How familiar are you with international benchmark and standards for human rights and human 
rights protection? 
Very familiar Somewhat familiar Not at all familiar 
1 2 3 
 
Q25. How familiar are you with the rights, protections and remedies available under the Constitution 
and general laws and procedures of Pakistan? 
Very familiar Somewhat familiar Not at all familiar 
1 2 3 
 
 
Q26. How familiar are you with Islamic legal principles and legal injunction?  
Very familiar Somewhat familiar Not at all familiar 
1 2 3 
 
Q27: Do you agree that the following systems are in compliance with International Human Rights 
standards? 
Response
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
ag
re
e
 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
ag
re
e
 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
Do
n’
t 
Kn
ow
 
 
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local 
representatives (e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  
01 02 03 04 88 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High 
Courts) 
01 02 03 04 88 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District 
& Sessions Courts) 
01 02 03 04 88 
d) Federal Shariat Court 01 02 03 04 88 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or 
other registered Madaris) 
01 02 03 04 88 
f) Ombudsman 01 02 03 04 88 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 01 02 03 04 88 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  01 02 03 04 88 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 03 04 88 
j) Biradari (clan) 01 02 03 04 88 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village 
Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 
01 02 03 04 88 
l) Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, 
pareon) / faislo or Baloch jirga  
01 02 03 04 88 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 03 04 88 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record 
Keepers); nambardars (Village Headmen); tehsildars 
(Tehsil administration/rev enue collection heads) or 
others 
01 02 03 04 88 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District 
magistrates etc.) 
01 02 03 04 88 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 03 04 88 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community 
Organizations 
01 02 03 04 88 
r) Local NGOs 01 02 03 04 88 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a 
Fee 
01 02 03 04 88 
t) Local Crime lords 01 02 03 04 88 
u) Religious leader in the community 01 02 03 04 88 
v) Musalihati Council  01 02 03 04 88 
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k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 01 02 03 04 88 
l) Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon) / 
faislo or Baloch jirga  
01 02 03 04 88 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 03 04 88 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); 
nambardars (Village Headmen); tehsildars (Tehsil 
administration/revenue collection heads) or others 
01 02 03 04 88 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates 
etc.) 
01 02 03 04 88 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 03 04 88 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community 
Organizations 
01 02 03 04 88 
r) Local NGOs 01 02 03 04 88 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 01 02 03 04 88 
t) Local Crime lords 01 02 03 04 88 
u) Religious leader in the community 01 02 03 04 88 
v) Musalihati Council  01 02 03 04 88 
 
Q24. How familiar are you with international benchmark and standards for human rights and human 
rights protection? 
Very familiar Somewhat familiar Not at all familiar 
1 2 3 
 
Q25. How familiar are you with the rights, protections and remedies available under the Constitution 
and general laws and procedures of Pakistan? 
Very familiar Somewhat familiar Not at all familiar 
1 2 3 
 
 
Q26. How familiar are you with Islamic legal principles and legal injunction?  
Very familiar Somewhat familiar Not at all familiar 
1 2 3 
 
Q27: Do you agree that the following systems are in compliance with International Human Rights 
standards? 
Response
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
ag
re
e
 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
ag
re
e
 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
Do
n’
t 
Kn
ow
 
 
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local 
representatives (e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  
01 02 03 04 88 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High 
Courts) 
01 02 03 04 88 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District 
& Sessions Courts) 
01 02 03 04 88 
d) Federal Shariat Court 01 02 03 04 88 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or 
other registered Madaris) 
01 02 03 04 88 
f) Ombudsman 01 02 03 04 88 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 01 02 03 04 88 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  01 02 03 04 88 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 03 04 88 
j) Biradari (clan) 01 02 03 04 88 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village 
Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 
01 02 03 04 88 
l) Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, 
pareon) / faislo or Baloch jirga  
01 02 03 04 88 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 03 04 88 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record 
Keepers); nambardars (Village Headmen); tehsildars 
(Tehsil administration/rev enue collection heads) or 
others 
01 02 03 04 88 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District 
magistrates etc.) 
01 02 03 04 88 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 03 04 88 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community 
Organizations 
01 02 03 04 88 
r) Local NGOs 01 02 03 04 88 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a 
Fee 
01 02 03 04 88 
t) Local Crime lords 01 02 03 04 88 
u) Religious leader in the community 01 02 03 04 88 
v) Musalihati Council  01 02 03 04 88 
 
225 226
A
n
n
ex
 II
: Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
A
n
n
ex
 II
: Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
Q28: Do you agree that the following systems are in compliance with Fundamental Rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution of Pakistan? 
Response
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
ag
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e
 
So
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t 
ag
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e
 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
di
sa
gr
ee 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
di
sa
gr
ee 
Do
n’
t K
no
w
  
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives 
(e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  
01 02 03 04 88 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High 
Courts) 
01 02 03 04 88 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & 
Sessions Courts) 
01 02 03 04 88 
d) Federal Shariat Court 01 02 03 04 88 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other 
registered Madaris) 
01 02 03 04 88 
f) Ombudsman 01 02 03 04 88 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 01 02 03 04 88 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  01 02 03 04 88 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 03 04 88 
j) Biradari (clan) 01 02 03 04 88 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 01 02 03 04 88 
l) Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon) / 
faislo or Baloch jirga  
01 02 03 04 88 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 03 04 88 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (LandRecord Keepers); 
nambardars (Village Headmen); tehsildars (Tehsil 
administration/revenue collection heads) or others 
01 02 03 04 88 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates 
etc.) 
01 02 03 04 88 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 03 04 88 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community 
Organizations 
01 02 03 04 88 
r) Local NGOs 01 02 03 04 88 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 01 02 03 04 88 
t) Local Crime lords 01 02 03 04 88 
u) Religious leader in the community 01 02 03 04 88 
v) Musalihati Council  01 02 03 04 88 
 
 
 
 
Q29: Do you agree that the following systems are in compliance with Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions? 
Response
 
St
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ng
ly
 
ag
re
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So
m
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ha
t 
ag
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e
 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
di
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gr
ee  
St
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ng
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di
sa
gr
ee 
Do
n’
t K
no
w
  
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives 
(e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  
01 02 03 04 88 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High Courts) 01 02 03 04 88 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & 
Sessions Courts) 
01 02 03 04 88 
d) Federal Shariat Court 01 02 03 04 88 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other 
registered Madaris) 
01 02 03 04 88 
f) Ombudsman 01 02 03 04 88 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 01 02 03 04 88 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  01 02 03 04 88 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 03 04 88 
j) Biradari (clan) 01 02 03 04 88 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 01 02 03 04 88 
l) Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon ) / 
faislo or Baloch jirga  
01 02 03 04 88 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 03 04 88 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); 
nambardars (Village Headmen); tehsildars (Tehsil 
administration/revenue collection heads) or others 
01 02 03 04 88 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates 
etc.) 
01 02 03 04 88 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 03 04 88 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community 
Organizations 
01 02 03 04 88 
r) Local NGOs 01 02 03 04 88 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 01 02 03 04 88 
t) Local Crime lords 01 02 03 04 88 
u) Religious leader in the community 01 02 03 04 88 
v) Musalihati Council  01 02 03 04 88 
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Q28: Do you agree that the following systems are in compliance with Fundamental Rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution of Pakistan? 
Response
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
ag
re
e
 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
ag
re
e
 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
di
sa
gr
ee 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
di
sa
gr
ee 
Do
n’
t K
no
w
  
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives 
(e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  
01 02 03 04 88 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High 
Courts) 
01 02 03 04 88 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & 
Sessions Courts) 
01 02 03 04 88 
d) Federal Shariat Court 01 02 03 04 88 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other 
registered Madaris) 
01 02 03 04 88 
f) Ombudsman 01 02 03 04 88 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 01 02 03 04 88 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  01 02 03 04 88 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 03 04 88 
j) Biradari (clan) 01 02 03 04 88 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 01 02 03 04 88 
l) Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon) / 
faislo or Baloch jirga  
01 02 03 04 88 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 03 04 88 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (LandRecord Keepers); 
nambardars (Village Headmen); tehsildars (Tehsil 
administration/revenue collection heads) or others 
01 02 03 04 88 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates 
etc.) 
01 02 03 04 88 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 03 04 88 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community 
Organizations 
01 02 03 04 88 
r) Local NGOs 01 02 03 04 88 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 01 02 03 04 88 
t) Local Crime lords 01 02 03 04 88 
u) Religious leader in the community 01 02 03 04 88 
v) Musalihati Council  01 02 03 04 88 
 
 
 
 
Q29: Do you agree that the following systems are in compliance with Islamic principles and legal 
injunctions? 
Response
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
ag
re
e
 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
ag
re
e
 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
di
sa
gr
ee  
St
ro
ng
ly
 
di
sa
gr
ee 
Do
n’
t K
no
w
  
a) Provincial Police Authorities and their local representatives 
(e.g. S.H.O, D.S.P., etc.)  
01 02 03 04 88 
b) Superior Courts in Pakistan ( Supreme Court and High Courts) 01 02 03 04 88 
c) Lower Courts in Pakistan (Judicial Magistrate, District & 
Sessions Courts) 
01 02 03 04 88 
d) Federal Shariat Court 01 02 03 04 88 
e) Religious seminary boards (e.g. Wafaq ul Madaris or other 
registered Madaris) 
01 02 03 04 88 
f) Ombudsman 01 02 03 04 88 
g) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 01 02 03 04 88 
h) Khandaan (extended family)  01 02 03 04 88 
i) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 03 04 88 
j) Biradari (clan) 01 02 03 04 88 
k) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 01 02 03 04 88 
l) Village panchayat (akhat, pareh, pareh panchayat, pareon ) / 
faislo or Baloch jirga  
01 02 03 04 88 
m) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 03 04 88 
n) Local Bureaucracy – patwaris (Land Record Keepers); 
nambardars (Village Headmen); tehsildars (Tehsil 
administration/revenue collection heads) or others 
01 02 03 04 88 
o) District Civil Bureaucracy (DROs, DCOs, District magistrates 
etc.) 
01 02 03 04 88 
p) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 03 04 88 
q) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community 
Organizations 
01 02 03 04 88 
r) Local NGOs 01 02 03 04 88 
s) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 01 02 03 04 88 
t) Local Crime lords 01 02 03 04 88 
u) Religious leader in the community 01 02 03 04 88 
v) Musalihati Council  01 02 03 04 88 
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3.3 HEARING AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEM  
 
Q30: How long have any of the following informal justice systems been operating in your 
community/area? 
Response
 
0-
5 
Ye
ar
s 
-6
25
 
Ye
ar
s 
26
-5
0 
Ye
ar
s 
50
 + 
Ye
ar
s 
Do
n’
t 
kn
ow 
N
ot
 e
xi
st
 
a) Local/Village panchayat  or faislo or Baloch 
jirga 
01 02 03 04 88 55 
b) Khandaan 01 02 03 04 88 55 
c) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 03 04 88 55 
d) Biradari 01 02 03 04 88 55 
e) Self-Provision Village Organizations; 
Community Organizations 
01 02 03 04 88 55 
f) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that 
charge a Fee 
01 02 03 04 88 55 
g) Local Crime lords 01 02 03 04 88 55 
h) Religious leader in the community 01 02 03 04 88 55 
i) Local Large Landowner (Village 
Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 
01 02 03 04 88 55 
j) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 03 04 88 55 
k) Local NGOs 01 02 03 04 88 55 
l) Musalihati Council 01 02 03 04 88 55 
m) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 03 04 88 55 
 
Q31: What is the composition of the informal justice system in your community/area? – Who are 
the members? (Multiple-choice response is allowed) 
Response Code 
Local respected citizens (who are not politicians) 1 
Local wealthy and influential people (who are not politicians), 2 
Local politicians 3 
Councillors of the Union Councils 4 
Religious leaders 5 
Civil society members 6 
clan or tribal elders 7 
local members of civil bureaucracy 8 
local police, other government representatives 9 
Other (specify) 77 
 
 
 
Q32: Do women have representation in informal justice system?  
Response Yes No Don’t know 
a) Local Village panchayat or faislo or Baloch jirga 01 02 88 
b) Khandaan 01 02 88 
c) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 88 
d) Biradari 01 02 88 
e) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community Organizations 01 02 88 
f) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 01 02 88 
g) Religious leader in the community 01 02 88 
h) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 01 02 88 
i) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 88 
j) Local NGOs 01 02 88 
k) Musalihati Council 01 02 88 
l) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 88 
 
 
Q33: Do non-local ethnic and/or tribal groups have representation in the informal justice system?  
 
 
Q34: Do religious minorities (Christians, Sikhs and Hindus) have representation in informal justice 
system?  
Response Yes No Don’t know 
a) Local Village panchayat or faislo or Baloch jirga 01 02 88 
b) Khandaan 01 02 88 
c) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 88 
d) Biradari 01 02 88 
e) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community Organizations 01 02 88 
f) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 01 02 88 
g) Local Crime lords 01 02 88 
h) Religious leader in the community 01 02 88 
i) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 01 02 88 
j) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 88 
k) Local NGOs 01 02 88 
l) Musalihati Council 01 02 88 
m) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 88 
Response Yes No Don’t know 
a) Local Village panchayat or faislo or Baloch jirga 01 02 88 
b) Khandaan 01 02 88 
c) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 88 
d) Biradari 01 02 88 
e) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community Organizations 01 02 88 
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3.3 HEARING AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEM  
 
Q30: How long have any of the following informal justice systems been operating in your 
community/area? 
Response
 
0-
5 
Ye
ar
s 
-6
25
 
Ye
ar
s 
26
-5
0 
Ye
ar
s 
50
 + 
Ye
ar
s 
Do
n’
t 
kn
ow 
N
ot
 e
xi
st
 
a) Local/Village panchayat  or faislo or Baloch 
jirga 
01 02 03 04 88 55 
b) Khandaan 01 02 03 04 88 55 
c) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 03 04 88 55 
d) Biradari 01 02 03 04 88 55 
e) Self-Provision Village Organizations; 
Community Organizations 
01 02 03 04 88 55 
f) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that 
charge a Fee 
01 02 03 04 88 55 
g) Local Crime lords 01 02 03 04 88 55 
h) Religious leader in the community 01 02 03 04 88 55 
i) Local Large Landowner (Village 
Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 
01 02 03 04 88 55 
j) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 03 04 88 55 
k) Local NGOs 01 02 03 04 88 55 
l) Musalihati Council 01 02 03 04 88 55 
m) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 03 04 88 55 
 
Q31: What is the composition of the informal justice system in your community/area? – Who are 
the members? (Multiple-choice response is allowed) 
Response Code 
Local respected citizens (who are not politicians) 1 
Local wealthy and influential people (who are not politicians), 2 
Local politicians 3 
Councillors of the Union Councils 4 
Religious leaders 5 
Civil society members 6 
clan or tribal elders 7 
local members of civil bureaucracy 8 
local police, other government representatives 9 
Other (specify) 77 
 
 
 
Q32: Do women have representation in informal justice system?  
Response Yes No Don’t know 
a) Local Village panchayat or faislo or Baloch jirga 01 02 88 
b) Khandaan 01 02 88 
c) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 88 
d) Biradari 01 02 88 
e) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community Organizations 01 02 88 
f) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 01 02 88 
g) Religious leader in the community 01 02 88 
h) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 01 02 88 
i) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 88 
j) Local NGOs 01 02 88 
k) Musalihati Council 01 02 88 
l) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 88 
 
 
Q33: Do non-local ethnic and/or tribal groups have representation in the informal justice system?  
 
 
Q34: Do religious minorities (Christians, Sikhs and Hindus) have representation in informal justice 
system?  
Response Yes No Don’t know 
a) Local Village panchayat or faislo or Baloch jirga 01 02 88 
b) Khandaan 01 02 88 
c) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 88 
d) Biradari 01 02 88 
e) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community Organizations 01 02 88 
f) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 01 02 88 
g) Local Crime lords 01 02 88 
h) Religious leader in the community 01 02 88 
i) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 01 02 88 
j) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 88 
k) Local NGOs 01 02 88 
l) Musalihati Council 01 02 88 
m) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 88 
Response Yes No Don’t know 
a) Local Village panchayat or faislo or Baloch jirga 01 02 88 
b) Khandaan 01 02 88 
c) Mohalla (neighborhood) 01 02 88 
d) Biradari 01 02 88 
e) Self-Provision Village Organizations; Community Organizations 01 02 88 
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3.4 HEARING AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
 
Q35: Who attends the proceedings of informal dispute resolution system? (Multiple-choice response 
is allowed) 
Response Code 
Only members of the dispute resolution mechanism  1 
The entire community, including minorities 2 
The entire community, except minorities  3 
Only the heads of the families involved in the dispute 4 
Women allowed to attend 5 
Government officials 6 
Other (Specify:____________________________________) 77 
 
Q36: Have you attended these proceedings? 
Response Code  
Yes 1 Go to Q37 
No 2 Go to Q38 
 
Q37: If yes, in which capacity?  
Response Code 
As an informal dispute resolution mechanism member 1 
As a Government official 2 
As a disputant 3 
As an observer 4 
Others (specify) 77 
 
Q38: How do informal dispute resolution systems convene their proceedings? 
Response Code 
In open  1 
Behind closed doors 2 
 
Q39: Are both parties to the dispute always present at the hearing? 
Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
f) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 01 02 88 
g) Local Crime lords 01 02 88 
h) Religious leader in the community 01 02 88 
i) Local Large Landowner (Village Chaudhry/Malik/Wadera) 01 02 88 
j) Local Influential(s)(local, provincial, national) 01 02 88 
k) Local NGOs 01 02 88 
l) Musalihati Council 01 02 88 
m) Political Groupings/vote banks (dharras) 01 02 88 
 
Q40: Is the decision of informal dispute resolution system final? 
Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Sometimes 3 
 
Q41: Is there a provision of appeal in the informal dispute  resolution system proceedings? 
Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q42: Does the informal dispute resolution mechanism itself allow any appeals or are there any 
other higher informal mechanisms to appeal to? 
Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q43: In your view do the disputants who are not satisfied with the outcomes/discisions of informal 
dispute resolution mechanisms then take their disputes to formal courts and tribunals? 
Almost 
always 
Most of the 
times 
Fairly 
frequently 
Sometimes Almost 
never 
Don’t 
know 
Other 
(Specify) 
1 2 3 4 5 88 77 
 
Q44: How are informal dispute resolution system decisions usually taken? (Single response) 
Response Code 
Through consensus 1 
Unanimously (Unanimous decision by all members) 2 
Through vote (Majority decision) 3 
There is discussion and input but the head of the IDRM is the one who ultimately decides’ 4 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q45: What procedures/rules are applied to resolve conflict/dispute through the informal dispute 
resolution system? 
Response Code 
Customary or tribal laws and rules 1 
Islamic law 2 
Combination of both 3 
Other (Specify:__________________________________________) 77 
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Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
f) Private Dispute Resolution Mechanisms that charge a Fee 01 02 88 
g) Local Crime lords 01 02 88 
h) Religious leader in the community 01 02 88 
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Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q42: Does the informal dispute resolution mechanism itself allow any appeals or are there any 
other higher informal mechanisms to appeal to? 
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No 2 
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Q43: In your view do the disputants who are not satisfied with the outcomes/discisions of informal 
dispute resolution mechanisms then take their disputes to formal courts and tribunals? 
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always 
Most of the 
times 
Fairly 
frequently 
Sometimes Almost 
never 
Don’t 
know 
Other 
(Specify) 
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Q44: How are informal dispute resolution system decisions usually taken? (Single response) 
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Through consensus 1 
Unanimously (Unanimous decision by all members) 2 
Through vote (Majority decision) 3 
There is discussion and input but the head of the IDRM is the one who ultimately decides’ 4 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q45: What procedures/rules are applied to resolve conflict/dispute through the informal dispute 
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Q46: Are you satisfied with the evidence collection and fact-finding mechanism of informal dispute 
resolution mechanisms? 
Response Code 
Satisfied   01 
Somewhat Satisfied  02 
Dissatisfied  03 
Somewhat dissatisfied  04 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q47: Do the disputants pay a fee for using the informal dispute resolution system when their 
disputes are resolved through it? 
Response Code  
Yes 01 Go to Q48 
No 02 Go to Q49 
Don’t know 88 Go to Q49 
 
Q48: If yes, what is this amount? 
Response Code 
It depends on the paying capacity of the disputants 1 
It is a lump sum amount to cover expenses related with the dispute resolution process and 
proceedings 
2 
It varies according to the seriousness of the dispute and the stakes involved 3 
It depends on how much time and effort it takes to resolve the dispute 4 
There are standard fees charged for different kinds of disputes  5 
Other (Specify:____________________________________) 77 
 
Q49: Does the police/local administration have a role in the functioning of the informal dispute  
resolution system? 
Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q50: Does the the police/local administration play a role in the implementation of the informal 
dispute  resolution system’s decisions? 
Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q51: Is there any provision for the parties to appoint a legal representative (similar to a lawyer in 
formal justice system) in the informal dispute resolution system proceedings? 
Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q52: Which sections of the community display more faith in informal dispute resolution systems? 
(Please give only 3 responses) 
Response Code 
Tribal elders 1 
Religious leaders 2 
Women 3 
Men 4 
Ethnic and religious minorities 5 
Ethnic and religious majorities 6 
Community as a whole 7 
Political and influential families 8 
The more affluent 9 
The poor 10 
The landed 11 
The landless 12 
Upper caste people 13 
Lower caste people 14 
Other (specify) 77 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q53: Do you believe that your community will support the informal dispute  resolution system if it is 
recognized and integrated with the state’s formal justice system like the Supreme Court/High 
Court/Session Court? 
Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know 88 
Q54:  What should be the nature of such recognition and integration? 
Reponse Code 
a) that the state determines which kinds of disputes should be heard and decided exclusively 
by informal dispute resolution mechanisms 1 
b) that the courts should decide which kinds of disputes should be heard and decided 
exclusively by the informal dispute resolution mechanisms 2 
c) that the state/courts decide that which kinds of disputes should be exclusively heard and 
decided by informal mechanism but that there are certain situations where an appeal can 
lie with the courts even in these cases; 
3 
d) Though the informal mechanisms be allowed the power to be the first forum for hearing 
all kinds of disputes but that everything can be potentially appealed to the courts 4 
e) that the informal dispute resolution mechanisms be allowed to decide all disputes if they 
follow a certain basic process laid down by the state/courts and such decisions will have 5 
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Q46: Are you satisfied with the evidence collection and fact-finding mechanism of informal dispute 
resolution mechanisms? 
Response Code 
Satisfied   01 
Somewhat Satisfied  02 
Dissatisfied  03 
Somewhat dissatisfied  04 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q47: Do the disputants pay a fee for using the informal dispute resolution system when their 
disputes are resolved through it? 
Response Code  
Yes 01 Go to Q48 
No 02 Go to Q49 
Don’t know 88 Go to Q49 
 
Q48: If yes, what is this amount? 
Response Code 
It depends on the paying capacity of the disputants 1 
It is a lump sum amount to cover expenses related with the dispute resolution process and 
proceedings 
2 
It varies according to the seriousness of the dispute and the stakes involved 3 
It depends on how much time and effort it takes to resolve the dispute 4 
There are standard fees charged for different kinds of disputes  5 
Other (Specify:____________________________________) 77 
 
Q49: Does the police/local administration have a role in the functioning of the informal dispute  
resolution system? 
Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q50: Does the the police/local administration play a role in the implementation of the informal 
dispute  resolution system’s decisions? 
Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q51: Is there any provision for the parties to appoint a legal representative (similar to a lawyer in 
formal justice system) in the informal dispute resolution system proceedings? 
Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q52: Which sections of the community display more faith in informal dispute resolution systems? 
(Please give only 3 responses) 
Response Code 
Tribal elders 1 
Religious leaders 2 
Women 3 
Men 4 
Ethnic and religious minorities 5 
Ethnic and religious majorities 6 
Community as a whole 7 
Political and influential families 8 
The more affluent 9 
The poor 10 
The landed 11 
The landless 12 
Upper caste people 13 
Lower caste people 14 
Other (specify) 77 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q53: Do you believe that your community will support the informal dispute  resolution system if it is 
recognized and integrated with the state’s formal justice system like the Supreme Court/High 
Court/Session Court? 
Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know 88 
Q54:  What should be the nature of such recognition and integration? 
Reponse Code 
a) that the state determines which kinds of disputes should be heard and decided exclusively 
by informal dispute resolution mechanisms 1 
b) that the courts should decide which kinds of disputes should be heard and decided 
exclusively by the informal dispute resolution mechanisms 2 
c) that the state/courts decide that which kinds of disputes should be exclusively heard and 
decided by informal mechanism but that there are certain situations where an appeal can 
lie with the courts even in these cases; 
3 
d) Though the informal mechanisms be allowed the power to be the first forum for hearing 
all kinds of disputes but that everything can be potentially appealed to the courts 4 
e) that the informal dispute resolution mechanisms be allowed to decide all disputes if they 
follow a certain basic process laid down by the state/courts and such decisions will have 5 
233 234
A
n
n
ex
 II
: Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
A
n
n
ex
 II
: Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
Don’t know
Don’t know
Somewhat Agree 02 
Somewhat Disagree 03 
Strongly Disagree 04 
Don’t know 88 
No response 99 
 
Q59:  How strongly do you agree/disagree with the following statements?  
Response
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a) both parties are provided with equal opportunities to 
express their views in informal dispute resolution system 
process 
01 02 03 04 88 
b) nepotism or favouritism influence the decision making 
process of informal dispute resolution system 
01 02 03 04 88 
c) decisions given by informal dispute resolution system are 
unbiased and free from all kinds of pressure from the 
economically and politically powerful section of the 
society 
01 02 03 04 88 
d) some decisions of informal dispute resolution systems are 
harsh and not commensurate with the deed done 
01 02 03 04 88 
e) informal dispute resolution system verdicts come into 
conflict with modern notions of justice or human rights 
01 02 03 04 88 
f) informal dispute resolution system fails to resolve 
disputes effectively 
01 02 03 04 88 
g) informal dispute resolution system violates women’s 
rights 
01 02 03 04 88 
h) informal dispute resolution system violates minorities’ 
rights 
01 02 03 04 88 
i) informal dispute resolution system maintains social order 
and restores harmony in a community 
01 02 03 04 88 
j) informal dispute resolution system plays a positive role in 
conflict transformation and conflict resolution. 
01 02 03 04 88 
k) informal dispute resolution system plays a positive role in 
reducing the levels of militancy in the region 
01 02 03 04 88 
l) informal dispute resolution system is well placed to 
resolve civil disputes only 
01 02 03 04 88 
m) informal dispute resolution system reintegrates and 
rehabilitates offenders into the community 
01 02 03 04 88 
n) informal dispute resolution system is well placed to 
resolve both civil and criminal disputes 
01 02 03 04 88 
o) informal dispute resolution system contributes to rule of 
law 
01 02 03 04 88 
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Q55: If recognized and integrated do you think informal dispute resolution systems could be 
plagued by the same weaknesses that afflict the existing formal justice system like the Supreme 
Court/High Court/Session Court?
Q56: Once recognized and integrated, would informal dispute resolution systems lose the 
advantages they have over the formal justice system like the Supreme Court/High 
Court/Session Court (less expensive, speedy, less corrupt, etc)?
Q57: How strongly do you agree/disagree with the statement: 'informal dispute resolution 
system is a speedy and less expensive mechanism of dispute resolution'?
Q58: How strongly do you agree with the statement: 'One of the main outcomes of the 
informal dispute  resolution system's decisions is a fair compensation to victims'? 
Don’t know
Don’t know
Somewhat Agree 02 
Somewhat Disagree 03 
Strongly Disagree 04 
Don’t know 88 
No response 99 
 
Q59:  How strongly do you agree/disagree with the following statements?  
Response
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a) both parties are provided with equal opportunities to 
express their views in informal dispute resolution system 
process 
01 02 03 04 88 
b) nepotism or favouritism influence the decision making 
process of informal dispute resolution system 
01 02 03 04 88 
c) decisions given by informal dispute resolution system are 
unbiased and free from all kinds of pressure from the 
economically and politically powerful section of the 
society 
01 02 03 04 88 
d) some decisions of informal dispute resolution systems are 
harsh and not commensurate with the deed done 
01 02 03 04 88 
e) informal dispute resolution system verdicts come into 
conflict with modern notions of justice or human rights 
01 02 03 04 88 
f) informal dispute resolution system fails to resolve 
disputes effectively 
01 02 03 04 88 
g) informal dispute resolution system violates women’s 
rights 
01 02 03 04 88 
h) informal dispute resolution system violates minorities’ 
rights 
01 02 03 04 88 
i) informal dispute resolution system maintains social order 
and restores harmony in a community 
01 02 03 04 88 
j) informal dispute resolution system plays a positive role in 
conflict transformation and conflict resolution. 
01 02 03 04 88 
k) informal dispute resolution system plays a positive role in 
reducing the levels of militancy in the region 
01 02 03 04 88 
l) informal dispute resolution system is well placed to 
resolve civil disputes only 
01 02 03 04 88 
m) informal dispute resolution system reintegrates and 
rehabilitates offenders into the community 
01 02 03 04 88 
n) informal dispute resolution system is well placed to 
resolve both civil and criminal disputes 
01 02 03 04 88 
o) informal dispute resolution system contributes to rule of 
law 
01 02 03 04 88 
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Q55: If recognized and integrated do you think informal dispute resolution systems could be 
plagued by the same weaknesses that afflict the existing formal justice system like the Supreme 
Court/High Court/Session Court?
Q56: Once recognized and integrated, would informal dispute resolution systems lose the 
advantages they have over the formal justice system like the Supreme Court/High 
Court/Session Court (less expensive, speedy, less corrupt, etc)?
Q57: How strongly do you agree/disagree with the statement: 'informal dispute resolution 
system is a speedy and less expensive mechanism of dispute resolution'?
Q58: How strongly do you agree with the statement: 'One of the main outcomes of the 
informal dispute  resolution system's decisions is a fair compensation to victims'? 
p) informal dispute resolution system resolves some very 
serious crimes 
01 02 03 04 88 
q) informal dispute resolution system is organized, well 
established, transparent and an efficient institution in 
society 
01 02 03 04 88 
r) informal dispute resolution system makes lasting Aman 
among disputants and reduces the possibility of future 
disputes as well as long-running vendetta 
01 02 03 04 88 
s) informal dispute resolution mechanism will always be a 
simpler and more intelligible option than the formal 
courts 
01 02 03 04 88 
t) informal dispute resolution mechanisms will always be a 
less time-consuming and more expeditious option than 
the formal courts 
01 02 03 04 88 
  
 
60: How strongly do you support the involvement of government officials in informal dispute 
resolution system proceedings?  
Response Code 
Strongly support 01 
Somewhat support 02 
Somewhat oppose  03 
Strongly oppose  04 
Don’t know 88 
No response  99 
 
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM VERDICTS 
 
Q61: How are the decisions of informal dispute resolution systems mostly implemented? (Multiple 
responses are allowed) 
Response Code 
Through social/community pressure and disrepute  1 
Through riwaaj and other local norms 2 
Through force or threat of violence/violence  3 
Through police and local administration 4 
Through financial penalty  5 
Through social excommunication or exile 6 
Through cooperation with the other party in whose favor the decision was made if the 
matter proceeds to police or court 
7 
Other (specify) 88 
 
Q62: If the decision is not acceptable to a party, what happens? (Multiple responses are allowed)  
Response Code 
The accused party can take the case to another informal dispute resolution system 1 
The accused party can take the case to the formal court 2 
The accused party can appeal the same to informal dispute resolution system 3 
The accused party simply defies the informal dispute resolution system decision 4 
The accused party can take the case to the police 5 
Other (specify) 77 
 
8. THE STATE OF RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND POOR IN THE INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM. 
Q63: Do you agree with the statement, that the informal dispute resol ution systems are at times 
biased against women when resolving matrimonial disputes including divorce and custody of children? 
Response Code 
Strongly agreed 01 
Somewhat agreed 02 
Somewhat disagreed 03 
Strongly disagreed 04 
Don’t know 88 
No response  99 
 
Q64: Do you agree with the statement that informal dispute resolution mechanisms are 
biased against the poor?
 
Q65: Do you support/oppose the informal dispute resolution system making decisions in  favour of 
honour killing?
 
Q66: Do you agree/disagree with the statement, that there is no representation of women in the 
informal dispute resolution system ? 
Response Code 
Strongly agreed 01 
Somewhat agreed 02 
Somewhat disagreed 03 
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Response Code 
Strongly agreed 01 
Somewhat agreed 02 
Somewhat disagreed 03 
Strongly disagreed 04 
Don’t know 88 
No response  99 
 
Response Code 
Strongly agreed 01 
Somewhat agreed 02 
Somewhat disagreed 03 
Strongly disagreed 04 
Don’t know 88 
No response  99 
p) informal dispute resolution system resolves some very 
serious crimes 
01 02 03 04 88 
q) informal dispute resolution system is organized, well 
established, transparent and an efficient institution in 
society 
01 02 03 04 88 
r) informal dispute resolution system makes lasting Aman 
among disputants and reduces the possibility of future 
disputes as well as long-running vendetta 
01 02 03 04 88 
s) informal dispute resolution mechanism will always be a 
simpler and more intelligible option than the formal 
courts 
01 02 03 04 88 
t) informal dispute resolution mechanisms will always be a 
less time-consuming and more expeditious option than 
the formal courts 
01 02 03 04 88 
  
 
60: How strongly do you support the involvement of government officials in informal dispute 
resolution system proceedings?  
Response Code 
Strongly support 01 
Somewhat support 02 
Somewhat oppose  03 
Strongly oppose  04 
Don’t know 88 
No response  99 
 
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM VERDICTS 
 
Q61: How are the decisions of informal dispute resolution systems mostly implemented? (Multiple 
responses are allowed) 
Response Code 
Through social/community pressure and disrepute  1 
Through riwaaj and other local norms 2 
Through force or threat of violence/violence  3 
Through police and local administration 4 
Through financial penalty  5 
Through social excommunication or exile 6 
Through cooperation with the other party in whose favor the decision was made if the 
matter proceeds to police or court 
7 
Other (specify) 88 
 
Q62: If the decision is not acceptable to a party, what happens? (Multiple responses are allowed)  
Response Code 
The accused party can take the case to another informal dispute resolution system 1 
The accused party can take the case to the formal court 2 
The accused party can appeal the same to informal dispute resolution system 3 
The accused party simply defies the informal dispute resolution system decision 4 
The accused party can take the case to the police 5 
Other (specify) 77 
 
8. THE STATE OF RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND POOR IN THE INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM. 
Q63: Do you agree with the statement, that the informal dispute resol ution systems are at times 
biased against women when resolving matrimonial disputes including divorce and custody of children? 
Response Code 
Strongly agreed 01 
Somewhat agreed 02 
Somewhat disagreed 03 
Strongly disagreed 04 
Don’t know 88 
No response  99 
 
Q64: Do you agree with the statement that informal dispute resolution mechanisms are 
biased against the poor?
 
Q65: Do you support/oppose the informal dispute resolution system making decisions in  favour of 
honour killing?
 
Q66: Do you agree/disagree with the statement, that there is no representation of women in the 
informal dispute resolution system ? 
Response Code 
Strongly agreed 01 
Somewhat agreed 02 
Somewhat disagreed 03 
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Response Code 
Strongly agreed 01 
Somewhat agreed 02 
Somewhat disagreed 03 
Strongly disagreed 04 
Don’t know 88 
No response  99 
 
Response Code 
Strongly agreed 01 
Somewhat agreed 02 
Somewhat disagreed 03 
Strongly disagreed 04 
Don’t know 88 
No response  99 
Strongly disagreed 04 
Don’t know 88 
No response 99 
 
Q67: Do you agree/disagree with the statement, that there is no representation of poor in the 
informal dispute resolution system ?
 
Q68: Do you agre e/disagree that there is effective indirect representation of women (through male 
relatives) in the informal dispute resolution system? 
 
Q69: Do local customs such as swara/wani/karo kari/Marrying women to Quran/bride price and 
jhag, suitably and fairly resolve some complex local issues which can’t be solved otherwise or by the 
formal legal system? 
Response Code 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q70: Do you believe that swara/wani/karo kari /marrying women to Quran/bride price and jhag 
violate women’s rights? 
Response Code 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Don’t know 88 
 
9. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORMS 
Q71: How strongly do you agree/disagree with the statements listed below?  
Response
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a) informal dispute resolution system decisions should be 
recorded officially 01 02 03 04 88 
b) informal dispute resolution system decisions should be 
enforced officially 01 02 03 04 88 
c) Provision of a right to appeal to the Courts against informal 
dispute resolution system decisions 01 02 03 04 88 
d) Final informal dispute resolution system  decision need to be 
subject to the approval of appropriate Pakistani Human Rights 
bodies 
01 02 03 04 88 
e) Women should be given the right to sit in the informal dispute 
resolution system proceedings 01 02 03 04 88 
f) Women should be given representation in the decision-making 
body of an informal dispute resolution system as member 01 02 03 04 88 
g) Religious and ethnic minorities should be allowed to sit in the 
informal dispute resolution system proceedings  01 02 03 04 88 
h) Religious minorities should be given a fair chance to resolve their 
disputes according to their customs and religious beliefs 01 02 03 04 88 
i) informal dispute resolution system can be integrated into 
formal justice system 01 02 03 04 88 
j) informal dispute resolution system members should be elected 
through a proper electoral process 01 02 03 04 88 
k) informal dispute resolution system members should be 
sensitized through an educational programme on Human 
Rights, Women Rights, Shariah, and Constitution of Pakistan 
01 02 03 04 88 
l) Women’s informal dispute resolution system institutions should 
be formed to resolve women issues 01 02 03 04 88 
m) Informal dispute resolution system should be utilized 
effectively to bring reform in the customs and to ban traditional 
practices such as swara/wani/karo kari /Marrying women to 
Quran, bride price and jhag.  
01 02 03 04 88 
n) informal dispute resolution system institutions should play a 
role in conflict transformation/resolution 01 02 03 04 88 
o) informal dispute resolution system should play its role in 
reducing the level of militancy in the area 01 02 03 04 88 
p) state should decide that certain kinds of disputes should only 
be decided by formal courts and rest can go to informal 01 02 03 04 88 
q) state should decide that certain categories of cases can’t be 
decided by informal at all 01 02 03 04 88 
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Response Code 
Strongly agreed 01 
Somewhat agreed 02 
Somewhat disagreed 03 
Strongly disagreed 04 
Don’t know 88 
No response  99 
 
Response Code 
Strongly agreed 01 
Somewhat agreed 02 
Somewhat disagreed 03 
Strongly disagreed 04 
Don’t know 88 
No response  99 
Strongly disagreed 04 
Don’t know 88 
No response 99 
 
Q67: Do you agree/disagree with the statement, that there is no representation of poor in the 
informal dispute resolution system ?
 
Q68: Do you agre e/disagree that there is effective indirect representation of women (through male 
relatives) in the informal dispute resolution system? 
 
Q69: Do local customs such as swara/wani/karo kari/Marrying women to Quran/bride price and 
jhag, suitably and fairly resolve some complex local issues which can’t be solved otherwise or by the 
formal legal system? 
Response Code 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Don’t know 88 
 
Q70: Do you believe that swara/wani/karo kari /marrying women to Quran/bride price and jhag 
violate women’s rights? 
Response Code 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Don’t know 88 
 
9. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORMS 
Q71: How strongly do you agree/disagree with the statements listed below?  
Response
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a) informal dispute resolution system decisions should be 
recorded officially 01 02 03 04 88 
b) informal dispute resolution system decisions should be 
enforced officially 01 02 03 04 88 
c) Provision of a right to appeal to the Courts against informal 
dispute resolution system decisions 01 02 03 04 88 
d) Final informal dispute resolution system  decision need to be 
subject to the approval of appropriate Pakistani Human Rights 
bodies 
01 02 03 04 88 
e) Women should be given the right to sit in the informal dispute 
resolution system proceedings 01 02 03 04 88 
f) Women should be given representation in the decision-making 
body of an informal dispute resolution system as member 01 02 03 04 88 
g) Religious and ethnic minorities should be allowed to sit in the 
informal dispute resolution system proceedings  01 02 03 04 88 
h) Religious minorities should be given a fair chance to resolve their 
disputes according to their customs and religious beliefs 01 02 03 04 88 
i) informal dispute resolution system can be integrated into 
formal justice system 01 02 03 04 88 
j) informal dispute resolution system members should be elected 
through a proper electoral process 01 02 03 04 88 
k) informal dispute resolution system members should be 
sensitized through an educational programme on Human 
Rights, Women Rights, Shariah, and Constitution of Pakistan 
01 02 03 04 88 
l) Women’s informal dispute resolution system institutions should 
be formed to resolve women issues 01 02 03 04 88 
m) Informal dispute resolution system should be utilized 
effectively to bring reform in the customs and to ban traditional 
practices such as swara/wani/karo kari /Marrying women to 
Quran, bride price and jhag.  
01 02 03 04 88 
n) informal dispute resolution system institutions should play a 
role in conflict transformation/resolution 01 02 03 04 88 
o) informal dispute resolution system should play its role in 
reducing the level of militancy in the area 01 02 03 04 88 
p) state should decide that certain kinds of disputes should only 
be decided by formal courts and rest can go to informal 01 02 03 04 88 
q) state should decide that certain categories of cases can’t be 
decided by informal at all 01 02 03 04 88 
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Response Code 
Strongly agreed 01 
Somewhat agreed 02 
Somewhat disagreed 03 
Strongly disagreed 04 
Don’t know 88 
No response  99 
 
Response Code 
Strongly agreed 01 
Somewhat agreed 02 
Somewhat disagreed 03 
Strongly disagreed 04 
Don’t know 88 
No response  99 
r) state should decide that in all cases involving Fundamental 
Right under the Constitution the informal decisions can be 
appealed in an expedition manner 
01 02 03 04 88 
s) The membership of a recognized informal dispute resolution 
mechanism should also go through some kind of a state 
approval 
01 02 03 04 88 
 
 
Q72: Rough distance from home to the district courts (in Kilometers): 
Response Code Response Code 
Less than 2 kms 1 Between 2 and 5 kms 2 
Between 6and 10 kms 3 Between 11 and 15 kms 4 
Between 16 and 20 kms 5 Between 21 and 30 kms 6 
Between 31 and 50 kms 7 Over 50 kms 8 
 
Q73: Mode of Transportation routinely used by respondent for everyday transportation   
Response Code Response Code 
Public transport 
(bus/rickshaw/taxi/Tonga)  
1 Private car 2 
Private motor cycle 3 Car/motor cycle belonging to a friend or 
relative 
4 
Rented car/motorcycle 5 Bicycle 6 
Pedestrian 7 Other (Specify____________________) 77 
 
10. DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
D10.1:  Gender of respondents:  
 
Male       1     Female     2     
 
D10.2: Age group of respondent 
Response Code Response Code 
18-24 years 1 51-60 years 4 
25-39 years 2 over 60 years 5 
40-50 years 3   
 
D10.3: Education level of respondent 
Response Code Response Code 
Not schooled 1 Schooled up to Secondary Certificate 
level (Matriculation)  
8 
Basic schooling plus some vocational 
education 
2 Schooled up to Intermediate level  9 
Madrassa education 2-5 years  3 Schooled up to Bachelor level 10 
Madrassa education 6-10 years 4 Master degree 11 
Madrassa/seminary education of more than 
10 years 
5 Those up to professional education 
(Doctors, Lawyers and Engineers)or 
higher education than an MA 
12 
Schooled up to Primary level 6 vocational/education leading to a 
diploma in some 
trade/craft/technical ability 
13 
Schooled up to Middle level 7   
 
D10.4: Education level of head of the household 
Response Code Response Code 
Not schooled 1 Schooled up to Secondary Certificate 
level (Matriculation)  
8 
Basic schooling plus some vocational 
education 
2 Schooled up to Intermediate level  9 
Madrassa education 2-5 years  3 Schooled up to Bachelor level 10 
Madrassa education 5-10 years 4 Master degree 11 
Madrassa/seminary education of more than 
10 years 
5 Those up to professional education 
(Doctors, Lawyers and Engineers)or 
higher education than an MA 
12 
Schooled up to Primary level 6 vocational/education leading to a 
diploma in some 
trade/craft/technical ability 
13 
Schooled up to Middle level 7   
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r) state should decide that in all cases involving Fundamental 
Right under the Constitution the informal decisions can be 
appealed in an expedition manner 
01 02 03 04 88 
s) The membership of a recognized informal dispute resolution 
mechanism should also go through some kind of a state 
approval 
01 02 03 04 88 
 
 
Q72: Rough distance from home to the district courts (in Kilometers): 
Response Code Response Code 
Less than 2 kms 1 Between 2 and 5 kms 2 
Between 6and 10 kms 3 Between 11 and 15 kms 4 
Between 16 and 20 kms 5 Between 21 and 30 kms 6 
Between 31 and 50 kms 7 Over 50 kms 8 
 
Q73: Mode of Transportation routinely used by respondent for everyday transportation   
Response Code Response Code 
Public transport 
(bus/rickshaw/taxi/Tonga)  
1 Private car 2 
Private motor cycle 3 Car/motor cycle belonging to a friend or 
relative 
4 
Rented car/motorcycle 5 Bicycle 6 
Pedestrian 7 Other (Specify____________________) 77 
 
10. DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
D10.1:  Gender of respondents:  
 
Male       1     Female     2     
 
D10.2: Age group of respondent 
Response Code Response Code 
18-24 years 1 51-60 years 4 
25-39 years 2 over 60 years 5 
40-50 years 3   
 
D10.3: Education level of respondent 
Response Code Response Code 
Not schooled 1 Schooled up to Secondary Certificate 
level (Matriculation)  
8 
Basic schooling plus some vocational 
education 
2 Schooled up to Intermediate level  9 
Madrassa education 2-5 years  3 Schooled up to Bachelor level 10 
Madrassa education 6-10 years 4 Master degree 11 
Madrassa/seminary education of more than 
10 years 
5 Those up to professional education 
(Doctors, Lawyers and Engineers)or 
higher education than an MA 
12 
Schooled up to Primary level 6 vocational/education leading to a 
diploma in some 
trade/craft/technical ability 
13 
Schooled up to Middle level 7   
 
D10.4: Education level of head of the household 
Response Code Response Code 
Not schooled 1 Schooled up to Secondary Certificate 
level (Matriculation)  
8 
Basic schooling plus some vocational 
education 
2 Schooled up to Intermediate level  9 
Madrassa education 2-5 years  3 Schooled up to Bachelor level 10 
Madrassa education 5-10 years 4 Master degree 11 
Madrassa/seminary education of more than 
10 years 
5 Those up to professional education 
(Doctors, Lawyers and Engineers)or 
higher education than an MA 
12 
Schooled up to Primary level 6 vocational/education leading to a 
diploma in some 
trade/craft/technical ability 
13 
Schooled up to Middle level 7   
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D10.5: Monthly income of respondent’s family in PKR? If respondent refuses to disclose the income of 
the household, ask for overall expenses and circle the appropriate code. 
 
Response Code Response Code 
Rs 6000 - 10000 1 Rs 20001 – Rs 25000 4 
Rs 10001 – Rs 15000 2 More than Rs 25000 5 
Rs 15001 – Rs 20000 3 Don’t want to answer 6 
 
D10.6: Occupation of respondent 
Response Code Response Code 
Agricultural labourer 1 Provincial civil servant 18 
Agriculture tenant 2 Shop owner 19 
Crafts man 3 Local or district government 
employee 
20 
Employee in a private firm/business 4 Government employee  21 
Chowkidar, security guard, security company 
employ (watchman) 
5 Skilled labourer 22 
Retired 6 Private company employee 23 
Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) owner 7 Cottage industry owner 24 
Industrial employee 8 Professional (doctor, engineer, 
lawyer, computer scientist etc 
25 
Civil servant 9 Small business owner 26 
Clerical employee 10 Teacher 27 
Farm owner 11 Technician 28 
Home-based worker 12 Unskilled labourer 29 
Lady health worker/Visitor (LHW/V) 13 Student 60 
Large business owner 14 House Wife 31 
White colour employee 15 Unemployed 32 
Management/supervisor  16 Independently wealthy 33 
Military, police, security personnel 17 Other (specify) 77 
 
D10.7: Marital status of respondent  
Response Code Response Code 
Married 1 Single 4 
Widowed 2 Separated 5 
Divorced 3 No response 99 
 
 
D10.8: How many people live in your household/compound? 
  
Number of People: 
 
D10.9: Religion of respondent 
Response Code Response Code 
Christian  1 Hindu 4 
Sikh 2 Other (specify) 77 
Muslim 3 No response 99 
 
 
(Ask if answer is 3 in D10.9) 
 
Response Code Response Code 
Shiite 1 Sunni 3 
Wahabi/Ahl-e-Hadees 2 No response 99 
 
D10.10  What is your caste (Quom)? 
Caste Code Caste Code 
Arrain 1 Mughal 9 
Jat 2 Pathan 10 
Rajput 3 Baloch 11 
Gujjar 4 Kashmiri 12 
Sheikh 5 Other (Specify)_______________ 77 
Awaan 6 No Response 99 
Malik 7 
Syed 8 
D10.11  What is your ethnicity? 
Ethnicity Code Ethnicity Code 
Punjabi 1 Seraiki 6 
Urdu Speaking 2 Kashmiri 7 
Sindhi 3 Behari 8 
Balochi 4 Other (Specify)_______________ 77 
Pathan 5 No Response 99 
D10.12: Would you be willing to participate in another survey later in this year? 
Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know  
  
88
99No response
243 244
A
n
n
ex
 II
: Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
A
n
n
ex
 II
: Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
D10.5: Monthly income of respondent’s family in PKR? If respondent refuses to disclose the income of 
the household, ask for overall expenses and circle the appropriate code. 
 
Response Code Response Code 
Rs 6000 - 10000 1 Rs 20001 – Rs 25000 4 
Rs 10001 – Rs 15000 2 More than Rs 25000 5 
Rs 15001 – Rs 20000 3 Don’t want to answer 6 
 
D10.6: Occupation of respondent 
Response Code Response Code 
Agricultural labourer 1 Provincial civil servant 18 
Agriculture tenant 2 Shop owner 19 
Crafts man 3 Local or district government 
employee 
20 
Employee in a private firm/business 4 Government employee  21 
Chowkidar, security guard, security company 
employ (watchman) 
5 Skilled labourer 22 
Retired 6 Private company employee 23 
Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) owner 7 Cottage industry owner 24 
Industrial employee 8 Professional (doctor, engineer, 
lawyer, computer scientist etc 
25 
Civil servant 9 Small business owner 26 
Clerical employee 10 Teacher 27 
Farm owner 11 Technician 28 
Home-based worker 12 Unskilled labourer 29 
Lady health worker/Visitor (LHW/V) 13 Student 60 
Large business owner 14 House Wife 31 
White colour employee 15 Unemployed 32 
Management/supervisor  16 Independently wealthy 33 
Military, police, security personnel 17 Other (specify) 77 
 
D10.7: Marital status of respondent  
Response Code Response Code 
Married 1 Single 4 
Widowed 2 Separated 5 
Divorced 3 No response 99 
 
 
D10.8: How many people live in your household/compound? 
  
Number of People: 
 
D10.9: Religion of respondent 
Response Code Response Code 
Christian  1 Hindu 4 
Sikh 2 Other (specify) 77 
Muslim 3 No response 99 
 
 
(Ask if answer is 3 in D10.9) 
 
Response Code Response Code 
Shiite 1 Sunni 3 
Wahabi/Ahl-e-Hadees 2 No response 99 
 
D10.10  What is your caste (Quom)? 
Caste Code Caste Code 
Arrain 1 Mughal 9 
Jat 2 Pathan 10 
Rajput 3 Baloch 11 
Gujjar 4 Kashmiri 12 
Sheikh 5 Other (Specify)_______________ 77 
Awaan 6 No Response 99 
Malik 7 
Syed 8 
D10.11  What is your ethnicity? 
Ethnicity Code Ethnicity Code 
Punjabi 1 Seraiki 6 
Urdu Speaking 2 Kashmiri 7 
Sindhi 3 Behari 8 
Balochi 4 Other (Specify)_______________ 77 
Pathan 5 No Response 99 
D10.12: Would you be willing to participate in another survey later in this year? 
Response Code 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Don’t know  
  
88
99No response
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Read Closing Statement  
 
To the Respondent: "Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have any 
questions?  In the next few days my supervisor may contact you 
to evaluate the quality of my work and answer any other 
questions you may have about the interview. To help him do 
that, could I have your telephone number?" 
 
Respondent Information:  Name:  
 
Address: 
 
Tel No: 
 
NIC Number 
 
Interviewer Certification: “I certify that I have completed this interview according to the 
instructions provided to me. 
 
Name:  
Signed:
Date: 
 
 
To be completed by the Supervisor: 
Interview subject to Back-check/Control  
 
1.  Yes  
2.  No  
 
Method of Back-check/Control   
 
1.  Direct supervision during interview 
2.  Back-check in person by supervisor 
3.  Back-check by telephone by supervisor or the central office  
4.  Not subject to back-check  
 
Initial Questions (for Interviewer only)
 
Name of surveyor Date of interview 
Province District Tehsil 
[1] Rural.   [2] Urban 
Gender of the respondents The age group 25-50 made up the larger group of 
the interviewees, because this age group is the 
The survey was planned to incorporate men and most involved in informal dispute resolution 
women's perceptions on different aspects of proceedings. 
dispute resolution mechanisms affecting the life of Education
the people of Pakistan. The following statistics 
show that the survey interviews of 2700 The following table shows statistics for the 
respondents was comprised of 50 per cent men educational level of the respondents. The survey 
and 50 per cent women. results show that 33.6 per cent of the respondents 
had not attended school; 13.2 per cent had been 
Age group schooled up to primary level; 8.6 per cent had 
been schooled up to middle level; 12.6 per cent 
The survey aimed to interview respondents over had been schooled up to Secondary Certificate 
the age of 18 years. The survey data shows that level; and 4.8 per cent (combined age 2-10 years) 
respondents interviewed were predominantly in of the respondents had received religious 
the middle age groups (aged 25-50 years), instead education. Other categories are explained in the 
of in the younger or older age groups. table below. 
Nevertheless, considering the population pyramid, If we analyse the entire data set, we can conclude 
the middle age is not over-represented nor the that around 60 per cent of the sample is literate, 
older cohorts under-represented as shown by the including the 'religious education only' category. 
1table below. This is equal to the literacy rate for Pakistan.
Gender  Frequency  %  
Male 1350  50  
Female  1350  50  
Total  2700  100  
ANNEX - III
TARGET DEMOGRAPHICS
Age group %  
18-24 years 16.6  
25-39 years 46.8  
40-50 years 24.9  
51-60 years 5.7  
60 and above 4
Not Answered  2  
Total  100  
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Read Closing Statement  
 
To the Respondent: "Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have any 
questions?  In the next few days my supervisor may contact you 
to evaluate the quality of my work and answer any other 
questions you may have about the interview. To help him do 
that, could I have your telephone number?" 
 
Respondent Information:  Name:  
 
Address: 
 
Tel No: 
 
NIC Number 
 
Interviewer Certification: “I certify that I have completed this interview according to the 
instructions provided to me. 
 
Name:  
Signed:
Date: 
 
 
To be completed by the Supervisor: 
Interview subject to Back-check/Control  
 
1.  Yes  
2.  No  
 
Method of Back-check/Control   
 
1.  Direct supervision during interview 
2.  Back-check in person by supervisor 
3.  Back-check by telephone by supervisor or the central office  
4.  Not subject to back-check  
 
Initial Questions (for Interviewer only)
 
Name of surveyor Date of interview 
Province District Tehsil 
[1] Rural.   [2] Urban 
Gender of the respondents The age group 25-50 made up the larger group of 
the interviewees, because this age group is the 
The survey was planned to incorporate men and most involved in informal dispute resolution 
women's perceptions on different aspects of proceedings. 
dispute resolution mechanisms affecting the life of Education
the people of Pakistan. The following statistics 
show that the survey interviews of 2700 The following table shows statistics for the 
respondents was comprised of 50 per cent men educational level of the respondents. The survey 
and 50 per cent women. results show that 33.6 per cent of the respondents 
had not attended school; 13.2 per cent had been 
Age group schooled up to primary level; 8.6 per cent had 
been schooled up to middle level; 12.6 per cent 
The survey aimed to interview respondents over had been schooled up to Secondary Certificate 
the age of 18 years. The survey data shows that level; and 4.8 per cent (combined age 2-10 years) 
respondents interviewed were predominantly in of the respondents had received religious 
the middle age groups (aged 25-50 years), instead education. Other categories are explained in the 
of in the younger or older age groups. table below. 
Nevertheless, considering the population pyramid, If we analyse the entire data set, we can conclude 
the middle age is not over-represented nor the that around 60 per cent of the sample is literate, 
older cohorts under-represented as shown by the including the 'religious education only' category. 
1table below. This is equal to the literacy rate for Pakistan.
Gender  Frequency  %  
Male 1350  50  
Female  1350  50  
Total  2700  100  
ANNEX - III
TARGET DEMOGRAPHICS
Age group %  
18-24 years 16.6  
25-39 years 46.8  
40-50 years 24.9  
51-60 years 5.7  
60 and above 4
Not Answered  2  
Total  100  
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Monthly income of the family The second highest occupation on the list is 
'agricultural labourer', which was selected by 12.3 
Statistics are self-explanatory and convey that per cent of respondents. This is followed by skilled 
nearly a third of families in our survey lives on less labourer, shop owner, unskilled labourer etc.    
than 3$ per day; an nearly a quarter of families 
lives on less than 5$ a day. Just 4.6 per cent of respondents identified 
themselves as 'unemployed' ? this is a striking 
Our survey data reveals that the majority in revelation, which is encouraging yet also confusing. 
Pakistan make up the poor segment of society, 
while the lower middle class represents only 9.8 Marital status
per cent of the population. 
Early marriages are common in Pakistan's rural areas 
Occupation ? which are mainly tribal in nature. Not surprisingly, 
77 per cent of the population sampled was married. 
In the table (on the next page) the occupation of The practice of divorce is very rare and considered a 
the male and female respondents shows that 29.6 sin in Pakistani society (borne out by only 0.4 per 
per cent identified themselves as housewives (out cent of respondents who identified themselves in 
of 50 per cent female respondents). The remaining this category). The number of widows is also very 
20.4 per cent of the women sampled worked as low, and because men readily remarry, the number 
teachers, health workers, labourers and of widowers in this group is very small compared 
shopkeepers.  with the number of widows.  
Education of the head of the family there are hardly any female heads of families in 
Pakhtun society overall). In general, the survey has 
If the respondent was not the head of the family sampled slightly more literate people than the 
himself/herself, then they were asked about the general population for the given age group. 
education level of the head of the family. (Note: 
Education of respondent %  
Not schooled 33.6  
Basic schooling plus some vocational education 1.6  
Madrassa education 2-5 years 2.9  
Madrassa education 6-10 years 1.9  
Madrassa/seminary education of more than 10 years 1.5  
Schooled up to Primary level 13.2  
Schooled up to Middle level 8.6  
Schooled up to Secondary Certificate level (Matriculation)  12.6  
Schooled up to Intermediate level 11.8  
Schooled up to Bachelor level 7.9  
Master degree 4.1  
Highly educated for a profession (e.g. doctors, lawyers and engineers) 
or above MA-level 
0.4  
Vocational education leading to a diploma in a trade/craft/technical 
ability 
0.1  
Total  100  
Education of the head of the family %  
Not schooled 35  
Basic schooling plus some vocational education 1.4  
Madrassa education 2-5 years 2.5  
Madrassa education 6-10 years 2.2  
Madrassa/seminary education of more than 10 years 1.9  
Schooled up to Primary level 14.2  
Schooled up to Middle level 9.4  
Schooled up to Secondary Certificate level (Matriculation) 11.6  
Schooled up to Intermediate level 10.3  
Schooled up to Bachelor level 6.6  
Master degree 3.7  
Highly educated for a profession (e.g. doctors, lawyers and engineers) or above 
MA-level 
1  
Vocational education leading to a diploma in a trade/craft/technical ability  0.1  
Total  100  
Income %  
Rs 6000 – 10000 31  
Rs 10001 – Rs 15000 23.9  
Rs 15001 – Rs 20000 16.4  
Rs 20001 – Rs 25000 8  
More than Rs 25000 9.8  
Don’t want to answer 10.9  
Total  100  
Marital status %  
Married 77  
Widowed 3.6  
Divorced 0.4  
Single 16.3  
Separated 0.3  
No response 2.4  
Total  100  
1. Federal Ministry of Education, 2013 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_Pakistan accessed 29 October 2014 248247
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Monthly income of the family The second highest occupation on the list is 
'agricultural labourer', which was selected by 12.3 
Statistics are self-explanatory and convey that per cent of respondents. This is followed by skilled 
nearly a third of families in our survey lives on less labourer, shop owner, unskilled labourer etc.    
than 3$ per day; an nearly a quarter of families 
lives on less than 5$ a day. Just 4.6 per cent of respondents identified 
themselves as 'unemployed' ? this is a striking 
Our survey data reveals that the majority in revelation, which is encouraging yet also confusing. 
Pakistan make up the poor segment of society, 
while the lower middle class represents only 9.8 Marital status
per cent of the population. 
Early marriages are common in Pakistan's rural areas 
Occupation ? which are mainly tribal in nature. Not surprisingly, 
77 per cent of the population sampled was married. 
In the table (on the next page) the occupation of The practice of divorce is very rare and considered a 
the male and female respondents shows that 29.6 sin in Pakistani society (borne out by only 0.4 per 
per cent identified themselves as housewives (out cent of respondents who identified themselves in 
of 50 per cent female respondents). The remaining this category). The number of widows is also very 
20.4 per cent of the women sampled worked as low, and because men readily remarry, the number 
teachers, health workers, labourers and of widowers in this group is very small compared 
shopkeepers.  with the number of widows.  
Education of the head of the family there are hardly any female heads of families in 
Pakhtun society overall). In general, the survey has 
If the respondent was not the head of the family sampled slightly more literate people than the 
himself/herself, then they were asked about the general population for the given age group. 
education level of the head of the family. (Note: 
Education of respondent %  
Not schooled 33.6  
Basic schooling plus some vocational education 1.6  
Madrassa education 2-5 years 2.9  
Madrassa education 6-10 years 1.9  
Madrassa/seminary education of more than 10 years 1.5  
Schooled up to Primary level 13.2  
Schooled up to Middle level 8.6  
Schooled up to Secondary Certificate level (Matriculation)  12.6  
Schooled up to Intermediate level 11.8  
Schooled up to Bachelor level 7.9  
Master degree 4.1  
Highly educated for a profession (e.g. doctors, lawyers and engineers) 
or above MA-level 
0.4  
Vocational education leading to a diploma in a trade/craft/technical 
ability 
0.1  
Total  100  
Education of the head of the family %  
Not schooled 35  
Basic schooling plus some vocational education 1.4  
Madrassa education 2-5 years 2.5  
Madrassa education 6-10 years 2.2  
Madrassa/seminary education of more than 10 years 1.9  
Schooled up to Primary level 14.2  
Schooled up to Middle level 9.4  
Schooled up to Secondary Certificate level (Matriculation) 11.6  
Schooled up to Intermediate level 10.3  
Schooled up to Bachelor level 6.6  
Master degree 3.7  
Highly educated for a profession (e.g. doctors, lawyers and engineers) or above 
MA-level 
1  
Vocational education leading to a diploma in a trade/craft/technical ability  0.1  
Total  100  
Income %  
Rs 6000 – 10000 31  
Rs 10001 – Rs 15000 23.9  
Rs 15001 – Rs 20000 16.4  
Rs 20001 – Rs 25000 8  
More than Rs 25000 9.8  
Don’t want to answer 10.9  
Total  100  
Marital status %  
Married 77  
Widowed 3.6  
Divorced 0.4  
Single 16.3  
Separated 0.3  
No response 2.4  
Total  100  
1. Federal Ministry of Education, 2013 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_Pakistan accessed 29 October 2014 248247
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Generally, non-Muslims make up less than 3 per 
cent of the population of Pakistan. The survey was 
successful in interviewing non-Muslims in their 
proportionate numbers. Hindu respondents make 
up 1.9 per cent; Christians 1.5 per cent; and Sikh 
0.5 per cent. Muslims make up the overwhelming 
majority of respondents (94.7 per cent); 1.4 per 
cent did not want to disclose their religious 
identity. 
Shiite-Sunni proportion 
Respondents who identified themselves as Muslim 
were subsequently asked which sect they belonged 
to. The results show that 83.7 per cent of these 
Muslim respondents are Sunni, and 8.6 per cent 
are Shia. A considerable number (7.7 per cent) did 
not want to disclose their sectarian affiliations. 
Religion
Occupation Percent  
Agricultural labourer 12.3  
Agricultural tenant 1.4  
Craftsman/skilled labourer 7.7  
Employee in a private firm/business 1.9  
Chowkidar, security guard, security company employee (watchman)  0.7  
Retired 1.4  
Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) owner 2.9  
Industrial employee 0.2  
Civil servant 0.7  
Clerical employee 0.8  
Farm owner 0.5  
Home-based worker 0.9  
Lady health worker/visitor (LHW/V) 0.6  
White-collar worker 0.2  
Management/supervisor 0.2  
Military, police, security personnel 0.4  
Provincial civil servant 1  
Shop owner 6.5  
Local or district government employee 0.3  
Government employee 4.3  
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Total  100  
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Sect Frequency  %  
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Sunni 1982  83.7  
No response 198  7.7  
Total 2558  100  
250249
A
n
n
ex
 II
I: 
Ta
rg
et
 D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
s
A
n
n
ex
 II
I: 
Ta
rg
et
 D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
s
Generally, non-Muslims make up less than 3 per 
cent of the population of Pakistan. The survey was 
successful in interviewing non-Muslims in their 
proportionate numbers. Hindu respondents make 
up 1.9 per cent; Christians 1.5 per cent; and Sikh 
0.5 per cent. Muslims make up the overwhelming 
majority of respondents (94.7 per cent); 1.4 per 
cent did not want to disclose their religious 
identity. 
Shiite-Sunni proportion 
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were subsequently asked which sect they belonged 
to. The results show that 83.7 per cent of these 
Muslim respondents are Sunni, and 8.6 per cent 
are Shia. A considerable number (7.7 per cent) did 
not want to disclose their sectarian affiliations. 
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